THIRD DIVISION
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ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,
ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES,
ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA,
Petitioners, - versus- HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO
CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
150175 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
On
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194,
dated
On
The facts of the case, as recounted in the
Decision,[10]
are as follows –
Petitioners are the heirs of
the late Donata Ortiz-Briones
(Donata), consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had
also passed away. Respondents, on the
other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of
his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of
the deceased siblings of Maximino.
x x
x x
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died
on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husband’s estate with the Cebu
City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District,
designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On
x x
x x
The CFI would subsequently
issue an Order, dated
Donata died on
On
On
x x x x
After trial in due course,
the RTC rendered its Decision, dated
x x
x x
x x x[T]he
RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled
to ½ of the real properties covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs
of Maximino the said properties and to render an
accounting of the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated
x x
x x
Unsatisfied
with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, x x
x.
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition
meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings,[11]
thus –
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real
properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino,
registered in her name. In the absence
of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata
and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code. Donata
was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or
mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI
Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata
as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino;
hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire
estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the
heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
same should have been dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
raising still the arguments that Donata committed
fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952,
which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino
and authorized her to have Maximino’s properties
registered exclusively in her name; that respondents’ right to succession to
the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from the moment of Maximino’s death and which they could no longer be deprived
of; that Donata merely possessed and held the
properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this
Court’s ruling in Quion v. Claridad[12]
and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles,[13]
respondents’ action to recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximino’s estate, held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latter’s
successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention
that the CFI Order, dated
While this
Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its previous
Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or argument that would
adequately justify a change in its previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since
there was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata
committed fraud. It should be remembered
that Donata was able to secure certificates of title
to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino’s
intestate estate), which declared her as Maximino’s
sole heir. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the
presumptions of regularity and validity.
Reproduced below are the relevant portions[15]
of the Decision –
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs
covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino
by virtue of a CFI Order, dated
x x x x
The CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the
intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her
deceased husband. The issuance by the
CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and
(n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below –
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
x
(m) That
official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a
court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
By reason of the foregoing
provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a
judgment valid in every respect; and it could not give credence to the
following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
x x
x x
There
was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented during the
course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a
finding that Donata willfully excluded from the said
Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second,
there was also no evidence showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices
of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino
or that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such
notices. It should be remembered that
there stands a presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his
duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included sending out of notices
and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices; and, the
heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient
evidence to debunk such presumption.
They only made a general denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No.
928-R, at least until 1985. There was no
testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino
categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency
of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The
only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of such
proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones
(Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
x x x x
Aurelia’s testimony deserves scant credit considering
that she was not testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase “I don’t think” is a clear
indication that she is merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her
uncles and aunts would have acted had they received notice of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth
noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an
evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not include an actual copy of
the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof on
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late
into the proceedings of this case.
Parties should present all their available evidence at the courts below
so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize and challenge
such evidence during the course of the trial.
However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the
petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certified true copy of the said
Order; and that the said Order may provide new information vital to a just
resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as
part of the evidence on record.
The CFI
Order[17]
in question reads in full as –
O R D E R
This is
with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix,
dated
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and based on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the latter’s death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.
From the
contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that the CFI
Order was in fact issued on
While it is
true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino
still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these
siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be
borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem,[19]
and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and
of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law,
is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in
the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition,
regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court
cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate
proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial
court. As this Court pointed out in its
earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings
enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is
the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any
allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication
in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof
from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or
explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have
missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official
duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned
Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for respondents
allege, sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in the
inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats.
There is a rationale for the establishment of rules of procedure, as
amply explained by this Court in De Dios v.
Court of Appeals[20] –
Procedural rules are
designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration of justice by
providing for a practical system by which the parties to a litigation may be
accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions and
refute each other's submissions under the prescribed requirements, conditions
and limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In
fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully
with the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss,
analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more
effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial
anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances. The presumptions relied
upon by this Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions, which are
satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented
by respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.
Although Donata may
have alleged before the CFI that she was her husband’s sole heir, it was not established
that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court
to conclude that she indeed committed fraud.
This Court again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed
the present case, when the principal actors involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino’s siblings,
have already passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly
transpired between them. On the other
hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took place when all these principal actors
were still alive and each would have been capable to act to protect his or her
own right to Maximino’s estate. Letters of Administration of Maximino’s estate were issued in favor of Donata as early as
"x x
x But length of time necessarily obscures
all human evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate
means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud.
It would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof
of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be
encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties
are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the
material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the
parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol
agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and
to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud,
or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the
legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer
for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of
fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost
vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [
Moreover, even if Donata’s
allegation that she was Maximino’s sole heir does
constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960,[22] considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the
disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful
exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On
prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s
misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the implied
trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot
sustain respondents’ contention that their right to recover their shares in Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that
an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription
and laches.
The case of
Ramos v. Ramos[23]
already provides an elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit –
"Trusts are either
express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being
by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral evidence.
An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a
trust is clearly intended" (Ibid;
Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag,
96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546).
"Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive
acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.
S. 122).
"Implied trusts are
those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent, or
which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724).
They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89
C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is
broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to
have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be
found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument
of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in
Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla
vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569,
On the other hand, a constructive
trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by
any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create
a trust, but by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by
agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).
"If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in
favor of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the
technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil.
244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a
trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property entrusted to
him (Palma vs. Cristobal,
77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the
defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property held
by a person in trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or
that property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of
the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones,
98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuñiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely
to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee is
not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the
property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of
prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting
trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho
and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino,
71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan,
74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12
SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held
in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not
repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Graño,
42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias,
63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon,
105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112
Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may
bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for
the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust
and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason,
55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in the last
paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code; Casañas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive
trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility
of an action for reconveyance based on constructive
trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares,
97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez,
L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription
may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29,
1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957,
May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is
resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado,
supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]
A present
reading of the Quion[24]
and Sevilla[25] cases, invoked by respondents, must be
made in conjunction with and guided accordingly by the principles established
in the afore-quoted case. Thus, while
respondents’ right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the
time of Maximino’s death, their enforcement of said
right by appropriate legal action may be barred by the prescription of the
action.
Prescription
of the action for reconveyance of the disputed
properties based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code, which reads –
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created
by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an
implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which
to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares
in Maximino’s properties. The next question now is when should the
ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from.
The general rule is that an action for reconveyance
of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration
and/or issuance of the title to the property,[26]
not only because registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice
of title,[27]
but also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in her
name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
By virtue
of the CFI Order, dated
Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.[28] Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than
prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover possession of the
disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense
of laches, which is a question of inequity in
permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which
is a question of time. Prescription is
statutory; laches is equitable.[29]
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert
it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which
requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.[30]
This Court
has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring
respondents’ action for recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This Court
pointed out therein[31]
that –
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino
even emphasized that Donata lived along the same
street as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet,
she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs
covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This
Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they
only lived nearby, Maximino’s siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the
status of the estate of their deceased brother.
Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located within the same area as their
residences in
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
respondents’ conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of
evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a
penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification for
such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show
that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.[32]
On void
judgment or order
Respondents
presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the petitioners’
Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order,
dated
This Court
is unconvinced.
In the
jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,[33]
an order or judgment is considered void when rendered by the court without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty,
circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable
one, thus –
"* * * A voidable judgment
is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be made void when a
person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps to have
its invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which may become fatal.
It carries within it the means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is
duly annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal
judgment. The party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or
an obligation, but only by a proper application to have it vacated or reversed.
Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel,
or a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it will
continue throughout its life to all intents a valid sentence. If emanating from
a court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary
presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral
action. * * *"
But it is otherwise when the
judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it
no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in
itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself
without title and without redress." (Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117,
citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7
Bush, 295, Huls vs.
Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell
vs. Goodrum,
3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2
Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley,
35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2
Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs.
Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell
vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and
Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer
vs. Mintonye,
106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to
draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment and a voidable
one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction
renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent.
(Fisher vs. Harnden,
1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9
Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga.,
247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9
Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs.
Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs.
Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111
Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3
Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34]
The fraud
and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate
of Maximino. Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the
CFI Order, dated
Nonetheless,
this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based
on fraud must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.[36] If it is conceded that the respondents came
to know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985,
during the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the
settlement of Maximino’s estate, then their right to
file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata
for the settlement of Maximino’s estate), has
likewise prescribed by present time.
In view of
the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chairperson
No Part
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* No part.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, and Romeo J. Callejo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 286-305.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] 74 Phil. 100 (1943).
[13] 97 Phil. 875 (1955).
[14] Rollo, p. 359.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] When the Decision was promulgated on
[19] Bautista, v. de Guzman, 211 Phil. 26, 35 (1983); Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 266-267 (1954); McMaster v. Reissman & Co., 68 Phil. 142, 144 (1939).
[20] G.R. No. 80491,
[21] G.R. No. L-19872,
[22] See Solivio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990, 182 SCRA 119, 131), wherein this Court quoted that, "Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own, claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment." (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149.)
[23] 158 Phil. 935, 950-952 (1974).
[24] Supra note 12.
[25] Supra note 13.
[26] Marquez v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 843, 849-850 (1998).
[27] Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, Section 31.
[28] Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 29759,
[29] Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho,
G.R. No. 159571,
[30]
[31] Rollo, pp. 300-301.
[32] Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28 at 450.
[33] Republic
v. Atlas Farms, Inc., 398 Phil. 1135 (2000); Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208
(2000); Ramos v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 42108, 29 December 1989, 180 SCRA 635; Estoesta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA
203; Caro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31426,
[34] Gomez
v.
[35] Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84888, 12 Fcbruary 1992, 206 SCRA 169, 171.
[36] Gallanosa v. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300,