G.R. No. 123346 – MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 134385 – ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., petitioner, versus HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, represented by his
Compulsory Heirs: His surviving spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their children,
NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and CARLOS LAGMAN,
LERMA and RENE POLICAR, and ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondents.
G.R. No. 148767 – STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner, versus CLT
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Promulgated:
December
14, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ,
J.:
“Justice
delayed is justice denied.” Let this Court be the shining example of
speedy justice for the lower courts to emulate.
At the
outset, I must stress that the final resolution of these cases has been delayed
unnecessarily and has dragged on far too long, thereby causing prejudice to the
parties. The oldest[1]
of these three consolidated cases was instituted in the trial court way back on
Petitioners
utterly failed to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals
in its assailed Decisions affirming the trial courts’ judgments. Therefore, why should these cases be remanded
to the same court?
I dread the
day when the aggrieved parties herein would bewail the delay of the resolution
of their cases and lay the blame on this Court as the perpetrator of the awful
dictum that “justice delayed is justice denied.” Let us give sense to the constitutional
mandate that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.”[3] This constitutional guarantee is intended to
stem the tide of “disenchantment among the people in the administration of
justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.”[4] In Matias v. Plan,[5]
this Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno, expressed grave concern if such
constitutional guarantee is ignored, thus:
The Constitution guarantees the right of
persons against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Judges play an active role in ensuring
that cases are resolved with speed and dispatch so as not to defeat the cause
of the litigants.
x x x
The
need for speedy administration of justice cannot be ignored. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of people guaranteed
by various legislations inutile. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
In the same
vein, Justice Isagani A. Cruz (retired) stated that the constitutional
provision on speedy disposition of cases “deserves support” and its
“implementation depends ultimately upon the Supreme Court, which unfortunately
is no paragon of speedy justice either, x x x.”[6]
Indeed, the
aphorism “justice delayed is justice denied” is by no means a trivial or
meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with
the dispensation of justice,[7]
including this Court of last resort.
The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner
that is in accord with our established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly
decided to better serve the ends of justice. The essence of the judicial function is that
“justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.”[8]
This Court
has incessantly admonished and dealt with severely members of the bench for
undue delay in the disposition of cases, for such amounts to a denial of
justice which, in turn, brings the courts into disrepute and erodes the faith
and confidence of the public in the Judiciary and the justice system.[9] The integrity and honor of the Judiciary is
measured not only by the impartiality, fairness, and correctness of the
decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are speedily
resolved.[10]
Let this Court be the shining example
of speedy justice for the lower courts to emulate.
It is on
the basis of the above doctrine that I strongly DISSENT to the Resolution of the Majority remanding the entire
record of these cases to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of determining:
“(i) Which of the contending parties
are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT. No. 994 dated
(ii) Whether the imputed flaws in
the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are
borne by the evidence? Assuming they
are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta?
(iii) Whether the factual and legal
bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Munoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo
are true and valid. Assuming they are,
do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor
of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
(iv) Whether any of the subject
properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since
the issuance of OCT No. 994 on
(v) Such other matters necessry and
proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should
prevail.”
At the
outset, I must stress that the cases at bar have been heard and decided by the
three (3) RTC Branches of Caloocan City. Their Decisions have been reviewed closely and
AFFIRMED by the three (3) Divisions
of the Court of Appeals, not to mention by this Court’s Third Division in its
Decision dated
A brief
restatement of the facts is imperative.
These
three (3) consolidated cases involve Lots 25-A-2 and 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (later transferred to the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan).
I- G.R. No. 123346
G.R. No. 123346 stemmed from a complaint[11]
for recovery of ownership filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
129,
During
the proceedings, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, appointed three Commissioners,
namely: Engr. Avelino L. San Buenaventura (nominated by CLT Realty), Engr. Teodoro I. Victorino (nominated by the Manotok Corporations), and Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, Chief of the
Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Quezon City (nominated by the two Commissioners and the
parties).
Commissioners
Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted a Majority Report finding
that CLT Realty’s title is valid,
while those of the Manotok Corporations
are spurious.
The
trial court, on the basis of the Majority Report, decided in favor of CLT Realty. Its Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision penned by Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by then Presiding Justice Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. (both retired) and Justice Cancio C. Garcia, a member of this Court
who retired recently.
The Manotok Corporations filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Third Division, in its Decision dated
II – G.R. No. 134385
The
second case is G.R. No. 134385. The Heirs of Jose B. Dimson filed with
the RTC, Branch 33,
The
trial court’s findings are similar to those of the Majority Report of the
Commissioners stated earlier. It
rendered a Decision in favor of the Heirs of Jose Dimson which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a
Decision penned by Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, concurred in by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez (both retired) and
Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion (deceased).
The
Third Division of this Court, in its same Decision, upheld the Court of Appeals judgment.
III - G.R. No. 148767
The
third case, G.R. No. 148767,
originated from a complaint[13]
for annulment of title and recovery of ownership filed with the RTC, Branch
121,
Again,
the Third Division sustained the
Court of Appeals Decision.
Notably,
the instant petitions for review on certiorari
filed by herein petitioners were denied by the Third Division basically on the
ground that they raised questions of fact,
over which this Court has no power to determine as it is not a trier of facts.[14] Besides, considering that the trial courts’
findings of fact have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, and there is no showing that their Decisions are contrary
to the evidence and the law, such factual findings are binding and conclusive
on this Court.[15]
The Manotok Corporations and Araneta Institute filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Petitioner Sto. Niño Association did not
file a motion for reconsideration, hence, the Decision of the Third
Division has become final and executory
as against it.
These
consolidated cases were later elevated to the Court En Banc. The parties (except for Sto. Niño Association who no longer participated) were then
heard in oral arguments. I wrote a
draft Resolution denying the Motions for Reconsideration. Justice Dante Tinga dissented.
Now, Justice Tinga, in his ponencia, concluded
that: first, there is only one
(1) OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917, it
appearing on the record that OCT No. 994 was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on May 3, 1917, the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title; second, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated April 17, 1917 is void for such title is inexistent;
and third, the Decisions of this Court in MWSS vs. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, “especially in regard
to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated April 17, 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent.”
I cannot
give my concurrence to such conclusions due to the following grounds:
A
There is only ONE existing OCT No. 994, with Decree (of registration) No. 36455, “issued” on April
19, 1917 by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal acting as Court of
Land Registration, then presided by Judge Norberto Romualdez, and was “received
for transcription” by the Registry of Deeds, same province, on May 3, 1917.
During the oral
arguments, then Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now a member of
this Court) representing herein
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 994
OFFICE OF THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
Entered pursuant to
the following Decree:
Decree No. 36455
Philippine
COURT OF
LAND REGISTRATION
Case No. 4429, having been duly and
regularly heard, in accordance with the provisions of law, it is hereby decreed
that in the undivided interests hereinafter stated, x x x.
Therefore,
it is ordered by the Court that said
land be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of x x x.
Witness:
The Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D.
nineteen hundred and twelve.
Issued at
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the
When
asked by Associate Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna on the above-quoted entries, the
Solicitor General admitted that the original OCT No. 994 refers also to
Decree No. 36455, “issued” on April 19, 1917, and was “received for transcription” by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal on May 3, 1917, thus:
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
Mr. Solicitor General, I have here the original OCT 994, but it says here that it
refers to the Decree also. And it says that it was issued at
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor. It’s the date of the Decree.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
In
reference to the date the Decree was issued.
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
In
fact, the date of the decision is
also here,
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes,
Your Honor.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
And then it says at the bottom, received for transcription [on]
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor. [17] (Underscoring supplied)
In light of the Solicitor General’s declaration, the Court,
upon termination of the oral arguments, required respondent CLT Realty to submit its own copy of OCT
No. 994. The parties were also directed
to submit their respective memoranda in support of their motions for
reconsideration, which they did.
Respondent CLT Realty
later submitted a certified copy of the same OCT No. 994 and manifested that it
forms part of the records in the Sto. Niño Association case (G.R. No. 148767) offered in
evidence as Exhibit “D” before the trial court in Civil Case No. C-15491.
Significantly, a perusal
of the copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the Solicitor General and respondent CLT Realty shows that they are identical. There is no dispute that they are one and the same.
It is now clear that there is only one OCT No. 994 at the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal. This mother
title, as shown on its face, was issued by virtue of the Decision dated
Now, why
does Justice Tinga maintain there are two
OCT No. 994 and that the one dated
The crucial issue is -- which of the Certificates of Titles
Certificates of Title of the contending parties validly emanated from the sole OCT No. 994
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal?
Now, considering that there is only
one OCT No. 994 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19, 1917 and received for transcription at the
said Office on May 3, 1917, the confusion or disagreement over the date of its
issuance (whether April 19, 1917 or May 3, 1917) becomes inconsequential in the
resolution of the merits of the instant cases since both dates appear on the
mother title itself. The real crucial issue here is:
Which of the
Certificates of Title of the contending parties validly emanated
from the sole OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal?
Let
me trace the titles of the contending parties in these two (2) cases, subject
of the motions for reconsideration .
I -G.R. No. 123346
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok
Estate Corporation, petitioners, v. CLT Realty Development Corporation,
respondents)
Here, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals found that the titles of Jose B. Dimson and CLT Realty have been validly
derived from OCT No. 994 issued pursuant to Decree (of registration) No. 36455 on April 19, 1917 in Land
Registration Case No. 4429.
The evidence shows that the titles of
CLT Realty and Dimson were
derivatives of OCT No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, which was originally issued to Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, married to Pioquinto Rivera. This mother title was issued
pursuant to the Decision dated
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal and
Pioquinto Rivera had four children, but three died, leaving Bartolome Rivera as
the surviving sibling.
Bartolome and his co-heirs (his
nephews and nieces) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
an action for partition and accounting,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-424.
On
Bartolome and his co-heirs filed with
the CFI of Rizal, presided by then Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma (who later became
a member of the Supreme Court), a petition for substitution of their names in
lieu of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, docketed as Civil Case No. 4557. Judge
Palma issued an Order granting the
petition.
Lots 25 and 26, among others, covered
by OCT No. 994, were allotted to Bartolome.
Bartolome then executed a Deed of Transfer and Conveyance in favor of
Jose B. Dimson, herein respondent in G.R. No. 134385 represented by his
heirs. Among the lots conveyed were
Lots 25-A-2 and 26. This Deed of
Transfer and Conveyance was approved
by Judge Palma in an Order dated
Consequently, Jose Dimson filed with
the CFI of Rizal, Branch 33,
Estelita I. Hipolito purchased
CLT Realty, on the other hand, acquired
CLT Realty’s TCT
No. 177013 is what is involved in both G.R. Nos. 123346 and 148767, while Jose
Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169 is the subject in G.R. No. 134385.
The trial
courts found that the titles of the Manotok Corporations were not derived
from OCT No. 994, hence, spurious.
As culled from the Commissioners’
Majority Report and the findings of the trial courts, the titles of the Manotok
Corporations were not derived from OCT No. 994 and are therefore spurious:
This is the chronology of transfer of the Manotok Corporation’s title.
TCT No. 4211 was later cancelled by
TCT No. 5261 in the name of Francisco Gonzales, which was later cancelled by
TCT No. 35486 in the names of his six children.
The land covered by TCT No. 35486 in
the names of Francisco’s six children was subdivided
under Plan Psu 21154. But this plan could not be traced at the
depository plans – the Bureau of Lands.
The alleged Subdivision Plan had seven resultant lots covered by
individual titles – TCTs Nos. 1368 to 1374 – six of which are in the individual
names of Francisco’s children.
These seven lots were expropriated by
the government thru the Homesite and Housing Corporation, after which they were
subdivided into 77 lots acquired by the tenants. The Manotok
Corporations purchased 20 lots from the tenants covered by 20 separate
TCTs.
The issuance of the Manotok Corporations’ titles suffer fatal irregularities.
The Commissioners’ Majority Report and
the trial court found numerous irregularities – fatal in character – in the issuance of the Manotok Corporations’ titles, namely:
1. The technical descriptions on the titles,
TCTs Nos. 4210 and 4211 in the names of Ruiz and Leuterio; and TCTs Nos. 5261
and 35480 in the names of Francisco Gonzales and his 7 children, from where the
titles of the Manotok Corporations
originated, were inscribed in Spanish. However, their alleged mother title, OCT No.
994, is in English.
2. The date of survey appearing on the said
titles (TCTs Nos. 4210, 4211, 5261 and 35486) was
3. The lots covered by the same titles are not identified by lot numbers. There
is no mention therein of
4. There is no Subdivision Survey Plan No. indicated on TCTs Nos. 4210, 4211,
5261 and 35486 covering the purported subdivision of
5. No
survey plan could be found in the Bureau of Lands or LRA.
6. Subdivision Plan No. Psd – 21154, the
alleged subdivision plan of TCT No. 35486 in the names of Francisco Gonzalez’s
6 children, could not be found in the
Bureau of Lands.
7. The tie
lines stated in the technical descriptions of TCTs Nos. 1368-1374 embracing
the lots expropriated, deviated from the mother lot’s tie point (the
Bureau of Lands Location Monument No. 1,
Based on these concrete facts, the
commissioners’ Majority Report concluded that petitioners Manotok Corporations’
titles overlap that of respondent CLT
Realty. The overlapping is caused by the inherent technical defects on TCT No.
4211 (from which the Manotok Corporations derived their
titles) and the questionable
circumstances of its issuance, thus:
8. In the light of the foregoing facts,
the undersigned Commissioners have come to the following conclusions:
a. There are inherent technical infirmities or
defects on the face of TCT Nos. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and
35486.
The fact that the technical descriptions in TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486 are written in Spanish
while those on the alleged mother title, OCT-994, were already in English,
is abnormal and contrary to the usual practice in the issuance of titles. If OCT-994 is the mother title of TCT
Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, then
said titles should also be written in English because OCT-994 is already in
English. It is possible that an
ascendant title be written in Spanish and the descendant title in English, the
language now officially used, but the reverse is highly improbable and
irregular.
b. Also, the fact that
the original survey dates of OCT-994 (September 8-27, October 4-21 and
November 17-18, 1911) are not indicated
on the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, but an entirely different date, December
22, 1917, is instead indicated, likewise leads to the conclusion that TCT Nos.
4211, 5261 and 35486 could not have been derived from OCT-994. It is the established procedure to always
indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or transfer
certificates, the date of the original survey of the mother title together with
the succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, in the absence of the original
survey dates of OCT-994 on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, then OCT-994 is not
the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, not only because the
original survey dates are different but because the date of original survey is
always earlier than the date of the issuance of the original title. OCT-994
was issued on
c. Granting that the
date
d. That TCT Nos. 4210
and 4211 which allegedly was the result of a subdivision of
e. The absence of a lot
number and survey plan number in the technical description inscribed on TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211, and the absence of a subdivision survey plan for Lot 26 at
the records of the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Authority lead
to the conclusion that there was no verified and approved subdivision survey
plan of Lot 26, which is a compulsory requirement needed in the issuance of
said titles;
f. Similarly, the absence
of plan Psd-21154 from the files of the Bureau of Lands, the official
depository of survey plans, is another indication that the titles covered by
TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 which were derived from TCT No. 4211 are again doubtful
and questionable;
g. Moreover, the
changing of the tie points in the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 1368 thru
1374 from that of the mother lot’s tie point which is BLLM No. 1, Caloocan City
to different location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate which resulted in the shifting of the position of the
seven (7) lots in relation to the mother lot defeats the very purpose of tie
points and tie lines since the accepted practice is to adopt the mother lot’s
tie point in order to fix the location of the parcels of land being surveyed on
the earth’s surface.
h. Based on the foregoing, it is the
conclusion of the undersigned Commissioners that defendants’ (Manotok Realty,
Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation) titles overlap portions of plaintiff’s (CLT Realty Development
Corporation’s) title, which overlapping
is due to the irregular and questionable issuance of TCT Nos. 4211 (also of TCT
No. 4210), 5261, 35486, 1368 to 1374.
The inherent technical defects on TCT No. 4211 (from where defendants
derived their titles) and TCT No. 4210 which were exhaustively elucidated
above, point to the fact that there was no approved subdivision of Lot 26 which
served as legal basis for the regular issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Thus,
as between plaintiff’s title, which was derived from regularly issued titles,
and defendants’ titles, which were derived from irregularly issued titles,
plaintiff’s title which pertains to the entire
Significantly,
the above findings and conclusions in the Commissioners’ Majority Report are similar to the findings of the trial
court[19] in Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation (G.R. No. 148767) wherein the titles of CLT Realty, and those of the Manotok Corporations (G.R. No. 123346) and Sto. Niño
Association are involved. These
findings and conclusions are discussed lengthily by the trial court in its
February 12, 1996 Amended Decision, later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision
dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
52549,[20] thus:
The conflict stems from
the fact that the plaintiff’s (CLT Realty
Development Corporation’s) and defendant’s (Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan
Association, Inc.’s)
titles overlap each other, hence, a determination of the respective
origins of such titles is of utmost importance.
TCT No. T-177013 in the name of the plaintiff was derived from R-17994 T-89 in the name
of Estelita Hipolito, which title can
trace its origin from OCT 994. The boundaries of OCT 994 known as
On the other hand, TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name
of the defendants, are the latest in a series of titles which descend from TCT
No. 4211. A trace of the
history of TCT No. 4211 reveals that it was succeeded by TCT No. 5261 which was
in turn succeeded by TCT No. 35486. TCT
No. 35486 was allegedly subdivided into seven lots covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to
1374. One or two of these subdivided
lots were the predecessors of the defendants’ titles.
It behooves this court to
address the issue of whether or not
TCT No. 4211 from which the defendants’ titles were originally derived can
validly trace its origin from OCT 994.
There is pervasive evidence that TCT No. 4211 could not have been a
true derivative of OCT No. 994.
Firstly, the survey dates indicated in OCT No. 994
are September 8-27, October 8-21 and November 17-18, all in the year 1911. On the other hand, these dates of original survey are conspicuously missing in TCT No.
4211 contrary to established procedure that the original survey dates of the
mother title should be indicated in succeeding titles. Instead, an examination of TCT No. 4211
reveals a different date on its face.
This date,
Neither is the Court inclined to consider this date as the date a
subdivision survey was made. The regular procedure is to identify the
subdivided lots by their respective survey or lot numbers; on the contrary,
no such lot number is found in TCT No.
4211, pointing to the inevitable conclusion that OCT No. 994 was never validly
subdivided into smaller lots, of which one of them is covered by TCT No. 4211.
Secondly, the assertion that TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374
which preceded the defendants’ titles were issued pursuant to subdivision plan
PSD 21154 is not supported by the evidence.
The Land Management Bureau which handles survey plans has no records of
the said PSD 21154. The Registry of
Deeds of Rizal has a copy of the plan but the court finds such possession
questionable since the Land Registration Authority which supervises the
Registry of Deeds does not have a copy of the same. The court therefore believes
that the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 is attended by a serious
irregularity which cannot be ignored as it affects the very validity of the
alleged subdivisions of the land covered by TCT No. 35486.
Thirdly, the language of
the technical descriptions of the land covered by OCT No. 994 is already in English, while its alleged derivative
titles TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are still in Spanish. This is in direct violation of the practice
that the language used in the mother title is adopted by all its derivative
titles. The reversion to Spanish in the
derivative titles is highly intriguing and casts a cloud of doubt to the
genuineness of such titles.
Fourthly, the tie points used in the mother lot were not adopted by the alleged derivative titles particularly TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374, the immediate predecessors of the defendants’ titles. The pivotal role of tie points cannot be brushed aside as a change thereof could result to the shifting of positions of the derivative lots in relation to the mother lot. Consequently, overlapping could take place as in fact it did when the defendants’ titles overlapped that of CLT at the northwestern portion of the latter’s property.
Fifthly, the results of
laboratory analysis conducted by a Forensic Chemist of the NBI revealed that
TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 were estimated to be fifty (50) years old as of March
1993 when the examination was conducted.
Hence, the documents could have been prepared only in 1940 and not in
1918 as appearing on the face of TCT No. 4211.
Based on the foregoing patent irregularities, the court finds the
attendance of fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211 and all its derivative
titles which preceded the defendants’ titles.
Evidently, TCT No. 4211 cannot be validly traced from OCT No. 994. Being
void ab initio, it did not give rise
to any transmissible rights with respect to the land purportedly invalid, and
resultantly, the defendants, being the holders of the latest derivatives,
cannot assert any right of ownership over the lands in question. ‘The void ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership.’ (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
x x x
The court’s findings are
consistent with a ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 45255 entitled ‘CLT Realty Development Corp. vs. Manotok
Realty, Inc., et al.’ promulgated on September 28, 1995, affirming the
decision of the other branch of this court ordering the cancellation of TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211 which encroached on a specific area of Lot No. 26 of the
Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City. This
court is also aware that on
It is
clear from the foregoing findings of the trial court and the appellate court
that petitioners Manotok Corporations’ titles
were derived from questionable and
irregularly issued titles whose origin cannot
be validly traced to OCT No. 994.
2. G.R. No. 134385
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
Inc., petitioner, v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, Represented by His Compulsory
Heirs: His Surviving Spouse, Roqueta R. Dimson and Their Children, Norma and
Celso Tirado, Alson and Virginia Dimson, Linda and Carlos Lagman, Lerma and
Rene Policar, and Esperanza R. Dimson; and the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, Respondents)
In this case, the trial court likewise
found that the titles of the Araneta Institute are not derived from
OCT No. 994 and are spurious. In upholding the title of the Heirs of Dimson, it ruled:
x x x, [T]racing back the title of the
plaintiffs’ (Heirs of Jose B. Dimson’s) TCT No. R-15169, the record will show
that:
1) On May 25, 1962,
then Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma of
the Court of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal,
issued an Order in Case No. 4557
(In re: petition for substitution of names of Bartolome P. Rivera, Eleuteria
Rivera, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancia R. Aquino and Rosauro
R. Aquino, as petitioners) judicially declaring said petitioners Bartolome
Rivera, et al. as the surviving heirs of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal and
directing the cancellation of the name of said Maria dela Concepcion Vidal, 9
years of age, among the registered owners, and to substitute in lieu thereof
the aforesaid petitioners Bartolome Rivera et al., (Exhibit 3-David &
Santos).
This Order of
Entry No. 43542 File
T-104230 – ORDER In compliance with an Order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Case No. 4557, the name Maria dela Concepcion Vidal, 9 years old is
hereby cancelled and in lieu thereof the following is substituted: 1. Bartolome
Rivera, widower 1/3 of 1/189/1000 percent; 2. Eleuteria Rivera, married to
Hermogenes Bonifacio 1/6 of 1-89/1000 percent xxx Fidela R. Angeles – 1/3 of
1-1897/1000
Date
of Instrument –
Date of Inscription –
June 1962
2) On June 13, 1966,
said Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance, 7th
Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal issued an Order in the same case No.
4557 wherein the deed of transfer and conveyance executed by Bartolome
Rivera in favor of Jose B. Dimson of whatever property said Bartolome
Rivera is entitled to as one of the heirs of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal to
be taken from lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT No. 994 of Rizal was approved (Exhibit 1-David
Santos).
3) Plaintiff applied for
the segregation of the 25% agreed upon on
4) On
WHEREFORE, it having
been duly established that Bartolome Rivera was the owner of the lots mentioned
in Exhibit E, which are Lots Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29; that Jose B. Dimson,
per Exhibit B, is entitled to 25% of the total area of the said lots contained
in Exhibit B; that the areas to which Jose B. Dimson is entitled and sought to be
segregated either in whole or in part are portions of the lots mentioned in
Exhibit “B”; that per Exhibit “D”, the segregation of the said lots
necessitates approval by the Court, upon certification by the Land Registration
Commission that the subdivision Plan of the lot on lots sought to be segregated
are correct: that the plans, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4419 – SWO – 5268 (Exhibit
“F”) covering Lots 15, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 and plan are certified correct and
approved by the Land Registration Commission on March 20, 1964; that plans of
portion of Lot 25-A which is Lot 25-a-1 (Exhibit “H”), plan of portion of Lot
25-A which is Lot 25-A-2 (Exhibit “I”), and plan of portion of Lot 28 (Exhibit
“J”) are based from the technical descriptions appearing on the approved LRC
SWO-5268 on file with the Land Registration Commission as correct; that
Bartolome Rivera can legally dispose the lands covered by and mentioned in
Exhibit “E”, the segregation and
issuance of separate certificates of title over Lots 25-A-1, 25-A-2, 26 and
portion of Lot 29 is hereby APPROVED. The
Register of Deeds for Caloocan City is hereby directed to issue in the name of
herein movant JOSE B. DIMSON, of legal age, Filipino, married to Roqueta
Rodriguez Dimson, with residence and postal address at No. 10 Magalang Street,
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, after payment of the necessary fees, separate
transfer certificates of titles for the lot covered by plan (LRC) SWO-5268
(Exhibit “G”) AND for the lots covered by the PLANS Exhibits “H”, “I” and “J”.
SO ORDERED.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the chronology of the
transfer of the title of the Heirs of
Dimson is consistent with that of CLT
Realty in G.R. No. 123346, the same title which the trial court and Court
of Appeals found to be valid.
On the other hand, it appears from the documentary evidence
that TCTs Nos. 7784 and 13574 in the
name of the Araneta Institute were
derived from TCTs Nos. 26538 and 26539, respectively, both in the name of Jose
Rato. Rato’s titles, however, were issued
pursuant to Decree No. 4429, which
is entirely different from Decree No.
36455 upon which OCT No. 994 was issued.
Moreover, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the CFI of Isabela, but with Record No. 4429 in Laguna. This means that the
properties of Araneta Institute are either in Isabela or Laguna, not in Maysilo
Estate,
The issuance of the Araneta Institute’s titles suffer
fatal irregularities.
Similarly, the trial court also found
the following fatal irregularities in
the issuance of the Araneta Institute’s titles,
to wit:
a.
Rato’s
titles from where the Araneta Institute’s
titles originated were not annotated on
OCT No. 994.
b.
When
TCT No. 13574 was issued in the name of the Araneta
Institute, what was cancelled was
TCT No. 6169, not TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Rato.
c.
When
the other TCT No. 7784 was issued in the name of the Araneta Institute, the
corresponding document (Deed of
In affirming the trial court’s nullification
of Araneta Institute’s titles for being spurious, the Court
of Appeals, in its Decision dated
“Upon the other hand, defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of
Agriculture’s TCT No. 13574 was derived from TCT No. 26539, while TCT No. 7784
(now TCT No. 21343) was derived from TCT No. 26538. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 were both
issued in the name of Jose Rato. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both show Decree
No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
Decree No. 4429 was
issued by the Court of First Instance of
Isabela. On the other hand, Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration Case
on
Another point, Araneta’s
TCT Nos. 13574 (Exh. 6) and 21343 are both derived from OCT No. 994 registered
on May 3, 1917 which was declared null and void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783 (1992).
The Supreme Court ruled: ‘Where two certificates of title purport to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. Since the land in question has already been
registered under OCT No. 994 dated
In sum, the foregoing
discussions unmistakably show two
independent reasons why the
title of defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of Agriculture is a nullity,
to wit: the factual finding that the
property is in Isabela, and the decision of the Supreme Court in
the MWSS case.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial
court’s findings that there exist questionable
circumstances “which create serious
doubts in the mind of the Court as to the genuineness and validity of the titles
of defendant Araneta (TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574) over the land in question,” to wit:
Thus, as correctly found by
the trial court:
The records will show
that defendant Araneta’s claim of ownership over the 500,000 square meters of
land covered by TCT R-15169 (Exhibit D also marked Exhs. 5, 5-A, 5-B and 20,
20-A, and 20-B David & Santos) in the name of plaintiff Jose B. Dimson, is
based on TCT 13574 (Exh. 6-defendant) and TCT 7784 (now TCT 12343) (Exhibit
M). And these said TCT 13574 and TCT
7784 (now TCT 21343) which were found to be overlapping TCT R-15169 (Exh. D)
were based on two (2) deeds of conveyances:
1) Deed
of
2) Novation
of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated
According
to witnesses Zacarias Quinto, real estate officer of defendant Araneta, the
land where Araneta Institute of Agriculture is located is within the area of
97.2 hectares. If the area of TCT 13574
(390,282 sq.m.) will be added, the same will give a total area of 972,154 sq.m.
or 97.2 hectares.
Let us
now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have
acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 (now TCT 21343) in the name of Araneta and the
other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that
its Decree No. and Record No.
are both 4429. In the same
vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has Decree
No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued
by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for
Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A
Bartolome Rivera et al.).
How then could TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both
have Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in the Court of
First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna,
respectively.
2) TCT 26538 and 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated
in the original Certificate of Title 994 where they were said to have
originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion
de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8,
1925 was only registered and was stamped
received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29,
1953 when the Deed of Sale &
Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947
(Exh. M). So that when the Philippine
Land Improvement was allegedly given a special power of attorney by Jose Ma.
Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said
Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato both cancel
TCT 21857 which was never presented in Court if only to have a clear tracing
back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5
defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant Araneta cancels
TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was
never explained. TCT 6196 was not even
presented in Court.
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was
cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282 sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name,
when the registration of the document entitled Novation of Contract, Deed of
Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title
was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document
was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Under
Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title shall be entered no memorandum
shall be made upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in
pursuance of any deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owner’s
duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not
reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538 (Exhibit
7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the
encumbrances annotated in the Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said
title (Exhibit 16-A and 16-N David & Santos).
9) In the encumbrance annotated at
the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry NO. 450 T
6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT
26539) and TCT 6196 was issued (Doc. No. 208, page 96, Book 17 of Notary Public
of Manila Rodolfo A. Scheerer, Date of Instrument: 8-23-47 Date of Inscription:
10-18-47 (Exh. 4-A defendant) which could have referred to the Deed of Sale and
Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with date of Instrument: 1-10-29,
and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT
26838 (sic – 26538), this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land
Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, Novation of
Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does
not appear.
Entry
marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of
P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement
Company. Said entry was also entered on
TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem
that all the documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of
said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate
officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now
in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents
marked in evidence which were obtained
only lately when they were needed for presentation before this Court
(t.s.n. 6-24-47, p. 34)
All the foregoing are matters which create serious doubts in the mind
of the Court as to the genuineness and validity of the titles of defendant
Araneta over the land in question.[24]
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the findings and conclusions
of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals that petitioners’ titles are
spurious are based on hard facts fully supported by the records
and thoroughly discussed in their respective
Decisions. They cannot simply be brushed aside without running afoul to settled
principles of law.
It
is appalling to note that, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the Araneta Institute “never
raised a single argument or assignment of error disputing these factual
findings of the trial court.” Its
failure to refute not only indicates the frailty or emptiness of its cause, but
also validates the correcness of the rulings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The recent ruling in G.R. No. 150091, Yolanda O.
Alfonso, petitioner, vs. Office of the President is inconsequential to the
present cases.
Justice
Tinga capitalizes on the Alfonso Decision upholding the dismissal from
the service of Yolanda O. Alfonso, former register of deeds of Caloocan City,
for grave misconduct and dishonesty after having been found administratively
liable for changing the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3,
1917 to April 19, 1917. This only reinforces the fact that there is
only one OCT No. 994 and that it was Alfonso who made it appear that there are
two OCT No. 994. In
fact, Justice Tinga concurred in this Decision.
Notably,
the Alfonso Decision categorically held that “in deciding this administrative case, this
Court deems it fit, though, to steer clear from discussing or passing judgment
on the validity of the derivative titles of OCT No. 994, x x x.” It stated that: “Reference to OCT No. 994 is
made only to determine the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
petitioner.” It cannot therefore
provide support to Justice Tinga’s position.
B
This Court should no longer review the trial
courts’ findings of fact which have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as there is no showing that such findings are not supported by
evidence. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this Court.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
strictly forbids this Court from resolving questions
of fact as it is not a trier of facts.
Thus, it is
not our function to review factual issues and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties already considered in the
proceedings below.[25] Since there is no specific showing that the
trial courts and the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, we cannot
disregard the elementary and well-established rule that where the findings of
fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in these
cases, the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, will
not be disturbed on appeal. Such
findings are binding and conclusive on this Court.[26]
In the ponencia, Justice Tinga also ruled that should there be a remand,
the validity of Dimson’s and CLT’s claims should further be explored since the ultimate
question would pertain to the validity of the Orders rendered in Dimson’s favor
by then-Judge Muñoz Palma of the Rizal CFI and Judge Sayo of the Caloocan CFI. Allegedly, the Order of Judge Sayo was recalled. I wonder why Justice Tinga, at this late
stage, still assail the validity of those Orders. Does he understand that to do so violates
basic procedural law?
Also, where in the records of the trial courts is the alleged “Recall Order”
by Judge Sayo? This “Recall Order”
was not presented as evidence before
the trial courts. Hence, there can be
no other conclusion than that the same is INEXISTENT.
In his ponencia, Justice Tinga made reference
to the DOJ Committee Report dated
The Senate Committee, it must be stressed, has a different
role from that of the Judiciary. The
courts of law have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes
properly brought before them. A congressional
investigation, however, is conducted in aid of legislation. As aptly held by this Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno, in Agan, Jr., et al. vs. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., et al.:[27]
Finally,
the respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by
the House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that
this Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a
co-equal body. They insist that the Court must respect the
findings of the said committees of the House of Representatives. With due respect, we cannot subscribe to their submission. There
is a fundamental difference between a case in court and an investigation of a
congressional committee. The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to
settle the dispute in controversy by adjudicating the legal rights and
obligations of the parties to the case.
On the other hand, a congressional investigation is conducted in aid of
legislation (Arnault v. Nazareno,
G.R. No. L-3820,
Moreover, the vehement objections of
the CLT Realty and the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson against any
reliance on the said Reports are reasonable. They contended that:
1. The
Committee Reports “were treacherously
secured ex-parte by petitioners Manotok Corporations and Araneta Institute and their allies after
they lost before the trial courts.”[28]
2. The
said Reports are unreliable because
they “emanate from ex-parte self-serving proceedings.” They (CLT
Realty and the Heirs of Jose B.
Dimson) were never notified of
the hearings conducted in the Senate and DOJ, and that the same were prepared
without their knowledge, consent or participation – hence, “a violation of
their constitutional right to due process.”[29]
3. The
Senate Committee Report is “long in recommendation, but short in duration of
hearing, for it took only one day for
the Senate to conduct the aforesaid hearing on
4. The
Reports “were practically solicited
for the purpose of subverting the judicial process. This
attempt continues today under the guise of persuading the Court to remand.”[31]
5. This Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot be unduly burdened
with the task of reexamining, reviewing, reevaluating, and re-weighing each and
every piece of evidence already adduced presented, evaluated and considered
below. Indeed, the Manotok Corporations and Araneta
Institute, after being faced with consistent and unanimous unfavorable
rulings by the trial courts, cannot now induce this Court to take a first look and a fresh crack at alleged new factual issues in the
alleged DOJ and Senate Committee Reports which were never raised before the trial courts.[32]
6. The Committee Reports cannot be considered because the factual
findings and conclusions reached therein were apparently based on inadmissible
hearsay evidence and documents that were never authenticated in the manner provided under the Rules of Court on
evidence.[33]
7. The
“scheming introduction of the Committee Reports is an attempt to influence
judicial proceedings and the judiciary itself, by interjecting the findings of
the different branches of the government, in the hope that said findings will
influence the Honorable Court, in petitioners’ favor, after they lost in the trial courts. This
is a crude attempt to sabotage the orderly administration of justice x x x,
obviously to obtain a reversal of the
trial courts’ decisions. This
violates the time-honored principle of separation of powers and thereby
undermines the independence of the judiciary.[34]
8. The
Reports cannot overturn the factual findings made by courts of justice after
judiciously weighing and evaluating the evidence presented by the parties. Worse, these alleged reports are now being
utilized to review the rulings of the Honorable Court in the MWSS and Gonzaga.
9. The Committee Reports are in the nature of a collateral attack against the titles of CLT Realty and Jose B. Dimson, which is proscribed under Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.[35]
10. Considering the
well-settled rule that a
court is not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases
pending before it of the contents of the records of other cases, and even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,[36] with
more reason that this Court should not take judicial notice of findings in
non-judicial proceedings in the adjudication of cases. At best, what may be taken judicial notice is
only the existence of these Reports, but not the findings and conclusions
therein which cannot supplant pervasive evidence, as found by the trial courts
and the Court of Appeals, independently establishing that petitioners’ titles
are
spurious.[37] Hence, these Reports may not even be
conveniently utilized as basis for a re-trial. Moreover, a court cannot take judicial notice of a
factual matter in controversy.[38]
Thus, to
reiterate, there is absolutely no basis to remand these cases to the Court of Appeals. To repeat, the trial courts had already
received, evaluated, and appreciated the respective evidence of the contending
parties in support of their contrasting claims on the validity of their
respective titles. The Court of Appeals
has affirmed the uniform findings of the trial courts. Significantly, all the courts below have consistent findings that the titles of the Manotok Corporations and the Araneta
Institute are spurious, and that those of the CLT Realty and Jose B. Dimson are valid, having
originated from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, based on the Decree No. 36455
issued on April 19, 1917 in Land Registration Case No. 4429.
C
Petitioners
are bound by the Court’s Decisions in MWSS and Gonzaga.
Petitioners
Manotok Corporations’ contend that
they are not bound by this Court’s pronouncement in MWSS and Gonzaga, they
being “strangers” in those cases.
Petitioners have ignored the unique nature of land registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, upon which OCT No. 994 was issued
pursuant to Decree (of registration) No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Section 2 of Act No. 496 (otherwise known as
“The Land Registration Act”), as amended, provides that the land registration
proceedings under the said Act “shall be proceedings in rem.”[39] Section 38, same Act, also provides that “(e)very
decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,” and “shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description ‘To
whom it may concern.’” Section 38 further declares that upon the
expiration of one year from entry of the decree of registration within which
the said decree may be questioned, “every decree or certificate of title issued
x x x shall be incontrovertible,”
meaning, it can no longer be changed, altered or modified.[40]
This has to be the rule so
as not to defeat the objective of the
The MWSS and
Gonzaga Decisions, confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on
The correctness of the MWSS and Gonzaga Decisions of this Court are now beyond question. These
Decisions confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision and
disturb not what is settled.[43]
This established doctrine simply means that a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different, as in these cases. It comes from the basic principle of
justice that like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same question relating to the same event is brought by parties similarly
situated as in a previous case already litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[44]
D
Petitioners were fully
afforded due process.
Petitioners
Manotok Corporations allege they were denied due process and that the
commissioners’ Majority Report are flawed.
Even if these matters can be raised
for the first time before this Court, petitioners’ allegations are utterly
baseless.
The proceedings before the commissioners and the trial
court were properly conducted.
Records
show that petitioners have been fully accorded due process during the
proceedings before the commissioners and before the trial court. It is unfortunate that petitioners
ignored the fact that the trial court, before it rendered its Decision, set the
hearing of the commissioners’ Majority and Minority Reports on
Then,
after respondent CLT Realty submitted its own comment on the Minority
Report, the trial court, on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
approves the [Minority] Report dated
Also,
when the trial court issued its Order dated April 22, 1994 resolving respondent
CLT Realty’s Motion for Clarification
and stating that the case was considered submitted for decision,[45] still petitioners did not question or seek
a reconsideration of this Order.
Certainly, this is not the actuation
of a litigant who feels aggrieved by such actions of the trial court. Simply put, had petitioners believed that
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in considering the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the commissioners’ Reports, the parties’
respective comments thereon, and their memoranda, they could have, right then and
there, asked the trial court for reconsideration and, if the same was denied,
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. That they did not do so only shows that their
belated allegation of denial of due process is a mere afterthought, obviously
because the trial court’s Decision was adverse to them.
It bears stressing that it is well
within the power of the trial court to adopt
the commissioners’ Majority Report as the basis of its judgment. The very reason why the commissioners were
appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was to determine
whether there is overlapping of the parties’ titles. By appointing them based on their background,
expertise and experience in the field of geodetic engineering, the contending
parties and the trial court concede that
their chosen commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the
titles were regularly issued.
Consequently, the trial court may rely on their findings and
conclusions. Under Section 11, Rule 32
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the trial court is clearly
authorized to “render judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report (by the commissioners) in whole
or in part or it may receive further
evidence or may recommit it with instructions.”
Furthermore, the trial court did not
conduct further reception of evidence before deciding the case since not one of
the parties asked for it. The parties
themselves opted to submit the case
for decision on the bases, among others, of their respective comments on the
commissioners’ Reports. By doing so,
they unmistakably impressed upon the trial court that their respective evidence
they submitted to the commissioners were complete and ripe for
adjudication. In fact, petitioners themselves specifically prayed that the trial
court adopt in its Decision the Minority Report of a single Commissioner, which
is favorable to them. Certainly, under
the doctrine of estoppel, petitioners
are barred from assailing the trial
court’s judgment for being premature since they themselves had asked the said
court that it should already decide the case.
They cannot now espouse a posture inconsistent with their conduct below
as this is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.
As aptly
stated by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
Had defendants-appellants
(herein petitioners Manotok Corporations)
seriously believed that the trial court acted erroneously and with grave abuse
of discretion in considering the case submitted for resolution and in deciding
the same solely on the basis of the Commissioners' Report and the memoranda
submitted by the parties without conducting hearings for the reception of
evidence, they could have immediately
brought this matter up before this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. However, they did not do
so.
Instead, it was only after the trial court had rendered an adverse decision against them that defendants-appellants raised for the first time in their Brief, the alleged procedural error committed by the trial court in rendering its Decision based on the Majority Report.[46] (Underscoring supplied)
The Commissioners’
Majority Report is duly supported by evidence.
Contrary
to their claim, the findings of fact and conclusions contained in the
commissioners’ Majority Report (as well as the Minority Report) are based on
the documentary evidence of the parties.
In fact, petitioners admitted that the commissioners verified the
certificates of title and related documents with the proper government agencies
and “examined the title records.”[47] It bears stressing that these certificates
are the core documents upon which
the commissioners based their findings because they contain the necessary facts showing the data of the
land in question, namely: the registered owner/s and the person/s to whom the
titles were issued or transferred; the technical description and the metes and
bounds of the land; the approved survey plans; the date of the original survey
of the mother title; voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or part
thereof or interest therein; the number of the previous certificate/s of title
covering the same land and the fact that it was originally registered; the
record number; the number of the original certificate of title; the volume page
of the registration book in which the latter is found; and annotation of
encumbrances in the certificates.[48]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the findings in the commissioners’ Majority
Report are based substantially on the very documents submitted by petitioners
themselves in the course of the proceedings. Clearly, their allegations that they were denied
due process and that the Majority Report is defective because it does not cite
any “specific evidence” are without merit.
The
commissioners who rendered the Majority Report did not exceed their authority.
The commissioners acted within the scope
of their authority. In their Comment
on the Majority Report, petitioners did not complain that the commissioners
exceeded their mandate. Likewise,
petitioners did not raise such objection in their Memorandum. Instead, they asked the trial court to
approve the Minority Report and render judgment in their favor. And since petitioners did not present before
the trial court the alleged error of the commissioners, the same is deemed waived.[49]
In De la Rama Steamship Co. v. National Development Co.,[50] this
Court held that where, as here, a party
fails to file opportunely his objections to the Report of the commissioner or
referee, questions relating to
the Report cannot be reviewed and he cannot dispute
the findings therein or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. In the same vein, we ruled in
By way of
emphasis, we now desire to add that
if a party desires to challenge the findings of a referee, he must do so by timely and specific exceptions to the referee’s report. If he fails to make such exceptions and the
report is confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by the findings and cannot be heard to dispute their
truthfulness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. Questions relating to the report of a
referee can be reviewed only where the
record discloses the exceptions taken thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
We reiterate that the commissioners
who submitted the Majority Report did not exceed their authority. They verified and examined the numerous
documents and certificates of title of the parties and their predecessors, as
well as the corresponding transfer documents and surveys. Upon examination, these commissioners found
“inherent technical defects on TCT No.
4211 (from which petitioners Manotok
Corporations derived their titles)
and TCT No. 4210.” The said defects,
they explained, “point to the fact that
there was no approved subdivision of
The Commissioners explained their
findings and stated their conclusions in their Majority Report pursuant to
their mandate to resolve the issue
of whether petitioners Manotok
Corporations’ titles overlap that of CLT Realty. Intrinsically
intertwined with such mandate is the commissioners’ duty to state the basis of their findings and
conclusions. This is obviously
necessary to enable the trial court, as well as the appellate court in case of
appeal, to fully understand the commissioners’ findings and to make proper
judgment. Petitioners very well know
that the commissioners’ Reports are still subject
to approval by the trial court which has
the final say on the
matter. Clearly, the commissioners acted
within their authority.
Considering that petitioners Manotok Corporations were fully accorded due process, their plea
that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing and reception of
evidence is unwarranted.
E
The magnitude of the land area involved in these
cases, as alleged by petitioners, is exaggerated.
In their motion for reconsideration,
the Manotok Corporations alleged that
the Maysilo Estate consists of 1,660 hectares of land located in Malabon,
Caloocan City and Quezon City, 1,342 hectares of which are covered by OCT No.
994; and that considering the magnitude of the land area involved, our Decision
will prejudice many landowners.
Likewise,
Araneta Institute claimed in its
motion for reconsideration that the Decision involves 1,660 hectares of land in
Malabon,
The
allegations of the Manotok Corporations
and Araneta Institute that our ruling
involves 1,660 hectares of land in Malabon,
In
Araneta Institute v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, the area involved is only
50 hectares, not 1,660 hectares.
The
case between Sto. Niño Association
and CLT Realty only covers 30,152
square meters, or more than three hectares only.
CONCLUSION
Finally, I cannot fathom why the majority of my colleagues
gave full credence to the allegations of
Justice Tinga which have no bearing
whatsoever to respondents’ claim. Worse,
they have not been raised and passed upon by the trial courts and the three (3)
Divisions of the Court of Appeals. To be
sure, they have not been proved by evidence. Justice Tinga’s posture grossly violates the
settled rule that no new issues shall be raised for the first time on appeal. The remand of these cases to the appellate
court is an attempt on his part to
prolong the litigation and disturb the findings of the said courts
sustained by overwhelming evidence. I
reiterate that the titles of Dimson
and his heirs and that of the CLT
are valid. On the other hand, the titles of the Manotok Corporations and Araneta
Institute are spurious. These are the findings of the three trial courts
and affirmed by the three Divisions
of the Court of Appeals. To litigate these findings once again will
entirely change the settled jurisprudence of this Court. The doctrine that there should be an end to litigation
has been seriously disturbed. This is
a sad day for the Court.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY
the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
[1] G.R. No. 134385
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.
v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, et al.); the complaint in G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok
Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation) was filed with the trial court on August 10, 1992; and the complaint in G.R. No. 148767 (Sto. Niño
Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation) was
filed with the trail court on
[2] Only the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385 have filed separate motions for reconsideration of the November 29, 2005 Decision.
[4] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Edition, p. 295.
[5] A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159,
[6] Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra.
[9] Re:
Cases Left Undecided by Retired Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan of the RTC,
[11] Docketed as Civil Case No. C-15539.
[12] Docketed as Civil Case No. C-8050.
[13] Docketed as Civil Case No. C-15491.
[14] Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
[15] Asia
Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 130759,
June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 449; Omandam v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 483.
[16] Solicitor General’s Memorandum dated
[17] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN),
[18] Rollo
of G.R. No. 123346, pp. 268-275.
[19] Civil
Case No. C-15491 of the RTC, Branch 121,
[20] Rollo of G.R. No. 148767, pp. 33-45.
[21] Amended Decision dated
[22] Decision, pp. 21-22.
[23] Annex “A,” Petition in G.R. No. 134385, Rollo, pp. 108, 122-124.
[24]
[25] Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 130759, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 449; Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 483.
[27] G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661,
[28] Memorandum for respondent CLT Realty Development Corporation, Inc. dated
[29] Id.,
p. 65; see also Memorandum for the respondent Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, dated
[30] Memorandum for the respondent Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, id., pp. 34-35.
[31] Memorandum for respondent CLT Realty Development Corporation, Inc. dated
[32]
[33] Memorandum for respondent CLT Realty Development Corporation, Inc. dated
[35] "Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
[36] It was held that:
"x x x As a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before
them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.'
x
x x
It is clear though, that this exception is applicable
only when, 'in the absence of objection,' 'with the know edge of the opposing
party,' or ' at the request or with the consent of the parties,' the case is
clearly referred to or 'the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives' and' admitted as part of the record of
the case then pending.' These conditions have not been established here. On the
contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending
before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the
trial and was 'unfairly sprung' upon him, leaving him no opportunity to
counteract." [Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650, 655
(1991)]
[37] The
Honorable Court in State Prosecutors v.
Judge Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (1994), enumerated the requisites for a court
to take judicial notice of a certain fact:
"Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known
is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of genera notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because of the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not
the judicial knowledge of the
court, and he IS not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are 'commonly' known.
Things of 'common
knowledge' of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally In the course of the orcl1nary experiences of life or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found
in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common
knowledge of every person." [Emphasis supplied]
[38] In Spouses
Badillo v. Tayag, 400 SCRA
494 (2003), the Honorable Court, quoting other cases, held that the trial court
cannot take judicial notice of factual
matter in controversy, thus:
"In Herrera v. Bollos, the trial court
awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC,
this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
. . . A court cannot take judicial notice of
a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
Before taking such judicial notice, the court must 'allow the parties to be heard thereon.' Hence, there
can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence."
[39] In the same vein, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (otherwise known as “The
Property Registration Decree,” which amended and codified the laws
relative to registration of property) provides:
“Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
[40] Aguilar
et al. v. Caoagdan et al., No. L-12580,
[41] Grey
Alba v. De la Cruz, id.; Gestosani v. Insular Development Co.,
Inc., No. L-21166,
[42] Moscoso
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-46439,
[43] Pepsico, Inc. v. Lacanilao, G.R. No.
146007.
[44] Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 144705, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 65, 75-76.
[45] Annex “H,” Petition in Manotok; Decision dated
[46] CA Decision in the Manotok Case, pp. 16-17.
[47] Rollo of
G.R. No. 123346, p. 2136.
[48] Sections 41, 43 and 44, Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, approved on
[49] CCC
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 264, 270 (1970).
[50] No. L-26966,
[51] No. 21113,