THIRD DIVISION
|
MARIETTA
K. ILUSORIO, Petitioner, - versus - SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO, JOVITO CASTRO and FIVE (5) JOHN DOES, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 171659
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: December
13, 2007 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
us on appeal, by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is the Decision[1]
dated
The
case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[3]
filed by petitioner Marietta K. Ilusorio (Marietta) for robbery, qualified
trespass to dwelling, and violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1829
against private respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio (Sylvia), Cristina A. Ilusorio
(Cristina), Jovito Castro (Jovito), and five (5) John Does.
In the said Complaint-Affidavit,
Marietta alleged that she, together with Erlinda K. Ilusorio (Erlinda), Ramon
K. Ilusorio, and Shereen K. Ilusorio, owns and controls the majority of the
shares of stock of Lakeridge Corporation (Lakeridge), the registered owner of
Penthouse Unit 43-C (Penthouse Unit 43-C) of the Pacific Plaza Condominium
(Pacific Plaza) in Ayala Avenue, Makati City; that Erlinda, Chairperson and President
of Lakeridge, has, for the past eight years, been the present and lawful
occupant of Penthouse Unit 43-C; that, sometime in October 1999, Erlinda left
for the United States of America, giving her (Marietta) full authority to take
care of, oversee, and secure Penthouse Unit 43-C through a letter to that
effect addressed to the management of the Pacific Plaza; that on November 2,
1999, Sylvia, Christie Agcaoili-Ilusorio (referring to Cristina), with several
unidentified persons, with the consent of Jovito, Chief Security of the Pacific
Plaza, forcibly entered Penthouse Unit 43-C by breaking its door and locks and allegedly
caused the loss of documents and jewelry (this incident was subject of a
robbery case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City docketed
as I.S. No. 99-Y-37824); that on November 6, 1999, five (5) unidentified
persons, with Jovito’s permission, forcibly entered Penthouse Unit 43-C by
breaking its door and locks, replacing it with new ones, and thus preventing
her entrance; that upon learning of the latter incident, she went to Penthouse
Unit 43-C to verify, and, having seen the door knob torn and one of the locks
broken, sought the assistance of the Makati Police; that during the on-site
investigation by the police, Jovito failed to cooperate and even concealed
information pertinent to the incident.
In their Counter-Affidavit,[4]
private respondents, while agreeing that the registered owner of Penthouse Unit
43-C is Lakeridge Development Corporation, denied that petitioner and the other
persons named in the Complaint-Affidavit own and control the majority shares
and that Erlinda is the chairperson and president of Lakeridge. To buttress this allegation, they submitted
copies of the updated General Information Sheet[5]
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Secretary’s Certification[6] dated
November 8, 1999, and SEC Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information[7]
dated November 3, 1999, all showing the stockholders, the officers, and the
members of the board of directors of Lakeridge.
They also alleged that the authority given by Erlinda to
In his separate Counter-Affidavit[10]
dated January 17, 2000, Jovito explained that the November 2, 1999 incident
cited by Marietta in her Complaint-Affidavit where she claimed that Penthouse
Unit 43-C was forced open by breaking the door and locks was really an act of
maintenance of the property upon written request made by Sylvia as one of the
legitimate unit owners per the records of Pacific Plaza. He claimed that he was merely dragged to the
family feud of the Ilusorios.
In a Resolution[11]
dated
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated
Petitioner
posits that this Court should grant the petition because –
The Public Respondents erred in
upholding the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang, which
dismissed the complaints for Robbery, Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and
Violation of P.D. [1829], considering that:
A.
The evidence on record sufficiently
established probable cause that [the] said crimes were committed and that the
private respondents were probably guilty thereof.
B.
The petitioner, together with EKI (Erlinda),
Ramon K. Ilusorio, and Shereen K. Ilusorio, were the duly constituted officers
of LAKERIDGE and that the lawful occupant of Penthouse Unit 43-C of Pacific
Plaza Condominium was EKI, who in turn entrusted the same to petitioner in her
absence.
C.
The self-serving assertions of private
respondents that they were representatives of LAKERIDGE did not authorize them
to break open the doors of Penthouse Unit 43-C of
We disagree.
In essence, Marietta ascribes reversible
error in the Office of the City Prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause
against private respondents for robbery, qualified trespass to dwelling, and
for violation of P.D. No. 1829, which was uniformly affirmed by the DOJ and the
Court of Appeals.
Probable cause has been defined as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that
the person charged is guilty of the crime for which he is sought to be prosecuted. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable
belief, it does not import absolute certainty.[16] A finding of probable cause merely binds over
the suspect to stand trial; it does not impose a guilty verdict. However, it requires more than bare
suspicion.[17]
The conduct of preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is
executive in nature. The right to prosecute
crime is reposed in the executive department of the government primarily responsible
for the faithful execution of the laws of the land. This right vests the government prosecutor
with a wide latitude of discretion on what and whom to charge upon proper finding
of probable cause, depending on a smorgasbord of factors best appreciated by
him. The preliminary investigation also serves
to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open accusation of a crime, and the expense and
anxiety of a public trial. It likewise protects
the State from useless and expensive trials, if unwarranted.[18]
Thus,
a prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is convinced that there is not enough evidence
to support its averments, or that the evidence at hand, to his mind,
necessarily leads to a different conclusion.
While his findings are not absolute and are subject to judicial review,
this Court generally adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct
of preliminary investigations, particularly when the said findings are
well-supported by the facts as established by the evidence on record.[19]
Findings of probable cause are
essentially factual in nature.
Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner clearly raises
issues anchored mainly on the propriety or impropriety of the prosecutor’s appreciation
of the facts. This Court is not duty
bound to scrutinize anew established facts in a petition for review for we are
not a trier of facts.[20]
In this case, we find no compelling
reason to deviate from our policy of non-interference with the investigating
prosecutor’s findings of absence of probable cause. It is admitted by both parties that the
registered owner of Penthouse Unit 43-C is Lakeridge. Aside from the allegation of
Furthermore, Sylvia and Cristina were
able to establish by competent evidence that they were then the Vice-President
and the Assistant Vice-President of Lakeridge, respectively. As such officers, they would, ostensibly,
have the right and authority to freely enter and perform acts of maintenance of
Penthouse Unit 43-C. The right could
include breaking open the door and replacing its locks, apparently due to loss
of the keys.
Be that as it may, we still take time
out to examine the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code on robbery
and qualified trespass to dwelling, and the violation of P.D. No. 1829 referred
to by
Art.
293. Who are guilty of robbery.—Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.
Art.
299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
worship.—Any armed person
who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be
punished by reclusion temporal, if
the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if –
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or
building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance
or egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor, or
breaking any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar
tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending
the exercise of public authority.
Or if –
(b)
The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests,
or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle.
2. By taking such furniture or objects away to
be broken or forced open outside the place of robbery.
Art.
280. Qualified trespass to dwelling.—Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the
latter’s will, shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of
violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be
applicable to any person who shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of
preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a
third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor
to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns, and other public houses, while
the same are open.
Presidential Decree No. 1829:
Section
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
x
x x x
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing, or
concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its
verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in
the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the
escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his
arrest, prosecution, and conviction.
We hold that the evidence adduced does
not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses defined in the provisions
cited above. Marietta failed to prove,
by competent evidence, that: (1) Penthouse Unit 43-C was the dwelling place of
Erlinda; (2) she has authority over the said unit; (3) Sylvia and Cristina had
no authority to enter the unit and conduct acts of maintenance thereon; and (4)
Sylvia and Cristina were armed when they effected entrance. Based on these circumstances, the charges of
robbery and qualified trespass to dwelling must inevitably fail. Perforce, the charge against Jovito for
violation of P.D. No. 1829 should also be dismissed.
We reiterate that
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-35.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Paredes
v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 394; Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
101978, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 360.
[17] Ramiscal,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169727-28, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 375,
395; Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327
Phil. 916, 923 (1996).
[18] Webb
v. De
[19] Salonga v. Paño, G.R. No. L-59524,
[20] Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499, 529 (2003).