Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION G.R. No. 158761
ADMINISTRATION,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
VICTORIANO
B. GONZAGA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December
4, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For review under Rule 45 are the
March 6, 2003 Decision[1] and
June 10, 2003 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which dismissed petitioner’s
appeal of the July 23, 2001 Order[3] of
the Pagadian City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No.
4282-2K, and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
On
On
ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss
and Answer on
The RTC said that the petition was
dismissible because of the failure of respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies,
as required by Section 2, 2.C of the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of District
Elections for Electric Cooperative. The section required that “a protest
arising from disqualification shall be filed with the screening committee
in not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The screening committee shall decide the
protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from receipt thereof. Failure of the applicant to file his/her
protest within the above-cited period shall be deemed a waiver of his right to
protest.”[5]
As observed
by the RTC, respondent had urgently filed the petition on
On
On
In its
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD
269 refers to “order, ruling or decision of the NEA” in the exercise of NEA’s
quasi-judicial functions. And the RTC
noted that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings, investigations, and
procedures. On the other hand, the
validity of the ECEC, subject of the instant petition, was an exercise of NEA’s
quasi-legislative function or rule-making authority.
Further,
according to the RTC, NEA took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context when it said
Sec. 58 dealt with the administrative remedy available to petitioner. It said that Sec. 58 presupposed a ruling or
decision of the NEA and there was none in the case before it. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and
ordered ZAMSURECO to accept Gonzaga’s certificate of candidacy for director.[10] The
RTC denied NEA’s motion for reconsideration.
The CA Ruled
that the Courts Have Jurisdiction Over
Issues on
Legality of Codes
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
CA. The CA denied due course and
dismissed the petition. It said that NEA
was not exercising its quasi-judicial powers but its rule-making
authority. In the case before the trial
court, the CA stressed that the issue involved the interpretation of the ECEC,
and to this extent, NEA had no jurisdiction because the issue is within the
province of the courts.
The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in its
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S NULLIFICATION OF THE ECEC
Issues
Involving NEA’s Rule-Making Authority
Are
Cognizable by Regular Courts
The petition has no merit.
Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:
SEC. 59. Court Review.—The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such order, ruling or decision when it clearly appears that there is no evidence before the NEA to support reasonably such order, ruling or decision, or that the same is contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA. The evidence presented to the NEA, together with the record of the proceedings before the NEA, shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or decision of the NEA may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari in proper case. The procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be presented by rules of the Supreme Court. Any order or decision of the NEA may be reviewed on the application of any person or public service entity aggrieved thereby and who was a party in the subject proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate cases or by a petition for review, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the notification of the NEA order, decision or ruling on reconsideration. Said petition shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme Court who shall furnish copies thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.
Petitioner argues that based on the
foregoing provision, only the Supreme Court has the authority to review the
“acts” of NEA as an administrative body with adjudicative and rule-making
power. It cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Court’s pronouncement that:
[T]he
power of judicial review of NEA’s order or decision pertains to the Supreme
Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests specifically on the
Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of
the NEA and to modify or set aside such orders, rulings or decisions.[11]
It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269
refers to “order, ruling or decision” of NEA. What is being challenged in this
case is the decision of the screening committee of ZAMSURECO to disqualify
respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the ECEC, particularly,
whether the requirement of publication was complied with. The ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its
rule-making authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy
over respondent’s disqualification and the question on the ECEC’s validity are
within the inherent jurisdiction of regular courts to review. Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is misplaced. The
subject in that case was the electricity rates charged by a cooperative, a
matter which is clearly within NEA’s jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition, however,
centers on the validity of NEA’s rules in light of the publication requirements
of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code.
The present issue is cognizable by regular courts.
With regard
to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial courts’
nullification of the ECEC. The CA
correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of
filing the code with the University of the
Article 2
of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the
procedure, as follows:
Sec. 3. Filing.
(1) Every Agency shall file with the University of the
(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his
equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under
pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be
kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity – In addition to other
rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each
rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in this rule.
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect – Laws shall take
effect after Fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided.
We have
already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in this Court’s
Resolution in Tañada v. Tuvera:
We
hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which
shall begin fifteen (15) days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered
by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) [12]
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated
in Dadole v. Commission on Audit,[13] De
Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[14]
and Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Commission on Audit.[15]
In the case at bar, the ECEC was
issued by petitioner pursuant to its rule-making authority provided in PD 269,
as amended, particularly Sec. 24:
Section 24. Board of
Directors. — (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board,
subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to
approve all policies and resolutions.
The composition,
qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the
procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined
in the By-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and
regulations x x x.
The ECEC applies to all electric
cooperatives in the country. It is not a
mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should
comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
1987. In previous cases involving the
election of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was
not put in issue. The ECEC then enjoyed
the presumption of validity. In this
case, however, respondent directly questioned the validity of the ECEC in his
second amended petition. The trial court
thus required petitioner to show proof of publication of the ECEC. Petitioner could have easily provided such
proof had the ECEC actually been published in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the
country. This simple proof could have
immediately laid this case to rest.
Petitioner’s failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was not
published accordingly, a fact supported by the certification from the National
Printing Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a
petition for mandamus and prohibition should not have been resorted to by
respondent. The proper recourse, according
to petitioner, is a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner miserably errs on this point. Rule 63 on declaratory relief states:
Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
As stated above, a requirement under
Rule 63 is that the petition for declaratory relief must be filed “before any
breach or violation” the questioned document may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid
that a breach has not yet occurred since an actual dispute has already arisen
between ZAMSURECO and respondent––the screening committee of the cooperative on
the erroneous implementation of a code whose legality and implementation is
being questioned.
On the other hand, it is familiar and
fundamental doctrine that a writ of prohibition or mandamus may issue when “x x
x a board unlawfully excludes another from x x x enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled x x x.”[16]
Considering that the screening
committee of the board has excluded respondent from being elected as board
member of ZAMSURECO because of the latter’s improper implementation of the
code, a petition for mandamus and prohibition is the proper recourse.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM
IN TOTO the March 6, 2003
Decision and
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
[3]
[4]
8. He/she does not hold an elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position above the level of a Barangay Captain.
x x x x
12. His/her spouse is not disqualified under Nos. 6, 7 and 8.
x x x x
14. Any bonafide member seeking election or re-election and any incumbent director shall satisfy all of the above-mentioned qualifications. Non-compliance with any single item shall mean disqualification or termination.
[5]
[7]
[8]
[9] Supra note 3.
[10]
[11]
No. L-62038,
[12]
No. L-63915,
[13]
G.R. No. 125350,
[14] G.R.
No. 109023,
[15] G.R.
No. 132593,
[16] Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may acquire.
x x x x
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)