THIRD DIVISION
AURORA
FE B. CAMACHO, G.R. No. 127520
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
COURT OF
APPEALS and
ANGELINO
BANZON,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 41268 affirming with modification
the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga,
The Antecedents
Camacho was the owner of
On
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, Aurora B. Camacho, widow, of legal age and
resident of Balanga,
That I, Aurora B. Camacho is the registered owner of
Lot No. 261 Balanga Cadastre, has secured the legal services of Atty. Angelino
M. Banzon to perform the following:
1.
To negotiate with
the Municipal Government of Balanga so that the above-mentioned lot shall be
the site of the proposed Balanga Public Market;
2.
To sell 1200 sq.
m. for the sum of TWENTY- FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P24,000.00) right at the
Market Site;
3.
And to perform
all the legal phase incidental to this work.
That for and in consideration of this undertaking, I
bind myself to pay Atty. Angelino M. Banzon FIVE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (5000)
of the said lot, for which in no case I shall not be responsible for payment of
income taxes in relation hereto, this area located also at market site.
That I, Angelino M. Banzon, is willing to undertake
the above-enumerated undertaking.
WITNESS our hands this 14 of July, 1968, in Balanga,
(Signed)
(Signed)
ANGELINO
M. BANZON AURORA B. CAMACHO
Pursuant to the agreement, Atty.
Banzon, on even date, sent a letter-proposal[4] to
the municipal council offering three sites for the proposed public market which
included
17,000-sq-m portion of
Silvestre Tuazon had been an
agricultural tenant in
On
On
On
1. Ordering the ejectment of Defendant
Silvestre Tuazon, in so far as (6880) square meters is concerned, INTERVENOR’S
claim over Lot 261;
2. The First Cause of Action, ordering
the Plaintiff Aurora B. Camacho to deliver (5000) square meters as per Annex
“A”; EIGHTY square meters as per Annex “C”; EIGHT HUNDRED (800) square meters
which the INTERVENOR purchased from
third parties;
3. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering
the Plaintiff Aurora B. Camacho to pay the sum of P8,820.00, corresponding to
the lease rental of (5880) square meters a month, counted from July, 1973,
until the same is delivered to the INTERVENOR;
4. On the Third Cause of Action,
ordering the Plaintiff Aurora B. Camacho to deliver (1000) square meters, as
attorney’s fee in handling seven (7) cases;
5. Ordering
the Plaintiff Aurora B. Camacho and Defendant Silvestre Tuazon to pay jointly
and severally, the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney’s fee for legal services to the
INTERVENOR; cost and litigation expenses of P1,000. until the case is
terminated.
6. To grant such relief, just and equitable in
the premises.[15]
Camacho opposed[16] Atty.
Banzon’s motion on the ground that the admission of the complaint-in-intervention
would merely serve to delay the case. She also claimed that his interest could be
fully ventilated in a separate case for recovery of property or for damages.
On
On
1. That for and in consideration of the sum of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), Philippine currency, which have been received
from the INTERVENOR and acknowledged to have been received by the Defendant
Silvestre Tuazon, the latter hereby acknowledges, waives his defenses against
the claim of the INTERVENOR ANGELINO M. BANZON over a portion of Lot No. 261,
portion of the lot in question, to the extent of SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY (6880) SQUARE METERS as claimed and contained in the COMPLAINT IN
INTERVENTION and to give effect to this AMICABLE SETTLEMENT hereby surrenders
the actual possession of the said portion, subject to the approval of this Hon.
Court, in favor of the INTERVENOR;
2. That the herein parties to this AMICABLE
SETTLEMENT waive and renounce whatever rights or claims, including future
claims that each may have against each other;
3.
That the parties herein bind themselves to comply with the conditions of the
foregoing settlement;
4. That the foregoing AMICABLE SETTLEMENT was
realized and achieved between the herein parties, thru the prior intercession
of the Defendant’s counsel Atty. Narciso V. Cruz, Jr.
WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing AMICABLE SETTLEMENT be approved
and made as the basis of this Hon. Court’s decision between the herein
INTERVENOR and DEFENDANT Silvestre Tuazon.[18]
In Answer[19]
to the complaint-in-intervention, Camacho denied that she solicited the
services of Atty. Banzon to facilitate the transfer of the site of the proposed
public market; in fact, it was Atty. Banzon who approached and convinced her to
donate a portion of the lot to the
Camacho
admitted, however, that she signed the Contract of Attorney’s Fee but only upon
the request of Atty. Banzon. He told her that the document would be shown to
the municipal councilors “for formality’s sake” to prove his authority to act
for and in behalf of Camacho. It was never intended to bind her to pay
attorney’s fees.[20] She further denied that she agreed to give to
Atty. Banzon 1,000 sq m for handling the seven cases; they never discussed attorney’s
fees. The cases stemmed from his assurance that he would take care of any legal
problem resulting from the donation of her property. She was not even a party
in some of the cases cited by Atty. Banzon.[21]
Lastly, she denied that he had made demands to deliver the mentioned portions
of the property.[22]
In
his Reply,[23] Atty.
Banzon countered that the Balanga Municipal Council Resolution No. 128
transferring the market site to Camacho’s property was enacted precisely
because of his letter-proposal[24]
to the municipal council.
On August 14, 1977, Camacho and Tuazon entered into a Compromise Agreement,[25] whereby Camacho agreed to transfer a 1,000-sq-m portion of Lot 261-B in favor of Tuazon; for his part, Tuazon moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 3805 and to remove all the improvements outside the portion of the property which Camacho had agreed to convey to him. Thus, the RTC rendered a partial decision[26] approving the compromise agreement.
On
After
trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision[30] on
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Ordering plaintiff Aurora
B. Camacho under the Contract of Attorney’s Fees, [to deliver] 5000 square
meters of the subject landholding,
2. Declaring the dismissal
of said intervenor from the case at bar as unjustified;
3. Ordering said plaintiff
to pay and deliver to said intervenor 1000 square meters of the property in
question, Lot 261-B-1 or any other derivative sublots of the original Lot 261-B
in case of deficiency, for legal services rendered in seven (7) cases;
4. Directing said plaintiff
to deliver to said intervenor, under a Provisional Deed of Sale, 80 square
meters of the subject property, Lot 261-B-1 or any other derivative sublots of
the original Lot 261 in case of deficiency, after payment of the balance of the
purchase price;
5. Ordering said plaintiff
to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of said intervenor for the
aforesaid 80 square meters;
6. Condemning said plaintiff
to pay moral damages to said intervenor in the amount of P100,000.00;
attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
According to the RTC, Camacho had indeed read the contract
and freely affixed her signature thereon. Applying the provisions of Section 7
(now section 9), Rule 130[32]
of the Rules of Court, it concluded that the terms of the contract were
embodied in the document itself. Moreover, Camacho did not bother to pay for
all the other cases being handled by Atty. Banzon because she knew that she had agreed already to pay attorney’s
fees. The court likewise found that
applying the provisions of Sections 24[33]
and 26,[34]
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the area of the lot agreed upon as attorney’s
fees appears to be a reasonable compensation for his services. Since Atty. Banzon handled other cases subsequent
to the execution of the contract of attorney’s fees, the additional 1,000-sq-m lot
which the parties had orally agreed upon is proper. The RTC declared that Atty. Banzon was entitled
to be compensated based on quantum meruit since his dismissal from the
present case was unjustified. It also
held that Camacho was obliged to execute the necessary public instrument covering
the 80-sq-m portion of the lot which she had sold to Atty. Banzon. It went
further and awarded moral damages to Atty. Banzon on account of the mental
anguish and besmirched reputation he had suffered.
On
On
appeal to the CA, Camacho raised the following errors:
I.
THE
II.
THE
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT INTERVENOR’S DISCHARGE AS PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THE CASE AT BAR
WAS UNJUSTIFIED, IN AWARDING INTERVENOR MORAL DAMAGES, AND IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTERCLAIMS.
IV.
THE
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO EXECUTE A FINAL DEED OF SALE FOR 80 SQUARE METERS OUT OF
LOT 261-B-1, CONSIDERING THAT LOT 261-B-1 IS NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PROVISIONAL
DEED OF SALE.[37]
On
WHEREFORE,
foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification requiring plaintiff Camacho to DELIVER 5,000 sq.m. and 1,000 sq.
m. of
SO ORDERED.[39]
The
CA held that all the elements of a valid contract were present: Camacho (a
dentistry graduate and an experienced businesswoman conversant in English) cannot
plead that she did not understand the undertaking she had entered into; the object
of the contract is certain since the genus of the object was expressed although
there was no determination of the individual specie; and the cause of the
obligation – to negotiate and offer a site where the public market will be
constructed – is not unlawful and cannot
be considered as influence peddling. As
to the alleged violation of the terms of the special power of attorney, the
court held that Camacho was estopped from claiming damages by reason
thereof.
The
CA likewise found the award of moral damages to be in order; that the discharge
of Atty. Banzon as counsel for Camacho was not justified and his discharge does
not in any way deprive him of his right to attorney’s fees. Lastly, the CA held
that the RTC erred in requiring Camacho to deliver
On
Atty.
Banzon filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the CA Decision, as well
as a Motion to Declare Decision Final insofar as Camacho was concerned. On the other hand, Camacho moved to cancel
the notice of lis pendens. In the
meantime, petitioner had filed the petition before this Court. Thus, the CA no
longer acted on the motions on the ground that it had already lost jurisdiction
over the case.[41]
In
the present petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT INTERVENOR CAN BE AWARDED A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE DECISION WHICH SHOW THAT HE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE (SIC) HIS MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS UPON WHICH HE BASIS (SIC) HIS CLAIM UNDER CONTRACT OF ATTORNEY’S FEE, EXH. “C,” ESPECIALLY PAR. 7 OF THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION.
CAN THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE AND (SIC) DUE EXECUTION OF CONTRACT EXH. “C” BE SHIFTED TO PLAINTIFF CAMACHO WITHOUT VIOLATING SECT. 1, RULE 131, OF THE RULES OF COURT?
2. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLY THE PROVISION OF ART. 1246 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE IN RULING THAT CONTRACT EXH. “C” IS VALID AS TO OBJECT?
WILL THE DECISION REQUIRING THE
DELIVERY OF 5,000 SQUARE METERS OF
IF SO, WILL THAT NOT ALL THE MORE PROVE THAT TE OBJECT OF CONTRACT EXH. “C” IS INDETERMINATE PURSUANT [TO] ART. 1349 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN A POSITION TO PROCLAIM THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF THE ALLEGED CONTRACT WITHOUT FIRST REVEALING OR SETTING FORTH THE REAL NATURE OF THIS OR THESE UNDERTAKINGS BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS AND TESTIMONIES OF INTERVENOR. HENCE, WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO UNDERTAKINGS IN CONTRACT EXH. “C” ARE LAWFUL.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY TREATING LIKE A MATTER OUT OF
RECORD THE ALLEGED REASONS OF PLAINTIFF CAMACHO FOR DISMISSING INTERVENOR AS
HER COUNSEL IN THE CASE AT BAR, WHICH WERE ENUMERATED AND DISCUSSED ON PAGES
42-60 OF HER APPELLANT’S BRIEF, ANNEX “B,” AND WHICH WERE PRINCIPALLY AND
SPECIFICALLY COVERED IN HER THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS AND CONSIDERING THAT ONE
OF THESE ALLEGED REASONS ALSO CONSTITUTE PLAINTIFF CAMACHO’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
WHICH SHE IS SEEKING MORAL DAMAGES OF P100,000.
DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REPRESENTING PLAINTIFF CAMACHO’S THIRD ASSIGNED
WAS NOT PLAINTIFF CAMACHO THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW?
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF 1,000 SQ. M. OF LOT 261 ATTORNEY’S FEE FOR ALLEGED HANDLING OF SEVEN CASES HAS ANY LEGAL BASIS CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO SHOWING IN THE DECISION THAT THE ORAL CONTRACT ALLEGED BY INTERVENOR TO BE THE BASIS OF THE SAID ATTORNEY’S FEE WAS DULY POROVEN (SIC).[42]
Petitioner argues that the findings of facts in the assailed
decision are mere conclusions, without citation of evidence to support
them. She likewise avers that consent
was not clearly proven; the conclusion of the CA was based on the presumption
that the document was read prior to being signed. Petitioner insists that there
is no “object certain” to speak of since the exact location of the subject
property cannot be determined; in short, the issue is not the quality of the
property but its identity. Petitioner further asserts that the cause of the
contract – pirating of the municipality’s market project and ejecting the
tenant to convert the property into a commercial establishment – is
illegal. She further insists that respondent
failed to accomplish the twin objective of ejecting Silvestre Tuazon and
converting the remaining land into a commercial area; thus, he is not entitled
to the 5,000-sq-m lot. She further
contends that the CA erred in awarding moral damages because respondent did not
ask for it in his complaint-in-intervention.
Lastly, she asserts that the CA erred in affirming the award of the 1,000-sq-m
lot pursuant to a verbal contract between Camacho and respondent, especially
considering the prevailing jurisprudence against a lawyer’s acquisition of a client’s
lot in litigation without the latter’s consent.
In his Comment,[43]
respondent counters that the elements of a valid contract are present: Camacho’s
consent to the contract is evidenced by her signature which was in fact
admitted by the latter; that while it is true that the identity of the 5,000-sq-m
portion of Lot 261 has not been specified due to the absence of the necessary
technical descriptions, it is capable of being made determinate without the
need of a new agreement between the parties; as to the validity of the cause of
the contract, the general principle of estoppel applies.
The Ruling of the Court
Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines
a contract as a “meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.” Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present.[44]
In
general, there are three (3) essential requisites for a valid contract: (1) consent of the contracting
parties; (2) an object certain which is the subject of the contract; and
(3) the cause of the obligation which is established.[45]
The first element –
Consent of the contracting parties –
Is shown by their signatures on the
Contract
Consent
is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the agreement.[46] In this case, Camacho admitted the existence
of the contract as well as the genuineness of her signature. However, she
claimed that she signed only upon the request of Atty. Banzon, who told her that
the document would only be shown to the municipal councilors (“for formality’s
sake”) to prove his authority in her behalf. It was never intended to bind her
to pay him attorney’s fees;[47] in
short, petitioner insists that Camacho had not given her consent to the
contract.
We,
however, do not agree. The contract between Camacho and respondent is evidenced
by a written document signed by both parties denominated as Contract of
Attorney’s Fee. It is an established
rule that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which
rests in fleeting memory only; that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to
control and vary the stronger, and to show that the parties intended a
different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them.[48] Moreover, the moment a party affixes her
signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is
open to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.[49]
In
the instant case, Camacho voluntarily signed the document evidencing the
contract. Camacho’s claim that the
document was intended only to show respondent’s authority to represent her with
respect to the transaction is flimsy, since a special power of attorney could
just as easily have accomplished that purpose. In fact, Camacho did execute a Special
Power of Attorney[50] after
the Contract of Attorney’s Fee was executed, and if Camacho were to be
believed, the Contract of Attorney’s Fee should have been immediately canceled
thereafter since it was no longer needed. As correctly held by the CA, Camacho was
an experienced businesswoman, a dentistry graduate and is conversant in the
English language. We note that the words and phrases used in the Contract of
Attorney’s Fee are very simple and clear; thus, she cannot plead that she did
not understand the undertaking she had entered into.[51]
Considering that her undertaking was to part with a 5,000-sq-m portion of her
property, she should have been more vigilant in protecting her rights.
Even
assuming that the contract did not reflect the true intention of the parties as
to their respective obligations, it is nevertheless binding. The existence of
the written contract, coupled with Camacho’s admission that the signature
appearing thereon was hers, constitute ineluctable evidence of her consent to
the agreement. It cannot be overcome by mere denial and allegations that they
did not intend to be bound thereby. We also note that Camacho did not avail of
the remedy of reformation of the instrument in order to reflect what, according
to her, was the true agreement.
Camacho’s
consent to the contract was further manifested in the following events that
transpired after the contract was executed: the execution of the agreement with
voluntary surrender signed by Tuazon; the execution of the Deed of Donation
where Atty. Banzon was authorized to sign the same on behalf of Camacho; and
the sale of 1200 sq. m. portion of the property right at the market site. In all
these transactions, Atty. Banzon represented Camacho pursuant to the Contract of
Attorney’s Fee.
The object of
the contract
Is still
certain despite the parties’
Failure to
indicate the specific
Portion of
the property to be
Given as
compensation for services
Articles 1349 and 1460 of the Civil Code
provide the guidelines in determining whether or not the object of the contract
is certain:
Article 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.
x x x x
Article 1460. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated and/or physically segregated from all others of the same class.
The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if
at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being made
determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the
parties.
In
this case, the object of the contract is the 5,000-sq-m portion of
The Cause or
Consideration
Of the
contract is not illegal
In
general, the cause is the why of the contract or the essential reason which
moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract.[53] For the cause to be valid, it must be lawful
such that it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.[54] Petitioner
insists that the cause of the subject contract is illegal. However, under the
terms of the contract, Atty. Banzon was obliged to negotiate with the municipal
government of Balanga for the transfer of the proposed new public market to
Camacho’s property (Lot 261); to sell 1,200 square meters right at the market
site; and to take charge of the legal phases incidental to the transaction
which include the ejectment of persons unlawfully occupying the property
(whether through amicable settlement or court action), and the execution of the
Deed of Donation and other papers necessary to consummate the transaction.
There was thus nothing wrong with the services which respondent undertook to
perform under the contract. They are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
Petitioner
argues that the cause of the contract is the “pirating” of the municipality’s
market project and ejecting the tenant to convert the property into a
commercial establishment. This is premised on the fact that the construction of
the new public market at Doña
Francisca Subdivision had originally been approved by the municipal council of Balanga,
the Development Bank of the
It
must be stressed that Camacho was not deprived of any property right. The
portions of her property which she parted with (the 17,000-sq-m portion donated
to the municipality; the 5,000-sq-m portion given to respondent as attorney’s
fees; and the 1,200-sq-m portion which was sold) were either in exchange for
services rendered or for monetary consideration. In fact, all these
transactions resulted in the increase in the economic value of her remaining
properties.
Thus,
the defense of the illegality of respondent’s undertaking is baseless. The municipal
council had the authority to choose the best site for its project. We also note
that the market site was transferred with the active participation of Camacho,
who agreed to donate the 17,000-sq-m portion of her property; the new public
market was constructed and became operational; and the sale of the 1,200-sq-m lot
was consummated when Camacho executed the deeds herself. Thus, petitioner cannot be allowed to evade
the payment of Camacho’s liabilities under the contract with respondent; a contrary
conclusion would negate the rule of estoppel and unjust enrichment.
As
to the additional 1,000-sq-m-portion of
Indeed,
it was sufficiently established that an attorney-client relationship existed
between Camacho and respondent and that the latter handled several other cases
for his client. The records show that the parties had agreed upon specific sums
of money as attorney’s fees for the other cases:
Civil Case No. C-1773 P10,000.00[55]
Civil Case No. 424 P1,000.00[56]
CAR Case No. 278-B’70 P2,000.00[57]
CAR Case No. 520-B’73 P5,000.00[58]
Civil Case No. 3281 P5,000.00[59]
This
clearly negates respondent’s claim of an additional 1,000-sq-m share as
compensation for services rendered. Likewise,
there being no evidence on respondent’s right over the 800-sq-m allegedly purchased
from third persons, he is likewise not entitled to this portion of the property.
On
the other hand, Camacho admitted in her Answer[60]
to the Complaint-in-Intervention that
respondent had purchased from
her an 80-sq-m portion of the property. Since she
had merely executed a Provisional Deed of Sale,[61] we
agree with the RTC that respondent has the right to require the execution of a
public instrument evidencing the sale.
It
must be understood that a retainer contract is the law that governs the
relationship between a client and a lawyer.[62] Unless expressly stipulated, rendition of
professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or compensation and is not
gratuitous.[63] Whether the lawyer’s services were solicited
or they were offered to the client for his assistance, inasmuch as these
services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that
there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, and
thus gives
rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make
compensation therefor.[64] Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial
protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are
against abuses on the part of the counsel.
The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper
and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful
fees.[65] If lawyers are entitled to fees even if there
is no written contract, with more reason that they are entitled thereto if
their relationship is governed by a written contract of attorney’s fee.
In
her fourth assigned error, petitioner claims that the CA failed to rule on the
propriety of the dismissal of respondent as Camacho’s counsel.
We
do not agree. We uphold the following pronouncement
of the CA on the matter:
In this case, the grounds relied upon by plaintiff
Camacho as justifications for the discharge of Intervenor are not sufficient to
deprive the latter of his attorney’s fees.
Intervenor may see the case in an angle different from
that seen by plaintiff Camacho. The
procedures adopted by Intervenor may not be what plaintiff Camacho believes to
be the best. But these do not in any way
prove that Intervenor was working to the prejudice of plaintiff Camacho.
Failure of plaintiff Camacho to prove that Intervenor
intended to damage her, We consider the charges of plaintiff Camacho as mere
honest difference of opinions.
As to the charge that Intervenor failed to account the
money he collected in behalf of plaintiff Camacho, the same is not supported by
any evidence. Suffice it to say that
mere allegations cannot prove a claim.[66]
The
ruling of the CA on the award of moral damages is likewise in accordance with
the facts and established jurisprudence:
The act of plaintiff Camacho is a clear case of breach of contract. Worst, when Intervenor demanded payment, plaintiff Camacho adopted all sorts of strategies to delay payment. This case dragged on for twenty (20) years. And until this time, plaintiff Camacho continues to unjustifiably refuse the payment of the attorney’s fees due to intervenor.
For these, one can readily imagine the worries and
anxiety gone through by Intervenor.
Award of moral damages is but proper.
Moral damages may be granted if the party had proven that
he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock as a consequence of
the act of the other party. Moral
damages can be awarded when a party acted in bad faith as in this case by
Camacho.[67]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of a 1,000-square-meter
portion of
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired), with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Court) and Artemio G. Tuquero (retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 127-141.
[2] Penned by Judge Abraham P. Vera; id. at 208-234.
[3] Records, p. 371.
[4] Exhibit
“B.”
[5] Rollo, p. 236.
[6] Kapasiyahan Blg. 127; Exhibit “E.”
[7] Exhibit “I.”
[8] Records, pp. 1-3.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Annex “C,” p. 372.
[14] The
other cases which Atty. Banzon handled for Camacho are as follows: (1) Civil
Case No. 3512 from which this petition stemmed; (2) CAR Case No. 278 B’70
entitled “Tuazon v. Camacho, et. al.”; (3) Civil Case No. 3281 “Emilio Ma
Naval, et.al. v. Camacho, et. al”; (4) I.S. No. 36-71; (5) CAR Case No. 520
B’73 “Tuazon v. Camacho”; (6) Civil Case No. C-1773 “Calvelo v. Camacho, et. al.”;
and (7) Civil Case No. 3510 “Balanga Market Vendors Association, et. al. v.
[15] Records, p. 369.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Exhibit “B.”
[25] Records, Vol. II, pp. 40-43.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] G.R.
No. 79564,
[30] Supra note 2.
[31] Records, pp. 519-520.
[32] Section 7. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
[33] Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
[34] Section 26. Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
[35] Records, pp. 521-523.
[36]
[37] CA rollo,
pp. 53-54.
[38] Supra note 1.
[39] CA rollo,
p. 356.
[40]
[41]
Embodied in a Resolution dated
[42] Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[43]
[44] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1356.
[45] CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1318, Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No. 155043,
[46] Caugma
v. People, G.R. No. 167048,
[47] Records, p. 801.
[48] Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343, 356 (2001).
[49] Lim v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 400, 410 (1996).
[50] Supra note 5.
[51] Rollo,
pp. 133-134.
[52] Quiros v. Arjona, G.R. No. 158901, March 9, 2004, 425 SCRA 57, 64-65.
[53] Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., G.R. No. 152072, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 258, 276.
[54] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1352.
[55] Exh. “L-3.”
[56] Exh. “O”; TSN, August 14, 1980, p. 13.
[57] Exh.
“P-10”; TSN,
[58] Exh.
“Q-11”; TSN,
[59] Exh.
“S-1”;
[60] Records, p. 802.
[61] Annex “C,” id. at 236.
[62] Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 652 (1997).
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66] Rollo, p. 139.
[67]