EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario,
JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS,
Respondent.
x
---------------------------------------------------- x
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions
for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
September 12, 1995[2] and
January 31, 1996[3]
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its
The instant case involves the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the
Five years later, on
On
Thereafter, respondent sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On
Respondent alleged that she is the
widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more
or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.
On
On
Unaware of the denial of the motions
to dismiss, respondent filed on
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein
petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss.[15] They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256[16]
of the Family Code.
On
On
Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19]
against Judge Tensuan on
On
On
On
Respondent moved for reconsideration[26]
and for the disqualification[27]
of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]
Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.[29]
The appellante court ruled that under
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged
his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration
was properly filed in
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo
had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code and the rulings in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of
With
the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel,
that “Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of
our state against divorce in any form whatsoever.” Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
Therefore,
under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x[33]
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed
separate motions for reconsideration[34]
which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On
In the instant consolidated petitions,
Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez
v. RTC,
Petitioners also contend that
respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1)
whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,[39] Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province
“in which he resides at the time of
his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40]
we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term “resides”
connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms
“residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
“domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term “inhabitant.” In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to
argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes
of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms,
that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44]
dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements[45] from
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.” Respondent
also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association[46] and
Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47]
letter-envelopes[48] from
1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and
the deceased’s calling cards[49]
stating that his home/city address is at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is in “Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.”
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court[50]
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December
17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was
still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in
Anent the issue of respondent
Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the
divorce in
“The purpose and effect of a decree
of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie,
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.”
Thus,
pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.[53]
As to the
effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations.
It held:
To
maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[54] (Emphasis
added)
This
principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera[55] where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien
spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that “the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”[56]
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,[57]
the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.[58] Although decided on
The significance of the Van Dorn case
to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
In the recent case of Republic v.
Orbecido III,[62] the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical
Background
On
All
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On
July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART.
26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Where
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x
x x
Legislative
Intent
Records
of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly,
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph
2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage
is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15[65]
and 17[66]
of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However,
in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.[67] In Alonzo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the
Court stated:
But
as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus,
we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As
judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. “Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law,” so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
“where these words import a policy that goes beyond them.”
x x
x x
More
than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due.”
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the
instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
With regard to respondent’s marriage
to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
Therefore, this case should be
remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule
78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC.
2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show,
as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An “interested person” has been
defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]
In the instant case, respondent would
qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to
prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations
of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79]
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80]
The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The
regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property
or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be
equal.
x x x x
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,
and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential.
x x x
As
in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x[81]
In view of the foregoing, we find
that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66.
Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
[2]
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge
Paul T. Arcangel.
[3]
[4] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68.
Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by
Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
[5]
Records, p. 125.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
[14]
G.R. No. L-68470,
[15]
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
[16]
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
[17] Records,
p. 259.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
[30] Supra note 14.
[31]
G.R. No. 80116,
[32]
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken
finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained
on
[33] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
[34]
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340,
and 362-369.
[35] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
[36]
[37]
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
[38]
G.R. No. 104960,
[39] SECTION 1. Where
estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
[40]
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670,
[41]
[42] Romualdez
v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note
38 at 415.
[43]
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373
Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa
Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento,
G.R. No. L-22795,
[44]
Records, pp. 76-78.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction
over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded P200,000.00
as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
[51]
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated
Pursuant
to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the
Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983,
declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby
defined as follows:
x x x x
5. Branches CXXXII to
CL, inclusive, with seats at
[52] Supra note 14.
[53]
[54]
[55] Supra note 31.
[56]
[57]
G.R. No. 124862,
[58] Id.
at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.
[59]
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the
[60]
G.R. No. 138322,
[61]
[62] Supra note 58.
[63]
[64] Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255
(1916).
[65]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the
[66]
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
[67] Supra
note 14 at 144.
[68]
G.R. No. L-72873,
[69]
[70] Supra note 60.
[71]
[72]
Records, pp. 118-124.
[73] Supra
note 60 at 451.
[74]
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as
the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
[75] Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193,
1195 (1962).
[76]
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man
and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
[77] Valdes
v. RTC,
[78] Francisco v. Master Iron Works &
Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494,
506.
[79]
G.R. No. 150611,
[80]
[81]