SECOND DIVISION
|
MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC., Petitioner, - vesus
- HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171438 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On
challenge via the present petition for review on certiorari are the Court of
Appeals August 18, 2005 Decision[1] which
granted in part petitioner’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
and February 9, 2006 Resolution which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.[2]
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1752, the
“Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980” which became effective on
The Pag-IBIG
Fund (the Fund) is a provident savings system for private and government
employees which is supported by contributions from their respective
employers. Under P.D. No. 1752, coverage
of the Fund is mandatory for all employees covered by the Social Security
System and the Government Service Insurance System and their employers. The law provides, however, for a waiver or
suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, viz:
SEC. 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plans. – An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes;
(a) For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so; or
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the effectivity
of the law in 1980 up to 1995, petitioner and its subsidiaries were, on their
application, annually granted waiver from coverage of the Fund because their Retirement
or Provident Plan was superior to it.[3]
On September 1, 1995, the Board of
Trustees of herein respondent, Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), issued
Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 pursuant to
which it issued on October 23, 1945 HDMF Circular No. 124-B or the Revised
Guidelines and Procedure for filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of
Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752. Under
the Amendment and the Guidelines, an employer with a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to
that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund is entitled to
execution/waiver from Fund coverage[4] (1995 amendment).
On
[petitioner’s] retirement/provident housing plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG Fund[‘s]. Further, the amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver, a company must have retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG Fund’s.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus directed petitioner
to register its employees with the Fund and to remit their monthly
contributions and its share to the Fund starting
On the ground that it was granted
exemption from Fund coverage for previous years based on its existing retirement
plan the features of which are superior to that of the Fund’s, petitioner
appealed respondent’s letter-resolution to respondent’s Board of Trustees.
Respondent’s Board of Trustees denied
petitioner’s appeal by Resolution of
Pursuant to the amendment to [the Implementing Rules and Regulations of] P.D. [No.] 7742 under Board Resolution No. 1208, series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver from the mandatory coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers, the Board of Trustees finds moot and academic all motions for reconsideration/appeals from the disapproval of the application for waiver.
Attached
herewith is a copy of the amendment on the policy to take effect
It
turned out that respondent had once again amended the Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended, this time limiting waiver from Fund coverage
only to “distressed employers” as defined in Rule III, Section 1[7] (1996 amendment).
Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Q.C.)[8] to
declare null and void the 1996 amendment
to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
By Order of
On
May 19, 1999, the Court, in China Banking
Corporation v. Home Development Mutual Fund,[13] nullified the 1995 Amendment “insofar as [it] require[s] that an employer
should have both a
provident/retirement plan superior to the retirement/provident benefits offered
by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG
housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund
coverage.”
On
the strength of the ruling in China
Banking, petitioner applied anew for a waiver from Fund coverage for the
years 1996 up to 2000.[14] By letter of
Undaunted,
petitioner reiterated its application for waiver, but the same was denied by respondent
by letter of
x x x x
Applications for exemption from membership contribution are on a yearly basis. In the event of late or no filing thereof, a company is under obligation to make the remittance for the said years.
Our
records show that your application for waiver for 1996 was denied and which
denial was in effect affirmed by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated
The
prescribed forms for application for Waiver for the years 1997 to 2000 were not
submitted by your company, though we acknowledge the “letter request” for
waiver for said periods, dated
Despite the foregoing, your company has failed to register all Pag-IBIG coverable employees/remit Pag-IBIG contributions due for the periods 1996-to present.
These acts are clear violations of P.D. [No.] 1752, as amended by R.A. [No.] 7742 which holds the employer criminally liable, apart from fines/civil liabilities that may be imposed.[16]
Petitioner thus filed before the Q.C.
RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,[17] Branch
225 of which dismissed it, by Resolution of
Petitioner thus filed on
. . . declaring that the second amendment [or 1996 amendment] to the Implementing Rules of HDMF is null and void, nullifying the first and second letters in question, and directing respondent HDMF to desist from taking similar action against petitioner, and commanding HDMF to entertain petitioner’s application for exemption/waiver of Fund coverage.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of
Appeals granted in part the petition by the assailed Decision of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent is DIRECTED to entertain petitioner’s applications for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the years 1997-to present with the concomitant obligation on the part of the latter to register its employees and remit their membership contributions covered by the same periods.[20] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Its motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s Decision having been denied, petitioner filed on March 29,
2006 the present petition for review on certiorari, faulting the Court of
Appeals,
A. IN DENYING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WAIVER/EXEMPTION FOR THE YEAR 1996 IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULING IN CHINA BANK CASE. LAW OF THE CASE ADMITS OF AN EXCEPTION.
B. WHEN IT ALLOWED RESPONDENT HDMF TO ENFORCE AN IMPLEMENTING RULE AND REGULATION WHICH WAS DECLARED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN CHINABANK CASE, AS NULL AND VOID.
C. WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE
SECOND IMPLEMENTING RULES OF RESPONDENT HDMF ‘DISTRESSED EMPLOYER’ AS THE ONLY
GROUND FOR WAIVER/EXEMPTION CONTRARY TO THE CHINA
BANK CASE AND THE LAW ON THE RULE MAKING POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.[21] (Underscoring and italics supplied)
Petitioner seeks the nullification of
the 1996 amendment. The 2000 case of Romulo, Mabanta,
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In affirming respondent’s denial of
petitioner’s request for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996, the
appellate court harped on the law of the case doctrine. Thus it held:
Undisputedly, petitioner’s application anew for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage is anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case which declared as null and void Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. [No.] 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund coverage under P.D. [No.] 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. It is in this view that petitioner contends that respondent should have considered its application for waiver/exemption from the coverage of the Fund. On the other hand, respondent invoked the doctrine of the law of the case pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 132416 in denying petitioner’s application for waiver/exemption from the Fund coverage.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Contrary to respondent’s position the law of the case doctrine applies only to the application for waiver/exemption for Fund coverage for the year 1996 and not to the applications for the succeeding years in view of the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case. The Supreme Court’s decision, which attained finality, limited itself only to petitioner’s application for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the year 1996. Apparently, petitioner applied for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the years 1996-2000 by virtue of the decision in the China Bank case. Thus, except for year 1996, respondent may still consider the remaining years, as they are not covered by the earlier application that was denied by the respondent and eventually decided by the Supreme Court with finality. Succinctly stated, the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier case became the law of the case only for petitioner’s application for the year 1996. x x x [23] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Expounding on the doctrine of the law
of the case, this Court, in Villa v. Sandiganbayan,[24] held:
The
doctrine has been defined as “that principle under which determination of
questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior
appeal to a court of last resort. It is “merely a rule of procedure
and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where
its application will result in an unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case.
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, we held:
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. …It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law to the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and appellate courts and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The doctrine of the law of the case
does not apply to the present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132416. The present
case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case – G.R. No. 132416. This is an entirely new one which was
commenced by petitioner’s filing of an original petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against respondent.
Even assuming arguendo
that the present proceeding may be considered a subsequent proceeding of
G.R. No. 132416, the doctrine of the law
of the case just the same does not apply because the said case was not resolved
on the merits. The Order of this Court
denying petitioner’s petition for review in G.R. No. 132416 found no reversible
error in the Order of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 222
dismissing petitioner’s case primarily on a procedural
ground – failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
At all events, the doctrine “is merely
a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be
adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision.”[25] To sustain respondent’s refusal to grant a
waiver of Fund coverage to petitioner on the basis of amendments to implementing
rules which had priorly been declared null and void by
this Court would certainly be unjust.
In fine, the doctrine of the law of
the case cannot be made to apply to the case at bar, hence, petitioner’s
application for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996 must be processed
by respondent.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent is enjoined to process petitioner’s
application for waiver from Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for
the year 1996.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, and Justice Arturo D. Brion, all of the Court of Appeals; CA-G.R. SP No. 87789, rollo, pp. 10-24.
[2]
[3]
[4] CA rollo, p. 34.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Records (Civil Action No. Q-97-31461), pp. 1-9.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] 366 Phil. 913, 930-931 (1999).
[14] CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
[15]
[16]
[17] Civil Case No. Q-03-49907.
[18] Records (Civil Case No. Q-03-49907), pp. 170-173.
[19] CA
rollo, p. 26.
[20] Rollo, p. 23.
[21]
[22] 389 Phil. 296, 306 (2000).
[23] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[24] G.R. No. 87186,
[25] Supra.