Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, Petitioners, - versus - T.E.A.M.
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGY ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY and MANAGEMENT
PACIFIC CORPORATION; and ULTRA ELECTRONICS INSTRUMENTS, INC., Respondents.
|
G.R. No.
131723
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: December 13, 2007 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent
T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation (TEC) was formerly known as NS Electronics (
Petitioner
and NS Electronics (Philippines), Inc., the predecessor-in-interest of
respondent TEC, were parties to two separate contracts denominated as
Agreements for the Sale of Electric Energy under the following account numbers:
09341-1322-16[3] and 09341-1812-13.[4] Under the aforesaid agreements, petitioner
undertook to supply TEC’s building known as Dyna Craft International Manila
(DCIM) located at
In
September 1986, TEC, under its former name National Semi-Conductors (Phils.)
entered into a Contract of Lease[5]
with respondent Ultra Electronics Industries, Inc. (Ultra) for the use of the
former’s DCIM building for a period of five years or until September 1991. Ultra was, however, ejected from the premises
on
On
In
a letter dated P7,040,401.01 representing its unregistered
consumption from
TEC
demanded from petitioner the reconnection of electrical service, claiming that
it had nothing to do with the alleged tampering but the latter refused to heed
the demand. Hence, TEC filed a complaint
on P1,000,000.00,
under protest. The complaint before the
ERB was later withdrawn as the parties deemed it best to have the issues threshed
out in the regular courts. Prior to the
reconnection, or on
Meanwhile,
on P280,813.72
representing the differential billing.[13] TEC denied petitioner’s allegations and claim
in a letter dated
On
At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues, as follows:
1. Whether or
not the defendant Meralco is liable for the plaintiffs’ disconnection of
electric service at
2. Whether or not
the plaintiff is liable for (sic) the defendant for the differential billings
in the amount of P7,040,401.01.
3. Whether or not the plaintiff is liable to defendant for exemplary damages.[19]
For failure of the parties to reach an
amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued. On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in this case in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants as follows:
(1)
Ordering both
defendants Meralco and ULTRA Electronics Instruments, Inc. to jointly and
severally reimburse plaintiff TEC actual damages in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of this case on
(2)
Ordering
defendant Meralco to pay to plaintiff TEC the amount of P280,813.72 as
actual damages with legal rate of interest also from
(3)
Ordering
defendant Meralco to pay to plaintiff TPC the amount of P150,000.00 as
actual damages with interest at legal rate from
(4)
Condemning
defendant Meralco to pay both plaintiffs moral damages in the amount pf P500,000.00;
(5)
Condemning
defendant Meralco to pay both plaintiffs corrective and/or exemplary damages in
the amount of P200,000.00;
(6)
Ordering
defendant Meralco to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00
Costs against defendant Meralco.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The
trial court found the evidence of petitioner insufficient to prove that TEC was
guilty of tampering the meter installations.
The deformed condition of the meter seal and the existence of an opening
in the wire duct leading to the transformer vault did not, in themselves, prove
the alleged tampering, especially since access to the transformer was given
only to petitioner’s employees.[21] The sudden drop in TEC’s (or Ultra’s)
electric consumption did not, per se,
show meter tampering. The delay in the
sending of notice of the results of the inspection was likewise viewed by the
court as evidence of inefficiency and arbitrariness on the part of petitioner. More importantly, petitioner’s act of
disconnecting the DCIM building’s electric supply constituted bad faith and
thus makes it liable for damages.[22] The court further denied petitioner’s claim
of differential billing primarily on the ground of equitable negligence.[23] Considering that TEC and TPC paid P1,000,000.00
to avert the disconnection of electric power; and because Ultra manifested to
settle the claims of petitioner, the court imposed solidary liability on both
Ultra and petitioner for the payment of the P1,000,000.00.
Ultra
and petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision, with a
modification of the amount of actual damages and interest thereon. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
dated
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment affirming in toto the Decision rendered by
the trial court with the slight modification that the interest at legal rate
shall be computed from January 13, 1989 and that Meralco shall pay plaintiff
T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation and Technology Electronics Assembly and
Management Pacific Corporation the sum of P150,000.00 per month for five
(5) months for actual damages incurred when it was compelled to lease a
generator set with interest at the legal rate from the above-stated date.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The appellate court agreed with the RTC’s conclusion. In addition, it considered petitioner negligent for failing to discover the alleged defects in the electric meters; in belatedly notifying TEC and TPC of the results of the inspection; and in disconnecting the electric power without prior notice.
Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari contending that:
The
Court of Appeals committed grievous errors and decided matters of substance
contrary to law and the rulings of this Honorable Court:
1. In finding that the issue in the case is whether
there was deliberate tampering of the metering installations at the building
owned by TEC.
2. In not finding that the issue is: whether or
not, based on the tampered meters, whether or not petitioner is entitled to
differential billing, and if so, how much.
3. In declaring that petitioner ME RALCO had the
burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that with respect to
the tampered meters that TEC and/or TPC authored their tampering.
4. In finding that petitioner Meralco should not
have held TEC and/or TPC responsible for the acts of Ultra.
5. In finding that TEC should not be held liable
for the tampering of this electric meter in its
6. In
finding that there was no notice of disconnection.
7. In finding that petitioner MERALCO
was negligent in informing TEC of the alleged tampering.
8. In making the finding that it is difficult to
believe that when petitioner MERALCO inspected on
9.
In declaring that
petitioner MERALCO estopped from claiming any tampering of the meters.
10. In finding
that “the method employed by MERALCO to as certain (sic) the ‘correct’ amount
of electricity consumed is questionable”;
11. In declaring that MERALCO all throughout its
dealings with TEC took on an “attitude” which is oppressive, wanton and
reckless.
12. In
declaring that MERALCO acted arbitrarily in inspecting TEC’s DCIM building and
the NS building.
13. In
declaring that respondents TEC and TPC are entitled to the damages which it
awarded.
14. In not
declaring that petitioner is entitled to the differential bill.
15. In not
declaring that respondents are liable to petitioner for exemplary damages,
attorney’s fee and expenses for litigation.[25]
The petition must fail.
The issues for resolution can be summarized as follows: 1) whether or not TEC tampered with the electric meters installed at its DCIM and NS buildings; 2) If so, whether or not it is liable for the differential billing as computed by petitioner; and 3) whether or not petitioner was justified in disconnecting the electric power supply in TEC’s DCIM building.
Petitioner insists that the tampering of the electric meters installed at the DCIM and NS buildings owned by respondent TEC has been established by overwhelming evidence, as specifically shown by the shorting devices found during the inspection. Thus, says petitioner, tampering of the meter is no longer an issue.
It is obvious that petitioner wants this Court to revisit the factual findings of the lower courts. Well-established is the doctrine that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Court. We would like to stress that this Court is not a trier of facts and may not re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. Factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.[26]
Looking at the record, we note that
petitioner claims to have discovered three incidences of meter-tampering; twice
in the DCIM building on
The first instance was supposedly
discovered on
However, contrary to petitioner’s claim that there was a drastic and unexplainable drop in TEC’s electric consumption during the affected period, the Pattern of TEC’s Electrical Consumption[28] shows that the sudden drop is not peculiar to the said period. Noteworthy is the observation of the RTC in this wise:
In fact, in Account No. 09341-1812-13 (heretofore referred
as Account/Meter No. 2), as evidenced by Exhibits “35” and “35-A,” there was
likewise a sudden drop of electrical consumption from the year 1984 which
recorded an average 141,300 kwh/month to 1985 which recorded an average kwh/month at 87,600 or a difference-drop of 53,700
kwh/month; from 1985’s 87,600 recorded consumption, the same dropped to
18,600 kwh/month or a difference-drop of 69,000 kwh/month. Surely, a drop of 53,700 could be equally
categorized as a sudden drop amounting to 69,000 which, incidentally,
the Meralco claimed as “unexplainable. x x x.[29]
The witnesses for petitioner who testified on the alleged tampering of the electric meters, declared that tampering is committed by consumers to prevent the meter from registering the correct amount of electric consumption, and result in a reduced monthly electric bill, while continuing to enjoy the same power supply. Only the registration of actual electric energy consumption, not the supply of electricity, is affected when a meter is tampered with.[30] The witnesses claimed that after the inspection, the tampered electric meters were corrected, so that they would register the correct consumption of TEC. Logically, then, after the correction of the allegedly tampered meters, the customer’s registered consumption would go up.
In this case, the period claimed to have been affected by the tampered electric meters is from February 1986 until September 1987. Based on petitioner’s Billing Record[31] (for the DCIM building), TEC’s monthly electric consumption on Account No. 9341-1322-16 was between 4,500 and 27,000 kwh.[32] Account No. 9341-1812-13 showed a monthly consumption between 9,600 and 34,200 kwh.[33] It is interesting to note that, after correction of the allegedly tampered meters, TEC’s monthly electric consumption from October 1987 to February 1988 (the last month that Ultra occupied the DCIM building) was between 8,700 and 24,300 kwh in its first account, and 16,200 to 46,800 kwh on the second account.
Even more revealing is the fact that TEC’s meters registered 9,300 kwh and 19,200 kwh consumption on the first and second accounts, respectively, a month prior to the inspection. On the first month after the meters were corrected, TEC’s electric consumption registered at 9,300 kwh and 22,200 kwh on the respective accounts. These figures clearly show that there was no palpably drastic difference between the consumption before and after the inspection, casting a cloud of doubt over petitioner’s claim of meter-tampering. Indeed, Ultra’s explanation that the corporation was losing; thus, it had lesser consumption of electric power appear to be the more plausible reason for the drop in electric consumption.
Petitioner
likewise claimed that when the subject meters were again inspected on P7
million would further jeopardize itself in the eyes of petitioner.[34] If it is true that there was evidence of
tampering found on
As to the alleged tampering of the electric meter in TEC’s NS building, suffice it to state that the allegation was not proven, considering that the meters therein were enclosed in a metal cabinet the metal seal of which was unbroken, with petitioner having sole access to the said meters.[38]
In view of the negative finding on the alleged tampering of electric meters on TEC’s DCIM and NS buildings, petitioner’s claim of differential billing was correctly denied by the trial and appellate courts. With greater reason, therefore, could petitioner not exercise the right of immediate disconnection.
The law in force at the time material to
this controversy was Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401[39]
issued on
Petitioner, in the instant case, resorted to the remedy of disconnection without prior notice. While it is true that petitioner sent a demand letter to TEC for the payment of differential billing, it did not include any notice that the electric supply would be disconnected. In fine, petitioner abused the remedies granted to it under P.D. 401 and Revised General Order No. 1 by outrightly depriving TEC of electrical services without first notifying it of the impending disconnection. Accordingly, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC decision.
As to the damages awarded by the CA, we deem it proper to modify the same. Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.[45]
Respondent TEC sufficiently established,
and petitioner in fact admitted, that the former paid P1,000,000.00 and P280,813.72
under protest, the amounts representing a portion of the latter’s claim of
differential billing. With the finding
that no tampering was committed and, thus, no differential billing due, the
aforesaid amounts should be returned by petitioner, with interest, as ordered by
the Court of Appeals and pursuant to the guidelines set forth by the Court.[46]
However, despite the appellate court’s
conclusion that no tampering was committed, it held Ultra solidarily liable
with petitioner for P1,000,000.00, only because the former, as occupant
of the building, promised to settle the claims of the latter. This ruling is erroneous. Ultra’s promise was conditioned upon the
finding of defect or tampering of the meters.
It did not acknowledge any culpability and liability, and absent any
tampered meter, it is absurd to make the lawful occupant liable. It was petitioner who received the P1 million;
thus, it alone should be held liable for the return of the amount.
TEC
also sufficiently established its claim for the reimbursement of the amount
paid as rentals for the generator set it was constrained to rent by reason of
the illegal disconnection of electrical service. The official receipts and purchase orders
submitted by TEC as evidence sufficiently show that such rentals were indeed
made. However, the amount of P150,000.00
per month for five months, awarded by the CA, is excessive. Instead, a total sum of P150,000.00,
as found by the RTC, is proper.
As
to the payment of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the same. Exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.[47] In this case, to serve as an example – that
before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public
utility, the requisites of law must be complied with – we affirm the award of P200,000.00
as exemplary damages. With the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney’s
fees is likewise proper, pursuant to Article 2208[48]
of the Civil Code. It is obvious that
TEC needed the services of a lawyer to argue its cause through three levels of
the judicial hierarchy. Thus, the award
of P200,000.00 is in order.[49]
We, however, deem it proper to delete the award of moral damages. TEC’s claim was premised allegedly on the damage to its goodwill and reputation.[50] As a rule, a corporation is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or sentiments like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is when the corporation has a reputation that is debased, resulting in its humiliation in the business realm.[51] But in such a case, it is imperative for the claimant to present proof to justify the award. It is essential to prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to petitioner’s acts.[52] In the present case, the records are bereft of any evidence that the name or reputation of TEC/TPC has been debased as a result of petitioner’s acts. Besides, the trial court simply awarded moral damages in the dispositive portion of its decision without stating the basis thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40282 dated June
18, 1997 and its Resolution dated December 3, 1997 are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P150,000.00 per month
for five months as reimbursement for the rentals of the generator set is REDUCED to P150,000.00; and (2)
the award of P500,000.00 as moral damages is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA MARTINEZ
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice
Maximiano C. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Ramon A.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 104-105.
[3] Records, pp. 73-76.
[4]
[5]
[6] Ultra was then in possession of the subject building by virtue of a contract of lease.
[7] Records, pp. 79-82.
[8]
[9]
The referral was embodied in
a letter dated
[10] Records, p. 197.
[11] The complaint before the ERB was later withdrawn by TEC on the ground that the issues should be ventilated before the regular courts.
[12]
Rollo, p. 89.
[13] Records, p. 246.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Ultra was impleaded as a
defendant being the lessee of the
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 213-214.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Rollo, pp. 32-34.
[26]
Manila Electric Company v. South Pacific Plastic Manufacturing
Corporation, G.R. No. 144215, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 114, 120; Manila Electric Company v. Court of Appeals,
413 Phil. 338, 354 (2001)..
[27]
Rollo, p. 198.
[28]
Records, pp. 446-449.
[29]
Rollo, p. 207.
[30] See Manila Electric Company v. Imperial Textile Mills, Inc., G.R. No.
146747,
[31] Exhibits “32” to “32-G” and “33” to 33-F.”
[32] To illustrate: TEC’s Billing Record (Account No. 9341-1322-16) shows the following details:
[33] To illustrate: TEC’s Billing Record (Account No. 9341-1812-13) shows the following details:
[34] Rollo, p. 203.
[35]
424 Phil. 811, 828 (2000).
[36]
Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126074,
February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 544, 552.
[37]
Manila Electric Company v. Macro
Textile Mills, supra note 35.
[38] Rollo, p. 194.
[39] “Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts”; as amended by P.D. 401-A.
[40] Repealed by Republic Act No. 7832, otherwise known as the “Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.”
[41]
Manila Electric Company v. Macro Textile Mills Corporation, supra
note 35, at 819.
[42] Section 1 thereof provides:
Any person who installs any
water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without previous authority
from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical
or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas
is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water,
electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly
possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped
gas pipes or conduits, shall upon conviction be punished with prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both.
[43]
Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Baltazar Dacula v. Quijano,
G.R. No. 144474,
[44] The requirement of 48-hour notice was provided for in Section 97 of Revised General Order No. 1. The provision reads:
Section 97. Payment of bills. – A public service may require that bills for service be paid within a specified time after rendition. When the billing period covers a month or more, the minimum time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be discontinued for the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48-hours’ written notice of such disconnection has been given the customer; x x x.
[45]
Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, 429 Phil. 727, 747 (2000).
[46] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95-97.
[47]
Quisumbing v.
[48] Article 2208 states:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
x x x.
[49]
Quisumbing v.
[50] Records, p. 11.
[51]
Coastal Pacific Trading, Inc. v. Southern Rolling Mills,
[52]
Development Bank of the