Republic of the
Supreme Court
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ALICE A.I.
SANDEJAS, |
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G.R. No.
155033 |
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ROSITA
A.I. CUSI, |
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PATRICIA
A.I. SANDEJAS and |
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Present: |
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BENJAMIN
A.I. ESPIRITU, |
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|
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Petitioners, |
|
YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
|
|
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Chairperson, |
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|
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO MORALES,* |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, and |
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|
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NACHURA, JJ. |
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SPS.
ARTURO IGNACIO, JR. |
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|
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and EVELYN
IGNACIO, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
|
December 19, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62404 promulgated on August 27,
2002, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Civil Case No.
65146 dated December 18, 1998.
The facts of the case, as summarized
by the RTC, are as follows:
It appears from the
plaintiffs' [petitioners] evidence that Arturo [respondent] is the elder
brother of Alice [petitioner] and Rosita [petitioner], Benjamin [petitioner]
and Patricia [petitioner] are Arturo's nephew and niece. Arturo and his wife
Evelyn [respondent] are residents of the
The
check later came to the possession of Alice who felt that Arturo cheated their
sister in the amount of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). She believed that Arturo and Rosita had a
joint “and/or” money market placement in the amount of P3 million with the UCPB
branch at
On
On
On
On
After
trial, the RTC rendered judgment dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs as against defendants Security Bank and Trust Co., Rene Colin Gray, Sonia Ortiz Luis, Alice A.I. Sandejas and Rosita A.I. Cusi, ordering them to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following amounts:
(1) P3,000,000.00
plus legal interest on it from
(2) P500,000.00
as moral damages;
(3) P200,000.00
as exemplary damages;
(4) P300,000.00
as attorney's fees; plus
(5) the cost of suit.
In turn, plaintiffs are directed to
pay Benjamin A.I. Espiritu the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
and another P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The counterclaims of Patricia A.I. Sandejas are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Both
parties appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the judgment shall read as follows:
The defendants-appellants Security Bank and Trust Company, Rene Colin D. Gray, Sonia Ortiz-Luis, Alice A.I. Sandejas, and Rosita A.I. Cusi, are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. P3,000,000.00
plus legal interest computed from
2. P200,000.00
as moral damages;
3. P100,000.00
as exemplary damages;
4. P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; plus
5. the costs of suit.
The award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of Benjamin Espiritu is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners and SBTC,
together with Gray and Ortiz-Luis, filed their respective petitions for review
before this Court.
However, the petition filed by SBTC,
Gray and Ortiz-Luis, docketed as G.R. No. 155038, was denied in a Resolution[7]
issued by this Court on November 20, 2002, for their failure to properly verify the petition, submit a
valid certification of non-forum shopping, and attach to the petition the
duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed CA Decision.
Said
Resolution
became final and executory on
On the other hand, the instant petition was
given due course. Petitioners enumerated
the following grounds in support of their petition:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE DECIDED BY THIS COURT AND/OR HAD DECIDED
(a) IN NOT HOLDING THAT AS BETWEEN SIBLINGS, THE AGGRIEVED SIBLING HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES OR STEPS TO PROTECT HIS OWN INTEREST OR PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM AN ACT OF THE GUILTY SIBLING;
(b) IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACT OF ROSITA AND ALICE IN FILLING OUT THE BLANK PORTIONS OF THE CHECK TO RECOVER WHAT ARTURO, JR. TOOK FROM AND DUE ROSITA, DID NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTIONABLE TORT;
(c) IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIMINAL
ACT OF ARTURO, JR. IN SUBMITTING AN AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
TIME DEPOSIT FOR P3,000,000 THAT RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO ROSITA JUST TO
BE ABLE TO PRE-TERMINATE THE TIME DEPOSIT AND GET ITS FACE VALUE, WHEN HE KNEW
IT WAS NOT LOST BUT IN FACT INTACT AND IN THE POSSESSION OF ROSITA, IS A DISHONEST
AND REPREHENSIBLE ACT THAT JUSTIFIED ROSITA AND ALICE IN TAKING MEANS TO REGAIN
THE MONEY AND TO DENY ARTURO, JR. ANY RIGHT TO RECOVER THE SAID AMOUNT AS WELL
AS TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES;
(d) IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIMINAL ACT OF ARTURO, JR. IN SUBMITTING AN AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS OF THE OWNER'S COPY OF THE TITLE IN MORAYTA AND IN TESTIFYING IN COURT AS TO SUCH, WHEN THAT IS NOT THE TRUTH AS HE KNEW THAT THE ORIGINAL OWNER'S COPY OF THE TITLE WAS WITH ROSITA, IS ANOTHER DISHONEST AND REPREHENSIBLE ACT THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTITLED HIM TO ANY AWARD OF DAMAGES; AND
(e) IN NOT APPLYING THE RULE ON PARI DELICTO UNDER ART. 1412 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE IN THE APPEAL THE COUNTERCLAIM OF ROSITA AGAINST ARTURO, JR. FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE AMOUNTS LEGALLY HERS THAT SHOULD JUSTIFY ALICE'S BEING ABSOLVED FROM ANY LIABILITY FOR USING THE CHECK IN RECOVERING THE AMOUNT RIGHTFULLY BELONGING TO ROSITA;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD
DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT REVERSED THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH AND MALICE THAT
ENTITLED PETITIONER BENJAMIN A.I. ESPIRITU TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE SHOWN THAT SUCH BAD FAITH AND
MALICE WAS MADE AS A LEVERAGE TO COMPEL ARTURO'S SIBLINGS TO RETURN TO HIM THE P3,000,000
WHICH WAS NOT HIS; and,
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED
THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHEN IT DELETED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO
PETITIONER ESPIRITU AND IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO A HIGHER
AWARD OF DAMAGES CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AS WELL AS IN NOT
HAVING RULED THAT PATRICIA WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES.[9]
Petitioners
argue that the CA overlooked and ignored vital pieces of evidence showing that
the encashment of the subject check was not fraudulent and, on the contrary,
was justified under the circumstances; and that such encashment did not amount
to an actionable tort and that it merely called for the application of the
civil law rule on pari delicto.
In
support of these arguments, petitioners contend that the principal adversaries
in the present case are full blooded siblings; that the law recognizes the
solidarity of family which is why it is
made a condition that earnest efforts towards a compromise be exerted before
one family member can institute a suit against the other; that even if Arturo
previously defrauded Rosita and deprived her of her lawful share in the sale of
her property, petitioners Rosita and Alice did not precipitately file suit
against him and instead took extra-legal measures to protect Rosita's property
rights and at the same time preserve the solidarity of their family and save it
from public embarrassment. Petitioners
also aver that Rosita's and Alice's act of encashing
the subject check is not fraudulent because they did not have any unlawful
intent and that they merely took from Arturo what rightfully belonged to
Rosita. Petitioners contend that even
granting that the act of Rosita and Alice amounted to an actionable tort, they
could not be adjudged liable to return the amount to respondents or to pay
damages in their favor, because the civil law rule on pari
delicto dictates that, when both parties are at
fault, neither of them could expect positive relief from courts of justice and,
instead, are left in the state where they were at the time of the filing of the
case.
Petitioners
also contend that the CA erred in failing to award damages to Patricia even if
the appellate court sustained the trial court's finding that she was not a
party to the fraudulent acts committed by Rosita and Alice. Petitioners argue that even if Patricia did
not bother to know the details of the cases against her and left everything to
her mother, she did not even know the nature of the case against her, or her
superiors in the bank where she worked did not know whether she was the
plaintiff or defendant, these were not reasons to deny her award of damages. The fact remains that she had been
maliciously dragged into the case, and that the suit
had adversely affected her work and caused her mental worries and anguish,
besmirched reputation, embarrassment and humiliation.
As
to Benjamin, petitioners aver that the CA also erred in deleting the award of
damages and attorney's fees in his favor.
Petitioners assert that the trial court found that Benjamin suffered
mental anguish, wounded feelings and moral shock as a result of the filing of
the present case. Citing the credentials
and social standing of Benjamin, petitioners claim that the award of damages
and attorney's fees in his favor should be increased.
Lastly,
petitioners contend that the award of damages and attorney's fees to
respondents should be deleted for their failure to establish malice or bad
faith on the part of petitioners Alice and Rosita in recovering the P3,000,000.00 which Arturo took from Rosita; and that it is
Rosita who is entitled to damages and attorney's fees for Arturo's failure and
refusal to give her share in the sale of her property in Morayta.
In
their Memorandum, respondents simply contend that the issues raised by
petitioners are factual in nature and that the settled rule is that questions
of fact are not subject to review by the Supreme Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule,
respondents assert that petitioners failed to show that the instant case falls
under any of these exceptions.
The Court’s Ruling
The
Court finds the petition bereft of merit. There is no compelling reason for the
Court to disturb the findings of facts of the lower courts.
The
trial court's findings are as follows: (1) Rosita failed to establish that
there is an agreement between her and Arturo that the latter will give her one-third
of the proceeds of the sale of the Morayta property;
(2) petitioners were not able to establish by clear and sufficient evidence
that the P3,000,000.00 which they took from Arturo when they encashed the subject check was part of the proceeds of the
sale of the Morayta property; (3) Rosita's
counterclaim is permissive and she failed to pay the full docket and filing
fees for her counterclaim.[10]
Petitioners
challenge the findings of the RTC and insist that they should not be held
liable for encashing the subject check because Arturo
defrauded Rosita and that he committed deceitful acts which deprived her of her
rightful share in the sale of her building in Morayta;
that the amount of P3,000,000.00 represented by the check which they encashed formed part of the proceeds of the said sale; that
Alice and Rosita were merely moved by their desire to recover from Arturo,
Rosita's supposed share in the sale of her property.
However,
the Court agrees with respondents that only questions of law are entertained in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[11]
The trial court’s findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, are
generally binding and conclusive upon this court.[12]
There are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific
evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of
facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings
of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA
are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.[13]
In the instant case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that their petition
falls under any one of the above exceptions.
Petitioners'
assignments of errors boil down to the basic issue of whether or not Alice and
Rosita are justified in encashing the subject check
given the factual circumstances established in the present case.
Petitioners' posture is not sanctioned
by law. If they truly believe that
Arturo took advantage of and violated the rights of Rosita, petitioners should
have sought redress from the courts and should not have simply taken the law
into their own hands. Our laws are
replete with specific remedies designed to provide relief for the violation of
one's rights. In the instant case,
Rosita could have immediately filed an action for the nullification of the sale
of the building she owns in light of petitioners' claim that the document
bearing her conformity to the sale of the said building was taken by Arturo
from her without her knowledge and consent.
Or, in the alternative, as the CA correctly held, she could have brought
a suit for the collection of a sum of money to recover her share in the sale of
her property in Morayta. In a civilized society such as ours, the rule
of law should always prevail. To allow
otherwise would be productive of nothing but mischief, chaos and anarchy. As a lawyer, who has sworn to uphold the rule
of law, Rosita should know better. She
must go to court for relief.
It is true that Article 151 of the
Family Code requires that earnest efforts towards a compromise be made before
family members can institute suits against each other. However, nothing in the law sanctions or
allows the commission of or resort to any extra-legal or illegal measure or
remedy in order for family members to avoid the filing of suits against another
family member for the enforcement or protection of their respective rights.
Petitioners invoke the rule of pari delicto to support
their contention that respondents do not deserve any relief from the courts.
The principle of pari delicto provides
that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and
denies recovery by either one of them.[14]
Indeed, one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands.[15]
However, in the present case, petitioners were not able to establish that
respondents are also at fault. Thus, the principle of pari
delicto cannot apply.
In any case, the application of the pari delicto
principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application.[16] One of these exceptions is where the
application of the pari delicto rule
would violate well-established public policy.[17]
The prevention of lawlessness and the maintenance of peace and order are
established public policies. In the
instant case, to deny respondents relief on the ground of pari
delicto would put a premium on the illegal act of
petitioners in taking from respondents what the former claim to be rightfully
theirs.
Petitioners also question the trial
court's ruling that their counterclaim is permissive. This Court has laid down the following tests
to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the
issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (2) Would res judicata bar
a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s
claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (4)
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that
the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court?[18]
Tested against the above-mentioned
criteria, this Court agrees with the view of the RTC that Rosita's counterclaim
for the recovery of her alleged share in the sale of the Morayta
property is permissive in nature. The
evidence needed to prove respondents' claim to recover the amount of P3,000,000.00 from petitioners is different from that required
to establish Rosita's demands for the recovery of her alleged share in the sale
of the subject Morayta property. The recovery of respondents' claim is not
contingent or dependent upon the establishment of Rosita's counterclaim such
that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication
of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL)
v.
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the
trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.[20]
In order for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, Rosita is bound to pay
the prescribed docket fees.[21]
Since it is not disputed that Rosita never paid the docket and filing fees, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim. Nonetheless,
the trial court ruled on the merits of Rosita's permissive counterclaim by
dismissing the same on the ground that she failed to establish that there is a
sharing agreement between her and Arturo with respect to the proceeds of the
sale of the subject Morayta property and that the
amount of P3,000,000.00 represented by the
check which Rosita and Alice encashed formed part of
the proceeds of the said sale.
It is settled that any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any
time, even on appeal before this Court.[22]
In the present case, considering that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaim
of Rosita, any proceeding taken up by the trial court and any ruling or
judgment rendered in relation to such counterclaim is considered null and void. In effect, Rosita may file a separate action
against Arturo for recovery of a sum of money.
However, Rosita's claims for damages
and attorney's fees are compulsory as they necessarily arise as a result of the
filing by respondents of their complaint.
Being compulsory in nature, payment of docket fees is not required.[23] Nonetheless, since petitioners are found to
be liable to return to respondents the amount of P3,000,000.00
as well as to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, it
necessarily follows that Rosita's counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees
should be dismissed as correctly done by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
As to Patricia's entitlement to
damages, this Court has held that while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left
to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant
should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and
its causal connection to defendant’s acts.[24] This is so because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer.[25] Moreover, additional facts
must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under
the Civil Code, these being,
social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc. that resulted
from the act being complained of.[26] In the present case, both the RTC and the CA
were not convinced that Patricia is entitled to damages. Quoting the RTC, the
CA held thus:
With respect to Patricia, she did not even bother to know the details of the case against her, she left everything to the hands of her mother Alice. Her attitude towards the case appears weird, she being a banker who seems so concerned of her reputation.
Aside from the parties
to this case, her immediate superiors in the BPI knew that she is involved in a
case. They did not however know whether she is the plaintiff or the defendant in
the case. Further, they did not know the nature of the case that she is
involved in. It appears that Patricia has not suffered any of the injuries
enumerated in Article 2217 of the Civil Code, thus, she is not entitled to
moral damages and attorney's fees.[27]
This
Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above-quoted findings as
Patricia failed to satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis for
granting her moral damages and the causal connection of such fact to the act of
respondents in filing a complaint against her.
In addition, and with respect to
Benjamin, the Court agrees with the CA that in the absence of a wrongful act or
omission, or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.[28] The adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it.[29] One may err, but error alone is not a ground
for granting such damages.[30] In the absence
of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a person for having
been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would
warrant the award of moral damages.[31]
A resort to judicial processes is not, per se,
evidence of ill will upon which a claim for damages may be based.[32]
In China Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] this
Court held:
Settled in our
jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot be recovered from a person
who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or
bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433
[1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
129 SCRA 736 [1984]). If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is
damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 5 [1989]).[34]
In the present
case, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that petitioners failed to
establish that respondents were moved by bad faith or malice in impleading Patricia and Benjamin. Hence, Patricia and Benjamin are not entitled
to damages.
The Court sustains the award of moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees in favor of respondents.
As
to moral damages, Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same. In addition, Article 2219 (10) of the
Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in acts or actions
referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the same Code.
More particularly, Article 21 of the said Code
provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. In the present case, the act of Alice and Rosita
in fraudulently encashing the subject check to the
prejudice of respondents is certainly a violation of law as well as of the
public policy that no one should put the law into his own hands. As to SBTC and
its officers, their negligence is so gross as to amount to a willfull injury to respondents. The banking system has become an indispensable
institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of
every civilized society.[35] Whether as mere passive entities for the
safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and
commerce, banks have attained a ubiquitous presence among the people, who have
come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and most of all,
confidence.[36] For this reason, banks should
guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith
on its part.[37]
There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed
by its own peculiar facts.[38] The yardstick
should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive.[39] Moreover, the social standing of the aggrieved
party is essential to the determination of the proper amount of the award.[40] Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to obtain
means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo ante
would not be achieved.[41] In the present case, the Court finds no cogent
reason to modify the amount of moral damages granted by the CA.
Likewise, the Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the modifications made by the CA on the award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages. In the instant
case, the award of exemplary damages in favor of respondents is in order for
the purpose of deterring those who intend to enforce their rights by taking
measures or remedies which are not in accord with law and public policy. On the part of respondent bank, the public
relies on a bank's sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving
irreproachable service.[42] Hence, the level of meticulousness must be
maintained at all times by the banking sector.[43] In the present case the award of exemplary damages is
justified by the brazen acts of petitioners Rosita and
As to
attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among others, that
attorney's fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded or when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
raffle dated
[1] Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with the concurrence of Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao; rollo, pp. 121-137.
[2] Security Bank and Trust Company.
[3] RTC Decision, rollo, pp. 110-111.
[4] Rollo, pp. 118-119.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 100-102.
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, p. 542.
[9] Petition, rollo, pp. 17-18.
[10] RTC Decision, rollo, pp. 117-118.
[11] Iron Bulk Shipping Phil. Co., Ltd. v. Remington Industrial Sales Corp., 462 Phil. 694, 703 (2003).
[12]
[13]
[14] Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 419 Phil. 845, 856 (2001).
[15] Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 441 Phil. 1, 45 (2002).
[16] Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 515, citing Silagan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 274 Phil. 182, 193 (1991).
[17]
[18] Tan v. Kaakbay Finance Corporation, 452 Phil. 637, 647 (2003), citing Intestate Estate of Dalisay v. Hon. Marasigan, 327 Phil. 298, 301 (1996) and Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 811, 819 (1997).
[19] G.R. Nos. 79937-38,
[20]
[21] Suson v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 816, 825 (1997).
[22] Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R.
No. 152145,
[23] Tan v. Kaakbay, supra note 18, at 648.
[24] Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 464 Phil. 146, 149 (2004), citing Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 414, 431-432 (1997).
[25] Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., id. at 149-150; Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, id. at 432.
[26] Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., id. at 150; Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, id.
[27] CA rollo, p. 518.
[28] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, G.R. No. 149454, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 261, 293-294.
[29] Id at 294.
[30]
[31] Padillo v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 334, 356 (2001).
[32] Ceballos
v. Intestate Estate of the Late Emigdio Mercado,
G.R. No. 155856,
[33] G.R. No. 94182,
[34]
[35] Cagungun v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 158674, October 17, 2005, 473 SCRA 259, 273-274.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] Samson, Jr. v.
Bank of the Philippine
[41]
[42] Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 817, 826 (2000).
[43]