SECOND DIVISION
FLORENTINO
PINEDA, G.R.
No. 143188
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA, CARPIO
MORALES,
represented by ERNESTO E. TINGA, and
GUEVARA and ISAGANI S. VELASCO, JR.
GUEVARA, namely: ELISEO
GUEVARA, JR., ZENAIDA G. Promulgated:
SAPALICIO, DANTE G.
GUEVARA, DANILO C. GUEVARA,
and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, February 14, 2007
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
On
appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are
the Decision[1] and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074. The Decision
reversed the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 273,
As
borne out by the records, the following are the factual antecedents.
On
7 September 1995, respondents Eliseo Guevara, Jr., Zenaida G. Sapalicio, Dante
G. Guevara and Isagani S. Guevara, collectively referred hereinafter as the
Guevara heirs, filed an action for the nullification of the certificates of
title of a parcel of land measuring approximately 2,304 hectares situated in
Marikina.
Named defendants were the estate of
the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez, Jose Perez, Roy
Guadalupe, Lino Bucad and Florentino Pineda. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-171-MK, was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina.
The
Guevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the co-owners of a
property originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 386
issued on 7 December 1910 in favor of the spouses Emiliano Guevara and Matilde
Crimen. The couple’s son, and the Guevara heirs’ predecessor-in-interest, Eliseo Guevara, allegedly purchased the property on
According to the Guevara heirs, the
defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of
the property, particularly that area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 223361 issued to the estate of Pedro C. Gonzales. TCT No. 223361 was
derived from OCT No. 629, which the Guevara heirs described as fake, having
been issued only on 26 January 1912 or subsequent to the issuance of OCT No.
386. Hence, the Guevara heirs prayed that OCT No. 629 and its derivative
titles, to wit, TCT Nos. 223361, 244447, 244448, 244449 be cancelled, that the
Guevara heirs be declared owners of the property and that a new certificate of
title be issued in their names.
Defendant Pineda filed an answer with
counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action, prescription,
laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been
in actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently
as an owner. He registered the property in his name and was issued TCT No.
257272.
Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and
Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and
averred that their father, Marcos Perez, purchased the property from the late
Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perez’s name for taxation purposes.
According to them, they had been in actual possession of a lot measuring 375
square meters before 1958 and had been regularly paying the property taxes
thereon.
The rest of the defendants, including
the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answer with counterclaim, raising
the same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. They
claimed that OCT No. 629 was issued to the Municipality of Marikina in 1912 and
that the late Pedro Gonzales and his family started occupying the property as
early as 1950 as lessees thereon. The late Pedro Gonzales allegedly bought the
property from the Municipality of Marikina in a public bidding on 25 April 1966
and had allowed defendants to occupy the property. They asserted that the
Guevara heirs never actually occupied the property.
On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the
case for hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. During the hearing,
the parties presented oral arguments and were directed to file their memoranda.
After submission of memoranda, the
RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action on the ground of
laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal, claiming the denial of
their right to due process.
On 23 August 1999, the Court of
Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, which set aside the RTC’s order of
dismissal and directed the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 95-171-MK. The
appellate court ruled that a complaint
cannot be dismissed under Rule
16, Section 1[2] of
the Rules of Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds
enumerated under said provision. Although the RTC order of dismissal did not
rule on the other affirmative defenses raised by petitioners in the answer,
such as lack of cause of action, prescription and res judicata, the Court of Appeals discussed them and ruled that
none of these affirmative defenses raised were present to warrant the dismissal
of the action.
Only Pineda sought reconsideration.
In its 3 May 2000 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Pineda’s motion.
Hence, the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS WHICH RAISED ONLY PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW; AND,
THEREFORE, IT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN HEARING AND DECIDING THE SAID
APPEALED CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES AS ANALOGOUS TO PRESCRIPTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT IS ERRONEOUS FOR THE REASON
THAT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES IS NOT AMONG THE GROUNDS FOR A MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER THE RULES, WHICH MAY BE ALLEGED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BE
PROVED DURING THE TRIAL.
AS A COROLLARY TO THE THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR ABOVE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF
RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TO AVOID
PROTRACTED LITIGATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT WHILE
PRESCRIPTION IN DEROGATION OF THE TITLE TO REGISTERED OWNERS WILL NOT LIE,
LACHES WILL.[3]
Counsel for the estate of Pedro
Gonzales filed a Comment/Manifestation,[4]
stating that her clients have adopted and joined Pineda’s petition praying for
the reinstatement of the trial court’s order of dismissal.
At bottom, the petition raises two
main issues, to wit: (1) whether or not the appeal of the heirs of Guevara was
improperly elevated to the Court of Appeals since, according to them, it raised
a pure question of law; and (2) whether or not the trial court correctly
dismissed the action on the ground of laches without conducting trial on the
merits.
Petitioner Pineda had ample
opportunity to raise before the Court of Appeals the objection on the improper
mode of appeal taken by the heirs of Guevara. This, he failed to do. The issue
of improper appeal was raised only in Pineda’s motion for reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals’ Decision. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
pass upon this issue. For an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[5] In
any case, the appeal by the heirs of Guevara also raised the issue regarding
the existence of laches on the part of petitioners as defendants, which is
factual in nature as discussed below.
Now, did the trial court correctly
order the dismissal of the complaint based on laches without conducting trial
on the merits? The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that under Rule 16,
Section 1[6] of
the Rules of Court, laches is not enumerated under said provision, hence, it
must be proved during trial. On the other hand, petitioner Pineda asserts that
laches is analogous to prescription and, therefore, can be a ground of
dismissing a complaint as though a motion to dismiss is filed.
Well-settled is the rule that the elements
of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of laches is premature.[7] Those
issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both
parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and
defenses.[8]
The elements of laches are: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting
the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[9]
Whether or not the elements of laches
are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial court.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[10]
Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather,
the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order
that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.[11] Without
prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay in the enforcement of one’s
claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party charged with
negligence or omission in invoking his right must be afforded the opportunity
to raise his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a contentious
proceeding.
In reversing the RTC’s order of
dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that “laches could not be a ground to
dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1.”[12]
This is not entirely correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to
dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words
“abandoned” and “otherwise extinguished” to the phrase “claim or demand deemed
set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading” is broad enough to include within its
ambit the defense of bar by laches. However, when a party moves for the
dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial court must set a hearing
on the motion where the parties shall submit not only their arguments on
the questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of fact
involved.[13] Thus,
being factual in nature, the elements of laches must be proved or disproved
through the presentation of evidence by the parties. As discussed above, an
apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as shown in a pleading does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches.
In the case at bar, while the trial
court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dismiss had been
filed, the records do not reveal that it extended to the parties the opportunity
to present evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevara filed and
served written interrogatories[14]
on one of the defendants but the trial court held in abeyance the resolution of
the motion to order the defendant to submit answers to the written
interrogatories.[15] The
trial court likewise denied the Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs
of Guevara.[16] These
were the instances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence
on which to anchor its factual findings. Although the trial court heard oral
arguments and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the
presentation of evidence on the defenses which are grounds for a motion to
dismiss was not held at all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted
by the parties would have enabled this Court to review the trial court’s
factual finding of laches instead of remanding the case for trial on the merits.
A perusal of the records precludes this Court from making a categorical
declaration on whether the heirs of Guevara were guilty of laches.
Neither does the affirmative defense
of prescription alleged in an answer automatically warrant the dismissal of the
complaint under Rule 16. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used
in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed
the action has already prescribed.[17] Otherwise,
the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a
full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to
dismiss.[18]
Pineda’s theory that the defense of laches should be treated as an affirmative
defense of prescription warranting the dismissal of the complaint is erroneous.
There is also no basis in procedural
law to treat the RTC’s order of dismissal as a summary judgment. The trial
court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an action is
in order. Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or
the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by
filing a motion.[19] The
adverse party must be notified of the motion for summary judgment[20]
and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before
hearing is conducted.[21]
More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.[22]
Based on the parties’ allegations in
the complaint and answer, the issues in the case at bar are far from settled.
For instance, both petitioner and respondents claim their ownership rights over
the same property based on two different original certificates of title.
Respondents charge petitioner of illegal occupation while the latter invokes
good faith in the acquisition of the property. Clearly, these are factual
matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the
trial court, especially when what are involved appear to be sizeable parcels of
land covered by two certificates of title.
Except for Pineda, the other
defendants did not elevate the Court of Appeals’ Decision to this Court. With
respect to them, the appellate court’s Decision has already become final and
conclusive, notwithstanding their adoption[23]
of Pineda’s petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074 are AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be
remanded for further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City,
which is hereby ORDERED to try and decide the case with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, Chairman, Eleventh Division, and concurred in by JJ. Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando.
[2]Rules of Court, Rule 16, Sec. 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
[4]
[7]Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, G.R. No. 138945, 19 August 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315.
[8]National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 362, 376 (1999).
[9]
[19]Rules of Court, Rule 35, Sec. 2. Summary
judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
[20]Rules of Court, Rule 35, Sec. 3.
[22]Rules of Court, Rule 35, Sec. 3.