Republic of the
Supreme Court
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ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, |
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G.R. No. 157912 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, |
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REYES, JJ. |
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VICTORIA S. MEDINA- |
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Administratrix, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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December
13, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
This
resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
the Order[1]
of the
The
undisputed facts are as follows.
The
RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker
and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective
claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00
in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of
said realties.
The
executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker
(respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on
the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to
attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.
On
Petitioner
then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the
probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an
estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees
at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a
probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?[2]
Petitioner maintains that
the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding
the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing
of the claim. He insists that Section 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are
applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory
manner.
The Court gave due course
to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with
this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]
The petition is imbued
with merit.
However, it must be
emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under
Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing
ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible
to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions,
rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as
possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings,
a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of
filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case
is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required
only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. Under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or
of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a
money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the
properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6]
the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is
not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is
confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to
some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7]
(Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing
fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court
of Appeals,[8]
that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees)
against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix
to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of
separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the
judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial
court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already
assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees
for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate.
With
regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda
v. De Guzman Vda. de
Macatangay[10]
is squarely in point. Therein, the Court
held thus:
In Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court,
passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service
or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than
ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare,
for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving
notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of
or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory
nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal
service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper
as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the
first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service,
for Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable”.
We
thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is
not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was
not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider
the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of
the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
“As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court]
requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever
practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service
by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and
expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with
the use of “may”, signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the
paper as not filed. While it is true
that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest
of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of
respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while
petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other cases,
“the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.”[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case,
petitioner holds office in
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the
speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors
and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts
and expenses of administration have been paid.[13]
The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,[14]
thus:
The filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:
x x x
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule
on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in
the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9,
2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Valerio M. Salazar, rollo, pp. 35 and 40.
[2] Rollo, pp. 12-13
[3] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2(c).
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. –
x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
[4] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1780
[5] Rules of Court, Rule 86, Sec. 5.
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed
under the notice. If not filed, bated; exceptions. – All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise,
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences
an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claims had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at the present value.
[6] G.R. No. 160479,
[7]
[8] G.R. No. 120575,
[9] Pascual v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 228-229.
[10] G.R. No. 164947,
[11] Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay, supra note 10, at 423-425.
[12]
[13]
[14] G.R. No. 149926,
[15] Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez, id. at 240-241.