Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
METROPOLITAN
BANK and G.R.
NO. 144322
TRUST
COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
(Chairperson)
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
NATIONAL
WAGES AND
PRODUCTIVITY
COMMISSION
and
REGIONAL TRIPARTITE
WAGES
AND PRODUCTIVITY
BOARD
– REGION II, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 6, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The
procedural antecedents and factual background of the case are as follows:
On
October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. No. 6727),
otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act,[2]
issued Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows:
Section
1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the private
sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment are granted
an across-the-board increase of P15.00 daily.[3]
The Wage Order was published in a
newspaper of general circulation on
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated
May 7, 1996, the Bankers’ Council for Personnel Management (BCPM), on behalf of
its member-banks, requested for a ruling on the eligibility of establishments
with head offices outside Region II to seek exemption from the coverage of the Wage
Order since its member-banks are already paying more than the prevailing
minimum wage rate in the National Capital Region (NCR), which is their
principal place of business.[8]
In
a letter-reply dated
In
a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated
In a letter-reply dated
On
October 15, 1996, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with the CA seeking nullification of the Wage Order on grounds that the RTWPB
acted without authority when it issued the questioned Wage Order; that even assuming
that the RTWPB was vested with the authority to prescribe an increase, it
exceeded its authority when it did so without any ceiling or qualification;
that the implementation of the Wage Order will cause the petitioner, and other
similarly situated employers, to incur huge financial losses and suffer labor
unrest.[12]
On
In view of the OSG’s manifestation,
the CA directed respondents NWPC and RTWPB to file their comment.[14]
On September 22, 1997, respondents filed
their Comment praying that the petition should be dismissed outright for petitioner’s
procedural lapses; that certiorari and
prohibition are unavailing since petitioner failed to avail of the remedy of
appeal prescribed by the Wage Order; that the Wage Order has long been in
effect; and that the issuance of the Wage Order was performed in the exercise
of a purely administrative function.[15]
On
Hence,
the present petition anchored on the
following grounds:
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 NULL AND VOID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
4.1.1 THE BOARD, IN ISSUING WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03, EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO IT BY CONGRESS.
4.1.2 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 IS AN UNREASONABLE INTRUSION INTO THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.
4.1.3 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 UNDERMINES THE VERY ESSENCE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
4.1.4 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VERY RATIONALE FOR A UNIFIED WAGE STRUCTURE.
4.2 PETITIONER’S RECOURSE TO A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS PROPER.[17]
Following the submission of the
Comment[18]
and Reply[19]
thereto, the Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to
submit their respective memoranda.[20]
In compliance therewith, petitioner and
respondents submitted their respective memoranda.[21]
Petitioner poses two issues for resolution,
to wit: (1) whether Wage Order No. R02-03 is void and of no legal effect; and
(2) whether petitioner’s recourse to a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA was proper.
Anent the first issue, petitioner maintains
that the RTWPB, in issuing said Wage Order, exceeded the authority delegated to
it under R.A. No. 6727, which is limited to determining and fixing the minimum
wage rate within their respective territorial jurisdiction and with respect
only to employees who do not earn the prescribed minimum wage rate; that the RTWPB
is not authorized to grant a general across-the-board wage increase for
non-minimum wage earners; that Employers Confederation of the Philippines v.
National Wages and Productivity Commission[22]
(hereafter referred to as “ECOP”) is
not authority to rule that respondents have been empowered to fix wages other
than the minimum wage since said case dealt with an across-the-board increase
with a salary ceiling, where the wage adjustment is applied to employees
receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling; that the Wage Order is an
unreasonable intrusion into its property rights; that the Wage Order undermines
the essence of collective bargaining; that the Wage Order fails to take into
account the rationale for a unified wage structure.
As
to the second issue, petitioner submits that ultra vires acts of
administrative agencies are correctible by way of a writ of certiorari
and prohibition; that even assuming that it did not observe the proper remedial
procedure in challenging the Wage Order, the remedy of certiorari and
prohibition remains available to it by way of an exception, on grounds of
justice and equity; that its failure to observe procedural rules could not have
validated the manner by which the disputed Wage Order was issued.
Respondents
counter that the present petition is fatally defective from inception since no
appeal from the Wage Order was filed by petitioner; that the letter-query to
the NWPC did not constitute the appeal contemplated by law; that the validity
of the Wage Order was never raised before the respondents; that the implementation
of the Wage Order had long become fait
accompli for prohibition to prosper. Respondents insist that, even if petitioner’s
procedural lapses are disregarded, the Wage Order was issued pursuant to the
mandate of R.A. No. 6727 and in accordance with the Court’s pronouncements in the
ECOP case;[23]
that the Wage Order is not an intrusion on property rights since it was issued
after the required public hearings; that the Wage Order does not undermine but
in fact recognizes the right to collective bargaining; that the Wage Order did
not result in wage distortion.
The Court shall first dispose of the procedural
matter relating to the propriety of petitioner’s recourse to the CA before
proceeding with the substantive issue involving the validity of the Wage Order.
Certiorari as a special civil action is
available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[24]
On the other hand, prohibition as a
special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[25]
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power
to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of
the parties.[26]
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[27]
Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the
context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.[28]
In the issuance of the
assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of subordinate
legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power under R.A. No.
6727. It was issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the
separation of the great branches of the government.[29]
Moreover, the rule on the special
civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition equally mandate that these extra-ordinary remedies are available
only when “there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment
or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.[30]
Section 13 of the assailed Wage Order
explicitly provides that any party aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an
appeal with the NWPC through the RTWPB within 10 days from the publication of
the wage order.[31]
The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on
In this case, petitioner did not
avail of the remedy provided by law. No
appeal to the NWPC was filed by the petitioner within 10 calendar days from
publication of the Wage Order on
It must also be noted that the NWPC
only referred petitioner’s letter-inquiry to the RTWPB. Petitioner did not appeal the letter-reply
dated
ART. 121. Powers
and Functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
x x x
x
(d) To review regional wage levels
set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to determine if
these are in accordance with prescribed guidelines and national development
plans;
x x x x
(f) To review plans and programs of
the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to determine whether
these are consistent with national development plans;
(g) To
exercise technical and administrative supervision over the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards;
x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.[33]
Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to resolve the substantial issues in
the present petition pursuant to the well-accepted principle that acceptance of a petition for certiorari
or prohibition as well as the grant of due course thereto is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.[34] It is a well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[35]
As to respondents’ submission that
the implementation of the Wage Order can no longer be restrained since it has
become fait accompli, the Wage Order
having taken effect on January 1, 1996 and its implementing rules approved on
February 14, 1996, suffice it to state that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[36]
Besides, a case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. Such circumstances do
not obtain in the present case. The
implementation of the Wage Order does not in any way render the case moot and
academic, since the issue of the validity of the wage order subsists even after
its implementation and which has to be determined and passed upon to resolve
petitioner’s rights and consequent obligations therein.
It is worthy to quote the Court’s
pronouncements in Tan v. Commission on
Elections,[37]
thus:
For this Honorable
Court to yield to the respondents’ urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Honorable Court
should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of
the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with
mischief. Respondents’ submission will
create a dangerous precedent. Should
this Honorable Court decline now to
perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and
should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of
power to recklessly and with ulterior motives commit illegal acts, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Honorable Court will abstain from
entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about
a fait
accompli.[38]
Having disposed of this procedural
issue, the Court now comes to the substance of the petition.
R.A. No. 6727 declared it
a policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of minimum wages and to promote productivity-improvement and
gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and
their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside
through industrial dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable
returns on investment, expansion and growth.[39]
In line with its declared policy, R.A.
No. 6727[40]
created the NWPC,[41]
vested with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination
of appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional,
provincial or industry levels;[42] and authorized the RTWPB to determine and fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their
respective regions, provinces, or industries therein and issue the
corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC.[43] Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the RTWPB may issue
wage orders which set the daily minimum wage rates,[44]
based on the standards or criteria set by Article 124[45]
of the Labor Code.
In ECOP,[46]
the Court declared that there are two ways of fixing the minimum wage: the
“floor-wage” method and the “salary-ceiling” method. The “floor-wage” method involves the fixing
of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage
rates. On the other hand, in the “salary-ceiling” method, the wage
adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a certain denominated
salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than the
existing minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are
also to be given a wage increase.[47]
To illustrate: under the “floor wage
method”, it would have been sufficient if the Wage Order simply set P15.00
as the amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates, while
in the “salary-ceiling method”, it would have been sufficient if the Wage Order
states a specific salary, such as P250.00, and only those earning below
it shall be entitled to the salary increase.
In the present case, the RTWPB did
not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the “floor-wage method” or the
“salary-ceiling method” in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range
to which a wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board wage
increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority
by extending the coverage of the Wage Order to wage earners receiving more than
the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage
Order granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
In no uncertain terms must it be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a
law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law
or putting it into effect. Corollary to this guideline is that administrative
regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment.[48]
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.[49]
Indeed, administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.[50]
Where the legislature has
delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or
which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid
exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate.[51]
It has been said that when the
application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the
intended scope, as in this case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being
unreasonable.[52]
Thus, the Court finds that Section 1,
Wage Order No. R02-03 is void insofar as it grants a wage increase to employees
earning more than the minimum wage rate; and pursuant to the separability
clause[53]
of the Wage Order, Section 1 is declared valid with respect to employees
earning the prevailing minimum wage rate.
Prior to the passage of the Wage
Order, the daily minimum wage rates in Region II was set at P104.00 for
the Province of Isabela, P103.00 for the Province of Cagayan, P101.00
for the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and P100.00
for the Provinces of Quirino and Batanes.[54]
Only employees earning the above-stated minimum wage rates are entitled to the P15.00
mandated increase under the Wage Order.
Although the concomitant effect of
the nullity of the Wage Order to those employees who have received the mandated
increase was not put in issue, this Court shall make a definite pronouncement thereon
to finally put this case to rest. As
ruled by the Court in Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,[55] “the Court will always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation.”[56]
Applying by analogy, the Court’s recent
pronouncement in Philippine Ports
Authority v. Commission on Audit,[57]
thus:
In regard to the refund of the
disallowed benefits, this Court holds
that petitioners need not refund the
benefits received by them based on our rulings in Blaquera v. Alcala, De
Jesus v. Commission on Audit and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit.
In Blaquera, the petitioners, who were officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits
pursuant to EO No. 292 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No.
292. On P1,000.
Section 4 of AO No. 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of P1,000 to immediately cause the refund of the
excess. Respondent heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the
overpayments. Petitioners therein filed
a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before this Court to prevent
respondents therein from making further deductions from their salaries or
allowances. The Court ruled against the
refund, thus:
Considering, however, that
all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of
subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners
have already received. Indeed, no indicia
of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The
officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in
the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the
latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve
such benefits.
The said ruling in Blaquera was applied in De Jesus.
In De Jesus, COA disallowed the
payment of allowances and bonuses consisting of representation and
transportation allowance, rice allowance, productivity incentive bonus,
anniversary bonus, year-end bonus and cash gifts to members of the interim Board of Directors of the Catbalogan
Water District. This Court affirmed the disallowance because petitioners
therein were not entitled to other compensation except for payment of per
diem under PD No. 198. However, the Court ruled against the refund of the
allowances and bonuses received by petitioners, thus:
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional
allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board
Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment.
At the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses,
the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such
payment was without legal basis. Thus,
being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses
they received but disallowed by the COA.
Further, in KMG, this Court applied the ruling in Blaquera
and De Jesus in holding that the Social Insurance Group (SIG) personnel
of the Government Service Insurance System need not refund the hazard pay
received by them although said benefit was correctly disallowed by COA. The Court ruled:
The Court however finds that
the DOH and GSIS officials concerned who granted hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305
to the SIG personnel acted in good faith, in the honest belief that there was
legal basis for such grant. The SIG
personnel in turn accepted the hazard pay benefits likewise believing that they
were entitled to such benefit. At that
time, neither the concerned DOH and GSIS officials nor the SIG personnel knew
that the grant of hazard pay to the latter is not sanctioned by law. Thus, following the rulings of the Court in De
Jesus v. Commission on Audit, and Blaquera v. Alcala, the SIG
personnel who previously received hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 need not
refund such benefits.
In the
same vein, the rulings in Blaquera, De Jesus and KMG apply to
this case. Petitioners received the hazard duty pay and birthday cash gift in
good faith since the benefits were authorized by PPA Special Order No. 407-97
issued pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 34-95 implementing DBM National
Compensation Circular No. 76, series of 1995, and PPA Memorandum Circular No.
22-97, respectively. Petitioners at that
time had no knowledge that the payment of said benefits lacked legal
basis. Being in good faith, petitioners
need not refund the benefits they received.[58]
(Emphasis supplied)
employees, other than minimum wage
earners, who received the wage increase mandated by the Wage Order need not
refund the wage increase received by them since they received the wage increase
in good faith, in the honest belief that they are entitled to such wage
increase and without any knowledge that there was no legal basis for the same.
Considering the foregoing, the Court
need not delve on the other arguments raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice
Godardo A. Jacinto (now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo
V. Cosico and Remedios Salazar-Fernando; CA rollo, pp. 102-123.
[2] Entitled “An Act to Rationalize
Wage Policy Determination by Establishing the Mechanism and Proper Standards
Therefor, Amending for the Purpose Article 99 of, and Incorporating Articles
120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126 and 127 into Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, Fixing New Wage
Rates, Providing Wage Incentives for Industrial Dispersal to the Countryside,
and for Other Purposes.” Effective
[3]
CA rollo, p. 31 (dorsal side).
[4]
[5]
Section 18, Wage Order No.
R02-03; CA rollo,
id. at 34 (dorsal side).
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
G.R. No. 96169,
[23]
[24]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule
65, Sec.
1.
[25]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule
65, Sec.
2.
[26] 1 Florenz
D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 706
(1999) citing Ruperto v. Torres, L-8785, February 25,
1957, and Municipal Council of Lemery v.
Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268 (1931).
[27] Bautista
v. Commission on Elections, 460 Phil. 459, 476 (2003); United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001, 353 SCRA 782, 797;
Midland Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
227 Phil. 413, 418 (1986); See also Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil.
497, 506-507 (1999).
[28]
De Guzman, Jr. v.
[29]
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November
17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 530; Bellosillo, J.,
Separate Opinion, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1017 (1996).
[30]
Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA
432, 441; Longino v. General, G.R.
No. 147956, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 423, 437; National
Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil.
362, 372 (1999).
[31]
Section 13, Wage Order No.
R02-03; CA rollo, p. 34. See also Labor Code, Art. 123.
[32]
Supra note 4.
[33] Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, 345
Phil. 524, 559 (1997).
[34] Tan
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., G.R. No. 148420, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA
115, 120; Floren Hotel v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155264, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 128, 141.
[35] Jaworski
v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004,
419 SCRA 317, 323-324; Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., 455 Phil. 992, 999 (2003).
[36] Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587, 593; Longino v. General, supra note 30; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, 664; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 438, 451.
[37] 226 Phil. 624 (1986).
[38]
[39] Republic Act No. 6727 (1989),
Sec. 2.
[40] Republic Act No. 6727
incorporated Articles 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126 and 127 into the Labor Code.
[41] Labor
Code, Art.120.
[42] Labor
Code, Art.121.
[43] Labor
Code, Art.122.
[44] Labor Code, Art. 123. Wage Order. – Whenever conditions in the region so warrant, the Regional Board shall investigate and study all pertinent facts; and based on the standards and criteria herein prescribed, shall proceed to determine whether a Wage Order should be issued. Any such Wage Order shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation in the region. (Emphasis supplied)
In the performance of its wage determining functions, the Regional Board shall conduct public hearings/consultations, giving notices to employees’ and employers’ groups, provincial, city and municipal officials and other interested parties.
Any party aggrieved by the Wage Order issued by the Regional Board may appeal such order to the Commission within ten (10) calendar days from the publication of such order. It shall be mandatory for the Commission to decide such appeal within sixty (60) calendar days from the filing thereof.
The filing of the appeal does not stay the order unless the person
appealing such order shall file with the Commission an undertaking with a
surety or sureties satisfactory to the Commission for the payment to the
employees affected by the order of the corresponding increase, in the event
such order is affirmed. (Emphasis supplied)
[45] Labor Code, Art.124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing.
– The regional minimum wages to be
established by the Regional Board shall be as nearly adequate as in
economically feasible to maintain the minimum standards of living necessary for
the health, efficiency and general well-being of the employees within the
framework of the national economic and social development program. In the determination of such regional minimum
wages, the Regional Board shall, among other relevant factors, consider the
following:
(a) The demand for living wages;
(b) Wage adjustment vis-à-vis the consumer price
index;
(c) The cost of living and changes or increases
therein;
(d) The needs of workers and their families;
(e) The need to induce industries to invest in the
countryside;
(f) Improvements in standards of living;
(g) The prevailing wage levels;
(h) Fair return of the capital invested and capacity
to pay of employers;
(i) Effects on employment generation and family
income; and
(j) The equitable distribution of income and wealth
along the imperatives of economic and social development.
The wages prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of this Title shall be the standard prevailing minimum wages in every region. These wages shall include wages varying
within industries, provinces or localities if in the judgment of the Regional
Board conditions make such local differentiation proper and necessary to
effectuate the purpose of this Title. (Emphasis supplied)
[46] Supra note 22, at 763.
[47] Norkis Free and Independent Workers
[48]
Land Bank of the
[49]
[50]
ART. 7, Civil Code of the
[51]
United BF Homeowner’s Association v. BF
Homes, Inc., 369 Phil. 568, 580 (1999); People
v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
[52]
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. Nos.
164171, 164172 and 168741, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 673, 699.
[53]
Section 16. All laws, orders,
issuances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Wage Order are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly. If any provision or part of this Wage Order or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
remainder of this Wage Order or the application of such provision or part
thereof to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(Emphasis supplied).
[54]
CA rollo, p. 36.
[55]
G.R. No. 45302,
[56]
[57]
G.R. No. 159200,
[58]