FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ and G.R. No. 125813
PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus
- CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS, RAFAEL
BASKIÑAS and RICARDO MANAPAT, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
An Information for Libel dated
“That on
or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true
names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character
and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the
Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to
public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and maliciously cause to be published in “Smart File,” a magazine of general
circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and
Author-Reporter, the following, to wit:
x x x x
with which published articles, the said accused meant
and intended to convey, as in fact they did mean and convey false and malicious
imputations of a defect, vice and crime, which insinuations and imputations as
the accused well knew are entirely false and untrue and without the foundation
in fact whatsoever, and tend to impeach, besmirch and destroy the good name,
character and reputation of said FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, as in fact, he was
exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[1]
Private respondents moved to quash the Information,
as well as the corresponding warrants of arrest subsequently issued. However,
these motions were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 16, in an Order dated
The crux of the matter revolves around whether the above-quoted Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for libel, considering the following requirement imposed by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4363:
Article
360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means,
shall be responsible for the same.
The
author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
The
criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations,
as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in
case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Referring to the fact that the Information
against private respondents states that the libelous matter was “caused to be
published in Smart File, a magazine
of general circulation in
The Court of Appeals further observed that even during the preliminary investigation, private respondents had already interposed that Smart File was actually printed and first published in the City of Makati, and that the address of the publisher Animal Farms Publication as indicated in the editorial page of the publication itself was a post office box with the Makati Central Post Office. Even as this observation was disputed by petitioner, who insisted the place of private respondent’s printing and publishing business was actually in Manila, the Court of Appeals noted that he should have been alerted enough by private respondents' adverse insistence and that a due investigation would have inevitably revealed that private respondents had transferred from their previous Manila address to Makati by the time the subject articles were published.[6]
Before this Court, petitioner attacks the
reliance placed on Agbayani and Soriano, primarily by pointing
out that in both cases, the complainants were public officers, and not private
officials. Petitioner submits that the 1965 amendments to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposed the present venue requisites were introduced
in order to preclude the harassment of members of the press through libel suits
filed in remote and distant places by public officers. Petitioner also assails
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the place of printing and first
publication of Smart File was in
Does the subject information
sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article
360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil
actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was
published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was
written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public
officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints for libel.
Before
article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or
circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja,
43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience
had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant place.
Thus,
in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine
Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged
with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec
v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To
forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the
offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882,
May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated
thus:
1.
Whether
the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2.
If the offended
party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense.
3.
If the offended
party is a public officer whose office is in
4.
If the offended
party is a public officer holding office outside of
The rules, as restated in Agbayani, do not lay a distinction that only those actions for criminal libel lodged by public officers need be filed in the place of printing and first publication. In fact, the rule is quite clear that such place of printing and first publication stands as one of only two venues where a private person may file the complaint for libel, the other venue being the place of residence of the offended party at the time the offense was committed. The very language itself of Article 360, as amended, does not support petitioner's thesis that where the complainant is a private person, a more liberal interpretation of the phrase “printed and first published” is warranted than when a public officer is the offended party. To wit:
Article
360. Persons responsible.―x x x The
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense. x x
x
Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.[8]
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for relying on Agbayani and Soriano, two cases wherein the complainant was a public officer. Yet the Court has since had the opportunity to reiterate the Agbayani doctrine even in cases where the complainants were private persons.
Most telling of the recent precedents is Agustin v. Pamintuan,[9] which involved a criminal action for libel filed by a private person, the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City. The relevant portion of the Information is quoted below:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community and with malicious intent of exposing the (sic) Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write in his column "Cocktails" and publish in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines x x x.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase “the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the
entire Philippines” bears obvious similarity to the reference in the
Information in this case to the publication involved as “‘Smart File,’ a magazine of
general circulation in Manila,” and both private complainants in Agustin
and the case at bar were private citizens at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Yet the Court in Agustin ruled that the failure to allege
that
In Macasaet v. People,[12]
the complainant was again a private person.[13]
The Information for libel against a gossip columnist and the editors of the
tabloid which published the column was filed with the RTC of Quezon City, but
it failed to state at all where the tabloid was printed and first published, or
where the complainant resided. Even as evidence was presented during trial that
complainant was a resident of
Macasaet resolutely stated that since the place of
printing and first publication or the place of residence at the time are “matters deal[ing] with the fundamental
issue of the court's jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the
information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the
information renders the latter fatally defective.”[17]
We affirm that proposition, which is fatal to this petition. There is no
question that the Information fails to allege that the City of
Petitioner does submit that there is no need to employ the
clause “printed and first published” in indicating where the crime of libel was
committed, as the term “publish” is “generic and within the general context of
the term 'print' in so far as the latter term is utilized to refer to the
physical act of producing the publication.”[18]
Certainly, that argument flies in the face of our holding in Agustin,
which involved a similarly worded Information, and which stands as a precedent
we have no inclination to disturb. Still, a perusal of the Information in this
case reveals that the word “published” is utilized in the precise context of noting
that the defendants “cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of
general circulation in
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently
vests jurisdiction in
Our ruling in Banal III v. Panganiban[19]
might tend to support petitioner's argument that the phrase “printed and first
published” need not be necessarily employed in the Information. The Information
in that case filed by private persons before the Makati City RTC read that the
libelous matter was found in a newspaper column “of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer which is published in English in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and of general circulation in the Philippines and abroad x x x x.”[20]
The Court did observe that this information was “sufficient in form”[21]
as it clearly stated “that the newspaper is published in
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant's place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous,
especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
If this disquisition impresses an unduly formalistic reading of the Information at hand, it should be reiterated that the flaws in the Information strike at the very heart of the jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information,[24] and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[25] Article 360 states, in as unequivocal a manner as possible, that the criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed with the court of the province or city “where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.” If the Information for libel does not establish with particularity any of these two venue requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal case.
Another point bears to be added. We are unable to share petitioner's insistence that since the protection of members of the mass media from frivolous libel suits filed by public officers in far-flung
places appears to have been a motivating force behind the amendments to Article 360, a more liberal interpretation of the provision should obtain if the complainant is a private person. Without the venue requirements under Article 360, a private person induced by a motive to harass could, similarly as a public officer, coerce a journalist to defend against a libel suit filed in the most remote of places. While Rep. Act No. 4363 does attribute value to the right to comment on the performance of public officials of their duties, it actually extends its protection to the right of any person to free expression, by assuring a reasonable venue requirement even if the subject of comment is not a public officer. Libel stands as an exception to one of the most cherished constitutional rights, that of free expression. While libel laws ensure a modicum of responsibility in one's own speech or expression, a prescribed legal standard that conveniences the easy proliferation of libel suits fosters an atmosphere that inhibits the right to speak freely. When such a prescribed standard is submitted for affirmation before this Court, as is done in this petition, it must receive the highest possible scrutiny, as it may interfere with the most basic of democratic rights.
Finally, we decline to resolve the
other issues raised in the petition, as the Information by itself is defective
on its face, for the reasons we have stated, that there is no need to evaluate
whether Smart File was actually
printed and first published in
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice