SECOND
DIVISION
NIÑO MASAS y MILAN, G.R. No. 177313
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus
- CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent. December 19, 2007
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R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner
Niño Masas y Milan[1]
(petitioner) and co-accused Gerry Ong (Ong) were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Misamis Occidental, Branch 36 (RTC-Branch 36) with
violation of Section 5, Article 2 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 for having in their possession one sachet of shabu
and for selling two sachets with two strips of aluminum foil to the poseur
buyer. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a lawyer from the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After trial,
the RTC-Branch 36 rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The RTC-Branch 36 acquitted co-accused Ong for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner
seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed the appeal
for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the required period, citing
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court in its Resolution dated 22
September 2006.
On
motion for reconsideration, petitioner, thru the PAO, contended that Section 8
of Rule 124 admits of an exception, that is, where the appellant is represented
by counsel de oficio.
The
motion for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated
The
present petition raises the lone issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the exception in dismissing the appeal.
We
take note of the Resolution dated
As
ground for the petition, petitioner invokes Section 8 of Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and contends that he was represented by
counsel de oficio and that he was not
furnished a prior notice
to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. The Court
of Appeals outrightly dismissed petitioner’s appeal
without looking into the merits of the case and disregarded the exception under
Section 8 of Rule 124. Petitioner points out that a mere reading of the
decision of the RTC-Branch 36 will reveal several glaring errors which
necessitate a review of the case. These errors include the conviction of petitioner
for violation of Section 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) despite the fact that the
information merely alleged possession of dangerous drugs; the sentence of life
imprisonment despite the absence in the Information of any allegation on the
weight or volume of the alleged drugs; the questionable findings of a buy-bust
operation; and obvious irregularity in the chain of custody of the confiscated
items.
Section
8 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (emphasis supplied)
The
provision is clear and unambiguous. Section 8 provides for an exception in the
dismissal of appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief, that is, where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The respondent, thru the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposes the petition and argues that petitioner is not
represented by a counsel de oficio as the
latter was not duly appointed by the court to represent petitioner. However, it
should be noted that in the Resolution dated 22 September 2006 dismissing the
appeal and the Resolution dated 6 February 2007 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals itself referred to Atty. Sumile as petitioner’s counsel de oficio
and ruled that the failure of petitioner’s “counsel de oficio
to comply with Our resolution [is] a gross disregard to the Rules.”
Further,
petitioner even filed a motion to litigate as pauper[2] in this Court as he has no work and no real property
where he could derive any income. Obviously, he could not afford the services
of a counsel de parte for which reason he was
previously represented by a PAO lawyer even in the trial court.
This
notwithstanding, also under Section 8, a criminal case may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals motu proprio
and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within
the prescribed time. The phrase “with notice to the appellant” means that a
notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal
should not be dismissed.[3] No notice was given to petitioner to this
effect. Besides, petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration, reiterated to
the court that it cannot “order the dismissal of the appeal without prior
notice to the appellant.”[4]
As the Court held in De Guzman v. People:[5]
A healthy respect for petitioner’s rights should caution courts against motu proprio
dismissals of appeals, especially in criminal cases where the liberty of the
accused is at stake. The rules allowing motu
proprio dismissals of appeals merely confer a
power and do not impose a duty; and the same are not mandatory but merely
directory which thus require a great deal of circumspection, considering all
the attendant circumstances. Courts are not exactly impotent to enforce their
orders, including those requiring the filing of appellant’s brief. This is
precisely the raison d’etre for the court’s
inherent contempt power. Motu proprio dismissals of appeals are thus not always
called for. Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural, right,
it is an essential part of the judicial system and courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative, but instead, afford
every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. More so
must this be in criminal cases where, as here, the appellant is an indigent who
could ill-afford the services of a counsel de parte.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the
petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice