Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
VALENTIN
P. FRAGINAL, G.R. NO. 150207
TOMAS
P. FRAGINAL and
ANGELINA
FRAGINAL-QUINO,
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
THE
HEIRS OF TORIBIA
BELMONTE
PARAÑAL,
represented
by PEDRO PARAÑAL,
FELISA
PARAÑAL, ABRAHAM
PARAÑAL,
IRENEA ACABADO
and
JOSEFA ESTOY, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 23, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 24,
2001 and September 3, 2001 Resolutions[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64174.[2]
The material facts follow.
The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal
namely: Felisa Parañal, Abraham Parañal, Pedro Parañal, Irenea Acabado and
Josefa Estoy (Heirs of Toribia Parañal), filed with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Camarines Sur, a Complaint
for Termination of Tenancy Relationship, Ejectment, and Collection of Arrear
Rentals and Damages,[3]
docketed as PARAD Case No. R-0503-306-‘98, against Valentin Fraginal, Tomas P. Fraginal and Angelina
Fraginal-Quino (Fraginal, et al.).
Fraginal, et al. filed an
Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the PARAD on the ground that they are
not tenants of the Heirs of Toribia Parañal, for the land they are tilling is a
1.1408-hectare public agricultural land within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[4]
The PARAD issued a Decision on
x x x x
Our perusal of [the] records shows that the defendants so-called documentary evidence as proof that the landholding cultivated by them is classified as public land contrary to the claims of herein plaintiffs is a mere scrap of paper. First, although it states that a certain area situated at Pili, Camarines Sur is declared as alienable and disposable for cropland and other purposes, yet, it does not specifically state through technical description or whatever the exact area of coverage, its location as well as the boundaries, hence, we cannot be sure or we have no way of knowing whether the subject property is part and parcel of that covered area. Second, it states that the list of occupants or claimants therein is attached to said document, however, a close scrutiny of the same reveals that it contains only one page without any attachment particularly the alleged list of claimants. Therefore, there is no proof that defendants are indeed one of the claimants listed therein. From here it can be inferred that such document was presented merely to confuse the Board in their attempt to gain favorable judgment. Moreover, we are far from convinced that defendants’ other allegations are tenable not only because they are self-
serving but also for
being irrelevant to the issue at bar. The same allegations and arguments have
been raised or asserted merely to resist the demands of the plaintiffs
particularly on their ejectment from the questioned landholding especially that
all the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs have never been effectively
refuted by the defendants.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering
the termination of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Contrata sa Pag-Arquila
nin Dagang Agricultural) dated
2) Ordering
all the defendants, their heirs and assigns to vacate the premises immediately
upon receipt of this decision;
3) Ordering
the defendants to pay plaintiffs the total of 54 cavans of palay at 46 kls. per
cavan representing the arrear rentals for the entire year of 1997 until the
filing of this case on June 26, 1998, including succeeding lease rentals as it
falls due until they finally vacate the premises; and
4) Ordering
the defendants to desist from further disturbing [the] herein plaintiffs in
their peaceful possession and cultivation of their landholdings subject of the
instant action.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On
Unimpressed, the CA dismissed the
Petition in its
A
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court
may be availed of to have judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts annulled. Also, Rule 47 requires that recourse
thereto may be had only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The petitioners ratiocinated [sic] this
instant recourse for their failure to avail of the remedy provided for under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, without fault (Rollo, p. 4). However,
the petition fails to offer any explanation as to how it lost that remedy
except for its claim that they failed to avail of Rule 65 without any fault on
their part. And even if We are to grant it arguendo, Rule 47 being exclusive to
judgments and final orders and resolution in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts is not available to the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered
DISMISSED.[8]
The CA also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration[9]
of Fraginal, et al. in the assailed Resolution[10]
dated
Hence, the herein Petition.
We dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.
Petitioners Fraginal, et al.
raised these issues:
I.
Whether or not the Honorable Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition filed before it for annulment of
judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as the land is a public
agricultural land.
II.
Whether or not the Honorable Court
of Appeals erred in holding that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court pertains only to
judgment or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial
Court.[11]
It is only the second issue which is
pivotal.
No doctrine is more sacrosanct than that
judgments of courts or awards of quasi-judicial bodies, even if erroneous, must become final at a definite time appointed
by law.[12]
This doctrine of finality of judgments is
the bedrock of every stable judicial system.[13]
However, the doctrine of finality of
judgments permits certain equitable remedies;[14]
and one of them is a petition for annulment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.[15]
The remedy of annulment of judgment
is extraordinary in character,[16]
and will not so easily and readily lend
itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by
final judgments. Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for
recourse to it, viz.:
Section
1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Section
2. Grounds for annulment. – The annulment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic
fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
The
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Fraginal, et al. before the
CA failed to meet the foregoing conditions.
First, it sought the annulment of the
PARAD Decision when Section 1 of Rule 47 clearly limits the subject matter of
petitions for annulment to final judgments and orders rendered by Regional
Trial Courts in civil actions.[17]
Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies
such as the National Labor Relations
Commission,[18]
the Ombudsman,[19]
the Civil Service Commission,[20]
the Office of the President,[21]
and, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible to petitions for annulment
under Rule 47.
Speaking through Justice Jose C.
Vitug, the Court, in Macalalag v.
Ombudsman, ratiocinated:
Rule 47, entitled “Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions,” is a new provision under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur by the courts. The rule covers “annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner.”An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards to be put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.
x x x x
x x x The right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
There must then be a law expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is
also applicable and even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which
is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. [22]
(Emphasis ours)
Second, Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a direct
recourse to a petition for annulment of
judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for
new trial, and a petition for relief from judgment or an appeal.[23]
The 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedures, which was applicable at the time the PARAD Decision was issued,
provided for the following mode of appeal:
Rule
XIII
Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a)
An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator
to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, resolution or decsion
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, if the appeal
is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced
into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy
thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the
taking of the oral appeal.
It
does not allow for a petition for annnulment of a final PARAD Decision.
While the DARAB Rules provide for an
appeal to the DARAB from a decision of the PARAD, Fraginal, et al. did
not avail of this remedy. However, they justified their omission, thus:
9.
Prior to the filing of this instant action, the
petitioners, without fault, failed to avail of the remedy provided under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, appeal the questioned decision and to file the
corresponding petition for relief from judgment, due to time constraint and
want of sources as to when the questioned decision be appropriately done as
they were not assisted by counself from the very beginning of the proceedings.[24]
Such pretext is unacceptable.
Fraginal,
et al., could have appealed to the DARAB even without resources or counsel.
They could have asked for exemption from payment of the appeal fee, as allowed
under Section 5, Rule XIII.[25]
They could have also requested for counsel de oficio from among
DAR lawyers and legal officers, as provided under Section 3, Rule VII.[26]
They appear not to have needed one, considering that they seem to have adequately fended for
themselves as shown by the Answer they prepared, which raised a well-thought
out legal defense.[27]
As it were, they neglected to exercise any of these rights and chose to fritter
away the remedy still available to them at that time. Their direct recourse to the CA through a
petition for annulment of the PARAD Decision was therefore ill-fated.
Moreover,
there is nothing in Rule XIII that allows a petition for annulment of a final
PARAD Decision. As held in Macalalag,
there must be a law granting such right, in the absence of which, Fraginals’ petition
for annulment of judgment was correctly denied due course by the CA.
With
the foregoing disquisition, we find no need to treat the first issue.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Both penned by Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ruben
T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Supreme Court
Associate Justice); CA rollo, pp.
34-35 and 71-72, respectively.
[2]
Entitled “Valentin P.
Fraginal, Tomas P. Fraginal and Angelina Fraginal-Aquino, Petitioners, v. Hon.
Virgil G. Alberto, in his Capacity as the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (DARAB),
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
Rollo, p. 20.
[8]
[9]
CA rollo, p. 43.
[10]
[11]
Petition, rollo, p. 9.
[12]
Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 161645,
[13]
Bañares v. Balising, 384
Phil. 567, 582 (2000).
[14]
The other remedies are petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38, a direct action such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
and a collateral attack against a judgment that is void on its face. Escareal
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 151922, April 7, 2005, 455 SCRA 119,
132-133, citing Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, L-29090, August 17, 1976, Bobis
v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 154, 163 (2000).
[15]
This remedy was first
recognized in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 948
(1918), where the Supreme Court cited Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as the bases of the authority of
Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Court to set aside final judgments.
[16] Ramos
v. Combong, Jr., G.R. No. 144273,
[17] See
also Collado v. Court of Appeals,
439 Phil. 149, 186 (2002) and Heirs
of Jose Reyes v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 150862, August 3,
2006, which involved petitions for annulment of decisions of the RTC rendered
in land registration cases.
[18]
Elcee Farms, Inc. v.
Semillano, 460 Phil. 81, 90 (2003).
[19]
Macalalag v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 147995,
[20]
Aguilar v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 144001,
[21]
Denina v. Sps. Cuaderno,
G.R. No. 139244,
[22]
Supra note 19, at 744-745.
[23]
Republic of the
[24]
CA rollo, p. 5.
[25]
Sec. 5. Requisites and
Perfection of the Appeal. x x x b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00)
shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary period to the DAR
Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant
shall, however, be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.
[26] Sec. 3. Assignment of DAR Lawyer or Legal Officer. A party appearing without counsel or represented by a non-lawyer may be assigned a counsel de oficio from among DAR lawyers or DAR legal officers, or a member of the bar who is willing to act as such counsel de oficio.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 14-15.