FIRST DIVISION
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CITIBANK, N.A., Petitioner,
- versus - RUFINO C. JIMENEZ, SR., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 166878 Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated: December 18, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated September 14, 2004[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58840 affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 273, dated December 29, 1997[2]
in Civil Case No. 95-130-MK.[3]
The RTC-Marikina City ordered petitioner to pay respondent $10,921.85 or its
peso equivalent, representing the value of respondent’s Foreign Currency Time
Deposit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals deleted
the award for attorney’s fees.
The antecedent facts are:
In 1991, spouses Rufino C.
Jimenez, Sr. and Basilia B. Templa opened a Foreign Currency Time Deposit with
petitioner in the amount of $10,000.00 for 360 days with a “roll-over” provision[4]
and interest at 5.25% per annum. The corresponding certificate of time
deposit was issued to “Jimenez, Rufino C. and/or Jimenez, Basilia T.,” with
address at
In 1993, respondent opened an account
with Citibank F.S.B.,
In a letter-reply dated
On
Petitioner denied receiving
the request for transfer by facsimile transmission. On the contrary, petitioner
alleged receipt of the request only on
The case against Basilia Templa was archived for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her person. Trial ensued against petitioner. During trial, respondent was represented by his son and attorney-in-fact, Joselito E. Jimenez.
On P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On
Petitioner contends that —
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT OVERCAME THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT CITIBANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN
ALLOWING THE PRETERMINATION OF THE SUBJECT “AND/OR” ACCOUNT CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
CONTRARY TO
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
REQUIREMENT LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
CITE ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT CITIBANK HAD, IN ANY
FORM WHATSOEVER, “PRIOR NOTICE” OF AN “EARLIER REQUEST” TO TRANSFER THE FUNDS
FROM THE SUBJECT “AND/OR” ACCOUNT TO A NEWLY OPENED CHECKING ACCOUNT IN
B.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS’ FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE IS MISTAKENLY PREMISED ON FACTS ALLEGED BUT NOT
ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, I.E., THAT THE LETTER-REQUEST WAS
MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT, THAT THE SAME LETTER-REQUEST WAS SENT
BY FAX TO CITIBANK ON 27 APRIL 1993, AND THAT THE SAME LETTER-REQUEST WAS
RECEIVED BY CITIBANK PRIOR TO THE
QUESTIONED PRETERMINATION.
1.
NO EVIDENCE,
TESTIMONIAL, DOCUMENTARY OR OTHERWISE, WAS OFFERED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE LETTER-REQUEST
WAS MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS OF RESPONDENT.
2. NO EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL, DOCUMENTARY OR
OTHERWISE, WAS OFFERED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE LETTER-REQUEST WAS SENT BY FAX TO,
AND RECEIVED BY, CITIBANK ON
C.
CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENTIAL RULINGS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED, AND THEREBY SANCTIONED THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS
RELIANCE ON HEARSAY AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE – A HANDWRITTEN NOTATION
INTERCALATED IN THE PRINTED LETTER-REQUEST WHICH WAS NOT IDENTIFIED,
AUTHENTICATED OR EVEN TESTIFIED ON BY ANY WITNESS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, IF NOT ACTED IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE TRIAL COURT’S DEPARTURE FROM
SETTLED RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ALLOWING, ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE AND RELYING ON
CLEARLY HEARSAY, INCOMPETENT AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE—THE “TESTIMONY BY PROXY”
OF RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND SOLE WITNESS AND UNIDENTIFIED AND
UNAUTHENTICATED LETTER-REQUEST. SUCH ALLOWANCE, ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE AND
RELIANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS EFFECTIVELY RENDERED
NUGATORY AND BREACHED CITIBANK’S RIGHTS OF EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION AND DUE
PROCESS.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO
CITIBANK WHICH BURDEN, AS HELD BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, NECESSARILY LAY WITH
RESPONDENT AS PLAINTIFF THEREIN.
IV.
THE WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENTIAL RULE IS THAT, IN THE
ABSENCE OF ADMISSIBLE, COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, THE BURDEN OF GOING
FORWARD WITH EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHIFT TO THE DEFENDANT AND, IN SUCH A CASE, THE
DEFENDANT IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO PROVE HIS EXCEPTION OR DEFENSE. CONTRARY TO
SAID PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF ANY ADMISSIBLE, COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
TO PROVE TRANSMISSION OF THE LETTER-REQUEST BY FACSIMILE, THE ONUS OF PROVING
THAT IT DID NOT RECEIVE THE LETTER-REQUEST BY FAX LAY ON CITIBANK.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
CITIBANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN PRETERMINATING THE SUBJECT “AND/OR” ACCOUNT,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT CITIBANK RECEIVED THE
LETTER-REQUEST ONLY BY MAIL AND ONLY AFTER THE PRETERMINATION OF THE SUBJECT
“AND/OR” ACCOUNT.
B.
GIVEN THE
“AND/OR” NATURE OF THE SUBJECT ACCOUNT, CITIBANK WAS UNDER A LEGAL AND
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO RELEASE THE FUNDS UPON DEMAND OF BASILIA T. JIMENEZ,
ONE OF THE CO-ACCOUNT HOLDERS, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN LIABLE FOR BREACH THEREOF
HAD IT NOT DONE SO.
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT NEGLIGENCE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO CITIBANK, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING DAMAGES IN
THIS INSTANCE CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT HIMSELF WAS UNDENIABLY GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE THAT CONTRIBUTED TO, OR EVEN PROXIMATELY CAUSED, THE DAMAGES HE HAD
ALLEGEDLY INCURRED.
In sum, the issue involved is whether petitioner bank was guilty of negligence in allowing the pretermination of the Foreign Currency Time Deposit by Basilia Templa and should be held liable for damages to respondent. Resolution of the issue, in turn, hinges on whether petitioner actually received respondent’s request for transfer by facsimile transmission before the request for pretermination by Basilia.
Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent. They concluded that petitioner
received respondent’s letter-request for transfer prior to the request for pretermination by Basilia Templa, hence,
was negligent in allowing the pretermination without first verifying the
genuineness of the request.
We affirm.
Basic is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.[11] As elucidated in Sta. Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez,[12] viz.:
The credibility of witnesses and the weighing of
conflicting evidence are matters within the exclusive authority of the Court of
Appeals x x x. Both the Judiciary Act [now The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980] x x x and the Rules of Court x x x only allow a review of decisions of
the Court of Appeals on questions of law; and numerous decisions of this Court
have invariably and repeatedly held that findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court x x x x Barring,
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record, and that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this
Court is not expected or required to examine and contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. As pointed out by former Chief
Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court x x x, the law creating the
Court of Appeals was intended mainly to
take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and
confine its task for the determination of questions which do not call for the
reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.[13]
An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[14] On the other hand, an issue is one of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.[15] The issues of whether petitioner received respondent’s request for transfer by facsimile transmission or not and whether it was negligent in allowing the pretermination by Basilia Templa notwithstanding such receipt, are factual.
We find evidentiary support
for the factual conclusion of the lower courts. In a letter dated
x x x we regret our inability to effect the request of
Mr. Jimenez through Mr. Robert S. Ostrovsky of Citibank San Francisco since we
received the original letter on May
4, 1993, a day after Mrs. Basilia T. Jimenez preterminated the account. For
your information, we do not act on faxed
instructions from customers as we cannot verify faxed signatures. This
control measure is in place to prevent unauthorized transactions and for the
protection of bank customers against fraud. (emphases ours)
Petitioner denies the admission now. However, its protestation
cannot prevail over the clear import of Exhibit “F.” Exhibit “F” was written by
petitioner’s Assistant Vice President for Citiphone Banking, Ms. Gina Marina P.
Ordonez, in response to the formal inquiry regarding the questioned
pretermination posed by the legal counsel of Joselito E. Jimenez before the
civil action for damages was filed in court.
Petitioner cannot be
excused from negligence in disregarding the faxed transmission. As the trial court correctly
observed—
x x x the
sender was the Branch Manager himself, Mr. Robert S. Ostrovsky, of x x x Citibank
x x x x There
are now advanced facilities for communication especially in computerized
systems of accounts. Ways and means, like fax transmissions, are available
which make it very easy for one bank to communicate with a foreign branch. This
notwithstanding, defendant Citibank did not care to do anything further
regarding the fax message.
x x x [I]f indeed it had doubts on the fax message, simple prudence would require defendant
Citibank not to entertain and/or to hold in abeyance any other transaction
involving the time deposit in question until the fax message has been verified.
To allow Basilia Templa to preterminate
the subject time deposit despite the fax message sent by Citibank
The Court of Appeals added:
x x x [B]y the nature of is functions, a bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. x x x [I]n dealing
with its depositors, a bank should exercise its functions not only with the
diligence of a good father of a family but it should do so with the highest degree
of care. The banking business is so impressed with public interest where the
trust and confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such
that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the
highest, degree of diligence.[18]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Rollo, pp. 108-115.
[2]
[3] Entitled Rufino
Jimenez, Sr., represented by Attorney-in-Fact Joselito E. Jimenez v. Citibank
N.A.
and Basilia B. Templa.
[4] Under a “roll-over” arrangement, the principal amount and earned interest of the time deposit
shall,
unless terminated, be automatically “rolled-over” for another 360-day term upon
maturity; rollo, p. 109.
[5] Exhibit “H” of respondent; id. at 132.
[6] Docketed as Civil Case No. 95-130-MK; id. at 143.
[7]
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Supra note 1.
[10] Resolution dated
[11] Security
Bank
and Trust Company v. Eric Gan,
G.R. No. 150464,
citing
Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. 148737,
[12] No.
[13]
[14] Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 74833,
101.
[15]
[16] Supra note 7.
[17] Rollo,
pp. 324-325.
[18]