THIRD
DIVISION
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DIGITAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., P e t i t i o n e r, - versus
- PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN represented by RAMON A.
CRISOSTOMO, Pangasinan Provincial Treasurer, R e s p o n d e n t. |
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G. R. No.
152534 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.* Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated 14 June 2001, and the Resolution[2]
dated 15 February 2002, both rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 in Civil Case No.
18037, with the latter ruling in favor of respondent Province of Pangasinan.
The
present petition stemmed from a Complaint[3]
for Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money
and Damages instituted by respondent
Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, took effect
on
SECTION 137. Franchise Tax. –
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on business
enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year
based on the income receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 232 likewise authorizes
the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by the local government of
a province, city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area wherein
the land, building, machinery and other improvement not thereinafter
specifically exempted. The particular provision reads:
SECTION 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Arena may levy an
annual ad valorem tax on real property such
as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specially
exempted. (Emphasis supplied.)
On
SECTION 6. The
grantee shall pay to the
Pursuant to the mandate of Sections 137 and
232 of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent
Section 4. Imposition
of Real Property Tax. – There shall be levied an annual AD VALOREM tax on
real property such as land, building, machinery, and other
improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted, situated or located within the territorial jurisdiction
of Pangasinan at the rate of one percent (1%) of the assessed value of said
real property. (Emphasis supplied.)[6]
On
Thereafter,
petitioner DIGITEL was granted by Republic Act No. 7678,[7]
a legislative franchise authorizing the grantee to install, operate and
maintain telecommunications systems, this time, throughout the
SECTION 5. Tax Provisions. – The grantee shall be liable
to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal property exclusive
of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may
be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee shall pay to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue each year, within thirty (30) days after the
audit and approval of the accounts, franchise tax as may be
prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other
telecommunications business transacted under this franchise by the grantee:
Provided, that the grantee shall continue to be liable for income taxes
payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended or
repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto.
The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in
accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be
subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. [Emphasis supplied.]
Later,
respondent
[C]ommunicate its conformity to Ordinance No. 40 to the Sanggunian thru the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Secretary and to pay the necessary and overdue
franchise taxes to the Provincial Treasurer of Pangasinan
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof otherwise its franchise shall be
declared in operative (sic) and its operations terminated;”
In
the interregnum, on
SECTION 23. Equality of Treatment in the
Telecommunications Industry. – Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall
ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The
provincial franchise and real property taxes remained unpaid despite the
foregoing measures instituted. Consequently,
in a letter[9]
dated
‘No persons shall establish and / or operate a public
utility business enterprises (sic) within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Province of Pangasinan whether in one municipality or group of municipalities,
except by virtue of a franchise granted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan.’
On
17 November 1998, petitioner DIGITEL took exception to respondent Province of Pangasinan’s claim on the ground that prior to the approval
of its legislative franchise, its operation of a telecommunications system was
done under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previously executed
with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Such agreement
was purportedly the result of a public bidding wherein petitioner DIGITEL was
“awarded the right to manage the operation, maintenance and development of
government telecommunications facilities under its Regional Telecommunications
Development Project Phases A and B x x x and National Telephone Program Phase I
Tranche 1 x x x covering Regions I to V.”[11]
It clarified that since “the facilities in the Province of Pangasinan are just
part of the government owned facilities awarded to DIGITEL,” not only did the
DOTC retain ownership of said facilities, the latter likewise “provided for the
budget for (the) expenses under its allocation from the government;” hence,
“all revenues generated from the operation of the facilities inured to the
DOTC;” and all the fees received by petitioner DIGITEL were purely for services
rendered.
Further,
it argued that under its legislative franchise, the payment of a franchise tax
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) would be “in lieu of all taxes”
on said franchise or the earnings therefrom.
Unconvinced,
on 8 December 1998, respondent Province of Pangasinan countered[12]
the provisions of its franchise were subject not only to the provisions of the
Constitution, but to “applicable laws, rules and regulations” as
well; that among the applicable laws being referred to were Sec. 137 of
the Local Government Code, which authorizes it to “impose a tax on business
enjoying a franchise x x x;” and Sec. 6 of Provincial Ordinance No. 4, which
similarly imposes a tax on a business enjoying a franchise.
On
1. to x x x open its books, records and
other pertinent documents so that the provincial government can make the proper
assessment of the Taxes due.
2. after
determination of the defendant’s capital investment and subsequent gross
receipts, to pay plaintiff the sum equivalent to 1/20th of one
percent (1%) of the total capital investment for the first year of its
operation and thereafter, fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross
receipts realized during the preceding calendar year for the year 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and up to the present.
3. after
determination of all of defendant’s real properties, to pay the Real Property
Tax due after its proper computation.
4. to pay
legal interest of the amounts from the time it was due until the whole amount
is fully complied with.
5. to pay the
cost of this suit.
On
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant
to open its books, records and other pertinent documents so that the provincial
government can make the proper assessment of the franchise tax and real
property tax due;
2. After the determination
of the defendant’s capital investment and subsequent gross receipts, to pay
plaintiff the sum equivalent to 1/20th of one percent (1%) of the
total capital investment for the first year of its operation (1993), and
thereafter, fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross receipts
realized during the preceding calendar year 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
and up to the present;
3. After determination of
all of defendant’s real properties, to pay Real Property Tax due after its
proper computation, pursuant to Section 4 of the Real Property Tax Ordinance of
1992 of the plaintiff;
4. To pay 1) A surcharge
of twenty-five percent of the amount of the franchise tax due or a fraction
thereof until the delinquent tax shall have been fully paid; 2) To pay an
interest of two percent (2%) per month on the unpaid amount or a fraction
thereof, until the delinquent tax shall have been fully paid, but in no case
shall the total interest on the unpaid tax or proportion thereof exceed 36 months;
5. To pay the cost of this
suit.
In
ruling against the claimed exemption, the court a quo held that petitioner DIGITEL’s
legislative franchise does not work to exempt the latter from payment of
provincial franchise and real property taxes. The court a quo reasoned that the provincial and legislative franchises are
separate and distinct from each other; and, that prior to the grant of its
legislative franchise, petitioner DIGITEL had already benefited from the use of
it. Moreover, it pointed out that Section 137 of the Local Government Code had
already withdrawn any exemption granted to anyone; as such, the local
government of a province may impose a tax on a business enjoying a franchise.
On the other hand, petitioner DIGITEL maintains that its
legislative franchise being an earlier enactment, by virtue of Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 7925, the ipso facto, immediate and unconditional application
to it of the tax exemption found in the franchises of Globe, Smart and
Bell, i.e., in Section 9 (b) of Republic Act No. 7229, Globe’s
legislative franchise; in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7294, Smart’s legislative franchise; and Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 7294, Bell’s legislative franchise, all basically or similarly
containing the phrase “shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to x x x of all gross receipts of the
business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or
assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise
or earnings thereof.
Stated simply, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925,
in relation to the pertinent provisions of the legislative franchises of Globe,
Smart and Bell, “the
national franchise tax for which petitioner (DIGITEL) is liable to pay shall be
‘in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description levied,
established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or
national, from which the grantee is hereby expressly granted.’
Petitioner
DIGITEL’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated
As the controversy involves pure questions of law,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
was filed directly with this Court, predicated on the following arguments:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
IS A SPECIAL LAW.
II.
THE
III.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE MAY BE RECONCILED WITH
THOSE OF PETITIONER’S LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER’S LEGISLATIVE
FRANCHISE, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7678, IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO NOR COVER FRANCHISES ISSUED BY CONGRESS.
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE TO PAY
FRANCHISE AND REAL PROPERTY TAXES, IT IS NONETHELESS STILL EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT
THEREOF IN VIEW OF ITS REGISTRATION WITH THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS AS A
NON-PIONEER BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 133 (G) OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE.
The plethora of arguments raised can be reduced to
two basic but essential issues, namely: 1) Whether or not petitioner DIGITEL is
entitled to the exemption from the payment of provincial franchise tax in view
of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925,[15]
otherwise known as the “Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines,” in relation to the tax
exemption provisions found in the legislative franchises of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation, Smart
Information Technologies, Incorporated
and Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Incorporated.
Stated otherwise, are the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes”
clauses/provisos found in Republic Act No. 7229, the legislative franchise of
Globe; Republic Act No. 7294, the legislative franchise of Smart; and Republic
Act No. 7692, the legislative franchise of Bell, vis-à-vis Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925, applicable to petitioner DIGITEL such that the latter is
now exempt from the payment of any other taxes except the national franchise
and income taxes?
And, 2) if answered in the negative, whether or not
petitioner DIGITEL’s real properties found within the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt from the payment of real
property taxes by virtue of the phrase “exclusive of this franchise”
found in Section 5 of its legislative franchise, Republic Act No. 7678?
At the outset, worth noting is the fact
that prior to the enactment and effectivity of its legislative franchise, with
only a provincial franchise to speak of, petitioner DIGITEL did not enjoy any
exemption from the payment of franchise and real property taxes. In fact, Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, its
provincial franchise, categorically made it liable for the payment of such
taxes. It was only with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7925 in 1995 and
succeeding legislative franchises containing the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes”
clauses/provisos that petitioner DIGITEL can claim exemption to such tax
liabilities.
The
case at bar is actually not one of first impression. Indeed, as far back as
2001, this Court has had the occasion to rule against the claim for tax
exemption under Republic Act No. 7925. In the case of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. City of Davao,[16]
we already clarified the confusion brought about by the effect of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925 – that the word “exemption” as used in the statute
refer’s or pertain’s merely
to an exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the
NTC and not to the grantee’s tax liability.
The
issue in the PLDT v. City of Davao case was
whether or not, by virtue of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925 (Public
Telecommunications Policy of the Philippines), PLDT is again entitled to an
exemption from the payment of local franchise tax in view of the grant of a tax
exemption to Globe and Smart telecommunications companies. Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 7925
in 1995, the Congress of the
In
denying PLDT’s petition, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, held that in approving Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925, Congress
did not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities; thus, it cannot be considered as having amended
petitioner PLDT’s franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the
imposition of local franchise taxes. The
ponencia went on further to elucidate that:
To begin with, tax exemptions are highly disfavored. x x x
The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. (Citation omitted.)
In
the present case, petitioner justifies its claim of tax exemption by strained
inferences. First, it cites R.A. No. 7925, otherwise known as the Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the
x x x x
Petitioner then claims that Smart and Globe enjoy exemption from the payment of the franchise tax by virtue of their legislative franchises per opinion of the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance. Finally, it argues that because Smart and Globe are exempt from the franchise tax, it follows that it must likewise be exempt from the tax being collected by the City of Davao because the grant of tax exemption to Smart and Globe ipso facto extended the same exemption to it.
The acceptance of petitioner's theory would result in absurd consequences. To illustrate: In its franchise, Globe is required to pay a franchise tax of only one and one-half percentum (1½%) of all gross receipts from its transactions while Smart is required to pay a tax of three percent (3%) on all gross receipts from business transacted. Petitioner's theory would require that, to level the playing field, any ‘advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity’ granted to Globe must be extended to all telecommunications companies, including Smart. If, later, Congress again grants a franchise to another telecommunications company imposing, say, one percent (1%) franchise tax, then all other telecommunications franchises will have to be adjusted to ‘level the playing field’ so to speak. This could not have been the intent of Congress in enacting §23 of Rep. Act 7925. Petitioner's theory will leave the Government with the burden of having to keep track of all granted telecommunications franchises, lest some companies be treated unequally. It is different if Congress enacts a law specifically granting uniform advantages, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity to all telecommunications entities.
The fact is that the term "exemption" in §23 is too general. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. x x x Hence, a consideration of the law itself in its entirety and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress is in order. [Citation omitted.]
x x x x
Art. VIII, entitled Telecommunications Development, where §23 is found, provides for public ownership of telecommunications entities, privatization of existing facilities, and the equality of treatment provision. (Citation omitted.)
x x x x
R.A. No. 7925 is thus a legislative enactment designed to set the national policy on telecommunications and provide the structures to implement it to keep up with the technological advances in the industry and the needs of the public. The thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the entry, pricing, and operations of all public telecommunications entities and thus promote a level playing field in the telecommunications industry (citation omitted). There is nothing in the language of §23 nor in the proceedings of both the House of Representatives and the Senate in enacting R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities, including those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by the LGC.
‘x x x When exemption is
claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist. At the outset, every
presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. It is
only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any
other construction that the proposition can be supported.’ In this case, the word
‘exemption’ in §23 of R.A. No. 7925 could contemplate exemption from certain
regulatory or reporting requirements, bearing in mind the policy of the law
x x x.[21]
From the preceding discourse, there is nothing more
left to be
argued. The issue has been settled. The Court’s pronouncement in the above-discussed case
has been reiterated in a number of cases concerning the import of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925. Therefore, this Court has no recourse but to deny petitioner
DIGITEL’s claim for exemption from payment of provincial franchise tax.
The foregoing pronouncement notwithstanding, in
view of the passage of Republic Act No. 7716,[22]
abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications companies effective
1 January 1996 and in its place is imposed a 10 percent Value-Added-Tax (VAT),[23] the
“in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause/provision in the legislative franchises of Globe,
Smart and Bell, among others, has now become functus
officio, made inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Therefore,
taking into consideration the above, from
As
to the issue relating to the claim of payment of real property taxes, of
particular import is Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7678, the legislative
franchise of petitioner DIGITEL. Sec. 5
of said law again states that:
SECTION
5. Tax Provisions. – The grantee shall be
liable to pay the same taxes on its
real estate, buildings, and personal property exclusive of this
franchise as other persons or corporations
are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Owing
to the phrase “exclusive of this franchise,” petitioner DIGITEL stands
firm in its position that it is equally exempt from the payment of real
property tax. It maintains that said
phrase found in Section 5 above-quoted qualifies or delimits the scope of its
liability respecting real property tax –that real property tax should only be
imposed on its assets that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the
conduct of its business pursuant to its franchise.
According
to respondent Province of Pangasinan, however, “the phrase ‘exclusive (of this)
franchise’ in the legislative franchise of Petitioner Digitel did not
specifically or categorically express that such franchise grant intended to
provide privilege to the extent of impliedly repealing Republic Act No. 7160.”
Thus, the question is, whether or not
petitioner DIGITEL’s real properties located within the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt from real property taxes by
virtue of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7678.
We
rule in the affirmative. However, it is with the caveat that such exemption solely applies to those real properties actually,
directly and exclusively used by the grantee in its franchise.
The present issue actually boils down to a
dispute between the inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated
authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987 Constitution. In the
afore-quoted case of PLDT v. City of
Davao, we already sustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions over
and above the power of the local government’s delegated taxing authority
notwithstanding the source of such power. And fairly recently, in the case of The City Government of Quezon City v.
Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.,[24]
we again had the opportunity to echo the ponencia
of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza that:
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. [Emphasis supplied.]
Succinctly
put, had the Congress of the
The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was
a later piece of legislation can be taken to mean that Congress, knowing fully
well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn exemptions from real
property taxes, chose to restore such immunity even to a limited degree. Accordingly:
The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and
real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC's
delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee's x x x properties that are
actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.[26]
In view of the unequivocal intent of Congress to
exempt from real property tax those real properties actually, directly and
exclusively used by petitioner DIGITEL in the pursuit of its franchise,
respondent Province of Pangasinan can only levy real
property tax on the remaining real properties of the grantee located within its
territorial jurisdiction not part of the above-stated classification. Said exemption, however, merely applies from
the time of the effectivity of petitioner DIGITEL’s legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.
In fine, petitioner DIGITEL is found accountable to
respondent Province of Pangasinan for the following
tax liabilities: 1) as to provincial franchise tax, from 13 November 1992 until
actually paid; and 2) as to real property tax, for the period starting from 13
November 1992 until 28 December 1992, it shall be imposed only on the lands and
buildings of petitioner DIGITEL located within the subject jurisdiction; for
the period commencing from 29 December 1992 until 16 February 1994, in addition
to the lands and buildings aforementioned, it shall similarly be imposed on
machineries and other improvements;[27]
and, by virtue of the National Franchise of petitioner DIGITEL or Republic Act
No. 7678, in accordance with the Court’s ruling in the abovementioned Bayantel case, from the date of effectivity on 17 February 1994 until the present, it shall
be imposed only on real properties NOT
actually, directly and exclusively used in the franchise of petitioner DIGITEL.
In addition to the foregoing summary, pertinent
provisions of law respecting interests, penalties and surcharges shall also be
made to apply to herein subject tax liabilities.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 14 June 2001,
and the Resolution dated 15 February 2002, both rendered by the RTC of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 in Civil Case No. 18037, are hereby AFFIRMED in
so far as it finds petitioner DIGITEL liable for the payment of provincial
franchise and real property taxes. However, the amount of taxes owing to
respondent
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[2] Annex “B” of the Petition; id. at 67-71.
[3] Annex “C” of the Petition; id. pp. 72-77.
[4] In relation to Section 234 of the Local Government Code, which provides that:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
x x x x.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
[5] Exemptions granted by any law or other special law.
[6] The expansion of petitioner DIGITEL’s tax liability, vis-à-vis its real properties, was particularly sanctioned by
Section 5 (f) of the preceding ordinance, viz:
Section 5. Exemptions from real property tax. – The
following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
x x x x
(f) Except
as provided in this Section, any exemption from payment
of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical including
all government-owned or controlled corporations are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
Ordinance, and therefore subject to real
property tax. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7] Enacted by the Congress of the
[8] Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 7678.
[9] Annex “F” of the Complaint; records, p. 52.
[10] The phrase “by the Congress of the
[11] Id at 55.
[12] Records, pp. 53-54.
[13] Annex “C” of the Petition; id. at 72-77.
[14] Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 56-66.
[15] Entitled “AN ACT TO PROMOTE AND GOVERN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION services.”
[16] 415 Phil. 764 (2001).
[17] Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation.
[18] Smart Information Technologies, Incorporated.
[19] Republic Act No. 7229 (Globe) and No. 7294 (Smart).
[20] This Court’s Resolution in G.R. No.
143867,
[21] Supra note 16 at 775-779.
[22] An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System, widening its tax base and enhancing its administration, and for these purposes amending and repealing the relevant provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other purposes.
[23] Imposed on telecommunications companies under Sec. 108 of the Tax Code.
[24] G.R. No. 162015,
[25] Id at 185.
[26] Id at 186.
[27] Pursuant to “The Real Property Tax
Ordinance” of respondent