EN BANC
|
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
(Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY
AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA
BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners, - versus - SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson,
HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent. |
|
G.R.
No. 167173 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: December
27, 2007 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for
Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction) dated and filed on
Petitioner
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-
The
petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin
respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner
SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be
conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3)
enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the
Watch List. It also prays that judgment
be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae
ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and
(2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and
testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.
The
facts are as follows:
On
February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent,
delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance
of Wealth”[1]
before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing
SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to
respondent. Prior to the privilege speech,
Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166,[2]
to wit:
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE
ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID
OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law Liberalizing the Entry and Scope
of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines,” was approved on May 18,
1994 to promote greater participation of foreign banks in the Philippine
Banking Industry that will stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for
the flow of funds into the economy;
WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine
Banking Industry, foreign banks were accorded the same privileges, allowed to
perform the same functions and subjected to the same limitations under relevant
banking laws imposed upon domestic banks;
WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign
banks granted the privilege to do business in our country under Republic Act
No. 7721;
WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered
Bank whose actions have reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of
billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in the form of
high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe investment
havens;
WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank
clearly knew that its actions were violative of Philippine banking and
securities laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of
pro-forma agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank;
WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of
conducting these questionable activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
warned and eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly P30,000 for
violating Philippine banking laws;
WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered
Bank may constitute "conducting
business in an unsafe and unsound manner,” punishable under Section 37 of
Republic Act No. 7653 and should have drawn the higher penalty of revocation of
its quasi-banking license;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of 2000"
deems a particular act or omission as conducting business in an unsafe and
unsound manner as follows:
"Section
56.2 The act or omission has resulted or
may result in material loss or damage or abnormal risk to the institution's
depositors, creditors, investors, stockholders or to the Bangko Sentral or to
the public in general."
WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a
clear violation of Republic Act No. 8799 or "The
Securities Regulation Code of 2000" which states:
"Section
8.1 Securities shall not be sold or
offered for sale or distribution within the
WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
reportedly issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered
Bank for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was reportedly
settled administratively and dismissed after Standard Chartered Bank paid a
fine of P7 Million;
WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that
Standard Chartered Bank actively engaged in promoting and marketing the
so-called "Global Third Party Mutual
Funds” to the investing public and even set revenue quotas for the sale of
these funds;
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities
Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered
securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to
protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP
likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities
in a manner that would protect the investing public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to
address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties
to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among
other additional regulatory measures;
Now, therefore, BE
IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the Committee on Banks,
Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the reported sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by
Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing
public.
Acting on the referral,
respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial
hearing on
Respondent
invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to
submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to
respondent a letter[3]
dated
On
Respondent then proceeded with the
investigation proper. Towards the end of
the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement[4]
that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization
from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and
the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's
privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding
the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign
securities.
The
The grounds relied upon by petitioners
are as follows:
I.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING
AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY PROBING
INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED
FOREIGN SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES.
SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW
PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS,
II.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY “IN AID OF
LEGISLATION,” BUT IN REALITY IN “AID OF COLLECTION” BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2)
CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND
RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH COLLECTION IS
WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE.
III.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING
PETITIONERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT RATHER
THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY – A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL.
IV.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES.[5]
Petitioners argue that respondent has
no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very
same subject matter of the following cases, to wit:
(a) CA-G.R. SP No.
85078, entitled “Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza P. Rosario, et al., pending
before the 9th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul
and set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint
against Standard Chartered Bank and its officers accusing them of SELLING
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED
ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No.
86200, entitled “Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael Buenaventura, et al.”,
pending before the 15th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul
and set aside the termination for lack of probable cause by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (“AMLC”) of the investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for
money laundering activities BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No.
87328, entitled “Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et
al.,” pending before the 16th Division of the Court of
Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and
set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint
accusing SCB and its officers of violation of the Securities Regulation Code by
SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(d) Civil Case No.
70173, entitled “Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard Chartered Bank,”
pending before Branch 155 of the
(e) Criminal Case No.
332034, entitled “People of the
(f) Criminal Case No.
331395, entitled “People of the
(g) I.S. No.
2004-B-2279-80, entitled “Aurelio
Litonjua III and Aurelio Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al.,” pending
before the Office of the Prosecutor,
Citing
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[7]
the petitioners claim that
since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered
foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of
the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon
the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon
does not apply squarely to petitioners’ case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the
issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been
acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee
to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments;
and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at
bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and
administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale
of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case
and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative
investigation -- was the Court’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The
Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation
contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon
the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No.
3019. Thus, the Court held that the
requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
The Senate or the House
of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Accordingly,
we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the
legislative investigation in that case.
Unfortunately for the petitioners,
this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon
does not obtain in the instant case.
P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as
found in the last three Whereas
clauses thereof, viz.:
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities
Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of
unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules
intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the
regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in
preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect
the investing public;
WHEREAS, there is
a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind
the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their
directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory
measures; (emphasis supplied)
The unmistakable objective of the
investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’
allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very
same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by
a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we
consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged
the Senate “to immediately conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future.”
Indeed,
the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or
a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
As
succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault
v. Nazareno[8] –
[T]he power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which
is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Neither
can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent
Committee. The Court notes that among
those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same
critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the
illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the
investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent
the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Still,
petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, “in
aid of collection.” They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter
a party to the pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a
friendly forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines;
and that the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently
available vehicle to effect this purpose.
However,
as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition, Atty.
Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering
his investment. On the contrary, and as confirmed
during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint humbly
requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal
activities of SCB-Philippines, with the end view of preventing the future occurrence
of any similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general.[9] Baviera, on the other hand, was not a
“complainant” but merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on
the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines,
being one of the supposed victims thereof.
The
Court further notes that when it denied petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of
a TRO to restrain the hearing set on
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution dated
March 14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held
in contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase “in aid of collection”
partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.
We
do not agree. The Court has already
expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and its committees
in this wise –
The principle that
Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said
power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if
it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information,
if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted
the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the
realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department’s
authority to be full and complete, independently of each other’s authority or
power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every
act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.[11]
The
exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt
is based on the principle of self-preservation.
As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Such power
is sui generis, as it attaches not to
the discharge of legislative functions per
se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of government.[12]
In
this case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was “in aid of
collection” is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation
against the petitioners reasonable and justified.
Furthermore,
it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power
to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary
to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that
said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most
of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily
evade the compulsive character of respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it
was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry
and defeating its purpose. In any event,
no HDO was issued by a court. The BID
instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely
delaying petitioners’ intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO
is issued against them.[13]
With
respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by
the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy
should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio
v. Gordon,[14] we have
held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared
that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the
rational basis relationship test, as
laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,[15] there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is
for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest
in foreign securities. Suffice it to
state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with
the assailed legislative investigation.[16]
As
regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of
SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal
proceeding. They were summoned by respondent
merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court –
[An] accused occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled
to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take
the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.[17]
Concededly,
this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents
in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous
to criminal proceedings. The privilege
has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and
to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.[18]
However,
in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they
be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline
appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.[19]
Petitioners’
argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a
recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such
as the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not persuade.
As
held in Sinclair v. United States[20]
--
It may be conceded that
Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding
the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or
through its Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be
elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation
of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the
leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action.
The
prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the
courts is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the
other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the
power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of
the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even
if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory
or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to address or
remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal
indictment of persons who may appear liable.
At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such
a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies
and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Finally,
petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion[21]
dated
WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Manifestation and
Motion dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
On leave
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
RUBEN T.
REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 63-72.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
G.R. No. 89914,
[8] 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950), citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 [1927].
[9] Rollo, p. 1064.
[10] Per the Resolution dated
[11] Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, No. L-72492,
[12]
[13] Under the BID’s Rules and Guideline In Handling Travelers Under Watchlist (November 19, 1999):
1. A passenger whose name is in the Bureau’s Watchlist shall be allowed to depart after the lapse of five (5) days from his first attempt, provided no Hold Departure Order is issued;
2.
The head Supervisor and/or Alien Control Officer shall
immediately notify the requesting person/agency of the attempt to leave by the
person whose name appears in the watchlist and the said requesting
person/agency has only five (5) days to secure a Hold Departure Order (HDO)
from the Department of Justice or the Courts; otherwise, after five (5) days
and there is no HDO issued, the passenger shall be allowed to leave.
[14] G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318, 174177,
[15] No. L-20387,
[16] Supra
note 14 at 738.
[17] Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil.
661, 679 (1968).
[18] Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
supra note 7, at 786, citing Galman v.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985).
[19] Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, Sec. 19.
[20] 279
[21] Rollo, pp. 1152-1177.