Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
HEIRS OF ANACLETO B. NIETO, namely,
SIXTA P. NIETO, EULALIO P. NIETO, GAUDENCIO P. NIETO, and CORAZON P.
NIETO-IGNACIO, represented by EULALIO P. NIETO, Petitioners, -
versus - MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, represented by
MAYOR EDUARDO ALARILLA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 150654
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: December 13, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals, dated
The antecedents are as follows:
Anacleto Nieto was the registered owner of a parcel of land, consisting
of 3,882 square meters, situated at Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered
by TCT No. T-24.055 (M). The property is being used by respondent,
Upon Anacleto’s death on
On
On P1,716,000.00,
and P10,000.00 a month thereafter, as well as P300,000.00 as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
In its Answer,[4] respondent alleged that the property was
donated to it and that the action was already time-barred because 32 years had
elapsed since it possessed the property.
Respondent and counsel failed to
appear during the scheduled pre-trial conference.[5] Upon petitioners’ motion, respondent was
declared as in default and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
which the RTC granted. Respondent was then allowed to cross-examine
petitioners’ lone witness and present its own evidence. However, despite
notice, respondent failed again to appear during the scheduled hearing. Hence,
the RTC considered respondent to have waived its right to cross-examine petitioners’
witness and present its own evidence. The case was then submitted for decision.
On
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
Accordingly, petitioners elevated the case to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following issues:
A. Are lands covered by the Torrens System subject to
prescription?
B.
May the defense of [l]aches be invoked in this specific case?
C. May the defense of imprescriptibility only be invoked by the registered owner to the exclusion of his legitimate heirs?[7]
The petition is meritorious.
Respondent argues that the action of petitioner
to recover possession of the property is already barred by prescription.
We do not agree.
An
action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of
the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession.[8] It follows that an
action by the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the
Torrens System does not prescribe.
Despite knowledge of this avowed doctrine, the
trial court ruled that petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed on the ground that the imprescriptibility to
recover lands registered under the Torrens System can only be invoked by the person
under whose name the land is registered.
Again, we do not agree. It is well settled that the
rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the
registered owner but extends to the heirs of the registered owner as well.[9] Recently in Mateo v. Diaz,[10]
the Court held that prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner, but also against his hereditary successors because the latter step into
the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, petitioners, as heirs of Anacleto Nieto, the
registered owner, cannot be barred by prescription from claiming the property.
Aside from finding that petitioners’ cause of action was barred by
prescription, the trial court reinforced its dismissal of the case by holding
that the action was likewise barred by laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert his right has either abandoned or declined to assert it.[11]
In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to recover registered land
covered by the Torrens System may not be barred by laches.[12] Laches
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.[13] Laches, which is a principle based on equity, may not prevail
against a specific provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as “justice
outside legality,” is applied in the absence of and not against statutory law
or rules of procedure.[14]
In recent cases, [15] however, the Court held
that while it is true that a
Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered lands, it
would still not bar petitioners’ claim. It should be stressed that laches
is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time.[16] The following elements must be present
in order to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.[17]
We note that the certificate of title in the name of Anacleto Nieto was found
in respondent’s possession but there was no evidence that ownership of the
property was transferred to the municipality either through a donation or by expropriation,
or that any compensation was paid by respondent for the use of the property.
Anacleto allegedly surrendered the certificate of title to respondent upon the
belief that the property would be expropriated. Absent any showing that this
certificate of title was fraudulently obtained by respondent, it can be
presumed that Anacleto voluntarily delivered the same to respondent. Anacleto’s delivery of the certificate of
title to respondent could, therefore, be taken to mean acquiescence to respondent’s
plan to expropriate the property, or a tacit consent to the use of the property
pending its expropriation.
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.[18] The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by
tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.[19]
Upon the refusal to vacate the property, the owner’s cause of
action accrues.
In this case, the first element of laches occurred the moment respondent
refused to vacate the property, upon petitioners demand, on
Moreover, case law teaches
that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches. Even if it be supposed that petitioners
were aware of respondent’s occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return
of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all.[20]
Furthermore,
the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to defeat justice or to perpetrate
fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result.[21]
Finally, we find that the rentals being prayed for by petitioners are
reasonable considering the size and location of the subject property. Accordingly, the award of rentals is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
dated P1,716,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of the property
from 1966 until the filing of the complaint and P10,000.00 monthly
rental thereafter until it vacates the property, with 12% interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid; and (c) to return to petitioners the
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M).
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
A T
T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E
R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
[2] Records, pp. 70-71.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 32-33.
[5] Rollo, p. 24.
[6]
[7]
[8] Mateo v. Diaz,
424 Phil. 772, 781 (2002).
[9] Mateo v. Diaz, supra, at 782; Bailon-Casilao
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-78178,
[10] Supra.
[11] Isabela
Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, 397 Phil. 955, 969
(2000).
[12] Mateo
v. Diaz, supra note 8, at 781; Quevada v. Glorioso, 356 Phil. 105, 119
(1998); Dablo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 93365, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 618, 628; Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA
636, 641; Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. 46364, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 190, 198; Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 106 (1985); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Macalindong, No. L-15398,
[13] Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals, 415 Phil. 665, 674 (2001).
[14] Mateo v. Diaz, supra note 8, at 781.
[15] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103,
[16] Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 627, 635
[17] Heirs
of Juan and Ines Panganiban v. Dayrit, supra note 15, at 382.
[18] Macasaet v.
Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92,
[19] Arcal v. Court of
Appeals, 348 Phil. 813, 825 (1998).
[20] Feliciano v.
Zaldivar, G.R. No. 162593,
[21] Heirs of Dumaliang
v. Serban, G.R. No. 155133,