FIRST DIVISION
|
NIDA ALEJO, FRANCISCA ALEJO and THE
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioners, -
versus - THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERLINDA PESTAÑO-BUTED, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, ARTHUR SERNA and JONG LINSANGAN, Respondents. |
G.R.
Nos. 154150-51
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, *YNARES-SANTIAGO, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, JJ. Promulgated: December
10, 2007 |
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DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For
our resolution is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
seeking to nullify and set aside the Order[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija dated June
26, 2002 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The
facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:
In
an Information dated
That on or about October 7,
2001, at Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with ARTHUR SERNA acting as the mastermind in contracting, thru
JONG LINSANGAN, his personal driver and long-time friend, a criminal gang from
Bongabon called the “Red Vigilante Group (RVG) composed of the herein accused
and headed by RICARDO PERALTA, alias “RIC,” did then and there, by force and
intimidation, and with the use of firearms, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
take, carry away and detain up to the present JULIO ALEJO and his son JULIUS
against their will and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for the
purpose of extorting ransom for their release in the original amount of P5
million and later reduced to P3 million, which amount, however, could
not be paid by the victims’ family, all to the damage and prejudice of the two
victims and their family in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In
another Information, also dated
That on or about October 7,
2001, at Bongabon, Nueva Ecija and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, and armed with different kinds of firearms and caliber, with
intent of gain and by means of violence or intimidation on the person, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take and carry away from
the kidnapped JULIO ALEJO the following personal propert(ies): (a) grocery
items worth P100,000.00; (b) BPI ATM card with more or less P250,000.00
account; (c) cash money of P350,000.00, (d) licensed pistol Cal. 45, (e)
Dia Star Rado wristwatch, (f) Polo sunglasses, (g) a college ring with markings
“BSF,” (h) Equitable and PCIB checks worth P1.6M, and from complainant
FRANCISCA ALEJO the following personal propert(ies): (a) P3,000.00 cash
money, and (b) Saudi gold necklace with pendant, to the damage and prejudice of
the aforesaid JULIO ALEJO and FRANCISCA ALEJO in the total sum of approximately
Two Million and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), Philippine
currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On
On
April 22, 2002, petitioners Nida Alejo and Francisca Alejo filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator a request for transfer of venue in both criminal
cases due to “threats to their personal safety” and that of their witnesses and
the possibility that the criminal gang from Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, known as the
Red Vigilante Group (RVG), might pressure then Presiding Judge Erlinda Pestaño-Buted,[2]
public respondent, in deciding the cases in favor of the accused.
When
arraigned on
Meanwhile,
the police arrested one Miguel De la Cruz, a suspected RVG member, for illegal
possession of firearms. During the custodial investigation, he disclosed to the
law enforcers that he was present at the RVG “safehouse” in Jaen, Nueva Ecija where the abductors detained Julio Alejo and Julius
Alejo; that the duo were killed two days later; and that he even helped in digging
their common grave. De la Cruz also informed
the police of the real names of the 17 John Does impleaded in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P. He agreed to
testify against the accused and applied for protection under the Witness
Protection Program pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. Nonetheless,
he was still charged with illegal possession of firearms in an Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1338-P. He was taken into protective custody by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) at
Upon
motion of the State Prosecutor, respondent judge ordered that the Information
in Criminal Case No. 1317-P be amended in the sense that the charge of robbery
be changed to robbery with double homicide.
On
June 11, 2002, respondent judge issued a verbal order directing the immediate
release of De la Cruz from the PNP’s custody on the
following grounds: (a) no warrant of arrest had been issued against him in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P; (b) he is not a witness for the
prosecution; and (c) he posted bail in Criminal Case No. 1338-P. The private prosecutor vehemently objected to
the release of De la Cruz considering that he is a potential witness for the
prosecution. But respondent judge
ignored the objection.
On
A. During
the hearing of the above-captioned cases, the Honorable Court motu proprio
brought out the matter of the bail bond posted by or for Miguel dela Cruz in a
case for illegal possession of firearms, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1338-P,
pending before this Honorable Court, directing that Miguel de la Cruz be
released from custody, despite the fact that the Honorable Court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the said Miguel de la Cruz since no warrant for his arrest
has been issued in the above-captioned cases, nor has he voluntarily
surrendered.
B.
The Honorable
Court made it appear that the said order concerning Miguel de la Cruz was
issued in Criminal Case No. 1338-P. when the truth of the matter is that it was
issued in open court during the hearing of the above-captioned cases.
C.
The Honorable
Court ordered the immediate release of Miguel de la Cruz “if indeed he is
detained” without granting the bonding company concerned and/or the PNP
Regional Command at
D.
The Honorable
Court has, time and again, even during the hearing in the above-captioned cases
on
E.
The Honorable
Court has continued to conduct proceedings in the above-captioned cases despite
the pending petition for transfer of venue filed by private complainants with
the Supreme Court.
F.
The Honorable
Court ordered the immediate release of ELIAS MINGOY, one of the accused in the
above-captioned cases, in a habeas corpus case in violation of Section 15, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On
On
the same day, the State Prosecutor reiterated his motion for the suspension of the
proceedings pending resolution of his motion to inhibit respondent judge. However, she did not act on the motion and
instead, she directed the prosecution to present evidence in support of its
opposition to accused’s motion to be admitted to bail.
Petitioners
are now before this Court contending that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
act on their Motion to Inhibit.
Eventually,
after the present petition was filed with this Court, respondent judge
issued an Order[3] dated
Section
1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
In
People v. Kho,[4]
this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions –
compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory
disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or
impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judge’s
discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and
valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise
of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition
must be for just and valid causes.[5]
In
1964, this Court, in People v. Gomez[6]
and Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz,[7] held
that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds other than those mentioned
in paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 and these grounds include bias and
partiality. In Pimentel v. Salonga,[8]
the Court laid the following guideposts for voluntary inhibition of judges:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
In
a long line of cases,[9]
this Court has unceasingly re-affirmed the standards laid down in Pimentel.
It
may be recalled that at the onset of the proceedings, petitioners sought a change
of venue in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P from Palayan City to Metro
Manila, due to fear for their lives and those of their witnesses. The prosecution also pointed out that the RVG
has the capability of pressuring respondent judge. Despite its pending request for change of
venue, respondent judge opted to continue with the proceedings. Significantly, the grounds specified by
movants in their Motion to Inhibit are obviously meritorious.
Under
the foregoing circumstances, the Salonga doctrine that judicial
“discretion should be exercised in a way that the people’s faith in courts of
justice should not be impaired” becomes relevant. Given the prosecution’s apparent lack of
faith in respondent judge, she was placed in a difficult position. Should she acquit the accused, her decision
will appear to be tainted with bias. Such
a situation is highly detrimental, not only to the image of the trial court,
but to the integrity of the judicial system. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must
be beyond suspicion and that he should maintain nothing less than cold
neutrality and impartiality. Otherwise, the wisest course for a judge would be
to disqualify himself. Thus, respondent
judge should have inhibited herself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos.
1316-P and 1317-P. At any rate, this
issue has become moot considering that she had retired from the service on
WHEREFORE,
for being moot, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated to sit as additional Member of the First Division under
Special Order No. 474 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 71-74.
[2] She retired on
[3] Rollo, pp. 258-265.
[4] G.R. No. 139381,
[5] Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No.
143089,
[6] G.R. No. 223456,
[7] G.R. Nos. 34756-59,
[8] G.R. No. 27934,
[9] See for instance, Zaldivar v. Estenzo, G.R. No. 26055,
May 3, 1968, 23 SCRA 533; Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No. 28826, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 165; Paredes v. Gopengco, G.R. No. 23710, September 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 688; Beltran v. Garcia, G.R. No. 30868, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 158; Mateo v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. 34756-59, March 31,
1973, 50 SCRA 18; Umale v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51
SCRA 84; Paredes v. Abad, G.R. Nos. 36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA
522; Castillo v. Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA
124; Martinez v. Gironella, G.R. No. 37635, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA 245; Villapando
v. Quitain, G.R. Nos. 41740-71, January 20, 1977, 75 SCRA 25; Baustista
v. Rebueno, G.R. No. 46117,