Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner, - versus - LUCIO
C. TAN, MARIANO TANENGLIAN, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, IRIS HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO SANTOS, SR., NATIVIDAD
SANTOS, FLORENCIO SANTOS, JR., FOREMOST FARMS, INCORPORATED, SHAREHOLDINGS,
INCORPORATED, and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
Respondents. |
G.R. Nos. 173553-56 Present: PUNO, C.J., chairperson, *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
On The
Second GROUND: Facts and documents indubitably showing that
petitioner made a prima facie factual
determination on the ill-gotten nature of the properties involved before the
writs of sequestration were issued were ignored and discarded thereby resulting
in deprivation of petitioner’s right to due process of law
In resolving whether there is a “prima facie” case that the properties
ordered to be sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” under Executive Orders Nos. 1
and 2, we have to examine and evaluate petitioner’s order of sequestration
itself and its minutes of meeting.
On this point, we find it relevant to
define “ill-gotten wealth.” In Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc.,[6]
this Court described “ill-gotten wealth” as follows:
Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or
as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging
to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks
or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust
enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the
State. And this, too, is the sense in
which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.
Concerning respondents’ shares of
stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner that they belong to
the Government of the
Significantly, the only evidence held
by petitioner prior to the issuance of the
writs of sequestration was the minutes of its meetings (reproduced
earlier). Although there were 190 exhibits,[7] however,
petitioner, prior to the issuance of the orders of sequestration, had no
evidence to prove that respondents’ shares of stock are prima facie
“ill-gotten wealth.”
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan’s
conclusion that the minutes of meeting do not reflect any deliberation showing
that the shares of stock sequestered are prima
facie “ill-gotten wealth.” In
resolving this issue, the Sandiganbayan held:
Indeed, the value of the minutes of the respondent’s meetings cannot be overemphasized by this Court because it is as well the responsibility of an administrative tribunal to draw up their decisions and resolutions with due care, and make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and their final dispositions. It is a requirement of due process and fair play that the parties be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions it derived. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors for review by a higher tribunal. Moreover, the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[8] The finding of a prima facie factual foundation prior to the issuance of a writ of sequestration undoubtedly shares the rationale advanced in the aforecited jurisprudence.
As stated earlier, this Court
affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100
declaring void petitioner’s sequestration of respondents’ properties.[9] The evidence presented in these two cases is
similar to those presented in the instant cases. This Court referring likewise to petitioner’s minutes of meeting involved in Civil
Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100 held:
Other than being informative of PCGG internal procedure on how and by whom sequestration orders in general are issued and of the “accomplishments” of one of its then commissioners, the excerpts are absolutely unreflective of any deliberation by PCGG commissioners particularly concerning the sequestration order against SIPALAY, much less the factual basis for its issuance. They do not even make the slightest allusion to SIPALAY, or ALLIED. That Atty. Hontiveros devoted two (2) months for document-searching only to come up with minutes that are as barren as the testimonial evidences of the PCGG validates indeed the claim of respondent corporations which may well sum-up the PCGG’s case specifically against SIPALAY, that:
The only logical conclusion that may be reached by Atty. Hontiveros’
inability to produce PCGG records in regards respondent Sipalay
is that there was no evidence before the PCGG or any of its Commissioners which
would tend to establish that the shares of stock in Maranaw registered in the
name of private respondent Sipalay are ill-gotten.
There being no evidence,
not even a prima facie one, there was
therefore no valid sequestration of the SIPALAY shares in the Maranaw Hotels
and Resort Corporation.
While it has been held in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc.[10] that
orders of sequestration may issue ex
parte¸ it was emphasized that a prima
facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are “ill-gotten
wealth” is required, and that the person whose property is sequestered has the opportunity to contest the validity
of sequestration pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules and Regulations
of PCGG itself. Indeed, that
“opportunity to contest” includes resort to the courts. The “opportunity to contest” will be
meaningless unless there is a record, on
the basis of which the reviewing authority, including the court, may determine
whether the PCGG’s ruling that the property sequestered is “ill-gotten wealth”
was issued “with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” That record should include the reason why
the shares of stock are being sequestered and the record of the proceedings, on
the basis of which, issuance of the order of sequestration was authorized. Those records do not exist here.
Without any reason in the sequestration order why respondents’ shares of stock were
being sequestered, it would be impossible to determine whether the order of
sequestration was issued with any prima facie factual foundation. But petitioner relies on the presumption of
validity of official acts. Suffice it
to state that such presumption undermines the basic principle embodied in the
Constitution that public officers and employees “must at all times be
accountable to the people.”[11]
On The Third
GROUND: The lifting of the sequestration orders by the court
a quo despite its declaration that the bulk of the respondents’ documents at
best constitutes or tends to show proof that the properties covered therein are
truly “ill-gotten wealth” clearly contravenes the law and applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court
In resolving this ground raised in petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the “Joint Decision,” the Sandiganbayan stated:
x x x The clause “the bulk of the
respondent’s documents at best constitutes or tends to show proof that the
properties covered therein are truly “ill-gotten wealth” contained in the
assailed Joint Decision should not be lifted apart from the Court’s statements
immediately previous and subsequent thereto, in order merely to suit the
respondent’s contention. It is very
definite that the aforequoted clause, found in the
middle of a single paragraph, was preceded by descriptions or categorization of
specific documents offered by the respondent which do not at all establish prima facie factual foundation, and then
followed by the categorical statement that they do not, on their face, indicate
that the PCGG indeed deliberated on these matters to define a prima facie factual basis prior to the
issuance of the writs of sequestration.
To amplify further, the
misconstrued clause merely emphasizes that those pieces of documentary evidence
are irrelevant and do not disprove the petitioners’
position that the issuance of the writs of sequestration was not founded on a prima
facie factual foundation, which is the real issue in these petitions, and
that the respondent may find more relevance therein in the case to determine
ill-gotten wealth against the petitioners. x x x
Clearly, petitioner
should have interpreted the subject phrase in conjunction with the Sandiganbayan’s finding that the issuance of the writs of
execution was not based on a prima
facie “factual foundation.” It
must be emphasized that petitioner’s evidence does not show how the
properties sequestered were acquired by respondents or that they are
“ill-gotten wealth,” and whether former President Marcos intervened in their
acquisition.
On The Fourth
GROUND: The petitioner is entitled to a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Considering the Sandiganbayan’s
finding which we sustain, that petitioner’s
orders of sequestration were not based on a prima
facie factual foundation that the subject properties are ill-gotten wealth,
this ground is misplaced.
In sum, there can be no question that
indeed, petitioner’s orders of sequestration
are void and have no legal effect.
WHEREFORE, we DENY
the petition. The assailed Joint Decision
and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Cases Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and
0099 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
|
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated to
sit as additional
Member of the First Division under Special Order No. 474
dated
[1] G.R. Nos. 112708-09,
[2] Section 26. The
authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3
dated
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.
The
sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
[3] No. L-77663,
[4] EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 – CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT. WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad;
x x
x x
x x
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be
charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
x x
x x
x x
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2. –
REGARDING THE FUNDS, MONEYS, ASSETS, AND PROPERTIES ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED OR
MISAPPROPRIATED BY FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS, MRS. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, THEIR CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES,
AGENTS, OR NOMINEES. WHEREAS, THE Government of the
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the
(1) Freeze all assets and
properties in the
[5] No. L-75885,
[6]
[7] Listed and described in the “Joint Decision,” pp. 21-38.
[8] Citing Arboleda v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38 (1999) and Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., 453 SCRA 529 (2005).
[9] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[10] Supra, footnotes 5 and 6.
[11] Section 1, Article XI, Constitution.