CYNTHIA CRUZ KHEMANI G.R. No. 147340
and SHANKER N. KHEMANI,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
THE HEIRS OF
ANASTACIO
NAPOLEON and
ROLANDO Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 13, 2007
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1]
assails the July 31, 2000 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55581, which affirmed the May 24, 1999
Order[3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato in Civil Case No.
1122, entitled “Heirs of Anastacio
and Francisca Trinidad, et al. v. Heirs of Jose Peña, et al.” Also assailed is the
The factual antecedents are as
follows:
Petitioner Cynthia Cruz Khemani is the
registered owner of Lot No. 107, Ts-1032 (Lot No. 107), which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 58976 issued on
Subject of the instant case is a 340 square meter portion (the Disputed
Property) of Lot No. 107 over which respondents Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad,
represented by Napoleon and Rolando Trinidad, are claiming ownership. Respondents allege that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Anastacio and Francisca Trinidad, have openly,
peacefully, publicly and adversely possessed the Disputed Property in the
concept of owner since 1950.
Lot No. 107 and Lot Nos. 108 and 109, constitute Lot No. 355 which was part
of the public domain. On
Thereafter, the original area of Lot No. 355 which was 1,500 square
meters increased to 3,616.93 square meters due to accretion. Peña then requested the Bureau of Lands (BOL)
to adjust the area of the lot awarded to him but the BOL denied the request on
the ground that the accretion belonged to the government.
Aggrieved, Peña appealed to the Office of the President. The BOL recommended that Lot No. 355 be subdivided
into three parts, to wit, Lot Nos. 107, 108 and 109, and that Lot No. 108 with
an area of 1,500 square meters, be awarded to Peña, instead of the whole of Lot
No. 355. Meanwhile, Lot Nos. 107 and 109
would be allocated to Basilio Mendoza (
The Office of the President initially adopted the recommendation of the
BOL. Upon reconsideration, however, it
modified its decision and held that the entire area of Lot No. 355, including
the accretion, belonged to Peña and not to the government. Thus,
On January 27, 1970, Mendoza filed a special civil action for certiorari
against the Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President, the BOL, the
Director of Lands, and Peña before Branch 24 of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 98. Claiming that he was denied due process,
On
In the case of Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs of the
Office of the President v. Court of Appeals[6]
which was decided on
On
On January 27, 1994, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato a verified complaint[8]
against the Peña Heirs,[9]
the DENR Region IX Office, and the BOL for “Review of Decree of Registration
and/or Reconveyance with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,” which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1122. Respondents filed the
complaint on the strength of their own and their predecessors’ open, peaceful,
public and adverse possession of the Disputed Property in the concept of owner
since 1950.
Respondents also claimed that on
Instead of an answer, the Peña Heirs filed
a Motion to Dismiss[11]
alleging that the Regional Trial Court lacks jurisdiction over the nature of
the action or the suit; that respondents have no legal capacity to sue as only
the government may seek nullification of the land grant in their favor; and
that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment or the statute of
limitations. They asserted that the
issue of ownership over the Disputed Property has long been settled in the Assistant
Executive Secretary case. Further, they
argued that respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio, was a mere
squatter who had been allowed by
In respondents’ Comment/Opposition,[12] they claimed
that the Disputed Property had long ceased to be
public land by virtue of their open, public, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession in the concept of owner for more than 40 years, and that they were
never parties in the Assistant Executive Secretary case involving
Mendoza.
On
Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration[14] alleging
that res judicata does not apply and that their action is not barred by
the Assistant Executive Secretary case. They argued that neither they, nor
Anastacio, were parties in the said case and that there is no identity of
causes of action.
In 1998, Judge Soledad died without resolving
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents. Judge Francisco S. Ampig (Judge Ampig) was
designated Acting Judge. On
The Peña Heirs, together with herein petitioner as the new owner of Lot
No. 107, filed a petition for certiorari[15] before the Court of Appeals which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55581.
On
Moreover, petitioners have plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedy against an adverse interlocutory
order, such as the assailed orders, is not certiorari but to continue with the
case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
appeal in the manner authorized by law.
x x x
With the denial of the motion to
dismiss and reinstatement of the case, petitioners will still answer the
complaint. Upon joinder of issues, the
parties will enter into trial, after which, the lower court will render a
verdict. And if adverse to them,
petitioners may appeal the decision together with the assailed orders. The case at bench does not fall under any of
the exceptional circumstances where the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be
resorted to despite availability of appeal.
x x x x
Private respondents are not parties in the first action. Neither are they the successors-in-interest
of any of the parties therein. The first
action is in personam. The final
judgment in said action is only binding and conclusive upon the parties therein
and their successors-in-interest.
x x x x
Mendoza, the petitioner in the first action, laid claim in
On the other hand, “the test often used in determining
whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been
sufficient to authorize recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of
the two actions be different” (Carlet
vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 97).
Considering that the foundation of private respondents’ action is different
from that of
Since not all requisites of res judicata are present,
respondent judge acted rightly in issuing the assailed orders. In short, he committed no abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing decision was denied hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the case of Assistant
Executive Secretary bars the filing of Civil Case No. 1122, and that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
proper remedy in assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court denying the
motion to dismiss.
Respondents argue that they have been
in open, peaceful, public and adverse possession of the Disputed Property in
the concept of owner since 1950; that the patent and original certificate of
title were fraudulently issued in favor of the Peña Heirs; and that their
action for review of decree of registration and/or reconveyance is not barred
by the Court’s ruling in Assistant Executive Secretary.
The issues for resolution are as
follows: 1) whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
proper remedy in assailing an order denying a motion to dismiss; and 2) whether
Judge Ampig committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
to dismiss and reinstating Civil Case No. 1122.
The petition lacks merit.
It has long been settled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order. It neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. As such, the
general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in
a special civil action for certiorari.[17]
However, there are exceptions to the general rule. In Velarde v. Lopez, Jr.,[18]
the Court held that resort to a special civil action for certiorari is
allowed when the ground for the motion to dismiss is improper venue, lack of
jurisdiction, or res judicata as in the case at bar.[19] Thus, petitioner
did not commit a procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, as to the substantive issue raised herein, the petition
must fail. We find that Judge Ampig did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
and reinstating Civil Case No. 1122.
In Oropeza Marketing Corp. v.
Allied Banking Corp.,[20] we
held that res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[21]
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the
following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is –
between the first and the second actions – identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.[22]
In this case, it is not disputed that the first three elements are
present. Likewise, there is no
controversy regarding the identity of the subject matter. The question, therefore, is whether there is identity
of parties and causes of action. We find
that there is none.
Civil Case No. 98 was a special civil action
for certiorari filed by Mendoza against the Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President, the BOL, the
Director of Lands, and Peña. On the
other hand, Civil Case No. 1122 is an action for review of decree of
registration and/or reconveyance. The
parties are respondents
True, res judicata does not require
absolute but only substantial identity of parties. However, there is substantial identity only
when the “additional” party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the
parties in the former action.[23] This is not so in the present case. It must be emphasized that respondents are
not asserting rights under
Moreover, as correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, the basis of respondents’ action was different from that of Mendoza;
the evidence necessary to sustain the latter’s claim is separate and distinct
from that required to establish respondents’ cause of action.[24] While
Thus, res
judicata does not apply in the instant case there being no identity of
parties and causes of action. Nevertheless, the public policy underlying the
principle of res judicata must be considered together with the policy
that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding wherein to
present his case.[27] It
bears stressing that respondents’ action for review of decree of registration
is sanctioned under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[28]
which provides that a person deprived of his land through actual fraud may
institute an action to reopen or review a decree of registration within one
year from entry of such decree. It
states:
Section 32. Review
of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including
the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from
and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent
purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.
The Court has repeatedly applied the foregoing provision of law to a
patent issued by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the
In this case, the patent was issued in favor of the Peña Heirs on
Further, even assuming arguendo that
respondents filed their action after one year, they may still be entitled to
relief. An aggrieved party may file an
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which
prescribes in ten years from the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent
purchaser for value.[31]
Respondents clearly asserted in their complaint
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have long been the owners of the
Disputed Property and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof
when the Peña Heirs obtained a patent and certificate of title in their favor. These allegations certainly measure up to the
requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance.[32]
A final note.
It appears from the records that after our ruling in the Assistant Executive Secretary case in
1989, the BOL issued a Patent on
All told, it would be premature to order the dismissal of respondents’
complaint as they have yet to be given an opportunity to substantiate their
claims. We note that respondents are in actual physical possession of the Disputed
Property up to this date, and the fact of their physical possession over many
years is not disputed by petitioner. [34]
Under the circumstances, it would
be more in keeping with the standards of fairness to have a full-blown trial
where the evidentiary matters are threshed out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 31, 2000 Decision, and the January
8, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55581 are AFFIRMED. The trial court is ORDERED to resume
trial in Civil Case No. 1122 and to resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-31.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
G.R. No. 76761,
[7] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[8] CA
rollo, pp. 68-82.
[9]
Being the new owner of Lot No. 107, petitioner later joined the Peña Heirs as
petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 55581.
[10] Rollo, p. 125.
[11] CA
rollo, pp. 35-41.
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 62-68.
[14] CA rollo, pp. 53-60.
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[17] Davao
Light v. Hon. Judge, G.R.
No. 147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 280.
[18]
G.R. No. 153886,
[19]
[20]
441 Phil. 551 (2002).
[21]
[22] Luzon
Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R.
No. 163338,
[23] Nery
v. Leyson, 393 Phil. 644,
655 (2000).
[24]
Rollo, p. 37.
[25]
G.R. No. 141510,
[26]
[27] Teodoro
v. Carague, G.R. No. 96004,
February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 429, 434; citing 46 Am. Jur. p. 403.
[28]
Formerly Section 38 of Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903.
[29] Heirs
of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 452
Phil. 238, 251 (2003); citing David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 711, 718-719.
[30] Rollo, pp. 52-54.
[31]
See Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, G.R. No. 140457,
[32]
[33] Supra note 6 at 36.
[34] Rollo, p. 16. In her petition for review, petitioner states
that Napoleon Trinidad is occupying an area of about 169 square meters of the
Disputed Property.