FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, G.R. No. 158121
SR. NAMELY:
TERESITA CONCHA-
PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA,
JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO
P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS
LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P.
CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA,
BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA Present:
P. CONCHA-NUNAG,
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus -
AZCUNA, JJ.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO[1]
and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA
J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND
SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO Promulgated:
and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,[2]
Respondents. December
12, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I
S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the
decision[3] and
resolution[4] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions[5] and
order[6] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos.
5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents.
The
relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners,
heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful
owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No.
6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A
(Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land
Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case
No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto
Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of
the subject lots.
The records show
that on
1.
Declaring Free
Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to
defendants as null and void ab initio;
2.
Declaring Lot No.
6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b)
of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;
3.
Ordering the
defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case
and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to
execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by
the defendant[s] themselves;
4.
Ordering
defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally
cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney’s
fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings;
5.
Declaring the
confiscated three (sic) flitches kept
in the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume
of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected
and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6.
The plaintiffs
further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises.[8]
On
respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433,
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled
under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western
portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA
141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic)
as amended by RA No. 1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the
equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in question in
favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its
Western portion and if she refuse (sic),
ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the defenda[n]t
herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00
for the 22 forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00
for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the
cost of the proceedings.[10]
In Civil Case
No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT
(P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare
located as (sic) the western portion
of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.
No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the
equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question
in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT
(T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they
refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed
of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants
themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00
for the six (6) forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.[11]
The three
complaints[12] commonly
alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958,
petitioners' parents (spouses
Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of
land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly
preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4)
hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that
they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195,
one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely,
peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and
occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December
23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses
"have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to the
exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up
to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case
Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and]
stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and]
disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case
No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that
even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired
imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees
felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the
subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that
respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the
lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the
geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never
informed them of the
survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the
corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation"; and k) that the
lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate
occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against
them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for
reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.[13]
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed
values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners
opposed,[14]
contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which
are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129,
as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTCs. They also contended that they have
two main causes of action: for
reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by
respondents. Hence, the totality of the
claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective
motions to dismiss of respondents.[15] The respondents filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration,[16] to no
avail.[17]
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly
filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining
Order Ex Parte[18]
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499.
In its Decision,[19]
the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the
complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of
limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud
prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed
as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the
filing of the complaints. The CA found
it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
Hence, this appeal in which
petitioners raise the following issues, viz:
FIRST - WHETHER
OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING
THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE
CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
SECOND - WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD - WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT
PETITIONERS OWN THE
PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION)
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE
CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).[20]
In
their memorandum,[21]
respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the
trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of
action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by
prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the
complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by
laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review by
this Court.
Since the issue of
jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA
skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their
respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.[22]
In their Supplemental
Memorandum,[23] petitioners
contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne
by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation
of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of
title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and
the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus,
the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that
the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a) Raymundo v. CA[24] which set the criteria for determining whether
an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b) Swan v. CA[25] where
it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of
the RTC; c) Santos v. CA[26]
where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion
and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA[27] where
it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it
should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be
argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in
their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled
natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the
properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated
value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence,
they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong.[28] It is
conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
parties.[29] To determine whether a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of
the cause of action and of the relief sought.[30]
The trial court correctly
held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.[31] An action for reconveyance respects the
decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to
its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.[32]
There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a
legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner[33]
and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value.[34]
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr.
together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the
forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four
hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from
1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by
occupation or possession;[35]
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and
Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels]
of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931
up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil
Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,]
forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of
[twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil
Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;[36]
(c) That
this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming
it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect
title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the
Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];[37]
(d) That [respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed[38] [their respective patent applications and
were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that
the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];[39]
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the
corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;[40] and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred
to an innocent purchaser.[41]
These
cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they
are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim
on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the
enjoyment of their alleged title.[42]
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x
(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject
lots are situated in Cogon, P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No. Lot No. Assessed Value
5188 6195 P1,030.00
5433 6196-A 4,500.00
5434 6196-B 4,340.00
7529-A 1,880.00.[43]
Hence,
the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance[44] of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet title[46] over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
The
original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section
44(b) of R.A. 296,[47]
as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n
all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
[MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and
municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law,
there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the
subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section
19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes
became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691[48]
in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs." Thus,
under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of
which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and
second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as
the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of
justice."[49]
The cases of Raymundo v. CA[50] and
Commodities Storage and ICE Plant
Corporation v. CA,[51] relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at
bar. Raymundo involved a
complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of
title. The bone of contention was
whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's
contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees
of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for
determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the
Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence,
said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities
Storage and ICE Plant Corporation
provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in
said case was venue and not jurisdiction.
The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption
period which was filed on
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA[52] and
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject
properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject
properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed
values of the subject properties is unavailing.
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that
the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)."
It is true that the recovery of the
value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term
"any interest therein."
However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has
jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should
be computed.[54] In this case, there is no dispute that the
assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are
less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction
over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has
no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Also referred to as
"Lomocso" or "Lumucso" in the records.
[2] The Court of Appeals was removed as
public respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and our
ruling in Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R.
No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499, 504.
[3] Promulgated on
[4] Promulgated on
[5] Annexes "M,"
"N" and "O" of the Petition; id. at 281-295.
[6] Annex "R" of the
Petition; id. at 305-306.
[7] Died on
[8] Rollo, pp. 98-99.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Motion for Preliminary Hearing of
Affirmative Defenses for the Dismissal of the Complaint and the Instant Case
(Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No.
5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id.
at 212-231.
[14] Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal
of the Complaint (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 233-248; Opposition to
Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 249-264; Opposition to
Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 265-280.
[15] In its separate Resolutions all
dated
[16]
[17] Order dated
[18]
[19] Dated
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] G.R. No. 97805,
[25] G.R. No. 97319,
[26] G.R. No. 61218,
[27] G.R. No. 125008,
[28] Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v.
Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil.
484, 486 (1941).
[29] Republic v. Sangalang,
L-58822,
[30] Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil. 591 (1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941).
[31] Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.
[32] Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v.
Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181
SCRA 431, 442.
[33]
[34] Philippine Economic Zone
Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v. CA, G.R. No.
77468, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47.
[35] Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.
[36]
[37] Ibid.
[38]
[39]
[40] Ibid.
[41]
[42] See
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[43] Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157,
158.
[44] Abrin
v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421; Estate
of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997, 283
SCRA 474.
[45] Santos
v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23,
1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan v. CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs
of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420
SCRA 219.
[46] Mendoza
v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646,
[47] Also
known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides
that:
SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction: x x x
(b) In
all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or
any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except
actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts;
x x x.
[48] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on
[49] Sponsorship Speech of Senator
Biazon, Record of the Senate dated
[50] Supra
Note 24.
[51] Supra
Note 27.
[52] Supra
Note 25.
[53] Supra
Note 26.
[54] Hilario v. Salvador, G.R.
No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in
Ponencias on Jurisdiction, Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines
(2002), p. 218.