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KKK FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 163785
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- versus - HON.
ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal, SHERIFF IV SALES T. BISNAR, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR MORONG, RIZAL, and IMELDA A. ANGELES, Respondents. |
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: December 27, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner urges this Court to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated November 28,
2003, and the Resolution[2] dated May 26, 2004,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On P4,181,450;
and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered by individual
titles but the same were sold en masse.
On
On
On May 2, 2002, Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order,[6] which reads in
part:
x x x x
Record shows
that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion to
Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and 5, Rule
15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of hearing.
The reason why the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to now has not yet
been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.
WHEREFORE, the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and the Motion to
[Approve] Compromise Agreement are considered mere scrap[s] of paper.
SO ORDERED.
In its Decision[7] dated
The parties,
duly assisted by their respective counsels, submitted before this Court a
Compromise Agreement, as follows:
x x x x
[1.] The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant, Imelda Angeles, the amount
of P5,500,000.00 representing the bid price for all
the eight titles (TCT Nos. M-95417, 95419, 95418, 95420, 95421, 50889, 50890
and 50893) subject of the auction sale dated March 7, 2001 plus whatever taxes
[and/or] assessments and expenses of the public auction as prescribed under Act
3135, within twenty (20) days from the signing of this compromise agreement.
Said payment shall be considered full settlement of all obligations stated
under that Real Estate Mortgage, dated
2. Upon the payment of the afore-stated amount,
the defendant shall make, sign, execute and deliver to the plaintiff a
Certificate of Deed of Redemption of all the above titles, and shall surrender
and deliver to the plaintiff all the eight titles mentioned above. The
defendant shall also make, sign, execute and deliver to the plaintiff a Deed of
Cancellation of Mortgage annotated at the back of all the eight titles
above-mentioned. The defendant shall also return to the plaintiff all checks
issued by the plaintiff to the defendant as payment of its obligations.
x x x x
Finding the
Compromise Agreement quoted above to be not contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED.
x x x x
Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. On
Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Calderon-Bargas
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when: (1) she issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders even
before petitioner could file its comment; (2) she granted the Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of hearing; and
(3) the writ of execution changed the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.
In dismissing the petition, the
appellate court ruled that petitioner was not deprived of due process when the
trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders since it
was given sufficient time to file its comment. The appellate court did not rule
on the second and third issues after noting that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order had not yet been resolved by the
trial court. It did not resolve the
issues even after the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on December 12, 2003,[11]
ratiocinating that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration did not operate to reinstate the petition because at the time
it was filed, petitioner had no cause of action.
In the instant petition before us, petitioner alleges that
the appellate court seriously erred:
I.
… IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE REQUISITE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WHEN PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS OF OCTOBER 3, 2002 AND OCTOBER 10, 2002
EVEN BEFORE PETITIONER COULD FILE ITS COMMENT AND IN FURTHER ISSUING THE WRIT
OF EXECUTION EVEN BEFORE THE RESOLUTION OF THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 3, 2002.
II.
… IN NOT HOLDING THAT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS
FILED WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING NOTICE OF HEARING.
III.
… IN NOT HOLDING THAT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN
ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
IS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PETITIONER, THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED PURSUANT
THERETO IS VOID AS IT VARIES THE TENOR OF THE JUDGMENT.[12]
Simply, the issues are whether the trial court seriously erred:
(1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders without
awaiting petitioner’s comment; (2) in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of hearing; and (3) in
issuing the writ of execution since it varied the tenor of the decision dated June
28, 2002.
Petitioner contends that it was denied due process when the
trial court granted Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution on
Respondent Angeles counters that
petitioner was not denied due process since it was given ten (10) days to
comment on the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which period had lapsed
without petitioner filing any comment. Petitioner filed its Motion for
Extension of Time to File Comment with Entry of Appearance only after the
reglementary period had expired. Angeles further contends that the Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution contained the requisite notice of hearing. Finally, she
argues that the writ of execution did not vary the tenor of the decision dated
On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial
court gave petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to Angeles’s Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order
only on
Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does
not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15[14]
of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk
of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act
upon. [15] Service of a copy of a motion containing a
notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements
renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the
strict application of this rule. These
exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the
alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent
on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of
substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is
addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4)
where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[16]
A notice of hearing is an integral
component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a chance to
be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the
adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.[17]
Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of
the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not denied procedural
due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the
trial court issued an Order dated
The notice requirement is not a ritual
to be followed blindly. Procedural due
process is not based solely on a mechanical and literal application that
renders any deviation inexorably fatal.
Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action and proceeding.[18]
On the last issue,
we note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court in its Decision
dated June 28, 2002 merely provided that petitioner would pay Angeles the bid
price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land subject of the
auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles would execute a
Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and
surrender to petitioner the titles to the eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when
the trial court issued the writ of execution, the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option “to allow the consolidation of the subject
real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles.”[19]
Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an
alternative obligation which was not included or contemplated in the Compromise
Agreement. While the complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles
from consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed properties, that has been
superseded by the Compromise Agreement. Therefore, the writ of execution
which directed Sheriff Bisnar to “cause the Register
of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, to allow the consolidation
of the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles” is
clearly erroneous because the judgment under execution failed to provide for consolidation.
Because the writ of execution varied the terms of the
judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The writ of execution must
conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms
of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may it go beyond the terms of the
judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
Let this case be REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED
to issue another writ of execution against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc.,
in conformity with the Decision dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 130-136. Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arturo D. Brion concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo,
pp. 26-37.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Id. at 61-62.
[10] Id. at 78.
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[13] CA rollo, p. 78.
[14] SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion.
[15] Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999, 304 SCRA 440, 446.
[16] Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 26, 53-54.
[17]
[18]
[19] CA rollo, p. 82.
[20] Windor Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34332, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 275, 283-284; See Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee v. Jancom Environmental Corporation, G.R. No. 163663, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 280, 297.