THIRD
DIVISION
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CONRADO
MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA, the latter assisted by her husband
ARTEMIO TABORADA,
Petitioners, - versus - PILAR S. JUNSAY, asssisted by her husband VICENTE JUNSAY, IBARRA LOPEZ,
and JUANITO JACELA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 132659 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,*
JJ. Promulgated: |
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This
is an Appeal by Certiorari from the
Decision,[1]
dated 26 January 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51750, which affirmed
in toto the Decision,[2] dated
25 July 1995, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, Bacolod
City, in Civil Case No. 4361, dismissing the Complaint for Damages for
malicious prosecution, filed by petitioners against respondents. The RTC rendered judgment declaring that the
prosecution was not prompted by sinister design to vex and humiliate petitioner
Rosemarie Magbanua.
The Court of Appeals similarly found the appeal without merit.
The
following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner
Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence
of complainant and herein respondent Pilar S. Junsay was charged
as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery before the RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 28 entitled, People of the
That
on or about the 18th day of July, 1982, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and with the use of force upon things
by then and there making a hole on the lower portion of the kitchen’s door of
the house of the herein offended party, Dra. Pilar S.
Junsay, situated at Bata Subdivision, Bacolod City, through which opening made (sic) them, said
accused gained entrance thereto and once inside the said house, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them,
assorted jewelries and cash, valued all in all in the amount of P29,624.00,
Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the herein offended
party in the aforementioned amount.[3]
The records show that only petitioner
Rosemarie was tried in Criminal Case No. 28.
Her co-accused, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo,
remain at large.
The case for the prosecution relied
on an alleged confession made by petitioner Rosemarie, admitting her
participation in the crime of Robbery.
The defense contested the admissibility of the confession, and averred
that the same was made under duress.
On
The evidence for accused [herein petitioner Rosemarie] more particularly the Medical Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician as well as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers guilty has clearly establish (sic) the fact that accused was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to force her to confess her participation in the robbery. Whatever declaration of accused therefore against her interest is inadmissible in evidence against her, hence, the alleged admission of the accused that she participated in the commission of the Robbery made to the police investigator and complainant [complainant respondent Pilar] even if it is true cannot be used against her. Notwithstanding however, accused could still be found guilty if the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to establish her participation in the crime without said alleged admission by the accused. Record, however, shows that other than the alleged admission of the accused made to the police investigator and the complainant, the only evidence to establish the participation of the accused in the robbery is the testimony of the complaining witness that after accused informed her that part of the jewelry stolen was inside her bag at her room, the complaining witness searched the room of accused and found one (1) piece of gold necklace. On this point, the evidence adduced shows that the police authorities went at (sic) the scene of the robbery and thoroughly investigated the incident including dusting for fingerprints, tending to show that the investigation of the police authorities was extensive, hence, it was quite improbable and difficult to believe that the police investigator would fail to search the bag nor the room of accused. This Court[,] therefore[,] find said testimony of the complaining witness on this point discredited.[5]
The
decretal portion of the
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the evidence for the
prosecution not only insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie case against
her for having participated in the robbery subject of the above entitled case
and therefore ACQUITS accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The bailbond of the
accused for her provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.[6]
On
The Complaint, alleged, inter alia,
that by reason of respondents’ false, malicious, and illegal actuations in
filing Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie, the
latter suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation, worry, and mental anguish,
which if assessed in monetary terms will not be less than P200,000.00.[8] It was further alleged therein that Conrado,
Rosemarie’s father, lost his job and his entire family suffered.[9] Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie suffered
physical pain and mental torture due to the filing of the false criminal charge
against her.[10] They sought moral and exemplary damages,
including attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings
and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemarie’s defense in Criminal Case
No. 28 for Robbery.[11] They similarly prayed for payment of the expenses
incurred in the prosecution of the instant case.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a
Petition to litigate as pauper which the RTC granted in its Order dated
Respondent Pilar
filed a Motion to Dismiss,[13]
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations,
as crystallized in Article 1146[14]
of the Civil Code. From the time the
cause of action arose to the filing of the Complaint, four years and eight months
had already lapsed.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss,[15]
contending that their cause of action is not for damages based on the physical
injuries suffered by Rosemarie during the investigation of the criminal case
nor the violation of her rights for the indignities foisted upon her by the
respondents from
On
Respondent Pilar
filed before the RTC an Answer,[20]
dated
Petitioners filed a Reply and Answer
to Counterclaim,[22]
reiterating the allegation in the Complaint, that respondent Pilar actually participated in the maltreatment of petitioner
Rosemarie, and she cannot deny her participation as she was always present in
the police station during the investigation.
Petitioners alleged that respondent Pilar
cannot claim lack of knowledge of the maltreatment and indignities suffered by
petitioner Rosemarie because she herself participated in such
maltreatment. Petitioners further
contended, inter alia,
that they have a proper and valid cause of action against the respondents,
including petitioner Conrado who suffered and incurred expenses to defend his
daughter, Rosemarie, who was then a minor against unjust accusation,
maltreatment and torture.
On
Meanwhile, respondents Ibarra and
Juanito, members of the police force of
Trial, thereafter, ensued.
Seeking to fortify their case,
petitioners offered the following exhibits, to wit:
Exhibit
“A” – The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teodoro
S. Lavasa, Medico-legal officer and Chief, Crime
Laboratory, Bacolod Metro Police District, dated
This exhibit is offered to show the many injuries sustained by [herein petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua at the hands of the [herein respondents] in their joint effort to make her admit the crime in the absence of proof that she participated therein and despite her protestations of innocence.
Exhibit “B” – The note of Dr. Teodoro S. Lavada to the jail warden.
This exhibit is offered to show the result of the maltreatment and/or physical injuries inflicted by the [respondents] on the person of [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua – hemoptysis, fever, and body pains - which made the medico-legal officer recommend hospitalization for her.
Exhibit “C” – The information filed
by Fiscal Ricardo F. Tornilla, 2nd Asst.
City Fiscal,
This exhibit is offered to show the result of the [respondents’] confederated efforts for Rosemarie Magbanua to be prosecuted for the crime she did not commit, including untrue affidavits, a biased and false investigation report mentioning Rosemarie Magbanua’s alleged confession of her participation in the robbery when she never did, despite the injuries and indignities to which she was subjected, all of which made the Asst. City Fiscal Ricardo F. Tornilla file the information against said plaintiff Rosemarie Magbanua.
Exhibit “D” – The Decision rendered
by Hon. Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., Judge, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Exhibit “D-1” – The portion appearing on page 4 of said decision stating that, “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the evidence for the prosecution not only insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie case against her for having participated in the robbery subject of the above entitled case and therefore ACQUITS accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The bailbond of the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.”
This exhibit with its sub-marking is offered to show that the [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua was acquitted of the crime charged because the evidence for the prosecution was not only insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie evidence against her for having participated in the robbery, thus glaringly exposing the utter lack of basis for charging and/or prosecuting Rosemarie Magbanua for the crime of robbery which was nevertheless filed at the behest of the [respondents] who knowing fully the bereftness of their stand even tried to concoct additional evidence of having found still more jewelry in [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua’s handbag, a maneuver which was debunked by the honorable Court in its decision.
Exhibit “E” – The decision of the National Police Commission Adjudication Board No. 11 in Adm. Case No. 83-0888 finding the respondent PFC Ibarra Lopez and respondent Patrolman Juanito Jacela, two of the defendants, guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their suspension for two (2) months without pay.
Exhibit “E-1” – The bracketed dispositive portion of the decision appearing on page 3 thereof which is as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Board finds respondents PFC IBARRA LOPEZ AND PAT JUANITO JACELA guilty of Misconduct and they are hereby ordered SUSPENDED FOR TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY WITH WARNING THAT A REPETITION OF THE SAME OFFENSE SHALL BE PENALIZED MORE SEVERELY.”
This exhibit with its submarking is offered to show that the two (2) [respondents], PFC Ibarra Lopez and Patrolman Juanito Jacela, employed unnecessary force on the person of the [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua just to make her admit and/or confess to a crime she did not commit, thus contributing to and even making possible the unnecessary, baseless, and malicious prosecution of the [petitioner].[26]
On
On
In sustaining the respondents, the
RTC said that the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner Rosemarie
was not prompted with a sinister design to vex, or humiliate her. It reasoned that respondent Pilar reported the robbery which occurred on
In denying petitioners’ prayer for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, the RTC ruled that:
In the course of the investigation, Rosemarie Magbanua admitted her participation in the robbery together with a certain Ernesto Fernandez and a person named “Gudo.” The necklace given to her as her share was recovered in her shoulder bag.
After the police authorities had completed their investigation, they filed a case for robbery with the office of the City Fiscal of Bacolod City (now City Prosecutor) against Rosemarie Magbanua, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain “Gudo.” The Office of the City Fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation filed a case for robbery against the three suspects. After trial, as against then accused now [herein petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua, the Court acquitted her.
[Herein
respondent] Dra. Pilar Junsay,
cannot be faulted for reporting to the police.
She was robbed of valuables worth P29,974.00. Besides, she did not tell the police that she
was robbed by herein [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua. And, there is no legal malice for a victim of
a crime to report the matter to the police.
Furthermore, the mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable
for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Albenson
Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16).
Neither can [respondents] police investigator Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela be faulted for filing a complaint of robbery with the Office of the City Fiscal, against herein plaintiff Rosemarie Magbanua, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain “Gudo.” It is part of their duties to conduct an investigation of a case reported to their office. And Rosemarie Magbanua admitted to them her participation to the commission of the crime together with her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez and Gudo. Thus, there was probable cause of the crime of robbery against said accused. Their finding of a probable cause against the accused was shared by the City Fiscal’s Office when an Information for robbery against said accused was filed after conducting a preliminary investigation.
[Respondents] police investigators
Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela do not know
[respondent] Dra.Pilar Junsay
nor [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua, prior to
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal
on the
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
in toto.
The
appellate court declared that the design to vex and humiliate petitioner Rosemarie
in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 28 was wanting. It held that respondent Pilar
as complaining witness merely reported the matter to the police authorities;
while respondents Ibarra and Juanito were merely performing their duties as
investigating police officers. Thus:
In the present case, there was no proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate the [herein petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua. The crime of robbery was actually committed and [petitioner] Rosemarie Magbanua admitted her participation therein. There was nothing illegal, sinister or malicious in prosecuting her on the part of [herein respondent] Dra. Junsay who, as a victim of the crime of robbery, reported the incident to the police authorities. In fact, the [respondent] did not suspect that the [petitioner] was one of those who committed the crime.
On the part of the police
investigators, they were only performing their duties in accordance with the
standard procedure of their office. They
came to know the victim Dra. Junsay and [petitioner]
Rosemarie Magbanua only during the
investigation. The fact was that
Rosemarie Magbanua admitted participation in the
commission of the crime. Finding that
there was a prima facie case, the
City Fiscal who investigated the case filed a case for robbery in the then
Court of First Instance of Bacolod (now RTC).[31]
The
Court of Appeals was also convinced that there was probable cause to believe
that the robbery was committed by petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused. The finding of probable cause, according to
the appellate court, was confirmed by the filing of the Information for Robbery
by the City Fiscal’s Office after the preliminary
investigation.[32]
The
Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the trial court dated
Hence,
petitioners come to the succor of this Court via the instant Appeal by Certiorari
to assail the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, that there was no malicious
prosecution.
For
our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to damages for
malicious prosecution. However, before we could resolve said issue, we should
first determine whether the filing of a criminal case for Robbery against
petitioner Rosemarie constituted malicious prosecution.
It
is petitioners’ submission that the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie was
founded upon baseless accusations.[34] Petitioners posit that the charges were based
on false affidavits and false police reports, without which the criminal case
against petitioner Rosemarie would not have been filed.[35] Petitioners further decry the maltreatment
which petitioner Rosemarie allegedly suffered from the hands of
respondents. According to petitioners,
Rosemarie was maltreated to extract a confession from her, and to make her
admit to a crime she did not commit.
They reasoned that petitioner Rosemarie, who was then a minor, an
uneducated farm girl, and a stranger in
In this jurisdiction, the term
“malicious prosecution” has been defined as “an action for damages
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after
the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein.”[38] While
generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate
the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.[39]
This Court, in Drilon v. Court of Appeals,[40]
elucidated, viz:
The term malicious prosecution has been defined
in various ways. In American jurisdiction,
it is defined as:
“One begun in malice without probable cause to
believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter,
28
In
Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
“An action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding
has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist
of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere
purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).”
The
statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the New
Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21,
26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8).
To constitute malicious prosecution,
however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution.
This
Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover
damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore,
for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the
prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action
finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal
malice -- an improper or a sinister motive.[41] The gravamen of
malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong
provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge
that the charges were false and groundless.[42]
We
shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie
for the crime of Robbery, all four elements were in attendance.
It
is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
The
prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery did occur, and
respondents Pilar, Ibarra and Juanito instigated its
commencement. On
On
the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled
that for purposes of malicious prosecution, “probable cause”
means “such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”[43] It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief.[44] Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.[45]
Anent
the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable cause in bringing
the action against petitioner Rosemarie, we find no reason to depart from the
conclusions reached by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The filing of Criminal Case No. 28 for
Robbery was not without probable cause.
Indeed, during the investigation petitioner
Rosemarie admitted her participation in the commission of the incident
complained of. The investigation report,
which prompted the filing of the Information for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie
showed that she admitted to receiving instruction from her co-accused Ernesto
Fernandez and a certain Gudo to leave the barrel belt
of the kitchen door unlocked,[46]
so her co-accused can gain entry to the house of respondent Pilar. Moreover, she admitted that after her
co-accused had taken the pieces of jewelry owned by respondent Pilar, they gave her a necklace which she kept in a
shoulder bag. During the investigation,
she was shown the said necklace, and she positively identified the same to be
the necklace her co-accused had given her.[47] On the basis of the said admission, the
Office of the Prosecutor found basis and probable cause to file the appropriate
Information with the RTC against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused
Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo. The inadmissibility of the aforesaid
admission on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an evidentiary
matter, which does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemarie’s
admission, there was reason for the respondents to believe that the suit was
not unfounded, and that the crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages
based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was
impelled by legal malice. There is
necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the
award of damages under Articles 19 to 21,[48] of
the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith.[49] Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in
jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law
would not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.[50]
Applying the rule to the case at bar,
we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no
proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate
petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her
co-accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be
expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be
attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal
proceedings. At the risk of redundancy,
we stress that the proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right
to litigate must not be violated. Mere
filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution
should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.[51] There was no other explanation or motive as
to why respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner
Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that
there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and
petitioner Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.
We also do not find the actuations of
respondents Ibarra and Juanito to be impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action against petitioner
Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police
officers. The same was made subsequent
to the report of respondent Pilar of the commission
of the crime, and the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then, mistakes committed by a public
officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith,[52]
which was not established in the case at bar.
Moreover, as was clear from the
outset, the instant case is a suit seeking damages for malicious prosecution,
and not for the violations and maltreatment that respondents allegedly
committed against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting the admission from
her. At any rate, the RTC had ruled that
the instant case is not an action on the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner
Rosemarie, but rather for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking
damages for her injuries should have been deemed prescribed.[53]
WHEREFORE, the
Appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES – SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
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On Leave
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salome
A. Montoya with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-26.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon B. Posadas; id. at 128-132.
[3] Records, p. 31.
[4] Penned by Judge Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.; id. at 31-34.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
x x x.
[15] Records, pp. 28-30.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Penned by Presiding Judge Designate
[28]
[29]
[31] Rollo,
pp. 23-24.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Yasoña v. De Ramos, G.R. No. 156339,
[39] See
Bayani v. Panay Electric
Co. Inc., 386 Phil. 980, 986 (2000), citing Equitable Banking Corp. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 218 Phil. 135, 140 (1984).
[40] 336 Phil. 949, 956-957 (1997).
[41] Villanueva
v. United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), 384 Phil. 130, 140 (2000).
[42]
[43] Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1194 (1999), citing Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil.
363, 365 (1915).
[44] Villanueva
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187,
[45]
[46] Records, p. 194.
[47]
[48] Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[49] See
Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy
Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 429, citing ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 531 (1999).
[50] Martires v. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 696, 709,
citing Lao v. Court of Appeals, 338
Phil. 191, 203 (1997).
[51] See
China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94182, 28 March
1994, 231 SCRA 472, 478; Saber v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 259, 290.
[52] Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R.
No. 83589,
[53] Supra note 14.