Republic of the
Supreme Court
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL G.R. NO.
154243
ROBERTO
LASTIMOSO, ACTING
CHIEF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL Present:
POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE
FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
MANAGEMENT
(DPRM), Chairperson,
INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
SUPT.
RAMSEY OCAMPO and CHICO-NAZARIO,
P/SUPT.
ELMER REJANO, NACHURA,
and
Petitioners, VELASCO,* JJ.
- versus -
P/SENIOR
INSPECTOR JOSE
J.
ASAYO, Promulgated:
Respondent. December
4, 2007
x-
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
the Court is respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
promulgated on
Respondent argues that the decision
should be reconsidered for the following reasons:
1. The summary proceeding was
null and void because no hearing was conducted; and
2. The evidence presented at
the summary hearing does not prove that respondent is guilty of the charges
against him.
Respondent insists that the
summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all but only relied on
the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding further
questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2
Villarama. It
should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no full-blown
trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings.
In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,[1]
the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:
Due process in an administrative context
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.
In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for
an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
The first issue presented by
respondent must, therefore, be struck down.
To resolve the second issue,
respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented
before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient
to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him.
However, it must be emphasized that
the action commenced by respondent before the Regional Trial Court is one for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as held in People v. Court of
Appeals,[3] where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of
the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
Yet, respondent-movant's
arguments and the fact that the administrative case against respondent was
filed way back in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of
procedure.
The general rule is that the filing of
a petition for certiorari does not toll the running of the period to
appeal.[4]
However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of Appeals[5]
and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[6]
the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promote
substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among
other instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the
honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the
country.
In addition, it is also understandable
why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead
of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief’s decision as an appeal
before the National Appellate Board (NAB).
It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over
his case. The complaint filed against
respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section 41 states that citizens' complaints
should be brought before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), while
Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately
remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police
officer.
It
was only in Quiambao v. Court of
Appeals,[7] promulgated in 2005 or
after respondent had already filed the petition for certiorari with
the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has
jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No.
6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors
have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases
filed against members of the PNP which may warrant
dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional
directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over
the case.
With the foregoing peculiar
circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the
opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of
the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal
before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.[8] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[9]
the Court stressed thus:
After all, technical rules of
procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore,
the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice.[10]
Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal
before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher interest
of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration is partly GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Special Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
raffle dated
[1] G.R. No. 140079,
[2]
[3] G.R. No. 142051,
[4] See Section 7, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and
Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. v. Castañeda, G.R. Nos. 169295-96,
[5] 357 Phil. 36 (1998).
[7] G.R. No. 128305,
[8] Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137.
[9] G.R. No. 164876,
[10]