THIRD DIVISION
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO G.R. No. 169454
DORONIO, NAMELY:
DORONIO, Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
HEIRS
OF FORTUNATO REYES,
JJ.
DORONIO,
NAMELY:
ROSALINA
DORONIO-BALMES,
MODING
DORONIO, FLORENTINA
DORONIO,
ALCANTARA-MANALO,
Respondents.
December 27, 2007
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
For Our review
on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (
The Facts
Spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay
Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 352.[3] The courts below described it as follows:
Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.[4]
The spouses had children but the
records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio
and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties
in this case are their heirs.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents
are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
On
Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00.[6]
It appears that the property
described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy
with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern
side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent
owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of
donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a
private document as it was never notarized.[7]
Both parties have been occupying the
subject land for several decades[8] although
they have different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the
owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their
predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim
that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of
donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda
and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern
side. Respondents posit that the donors
respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half
of the land. They are the ones who have
been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property,
the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on
During the hearings, no one
interposed an objection to the petition.[12] After the
On
Determined to remain in their
possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed
an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction[15] against
petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the
During the pre-trial conference, the
parties stipulated, among others, that the property was originally covered by OCT
No. 352 which was cancelled by
After due proceedings, the
The
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.[21]
Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC,
respondents appealed to the CA. They
argued that the trial court erred in not finding that respondents’
predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No.
352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated
April 26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was
valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half
portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.[22]
CA Disposition
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.[23]
The appellate court determined that “(t)he
intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees’ predecessors
can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the
title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed
of donation propter nuptias executed
on
The CA based its conclusion on the
disparity of the following technical descriptions of the property under OCT No.
352 and the deed of donation, to wit:
The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows:
“Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.”
On the other hand, the property donated to appellees’ predecessors was described in the deed of donation as:
“Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00.”[25] (Emphasis ours)
Taking note “that the boundaries of
the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the
boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante,” the
CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half
of the property covered by OCT No. 352.[26]
Regarding the allegation of
petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA pointed out
that, “while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already
forms part of the records of this case for failure of appellees to interpose a
timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo.
It is a well-settled rule that any objection to the admissibility of
such evidence not raised will be considered waived and said evidence will have
to form part of the records of the case as competent and admitted evidence.”[27]
The
CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime
of respondents’ predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.
On this aspect, the CA reasoned out:
Moreover, We find the donation of
the entire property in favor of appellees’ predecessors invalid as it impairs
the legitime of appellants’ predecessor.
Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. “In
default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the
legitimate x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x.” As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante
died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato
and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the
entire property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another
heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of his rightful share in
his parents’ inheritance. Besides, a
person’s prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one
of which is that he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will
(Article 752, Civil Code). If he does,
so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess.[28]
Petitioners were not pleased with the
decision of the CA. Hence, this petition
under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioners now contend that the CA
erred in:
1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION THEREOF.
2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS.
3.
(ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE,
Our Ruling
OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not
Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection
Petitioners fault the CA for
admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish
language. They posit that “(d)ocumentary
evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino.”[30]
The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an
unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or
Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon
by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been
impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.[31] Where such document, not so accompanied with
a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected
to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language
in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is
admissible in evidence.[32]
Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence provides:
SECTION
36. Objection. – Objection to evidence
offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection
to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In
any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours)
Since petitioners did not object to the offer
of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to
question its admissibility. The rule is
that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment.[33] This is true even if by its nature, the
evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time.[34]
As a matter of fact, instead of
objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit “A,” that is, OCT No.
352 in their comment[35] on
respondents’ formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged,
among others, that “Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for
the purpose they are offered because these
exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they
contain and not for what a party would like it to prove.”[36] Said evidence was admitted by the
Issues on Impairment of Legitime
Should Be Threshed Out in a Special
Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages
On the other hand, petitioners are
correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of
Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates
of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment
of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
estate.[40]
An action for reconveyance with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate
of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding.
Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.[41]
As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:[42]
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
x x x x
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term “special proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word “may,” it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the “court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.”
Corollarily,
the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said
question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the
We likewise find merit in petitioners’
contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.[43] The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of
the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can
it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.[44]
Declaration of Validity of Donation
Can Be Challenged by an Interested
Party Not Impleaded in Petition for
Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief
or Where There is No Res Judicata.
Moreover, This Court Can Consider
a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error
in the Interest of Substantial Justice.
Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination
of validity of the deed of donation on the ground that (1) it has been
impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been determined with
finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an
action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.[45]
The validity of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors was one of the issues in this case before the lower
courts. The pre-trial order[46]
of the
The issue of the validity of donation
is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in their Memorandum[48]
that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that “THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID.” We are thus poised to inspect the deed of
donation and to determine its validity.
We
cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that respondents may no longer
question the validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already
impliedly admitted it. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning.
The right to set up the defense of its
illegality cannot be waived.[49] The right to set up the nullity of a void or
non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of
annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are
directly affected by the contract.[50]
Consequently, although respondents
are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity because
they are directly affected by the same.[51] The subject of the deed being the land they
are occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.
Petitioners cannot
also use the finality of the
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this rule.
SECTION
2. Parties. – All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the action. (Emphasis ours)
However, respondents were not made
parties in the said Petition Case No. U-920. Worse, instead of issuing summons to
interested parties, the
x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.[54]
Suits to quiet title are not
technically suits in rem, nor are
they, strictly speaking, in personam,
but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.[55] The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.[56] Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision
in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.
The rules on quieting of title[57]
expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not
prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.
That respondents filed a subsequent pleading[58]
in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final
did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being
impleaded in the case. Said subsequent
pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision.[59]
Thus, the
Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following
must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve
identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.[61] The fourth element is not present in this
case. The parties are not identical
because respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same
property covered by OCT No. 352, the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory
relief while the case below is for recovery of property.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’
posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who has a better
right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside
the point.[62] It is precisely the validity and
enforceability of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in
resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses
as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed
before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of
justice. In some instances, this Court
even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so demanded.[63]
Moreover, although respondents did
not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at the
commencement of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated[64]
by the parties during the pre-trial conference.
In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question
necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it.[65] Though not specifically questioned by the
parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for
substantial justice to be rendered.[66]
Furthermore, this Court has held that
although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal
factual matter. The Supreme Court is
clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if
it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.[67]
A rudimentary doctrine on appealed
cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case.[68] Also, an unassigned error closely related to
an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question
raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.[69]
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real
Property Made in a Private Instrument
Before the New Civil Code Took Effect
on
We now focus on the crux of the
petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation. It is settled that only laws existing at the
time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect.[70] Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in
this case as the donation propter nuptias
was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.[71] Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides
that gifts propter nuptias are
governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the
gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.[72] It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by
public instrument.[73]
In
the instant case, the donation propter
nuptias did not become valid. Neither
did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument.[74] Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in
question to petitioners’ predecessors.
Logically,
then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new
Direct
reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been
determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It
is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the
properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things
to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.[75]
Titled
Property Cannot Be Acquired
By Another By
Adverse Possession
or Extinctive
Prescription
Likewise, the claim of respondents
that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription has no
merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot
successfully invoke the argument of extinctive prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by
acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property they have been
possessing. The reason is that the property
was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open
and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.[76] It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and
no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[77]
The torrens system is intended to
guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration,
but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of
the registered land.[78] The system merely confirms ownership and does
not create it. Certainly, it cannot be
used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it
to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by
law. It cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another.[79] Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in
the case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so
retains title in the real owner of the land.[80]
Although
We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting
WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision is REVERSED
(1)
Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners’ predecessors NULL
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
to:
(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and
(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title
No. 352 in the names of its original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 39-51. Dated
[2] Records, pp. 344-356. Dated
[3] Rollo, pp. 43-44, 48-49.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Civil Case No. U-6498.
[16] Records, pp. 134-135.
[17] CA rollo, p. 43; id. at 354.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the
[32]
[33] People v. Pansensoy, G.R. No. 140634,
[34] Interpacific Transit, Inc. v.
[35] Records, p. 188.
[36]
[37]
[38] Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, supra.
[39] Quebral v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
101941,
[40] Natcher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
133000,
[41]
[42] Supra at 391-392.
[43] Natcher v. Court of Appeals, supra note
40, at 394; Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 70722,
[44]
[45] Rollo, p. 148.
[46]
Records, pp. 134-135.
[47] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[48]
[49] Civil Code, Art. 1409.
[50] Manotok Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-45038,
[51] Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-66696,
[52] Records, p. 14; Exhibit “C.” Entitled “For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation − The Heirs of Veronica Pico.”
[53] Rollo, p. 143.
[54]
[55] Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67451,
[56] Foster-Gallego v. Galang, G.R. No.
130228,
[57] Rules of Court, Rule 64.
[58] Rollo, p. 45; records, pp. 111-113.
[59]
[60] Domingo v. Scheer, G.R. No. 154745,
[61] Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 114151,
[62] Rollo, p. 148.
[63] Government of the United States of America
v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,
[64] Records, p. 134.
[65] Serrano v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 117040,
[66] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 312.
[67] Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino,
G.R. No. L-39086,
[68] Nordic
[69]
Id.; Sesbreño v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 106588,
[70] Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134,
[71] Valencia v. Locquiao, supra at 610.
[72]
[73] Valencia v. Locquiao, supra; Solis v. Barroso, 53 Phil. 912, 914
(1928); Velasquez v. Biala, supra; Camagay v. Lagera, supra at 398.
[74] Solis v. Barroso, supra note 73.
[75] Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 43, at 732.
[76] Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
142056,
[77] Brusas v. Court of Appeals, supra; Jacob v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92159,
[78] Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
130768,
[79] Bayoca v.
[80] Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 84888,