HEIRS
OF WENCESLAO TABIA, G.R. Nos. 129377
& 129399
SPOUSES ERLINDO MAMONONG
and VIRGINIA DE LUMBAN, HEIRS
OF MANUEL SOMO and FELICIDAD Present:
SOCORRO,
SPOUSES NICANOR
OSORIO and
SPOUSES
MAXIMINO PEREZ and QUISUMBING,
J,.
JOVITA
LADUB, HEIRS OF THE Chairperson,
SPOUSES
JUAN RABACA and CARPIO,
CRISTINA
BADIOLA, JULIANA CARPIO
MORALES,
ANSAY,
MACRA BADILLO, ROSALIA TINGA, and
RABIE
and HEIRS OF PEPING VELASCO, JR., JJ.
MERCADO and CONCORDIA
ABAYARI,
Petitioners, Promulgated:
- versus
-
COURT OF APPEALS, ABRAHAM
DELA CRUZ and DIRECTOR OF
LANDS ABELARDO PALAD, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before this Court are two Petitions
for Review[1] both
filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the 29 November
1996 Decision,[2] as well
as the 4 June 1997 Resolution[3] of
the 8th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39205,
which affirmed the 31 August 1992 Order[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-2852 and
denied reconsideration thereof, respectively.
On 16 April 1991, Francisco, Amparo,
Rosita, Araceli and Teresita, all surnamed Tabia;
Yolanda, Roynilo, Tomas, Jr., Domingo, Carlito and Augustus, all surnamed Añonuevo; Susan, Jojo, and Wilma, all surnamed Cacalda; and Danilo, Moises, Jr., Ramon and Roberto, all
surnamed Paraiso (herein petitioners) filed a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-2852, for Annulment of Free Patent No.
DENR IV-FP No. 00002P and Damages and/or Reconveyance
of Title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laguna against Abraham dela
Cruz (dela Cruz), representing the heirs of Antonina Rabie, and Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., Director of Lands.
The
case arose from a Decision[5]
rendered by the Director of Lands on
WHEREFORE,
the claim of the Heirs of Wenceslao Tabia represented
by Narciso Tabia, et al[.] is hereby dismissed and this
case, dropped from the records. Within the period of sixty (60) days from
finality hereof, the [petitioners] shall remove their improvements from the
land and shall vacate the premises thereof. The Free Patent Application
(Unnumbered) of Antonina Rabie, represented by Abraham dela Cruz, is hereby
amended to exclude therefrom the portions occupied by the
SO ORDERED.[6]
The
subject matter of B.L. Claim No. 288(n) was
Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Director of Lands in
his Order, dated
In Civil Case No. SC-2852, petitioners
accused the Director of Lands of unlawful conspiracy with dela Cruz and gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the
Dela Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss[12] Civil
Case No. SC-2852 on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2)
bar by prior judgment. On the other hand, the Director of Lands, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed an Answer.[13] Petitioners
filed a Motion for Admission of/and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.[14]
On
On
The trial court noted the Director of
Lands’ exhaustive findings of fact and conclusions of law. It held that
petitioners’ failure to exploit the available administrative remedy of appeal
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources rendered the decision of
the Director of Lands final and executory. Consequently, the filing of Civil
Case No. SC-2852 was deemed premature for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Further, the decision of the Director of Lands having become final, res judicata operated
to preclude the trial court from assuming jurisdiction. The trial court further
found that petitioners were precluded from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands because they voluntarily submitted themselves to said
jurisdiction by actively participating in B.L. Claim No. 288(n). Finally, it
held that the decision of the Director of Lands was supported by substantial
evidence.
On
On
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the
The grounds relied upon by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by dela
Cruz in Civil Case No. SC-2852 were the following: (1) finality of the Director
of Lands’ findings of facts; (2) failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) res judicata. All the grounds relied upon by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are all meritorious.
Petitioners’ foremost contention is
anchored on the Director of Lands’ alleged disregard of a supposedly undisputed
factual matter, which is that Wenceslao Tabia and the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 1430 for a period
of more than fifty (50) years, and by virtue of this possession, they are the
owners of the said lot, to the exclusion of dela Cruz. It is on this basis that
they seek the annulment of Free Patent No. DENR
IV-FP No. 00002P which, it was alleged, was fraudulently issued to dela Cruz
who misrepresented himself as the actual possessor of the land.
A
determination of the validity of petitioners’ claim necessitates a review of
the factual findings of the Director of Lands. However, in petitions such as
the one in the case at bar, pure questions of fact may not be the proper
subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as
this mode of appeal is generally confined only to questions of law.[23]
Further, findings of the Director of Lands as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.[24]
In this case, the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources had the effect of rendering the decision of
the Director of Lands final and executory.
The factual findings of the Director
of Lands assume an even more conclusive character because they were affirmed by
both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Their reliance on the
factual findings of the Director of Lands is not without reason. By reason of his
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under his jurisdiction, he
is in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, his factual findings in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of
sufficiency of evidence.[25]
Petitioners cannot fault the Director
of Lands for not appreciating the Deeds of Sale[26]
allegedly executed by and between Glicerio Tabia (the immediate heir of
Wenceslao Tabia) and the parents of dela Cruz for the reason that said
documents were not presented in B.L. Claim No. 288(n). They presented said
documents only in Civil Case No. SC-2852. Thus, the Director of Lands, in his
Answer to the Complaint, denied petitioners’ allegation to the effect that the
parents of dela Cruz bought portions of Lot No. 1430 from Glicerio Tabia.[27] Further, considering that the Deeds of Sale
were allegedly dated 1951, there was no reason for their non-production or
presentation in B.L. Claim No. 288(n). Failure to submit evidence could only
mean that if produced, it would have been adverse to petitioners’ case.[28]
If the inability to produce it was due to their counsel’s negligence or
omission, the same would bind petitioners.
It is worth mentioning that the bulk
of the evidence presented in support of their protest to dela Cruz’s
application for free patent consisted mainly of the following documents: (1)
tax declarations, the earliest of which is for the year 1945; (2) Deeds of Sale;
(3) Deeds of Partition; and (4) Payment Receipts. The transactions evidenced by
the Deeds of Sale, the earliest of which is dated 1958, show the chain of
transfer from Glicerio Tabia to the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners. On
this score, the Director of Lands ruled:
Wenceslao
Tabia is neither a survey-claimant nor owner of the land in question and the
same cannot form part of his estate which could be validly transmitted to his
heirs by succession. The extra-judicial partition of the land, confirmatory
deed of sale and deed of sale executed by the Heirs of Wenceslao Tabia are,
therefore, null and void because they have not acquired any right to the land
in question.
x
x x
[Petitioners] anchored their right
to, and interest in, the land by virtue of the sale executed by the heirs of
Wenceslao Tabia and alleged continuous possession of their respective portions.
As earlier mentioned, Tabia was not the owner of the land in question and as
such, he has nothing to transmit to his heirs. Corrorarily,[sic] his heirs has [sic] nothing to sell in favor of the
[petitioners].[29]
[Emphasis supplied.]
On
the other hand, the conclusions of the Director of Lands were drawn from
affidavits, public documents and records,[30]
as well as the results of the ocular inspection conducted.
On petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the trial court aptly held that petitioners were, in
effect, seeking a review of the decision of the Director of Lands which was the
basis for the issuance of the free patent. Since what is being disputed is an
action of an administrative agency, in consonance with the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedy, the concerned agency should be given the
opportunity to correct itself before the intervention of the court is sought.
There is a further requirement that the party with an administrative remedy must
not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief,
but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention.[31]
Petitioners
in the instant case did not fully exploit the administrative remedies available
to them. In fact, they were responsible for the dismissal of their appeal
before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource. It should be
remembered that their failure to file an appeal memorandum was the cause for the
dismissal of their appeal. They did not even question the dismissal by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource. Indeed, by their own neglect and
grave omission they allowed the Decision of the Director of Lands to become
final and executory, a matter that they could no longer question in Civil Case
No. SC-2852.
While the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies has recognized exceptions, [32]
none of them obtains in the case at bar.
On the third ground relied upon for
granting the Motion to Dismiss, we agree with the trial court that the doctrine
of res judicata operates
to bar the filing of Civil Case No. SC-2852.
We have held that the rule of res judicata which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.[33]
The Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer.[34]
As such officer, his decisions and orders rendered pursuant to his quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata.[35]
Res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. In the case at bar, where there is no
identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Thus, the issues in B.L. Claim No.
288(n) of prior possession of Lot No. 1430 as well as the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the Director of Lands’ conclusion may no longer be relitigated.
The issues now remaining for the
Court to resolve do not detract from the conclusion that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. SC-2852 is proper. The issues are: (1) whether petitioners have the
legal personality to institute the action for annulment of the free patent
and/or reconveyance; (2) whether the Director of Lands had jurisdiction to
award the free patent to dela Cruz; and (3) whether a constructive trust was
created in favor of petitioners when the free patent was awarded to dela Cruz.
The first issue is the personality of
petitioners to bring the action for annulment of Free Patent No. DENR IV-FP No. 00002P. Suffice it to say that since
the land in this case was public land prior to the issuance of the free patent,
the only party who could question that grant is the government, represented by
the Solicitor General. The free patent
is a grant by the government, acting through the Director of Lands. Thus, the
cancellation thereof is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[36]
On
the issue of jurisdiction, there is no question that the Director of Lands had
jurisdiction over B.L. Claim No. 288(n). Under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public
Land Law, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over
public lands.[37] Section
4 of C.A. No. 141 states:
Sec.
4. Subject to said control, the Director
of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification,
lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of
the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. [Emphasis supplied.]
The alleged pendency
of a cadastral case involving Lot No. 1430 is not at all inconsistent with the
Director of Lands’ exercise of jurisdiction in B.L. Claim No. 288(n). In fact, the
assumption underlying the initiation of cadastral registration proceedings is
that the parcels of land covered by the cadastral proceedings are public lands
and it is up to the claimants as oppositors to plead
and prove otherwise. Precisely, the cadastral proceedings is an innovation
which was conceived to hasten and accelerate registration of lands with the
Director of Lands, not the claimants, initiating the proceedings.[38] Since
there is no showing that the cadastral case adjudicated Lot No. 1430 in favor
of one of the claimants therein, it may still be presumed to be land of the
public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
If public purpose is to encourage
land registration for lands to be covered by the Torrens System and considering
further that the cadastral proceedings has remained pending and unresolved since
1930, the Director of Lands properly entertained dela
Cruz’s application for free patent.
Furthermore,
the effect of registration of a homestead or any similar patent and the
issuance of a duplicate certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him
an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been
determined by final decree of the court.[39]
Thus, in the case at bar, the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-9927 operates to take
Petitioners’ alternative prayer for reconveyance of Lot No. 1430 based on the principle of
constructive trust[40]
must likewise fail considering that their claimed ownership of Lot No. 1430 was
found to be without basis. Under this principle, registration of property by
one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being
another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a
constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance.[41]
The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the
decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought
instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to
one with a better right.[42] Clearly, not being the owners of Lot No.
1430, petitioners cannot ask for reconveyance of the
property to them under the principle of constructive trust.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
are hereby DENIED. The
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo (G.R. No. 129399), p. 107. On
[2]
[3]
[5]Rollo (G.R. No.
129377), pp. 60-62; CA rollo,
pp. 120-122; 495-497; Records, pp. 116-118.
[6]
[7]Records,
pp. 56-59.
[8]
[9]Rollo (G.R. No. 129377), pp. 63-65; Records,
pp. 148-150.
[10]Records,
pp. 119-121; 151-154. Signed by Romulo D.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]Supra
note 2.
[22]Supra
note 3.
[23]See
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442
Phil. 534, 544 (2002), citing Spouses
Leon Casimiro and Pilar Pascual, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
136911, July 3, 2002 and Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 85, 91
(2000).
[24]Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (1936), Sec. 4.
[26]Records,
pp. 124-125.
[27]
[28]Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 78787,
[29]Rollo (G.R. No. 129377), p. 62; CA rollo, 497;
Records, p. 118.
[30]These
public records were certificates issued by (1) the District Land Officer of
Laguna dated
[31]See
Hon. Carale v. Hon. Abarintos, 336 Phil. 126,
135-136 (1997).
[32]The instances when the rule may be disregarded are as
follows: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; and (11) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention. See Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 153 (1997).
[33]See
Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497, 503 (1956).
[34]See
Peña, Narciso, et al.,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Revised Ed., p. 466.
[35]See
Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956) and Ipekdjian Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al. 118 Phil. 915 (1963).
[36]See
Caro v. Sucaldito,
G.R. No. 157536, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA
595; and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,
442 Phil. 534, 543 (2002) citing Spouses
de Ocampo v. Arlos, 397
Phil. 799 (2000); Spouses Tankiko v. Cesar, 362 Phil. 184 (1999).
[37]Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño
Residents Association, Inc., G.R. No. 158455,
[38]See
Peña, Narciso, et al.,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Revised Ed., p. 486, and Act No. 2259, Sec. 5.
[39]See
Peña, Narciso, et al.,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Revised Ed., p. 460.
[40]Civil Code, Art. 1456 states: “If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.”
[41]Vda. De Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 416
Phil. 263, 274 (2001), citing Bueno v. Reyes, No. L-22587, 27 SCRA 1179, 1183 (1969).
[42]De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil.
534, 543 (2002), citing De Ocampo v. Arlos, 397 Phil.
799 (2000); David v. Malay, 376 Phil. 825 (1999); Manangan v. Delos Reyes, 367 Phil. 409 (1999); Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898 (1998); Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, 339
Phil. 184 (1997); Amerol v. Bagumbaran,
No. L-33261,