FIRST DIVISION
RUBY DIMACUHA y EBREO, G.R. No. 143705
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
*AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
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D
E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for
review on certiorari, petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha seeks her acquittal
by a reversal
of the October
22, 1999 decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20720 which affirmed her earlier conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of Marikina, Metro Manila, Branch 273, for violations of Sections 15[2]
and 16[3]
of Article III of Republic Act (RA)
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-112-D-MK and
95-63-D-MK, respectively. Dimacuha’s motion for reconsideration of said
decision was denied by the CA in its
Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK of the court of origin traces
its formal beginning from an Information charging petitioner of the crime of
violation of Sec. 16 (Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs), Art. III of RA No.
6425, as amended. A companion case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK, for violation of Sec. 15 (
The two separate Informations filed against the petitioner
respectively read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 95-63-D-MK
(For Possession or Use of
Regulated Drugs)
That on or about the 10th day of August 1995, in the
Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody and control 10.78 and 1.15 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law, as
amended.
Contrary to law.
Crim.
Case No. 96-112-D-MK
(For
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs)
That on or about the 10th day of August, 1995, in the
Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver 1.15 gram
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug to another person, in violation
of the above-cited law, as amended.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on separate
dates, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not
Guilty" in both cases. Thereafter, by agreement of the parties, the two cases were
tried jointly.
To buttress its case
against the petitioner, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police
Inspector Julita T. De Villa, SPO2 Melanio Valeroso and SPO2 Vicente
Ostan.
The People's version of the incident, as summarized by the
CA in the decision now on appeal, is as follows:
The prosecution's evidence tend to
show that at around
At about
More or less thirty minutes later,
two vehicles (a colored blue
Complying with the letter request
dated
“SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. “A” -- One (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic bag with 10.78 grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. “B” -- One (1) transparent
plastic bag containing 1.15 grams of white crystalline substance allegedly
delivered by R. Dimacuja.
x x x x x x x x x
PURPOSE
OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of
prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on
the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride a regulated drugs.”
For its
part, the defense offered in evidence the testimonies of the petitioner herself
and her witnesses, namely, Rodolfo
Enutallo and Jose Antonio Boo.
The CA
decision likewise summarizes the defense' account of the incident, to wit:
On the other hand,
the defense's evidence tend to show that at around
Upon reaching the two-storey house
of Mang Rudy, Ms. Dimacuja went at the second floor. On her way up, she saw
Benito Marcelo whom she had known since June 1995 talking with Mang Rudy at the
first floor. At the second floor, she saw Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari. Ms.
Dimacuja asked Juvy Carpio about the latter's indebtedness of P24,000.00
to her. As Ms. Dimacuja was collecting the said amount, two men in civilian
clothes appeared at the second floor and were looking for Michael Mallari. Upon
seeing them, Mallari asked them what the problem was. The two men responded,
they wanted to see his belt bag. A scuffle for the belt bag ensued. While that
was happening, Ms. Dimacuja continued talking with Juvy Carpio about the debt.
Moments later, the three men went down, still grappling for the possession of
the said bag. Sensing that what was
happening among the men was just a scheme of Juvy Carpio to avoid paying the
debt, Ms. Dimacuja followed them at the first floor. There, the two men who
barged in at the second floor asked Ms. Dimacuja to go with them at the
Marikina Police Station to explain her presence in the house. Hesitantly, Ms.
Dimacuja acceded. Using her car, they (Ms. Dimacuja, Juvy Carpio, Michael
Mallari, and three other men, as there were six of them) rode together. In the
car, Ms. Dimacuja noticed the presence of Valeroso, a friend of her mother, who
arrived after the scuffling incident.
At the police station, Ms.
Dimacuja's shoulder bag was inspected. Found inside were the “telephone book,
perfume, check book and cash money (of) less than P2,000.00.” She was
told that the contents were to be used as “part of the evidence.” She disclaimed
carrying the drugs. Thereupon, she was detained for two days and two nights,
the contents of her bag remain unreturned and her car was not released from
police custody until after one month.
After due assessment of
the evidence presented, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and upheld the presumption applied in
cases involving violation of Dangerous Drug Acts of regularity in the
performance of duty by public officers conducting anti-narcotics operations
when the police officers have no motive in testifying falsely against an
accused. It found that the evidence for
the prosecution convincingly established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and accordingly sentenced her thus:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.)
In Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK - the Court finds accused Ruby Dimacuja
y Ebreo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and considering that the quantity of the
shabu is only 10.78 and 1.15 grams, and there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
consonance with People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 572-573, and People vs. Martinez,
235 SCRA 183, the accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
prision correccional, as maximum, and
to pay the costs;
2.) In Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK - the
Court finds accused Ruby Dimacuja guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and considering
that the quantity of the shabu is only 1.15 gram, and there being no mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
consonance with People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 572-573, and People vs. Martinez,
235 SCRA 183, the accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The confiscated shabu are hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the government and shall be disposed of in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the trial court’s judgment of conviction, petitioner
went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 20720.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein
assailed Decision[5]
dated
Premises
considered, the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for violations of Sections 15 (
WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision being in conformity with the law and evidence, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO
ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with this Court via the present recourse thereunder raising
the following issues:
1. Whether
the CA, in holding that petitioner did not approach SPO2 Melanio Valeroso to profess her innocence, committed a reversible
error by affirming in toto the
questioned decision of the court a quo;
2. Whether the CA committed a reversible
error when it affirmed the conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
96-112-D-MK for violation of Section 15 (
3. Whether the non-presentation of one
Benito Marcelo, the professed police asset, was a denial of petitioner's right
to confront her accuser;
4. Whether the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was justified under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court;
5. Whether the alleged pieces of
prohibited stuff presented in Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK for violation of
Section 16 (Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs), Article III of R.A. 6425,
allegedly obtained as an incident to a warrantless arrest, are admissible in
evidence;
6. Whether the CA committed a reversible
error when it failed to adopt and apply the equipoise rule in the instant
cases.
These issues raised can actually be trimmed down to only two:
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies; and, the
validity of the arrest and search conducted on the person and belongings of the
petitioner without a warrant.
It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary. Moreover, in the absence
of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the
petitioner, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,
as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses,
shall prevail over petitioner’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having
been framed.[6]
Here, we found nothing in the record to justify why we
should depart from the above rule as far as the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses SPO2 Melanio Valeroso and SPO2 Vicente Ostan are concerned. As correctly noted by the trial court, there
is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers who
conducted the entrapment operation in this case.
The prosecution’s evidence established that an
honest-to-goodness entrapment operation which has repeatedly been accepted to
be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law was
conducted on August 10, 1995 against Dimacuha by the team composed of SPO2
Melanio Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr. and
Felipe Evangelista. SPO2 Valeroso and
SPO2 Ostan positively testified that from a distance of more or less 5 to 7
meters, they saw petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small
plastic sachet, suspected to be “shabu,” and handed
the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police
officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small
plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo. A
subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small
plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the
cover of petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets
was found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug.
Petitioner now questions the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies by giving stress over the non-presentation in
court of Benito Marcelo, the professed police asset. She argues that the
non-presentation of Marcelo was a denial of her constitutional right to meet
and confront her accuser.
The right of the petitioner to confront the witnesses
against her is not affected by the failure of the prosecution to present the
informant. The matter of presentation of witnesses is not for accused nor even for
the trial court to decide. Discretion
belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom
he would present as witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs cases, the
presentation of an informant is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative. Informants
are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity
and preserve their invaluable service to the police. It is well-settled that except when the accused
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are
reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to falsely testify against
the accused, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually
witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness accounts.[7]
Here, SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan directly testified regarding
the entrapment operation, as they witnessed the whole transaction of
petitioner's handing over the 1.15 grams of shabu
to their asset, and, immediately thereafter, seized from her another 10.78
grams of shabu which was placed inside
her shoulder bag. The non-presentation, therefore,
of the informant would not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence since his
testimony would merely have been corroborative. The physical evidence on record, which is Chemistry
Report No. D-578-95, also corroborates
the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[8] Upon laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance found in appellant’s possession
was positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
As stated earlier, the testimony
of the police
officers carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official function. Absent any persuasive
evidence showing why these officers would falsely testify against
the petitioner, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive exists, and
that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[9]
Finally, petitioner contends that the arrest and the search
conducted incidental to her arrest were illegal as the surrounding
circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of the allowable
warrantless arrests under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[10] To give full protection to it, the Bill of
Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[11]
In People v. Chua Ho
San,[12]
we pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures
is not absolute and that warrantless searches
and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the
following instances: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view;
(3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes
permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3)
arrest of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in
actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on
the basis of information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's
illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent
seizure of a bag of shabu inserted
inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of
the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible
in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
Petitioner next argues that no entrapment (buy-bust) operation ever took place as no payment was made. This is of no moment. In the crime of distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the prohibited drug to others is in itself a punishable offense.[13] In Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK, petitioner was charged under Section 15, Article III of RA No. 6425 for the distribution of regulated drugs. The law defines the word “deliver” as a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any manner with or without consideration.[14]
At the trial court, petitioner invoked the defense of alibi. She claimed that Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari were already at Mang Rudy’s residence when she arrived, and while talking with Carpio, two men in civilian clothes appeared and asked for Michael Mallari. When Mallari identified himself, the two men asked for his belt bag. While the three men scuffled for the bag, she followed them and later on was asked to go to the police station for some questioning.
The defense set up by the petitioner does not deserve any consideration. She should have presented her friends, Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari, to collaborate her tale, but she did not, for reasons known only to her. The consistent ruling of this Court is that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and the easiest to concoct. So it is that in drug cases, the Court views alibi with disfavor. For alibi to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove her defense of alibi. On the contrary, were she not at the house of Mang Rudy at the time of the entrapment, she would not have been arrested and her bag searched.
The Court has no doubt at all that the charge for delivery
or distribution of 1.15 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) in Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK,
and possession of 10.78 grams in
addition to the 1.15 grams of shabu in Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK, were proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
We found
the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA to be
correct. Although the Congress later
enacted an amendatory law, R.A. No. 9165,[15]
which increased the penalty for illegal possession of 10 grams or more but less
than 50 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00),[16] and for the sale/delivery of dangerous drugs from
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00)
to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) regardless of the quantity and
purity involved,[17]
the said law is not favorable to the petitioner, hence, it cannot be given
retroactive application in the instant case.
In People
v. Tira,[18]
we held:
Under
Section 16 [Possession or Used of Regulated Drugs], Article III of Rep. Act No.
6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less
than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua. Based on the quantity of the
regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as
follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less
than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision
correccional
49.26
grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51
grams to 147.75 grams reclusion
temporal
147.76
grams to 199 grams reclusion
perpetua
The same ruling
was applied in People
v. Isnani[19]
where the petitioner therein was found guilty for the crime of illegal sale of
0.60 gram of shabu.
Petitioner
in this case was caught in the act of delivering
1.15 grams of shabu plus the 10.78
grams found in
her possession. Thus, the
proper penalty should be no more than
prision
correccional. There being neither generic mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed
in its medium
period which has a duration of 2 years,
4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. And applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum period shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree which is arresto mayor,
the duration of which is 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, petitioner was correctly sentenced to
6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional in its medium period, as maximum.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed CA decision and resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando; Rollo, pp. 46-59.
[2] Sec. 15.
[3] Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
[4]
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] People v. Chua Uy, 384 Phil. 70 (2000).
[7] People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, citing People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81 (1986); People v. Sillo, G.R. No. 91001, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 74; People v. Sahagun, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 91; People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 84656, January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA1; People v. Solon, G.R. No. 106639, May 31, 1995, 244 SCRA 554.
[8] RTC Record (CR No. 95-63-D-MK), p. 6.
[9] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 148919, December 17, 20002, 442 SCRA 405.
[10] Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[11] Constitution, Article III, Section
3, par. 2.
Sec. 3 (1). xxx xxx xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[12] G.R. No. 128222,
[13] People v. Rodriguez, 429 Phil. 359 (2002).
[14] Section 2(f), Article 1 of RA No. 6425.
[15] An Act Instituting the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and
For Other Purposes.
[16] Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
[17] Sec. 5. P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
[18] G.R. No. 139615,
[19] G.R. No. 133006,