THIRD
DIVISION
|
HON
Petitioners, - versus
- HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., AND HONDA
PHIL., INC., Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 172775 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,*
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before the
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85353, granting respondents’ Petition
for Certiorari and setting aside the
Orders dated
On
On the same date, RTC Judge Artemio
S. Tipon issued two search warrants. The
first warrant, Search Warrant No. 03-4438,[5]
was directed against petitioner “Hon Ne Chan and John Does, operating under the
name and style ‘Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center,’ located at No. 192 M.H. del
Pilar Street corner 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro
Manila.”
On the other hand, the second search
warrant, or Search Warrant No. 03-4439[6]
was issued against petitioner “Yunji Zeng and John Does, operating under the
name and style ‘
Except for the names of respondents
and addresses to be searched, both search warrants stated the following:
SEARCH
WARRANT[7]
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the
satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath the applicant
Special Investigator Glenn M. Lacaran of the National Bureau of Investigation,
and his witnesses Atty. Elmer NA. Cadano and Mr. Rene C. Baltazar, that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that a violation of Sec. 168 in
relation to Sec. 170 of the R.A. No. 8293 has been committed and that there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that the following :
a) Motorcycles bearing the
model names and/or markings “DS-110”, “DSM-110”, “SUPER WAVE”, “DS-125”,
“DSM-125”, “WAVE R”, and “WAVE” and the engines, moldings, spare
parts, tires and accessories for the manufacture and assembly of such
motorcycles;
b) Papers, documents,
brochures, documents, receipts, invoices, ledgers, books of accounts, labels,
materials, paraphernalia, effects, computer software, computer systems, central
processing units, hard disks, floppy disks, diskettes, date storage and
retrieval devices, monitors, and vehicles used or intended to be used in
importing, producing, manufacturing, assembling, selling, marketing,
distributing, dealing with and/or otherwise disposing of motorcycles bearing
the model names and/or markings “DS-110”, “DSM-110”, “SUPER WAVE”, DS-125,
DSM-125”, “WAVE R”, and WAVE”,
are in the possession and
control of Respondents HON NE CHAN[8]
and JOHN DOES, operating under the name and style “
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at
any time of the day of the premises above-described and to search for, and
seize, the above-described personal properties which are the subject of the
aforesaid offense and bring to this Court said properties to be dealt with as
the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL this 14th day of
November, 2003 at the City of Manila, Philippines.
ARTEMIO S. TIPON
Judge
On the strength of these search warrants, NBI agents
conducted a search of petitioners’ premises and seized the following items:
1.
from
petitioner Hon Ne Chan’s premises:
a) seven (7) motorcycles bearing the
model name “DSM WAVE R;”
b) three (3) motorcycles bearing the
model name “DSM SUPER WAVE”, and
c) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model
name “WAVE CX”.
2.
from
petitioner Yunji Zeng’s premises:
a) twenty-one (21) motorcycles bearing
the model name “WAVE CX 110;”
b) eight (8) motorcycles bearing the
model name “WAVE 110;”
c) thirty-five (35) motorcycles bearing
the model name “WAVE 125”;
d) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model
name “WAVE R”;
e) eight (8) motorcycles bearing the
model name “SUPER WAVE 110;” and
f)
two
(2) plastic bags containing various documents.[10]
On
Respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated
On
Hence, the present petition imputing
error to the Court of Appeals because of the following:
i.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE WARRANTS COMPLIED WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF VALID SEARCH
WARRANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH ONE SPECIFIC
OFFENSE TO SEARCH AND SEIZE THE MOTORCYCLE UNITS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THE
LACK OF PARTICULARITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE THINGS TO BE SEARCHED.
ii.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED GOODWILL IN HONDA
WAVE MOTORCYCLE DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD
SUPPORTING THE CLAIM.
iii.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS PASSED OFF THEIR GOODS AS THAT OF THE
RESPONDENTS BY USING THE MODEL NAME WAVE AND EMBODYING THE PROMINENT FEATURES
OF THE DESIGNS, WHICH IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION.[17]
We are primarily tasked to resolve the
questions of: 1) whether probable cause existed in the issuance of the subject
search warrants; 2) whether said search warrants were in the nature of general
search warrants and therefore null and void; and 3) whether there existed an
offense to which the issuance of the search warrants was connected.
We affirm the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The pertinent provision of the Rules
of Court on the issuance of a search warrant provides:
Rule 126
Search and Seizure
x x x x
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. –
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, the validity of the issuance of
a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.[18]
In this case, petitioners argue that
the requirements enumerated in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court pertaining to the
issuance of a search warrant were not fulfilled when Search Warrants No. 03-4438
and 03-4439 were issued by the trial court.
First, they contend that no probable cause existed meriting the issuance
of the search warrants in that it was stated in the Application for Search
Warrant of National Bureau of Investigation Special Investigator (NBI SI)
Lacaran that “(h)e has information and
verily believes that (petitioners) are in possession or has in their
control properties which are being sold, retailed, distributed, imported, dealt
with or otherwise disposed of, or intended to be used as a means of committing
a violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines”[19] Said statement, petitioners insist, failed to
meet the condition that probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on
mere hearsay.[20]
It is
settled that in determining probable cause, a judge is duty-bound to personally
examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may present. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the
oath required must refer to “the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.”[21]
Search warrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere suspicion or belief.[22]
In the case
at bar, petitioners capitalize on the first paragraph of the Application for
Search Warrant executed by NBI SI Lacaran to support their argument that he
lacked the personal knowledge required by both the Rules of Court and by
jurisprudence. However, the very next
paragraph of the application reveals the tremulous nature of their argument for
it is clearly stated therein that far from merely relying on mere information
and belief, NBI SI Lacaran “personally verified the report and found [it] to be
a fact.”[23]
This, to our mind, removed the basis of his application from mere hearsay and
supported the earlier finding of probable cause on the part of the examining
judge. We cannot, thus, agree in his
Order of
It is
likewise well to reiterate here that “probable cause,” as far as the issuance
of a search warrant is concerned, has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[24] Equally important is our declaration in Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Development
Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.[25]
that –
The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this
stage reasonable doubt. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full-blown trial.[26]
Applying
these standards, we hold that the trial court overstepped its boundaries as far
as determination of probable cause is concerned when it ratiocinated in its Order
dated 20 February 2004 that –
With respect to the other units seized
by the NBI, their immediate release is likewise proper since there is no
showing of probable cause that justified the issuance of the search
warrant. The (herein respondents) claims
(sic) that the (herein petitioners) are guilty of Unfair Competition because of
the alleged similarities between its motorcycle units and those of the
(petitioners). There maybe similarities
as claimed by the (respondents) but the differences far outweigh the
similarities that any confusion to the consumer is remote and speculative. These differences are quite evident from the
very comparative pictures attached by the (petitioners) in its (sic)
application for Search Warrant as well as in the Opposition filed relative to
the pending “Joint Motion to Quash Search Warrants and to Return Illegally
Seized Items.”
Aside from the differences in features, the motorcycle
units sold by the (petitioners) prominently bear the distinct trade name
“DRAGON SPIRIT.” This is not the same
trade name of the (respondents), which is Honda. The fact alone would practically eliminate
any possible confusion on the part of the public that the motorcycle units they
would be buying from the (petitioners) are those manufactured and/or sold by
(respondents).[27]
Such pronouncement by the RTC is
utterly premature for, at that point, all that was presented before it by
respondents was evidence, which to their minds, was sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause. The trial
court’s above-cited declaration unmistakably conveys the message that no unfair
competition exists in this case – a conclusion that is not within its
competence to make, for its task is merely confined to the preliminary matter
of determination of probable cause and nothing more. The evidence it requires to dispense this
function is, as stated before, far less stringent than that required in the
trial on the merits of the charge involving unfair competition.
Petitioners also argue that the search
warrants in question partook the nature of general search warrants in that they
included motorcycles bearing the model name “WAVE.” They insist that word “WAVE” is generic and
that it fails to pass the requirement of particularity of the items to be
seized. They also maintain that had the
word “WAVE” been enough, there would have been no need for petitioners to state
in their application for search warrants the specific motorcycle models, i.e., “DSM WAVE,” “DSM SUPERWAVE 110,”
and “WAVE R 125.”[28]
It is elemental that in order to be
valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the
things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent
them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures.[29] It is not, however, required that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.[30]
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,[31]
it was pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the
description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued. A
reading of the search warrants issued by the trial court in this case reveals
that the items to be seized, including motorcycles, are those which are
connected with the alleged violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170
of Republic Act No. 8293, notwithstanding the use of the generic word
“WAVE.” We, therefore, adopt the
following finding of the appellate court:
We may say this of the Wave motorcycles. It is evident that Wave is the model name of
the motorcycles produced by the (herein respondents) Honda and, therefore, any
imitation unit that is in the possession of the (herein petitioners) and
carries the name Wave is the fit object of the warrants – whether some other
name or figure is affixed to it or not.
The name Wave CX 110 is but a [species] of units under the generic name
Wave. The warrant that directs the
seizure of Wave logically includes Wave CX 110 and is by no means converted
into a roving commission when it allows the officer to seize it.[32]
Anent petitioners’ contention that the
search warrants were issued in relation to no particular offense, they rely on
the holding of this Court in Savage v.
Judge Taypin,[33] where it was held that –
There is evidently
no mention of any crime of “unfair competition” involving design patents in the
controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime
exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment
of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, for penal statutes
cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable
consideration.[34]
A reading of said case readily exposes
its stark inapplicability to the instant Petition.
To be sure, the search warrant in Savage was issued in the face of
possible violation of Republic Act No. 8293.
The acts complained of in said case were the alleged manufacture and
fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by private
respondent therein sans any license
or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding private
respondent and the buying public.
In making the above-quoted declaration
in said case, this Court recognized that paragraph 3 of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code stating that –
3. Any
person who, by means of false or fraudulent representations or declarations,
orally or in writing, or by other fraudulent means shall procure from the
patent office or from any other office which may hereafter be established
by law for the purposes, the registration of a tradename, trademark, or
service mark, or of himself as the owner of such tradename, trademark, or
service mark or an entry respecting a tradename, trademark, or servicemark.
was not
included in the enactment of Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293.
On the other hand, in the Application
for Search Warrant filed by NBI SI Lacaran, it is clearly stated that what
respondents are complaining about was the alleged violation of the goodwill
they have established with respect to their motorcycle models “WAVE 110 S”
and “WAVE 125 S” and which goodwill is entitled to protection in the same manner
as other property rights. It is quite
obvious then that their cause of action arose out of the intrusion into their
established goodwill involving the two motorcycle models and not patent
infringement, as what existed in Savage.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered the present petition for review is DENIED, and the
SO ORDERED
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario
L. Guariña III with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Santiago Javier
Ranada, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-39.
[2] SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. – 168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactures by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to any action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feather of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the service of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
[3] SEC. 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil
and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment
from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) to Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall
be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts
mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.
[4] Records, pp. 1-57.
[5]
[6]
[7] Search Warrant No. 03-4438.
[8] “Yunji Zeng.”
[9] No. 195,
[10] Rollo,
pp. 12-13.
[11]
[12] Records, pp. 104-117.
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, pp. 2-50.
[16] Rollo,
pp. 30-38.
[17]
[18] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09,
[19] Records, p. 1.
[20] Prudente
v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870,
[21]
[22] Cupcupin
v. People of the
[23] Records, pp. 2-3.
[24] Kho
v. Hon. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 150877,
[25] G.R. No. 140946,
[26]
[27] Records, p. 128.
[28] Rollo,
p. 21.
[29] People
v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 535 (2003).
[30] Kho
v. Makalintal, G.R. Nos. 94902-06,
[31] 148 Phil. 794, 811 (1971) cited in Al-Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil.
759, 771 (2001).
[32] Rollo,
p. 35.
[33] 387 Phil. 718 (2000).
[34]