ERLINDA F. SANTOS,
Petitioner, -
versus - MA.
CAREST A. RASALAN, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 155749
Present: PUNO,
CJ.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, * AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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For
our Resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
assailing the Decision[2]
dated June 29, 2001 and Resolution dated October 17, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59241 affirming the Decision dated March 24, 2000 of
the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0679.
Erlinda F. Santos, petitioner, and
Ma. Carest A. Rasalan, respondent, are both employed as government nurses at
the Tondo Medical Center, Balut, Tondo, Manila. On
On
Despite those words of caution of
Ilasin, respondent continued telling stories about me and then continued by
maliciously saying, “Di ba Baby, only the mother can tell who is
the father of her child?”
That because of these malicious
remarks, Ilasin asked the respondent to stop saying innuendoes against me, and
she said, “Please lang, Lyn, tumigil ka
na.”
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that the respondent be held GUILTY as charged, with a
mitigating penalty of SUSPENSION FROM THE SERVICE for SEVEN (7) MONTHS WITHOUT
PAY.
It is hereby ordered that the Chief of Tondo
Medical Center should carry out the implementation of the suspension from the
service of respondent Erlinda F. Santos, Staff Nurse of the said hospital,
informing this Office of the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order[5]
dated May 10, 2000.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. On
Forthwith, petitioner filed the
instant petition alleging that: (1) the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over respondent’s administrative complaint considering that the acts complained
of are not work-related and are purely personal between the parties; and (2)
the facts do not establish the charge against her.
For her part, respondent prays that
the petition be denied for lack of merit.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act
on respondent’s administrative complaint is anchored on Section 13(1), Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section
13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1)
Investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989,[7] likewise provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative
Complaints. – The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are
contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course
of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed
from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are
in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are
otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. (Underscoring supplied)
The Office of the Ombudsman and the
Court of Appeals found that the acts committed by petitioner as a public
employee are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular, immoral and devoid of
justification, thus falling within the purview of the above-quoted constitutional
and statutory provisions. We find no cogent reason to deviate from their
findings.
Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. No.
6770, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or
employee during his/her tenure of
office, thus:
SEC. 16. Applicability. - The provisions of this
Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that
have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure of office.
Moreover, in Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio,[8] we
held that even if the act or omission complained of is not service-connected,
still it falls within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, thus:
The law does not qualify the nature of the
illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance
of official duty. Since the law does
not distinguish, neither should we.
Having settled the issue of jurisdiction, we shall
now determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it sustained the findings
of the Ombudsman and concluded that petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Ombudsman also found that:
Rightly so, when the complainant got back to
work at the hospital after her maternity leave, she was ashamed and offended to
know that the malicious and slanderous words alluded to her by the respondent
were like wild fire that reverberated through the walls of the hospital and
seeped through and lingered in every ear of the employee.
For who could not feel the shame of these
slanderous remarks?
“Erlinda F. Santos: Di ba Baby, only the mother can tell who is the father of her child.”
The foregoing words imply that the father of
the newborn baby is other than complainant’s husband. But, of course, the respondent very well knew
the husband of the complainant, who is the brother of her boyfriend. To ask who the father of the child of the
complainant is to impute that the father of the child is other than Ramon
Rasalan, the husband of the complainant. No other meaning could be inferred from the
foregoing words.
The defamatory imputation of unchastity to
the complainant is slanderous as it was maliciously intended to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt. x x x.[9]
We shall not disturb the above
findings. Under Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive as long as these are
supported by substantial evidence,[10] as in this case.
However,
under the same set of facts, we do not agree that petitioner’s offense can be
categorized as “grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.” Her offense merely
constitutes simple misconduct.
In
Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma,[11]
we held that misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved
by substantial evidence.[12]
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. A person charged with grave misconduct may
be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of
the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct necessarily includes the
lesser offense of simple misconduct.[13]
In
the present case, there is no substantial evidence to show that any of those additional elements exist to qualify petitioner’s
misconduct as grave. Thus, to our mind,
the penalty of suspension for seven (7) months without pay is too harsh.
Section 52, B-2, Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases In the Civil Service[14]
provides that the offense of simple misconduct is classified as less grave,
punishable as follows:
2. Simple
Misconduct
1st
Offense – Suspension
1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.
2nd Offense – Dismissal
Under the circumstances obtaining in
this case, we hold that the penalty of suspension of two (2) months without pay
is in order.
One
final word. The law does not tolerate
misconduct by a civil servant.
Petitioner’s acts in question undoubtedly violate the norm of decency
and diminish or tend to diminish the people’s respect for those in the
government service. When an officer or
employee is disciplined, the object is the improvement of the public service
and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.[15]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59241 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioner is found
guilty of simple misconduct and is suspended from the service for two (2)
months without pay.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice Chairperson |
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(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* On leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Penned by Associate Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz.
[3] Annex “H” of the petition, Rollo, pp. 107-109.
[4] See Decision of the Court of Appeals, id., pp. 61-82.
[5] Annex “L” of the petition, id., pp. 119-121.
[6] See Resolution of the Court of Appeals, id., pp. 83-84.
[7] Its full title reads, “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
[8] G.R. Nos. 118813-14,
[9] Annex “K” of the petition, Rollo, pp. 112-121.
[10] Almanzor
v. Felix, G.R. No. 144935,
[11] G.R. No. 154521,
[12] Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, id., citing Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486; 301 SCRA 560 (1999); Landrito v. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA 564 (1993).
[13] Civil
Service Commission v. Ledesma, id.
[14] Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999 of the Civil Service Commission.
[15] Civil Service Commission v. Cortez,
G.R. No. 155732, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 593, citing Bautista v. Negado,
108 Phil. 283, 289 (1960).