G.R. No. 123346 – MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

 

G.R. No. 134385 – ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC. versus HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, represented by his compulsory heirs: his surviving spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their children, NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA and RENE POLICAR and ESPERANZA DIMSON; and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MALABON.

 

G.R. No. 148767 – STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC. versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

 

 

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.

 

 

Promulgated:

 

December 14, 2007

 

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

 

CORONA, J.:

 

 

The integrity of the Torrens system of land registration should be zealously guarded at all costs. Otherwise, the value of certificates of titles will be seriously impaired. This is the fundamental principle that should guide this Court in resolving the motions for reconsideration in these consolidated petitions. And the reason why I respectfully submit that the decision dated November 29, 2005 should be reconsidered.

 

 

There is Only One OCT No. 994: That Registered On May 3, 1917

 

 

        The issue involving OCT No. 994 is not whether the true date of its registration was April 19, 1917 or May 3, 1917 but which of these dates exists in the books of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

       

While it appears at first glance that there were two different dates of registration of OCT No. 994 — April 19, 1917 and May 3, 1917 — only one OCT No. 994 appears in the books of the LRA. This was OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. There was only one OCT No. 994. And it was registered on May 3, 1917, not on April 19, 1917.

   

The voluminous records of these cases show the following material antecedent facts relative to the issuance of OCT No. 994:

 

1.   on December 3, 1912, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal presided by Judge Norberto Romualdez, rendered judgment in Land Registration Case No. 4429 ordering the issuance of a decree of registration;

2.   pursuant thereto, the General Land Registration Office prepared decree no. 36455 and issued the same on April 19, 1917 at 9:00 in the morning in Manila, Philippine Islands and

3.    on May 3, 1917, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal received decree no. 36455 and had it transcribed. Thus, the following entries appeared on the first page of OCT No. 994:

 

 

Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate, Judge of said Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.

 

Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April, A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.

 

ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS

Chief of the Land Registration Office

 

Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, this third day of May nineteen hundred and seventeen at 7:30 A.M.

 

 

Clearly then, May 3, 1917, the date of transcription of the decree of registration, was the date OCT No. 994 was registered and became effective. This was in accordance with Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), the applicable law at the time OCT No. 994 was issued:

 

Section 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified true copy of such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with Section forty of Act Numbered Four Hundred and Ninety Six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the “Registration Book,” in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The register of deeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words “owner’s duplicate certificate,” and deliver the same to the owner, or to his attorney duly authorized. In case of a variance between the owner’s duplicate certificate and the original certificate, the original shall prevail. The certified copy of the decree of registration shall be filed and numbered by the register of deeds with reference noted on it to the place of record of the original certificate of title: Provided, however, That when an application includes land lying in more than one province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court shall cause the part lying in each province or in the city of manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in the decree of registration, and the clerk shall send to the register of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila, as the case may be, a copy of the decree containing the description of the land within that province or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same and issue an owner’s duplicate thereof, and thereafter for all matters pertaining to registration under this Act the portion in each province or city shall be treated as a separate parcel of land.        

 

Section 42.  The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book, “Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at” (stating the time and place of entry of decree and the number of case).  This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.  Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled “Transfer from number” (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words “Originally registered” (date, volume, and page of registration).  (emphasis supplied)

 

 

April 19, 1917 was the date of issuance or forwarding of the decree of registration (decree no. 36455) to the registrar of deeds. It was not the date of transcription of said decree. The transcription in the registry book by the registrar of deeds was made on May 3, 1917, the day it was received by the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. There could thus be no other date of registration but May 3, 1917.

 

Registration means “recording; inserting in an official register; enrollment, as registration of voters; the act of making a list, catalogue, schedule, or register, particularly of an official character, or of making entries therein.”[1] In general, it means any entry made in the books of registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict senses, and cancellation, annotation and even the marginal notes.[2] In its strict sense, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.[3] In its juridical aspect, it is the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds.[4] Therefore, the transcription or entry of the decree of registration in the registration book was what constituted registration, in this case, on May 3, 1917.

 

Since The “Two OCT No. 994 Theory” Is False, The Ruling That Upheld The Respective Titles of Respondents Has No Basis

 

The “two OCT No. 994 theory” (that is, there were two OCT No. 994s, one registered on April 19, 1917 which was superior to the other OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917) was the foundation of the November 29, 2005 decision. On that theory rested the ruling that the respective titles of respondents CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) and the heirs of Jose B. Dimson (heirs of Dimson) as derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on April 17, 1917[5] should be upheld over that of petitioners. The theory has been proven false as no OCT No. 994 registered on April 17, 1917 ever existed.

 

The difference between the “two OCT No. 994 theory” and the fact that only one OCT No. 994 existed is critical and crucial. In judicial decision-making, theory must give way to reality because a decision should always be based on facts to which the relevant law shall be applied.

 

Moreover, in these cases, the difference between theory and reality and the dates April 19, 1917 and May 3, 1917 are significant as well as decisive. On them hang the conflicting claims and rights of the contending parties. Indeed, the Court formulated the Advisory on the issues for oral arguments of these cases on the premise that there were two OCT No. 994s:

 

I.

 

Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid?

 

A.        Petitioners’ titles:

 

1.         Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 53268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc., and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of Manotok Estate Corporation;

 

2.         TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta Institute of Agriculture; and

 

3.         TCT Nos. T-158373 and 13574 in the name of Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.

 

            All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same city.

 

B.        Respondents’ titles:

 

1.         TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation; and

 

2.         TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson.

 

            All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917, covering the same Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate. (emphasis supplied)

 

 

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-177013 and R-151669 Could NOT Have Been Validly Derived From OCT No. 994 Registered on May 3, 1917

 

I submit that the respective certificates of title of respondents (TCT No. T-177013 of CLT and TCT No. R-15166 of the heirs of Dimson) could not have been valid derivative titles of OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917.

 

        First, CLT and the heirs of Dimson have consistently claimed that the mother title of their respective certificates of title was OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. However, OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 never existed. It was a fruit of fraud and falsification.[6] Thus, the certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson had no valid source.

 

Neither CLT nor the heirs of Dimson presented a certified copy (or even any copy) of the mother title of TCT Nos. T-177013 and TCT No. R-15166. CLT submitted OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 and admitted that there was only one OCT No. 994. It, however, argued that OCT No. 994’s registration date should be April 19, 1917, the date of issuance of the decree of registration. This is a complete turnaround from its original contention that there were two OCT No. 994s, one registered on April 19, 1917 and another registered on May 3, 1917. The Court should not allow this.

 

In the trial courts, CLT and the heirs of Dimson traced their titles to the spurious OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. They even underscored this point to show that their mother title was issued earlier than, and prevailed over, OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. They are therefore estopped from claiming otherwise.[7]

 

Respondents cannot change horses in midstream. A party cannot adopt a new theory or argument, specially one that is inconsistent with its previous contention. The Court should not countenance CLT’s act of adopting inconsistent postures as this would be a mockery of justice.[8] This rule applies more strictly in case of appeal. As this Court declared in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:[9]

 

The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, much more in a motion for reconsideration as in this case, because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

 

 

Second, in upholding the validity of the titles of CLT, heavy reliance is made on the observations of the trial court and the Court of Appeals focusing on the alleged technical defects of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 (from where petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc.’s titles originated). To my mind, however, there are compelling reasons to annul respondent CLT’s title.

 

True, this Court is not a trier of facts, specially if the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court.  But it is not without exceptions.[10] The Court may review the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts when such findings are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.[11] Moreover, to lay the matter to rest and in the interest of justice, this Court can set aside the procedural barrier to a re-examination of the facts to resolve the legal issues.[12]

 

In these cases, the trial and appellate courts found (and this Court adopted the finding in its November 29, 2005 decision) that there are two OCT No. 994s, registered on April 19, 1917 and May 3, 1917, respectively. However, such finding has been shown to be manifestly erroneous.

 

TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.

       

Annotations at the back of Hipolito’s title revealed that Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement which admitted the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney’s fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.

       

However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly the following entries, showed:

 

            AP-6665/0-994 – Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22.

 

            Fecha del instrumento – Agosto 29, 1918

 

            Fecha de la inscripcion – September 9, 1918

                                                                                    10.50 AM

            AP-6665/0-994 – Venta: – Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el cuanto a una extencion superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el  segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Libro T-22.

            Fecha del instrumento – Agosto 25, 1918

 

            Fecha de la inscripcion – September 9, 1918

                                                                                    10:50- AM

 

 

        Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.

       

Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito’s certificate of title was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to say the least.

       

All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded them.

 

 

CLT’s and the Heirs of Dimson’s Predecessors-In-Interest Had Nothing to Transfer

 

 

            As early as 1918, the entire Lot No. 26 had already been disposed of and title thereto was transferred to the predecessors-in-interest of Manotok Realty, Inc. as evidenced by the issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. This fact was reflected in the following annotations on OCT No. 994:

 

a.                Ap 6665/0-994 stating that TCT 4210 was issued on September 9, 1918 in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio canceling OCT No. 994 insofar as portions of Lot No. 26 with areas of 3,052.93 sq. m. and 16,512.50 sq. m., respectively, by virtue of a deed of sale dated August 29, 1918 and

b.               Ap 6665/0-994 stating that TCT No. 4211 was issued on September 9, 1918 in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio totally canceling OCT No. 994 with regard to Lot 26 by virtue of a sale dated August 25, 1918 covering the remaining 871,982 sq. m. of the said lot.

 

Clearly, Dimson’s TCT No. R-15166 had no basis because the property it was supposed to cover was already covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Moreover, Dimson anchored his right to Lot No. 26 by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1. He presented the said order dated June 13, 1966 to the CFI of Caloocan City for confirmation only after the lapse of 11 years from its issuance.[13]

 

The order dated June 13, 1966 was recalled by the CFI of Rizal on August 16, 1966. Thus, his petition for confirmation was invalid on two grounds: (1) his right to file it had already prescribed and (2) with the recall of the order dated June 13, 1966, there was no longer anything to confirm. These fatal defects likewise tainted the heirs of Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169 because it was issued on the basis of the same decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated October 18, 1977 of the CFI of Caloocan (the same bases for the issuance of TCT No. R-15166). 

 

The river cannot rise higher than its source. To reiterate, Dimson’s TCT Nos. R-15166 and R-15169 had no basis. Since Dimson’s title was the source of Hipolito’s title and, subsequently, of CLT’s TCT No. 177013, then CLT’s certificate of title also had no basis. Dimson did not acquire any portion of Lot Nos. 26 or 25-A (covered by the titles of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. [Araneta]). As such, he could not transfer any portion thereof to Hipolito. In the same vein, having acquired nothing from Dimson, Hipolito transmitted nothing to CLT.

 

        Moreover, the rule is that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties and, in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding title under the prior certificate is entitled to the property as against the person who relies on the second certificate.[14] In other words, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from, the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate.[15]

 

TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 preceded Dimson’s TCT No. R-15166 by almost 50 years while TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 of Araneta were issued 30 years earlier than Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169. As between the source of Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation’s titles and that of CLT’s, therefore, that of the latter prevails. In the same vein, Araneta’s titles prevail over that of the heirs of Dimson.      

 

 

The Alleged Defects in Connection With the Issuance of TCT No. 4211 Were Insufficient to Nullify the Title

       

 

The trial and appellate courts ruled that fraud attended the issuance of TCT No. 4211 from which petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. derived its titles. According to the trial and appellate courts: (1) the dates of original survey appearing on TCT No. 4211 were different from those indicated in OCT No. 994; (2) the Bureau of Lands had no copy of Psd-2115 which was the basis for the issuance of TCTs Nos. 1368 to 1374 which preceded petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc.’s titles and (3) the technical description of the land appearing on OCT No. 994 was in English  while the derivative titles were still in Spanish and the tie points in the mother lot were not adopted in the derivative titles.

       

However, the alleged irregularities are not sufficient to nullify TCT No. 4211. They were mere technical defects which may have been committed in the preparation thereof. The more important consideration should be whether or not there was a deviation or change in the area of Lot No. 26 as described in OCT No. 994 and those described in the derivative TCTs. In the case of TCT No. 4211, there was no such deviation or change.

 

Moreover, since the titles of respondents CLT and the heirs of Dimson are invalid for having a non-existent source, the respective titles of petitioners enjoy the presumption of valid and regular issuance. A review of the purported defects of these titles should await a proper action, that is, one that directly attacks their validity.

 

 

The Committee Reports of the Senate and the Department of Justice Have probative Value

 

 

This Court already recognized the evidentiary value of the report of the Senate in Alfonso v. Office of the President[16] when it included relevant portions of the report in its factual findings. While Alfonso involved a disciplinary issue distinct from the issues in these cases, the facts there were intimately and extensively related to the facts here as Alfonso showed how OCT No. 994 allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 came about as a product of fraud and falsification.

 

Moreover, the reports of the Senate and the Department of Justice are official acts of co-equal branches of the government. Under Section 9, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory for courts to take judicial notice of these reports.

 

 

There is No Need to

Remand These Cases

 

The discussion on the venue of these cases (should these cases be remanded to the CA) and the reasons why such venue is the proper one ought to be commended for its comprehensiveness. However, I submit it is actually academic and unnecessary. There is no need to remand these cases.

 

The discussion is unequivocal:

 

[The existence of the so-called 17 April OCT having been discounted], it should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced from the 17 April 1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there may be about the veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT….

 

            The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside [is] whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court.

 

As emphasis, the following point is made:

 

            The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles can be accorded recognition simply because the original title commonly referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the [Dimsons] were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is also the one which the Office of the Solicitor General submitted as true and that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917.

 

The certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson have no valid source. They are the bastard offsprings of the “mother of all land titling scams.”[17] This Court has the duty to snuff them out, not to perpetuate them. They should be ordered expunged from the registry books of the Office of the Registrar of Deeds.  Furthermore, the respective complaints filed by CLT and the heirs of Dimson in the trial courts should be dismissed.

 

To reiterate, the logical consequence of declaring the respective certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson void and unworthy of legal recognition is to order the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. C-15539 and C-15491 instituted by CLT and Civil Case No. C-8050 filed by the heirs of Dimson.

 

With the dismissal of the complaints, no controversy remains to be decided and no case need be remanded. Nonetheless, the ponencia is still not satisfied but asks further:

 

xxx what then is the proper course of action to take with respect to these pending motions for reconsideration? 

 

 

The esteemed ponente further argues that:

 

Considering that CLT and [the heirs of Dimson] clearly had failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as the plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court. 

 

Yet, more is desired:

 

However, such solution may not satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.

 

The ponencia’s allusion to “the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate” is misleading and without factual and legal basis. After the respective complaints of CLT and the heirs of Dimson are dismissed, the controversy surrounding the portions of the Maysilo Estate involved in these cases will be resolved and terminated. Thus, there will be no more controversy to speak of.

 

Judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”[18] Courts resolve only cases that involve actual controversies. They are mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties through the application of the law.[19] Until it can be shown that an actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding decision.[20]

 

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[21] There will be no more justiciable controversy in these cases after the Court declares that the respective certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson are void and unworthy of legal recognition. Thus, there will be nothing more to remand.

 

 

No Direct Challenge to Petitioners’ Titles Remains

 

 

In support of the action to remand these cases, the following opinion is rendered:

 

More pertinently, after the present petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, had sought to intervene. The Republic did not participate as a party when these cases were still before the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. While the Republic originally prayed for the grant of the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks of the Court the promulgation of a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued or registered on [3 May 1917]. Rather than suggest whether the petitions be granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it is the 3 May 1917 OCT mother title which is valid, “a remand of this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle which among the private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is proper.”

 

            Notably, both the Manotok group and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the petition[s], albeit under differing qualifications.     

 

And the ponencia concludes:

 

Considering the reality that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued/registered/dated 3 May 1917, remand would be appropriate to determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the genuine OCT No. 994.

 

 

There is no factual and legal basis therefor. The annulment of the respective certificates of title of respondents CLT and the heirs of Dimson terminated the controversies subject of these cases. It removed the direct challenge raised by respondents to the respective titles of petitioners.

 

Notably, nowhere did the Republic assail the validity of the respective certificates of titles of petitioners. It never prayed for the annulment of their titles.[22]  Otherwise, it would have gone against one of the fundamental principles of the Torrens system of land registration: a Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title cannot be changed, altered, modified enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[23] As a rule, it is irrevocable and indefeasible. A strong presumption exists that it was validly and regularly issued.[24] The duty of courts is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless assailed in a direct proceeding.[25] A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally.[26] The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens system must be protected at all costs.

 

With the annulment of the respective titles of respondents CLT and the heirs of Dimson, no direct challenge to the respective titles of petitioners subsists. The strong presumption of valid and regular issuance of petitioners’ titles remains. Unless and until directly attacked by a party that has an actual and direct interest on the annulment of said titles, that presumption will stand.  

 

The Court does not have the panacea for any and all ills allegedly surrounding the Maysilo Estate. It should be constantly  reminded  of  its  own  pronouncement  in  Vera  v.

Avelino:[27]

 

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct….

 

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political or social ills….[28]

 

 

The duty of this Court is to ensure and preserve the integrity of the Torrens system. That duty must be performed with all due fidelity to the fundamental principles governing that system.

 

Resolving all controversies, perceived or real, surrounding the Maysilo Estate is a desirable objective. However, it is simply not within the Court’s powers to do in these cases. The Court is not enjoined, empowered or equipped to clean the Augean stables, nor to accomplish the task in a single day.

 

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the intervenor Republic of the Philippines.

           

                                               RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                Associate Justice


[1]               Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, p. 1449.

[2]               Po Sun Tun v. Price and Provincial Government of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192 (1929).

[3]               Id.

[4]               Id.

[5]               Both their titles state that they were “originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.” 

[6]               See Alfonso v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 150091, 02 April 2007.

[7]               Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying the truth of a fact which has, in contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers. Or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied. “Estoppel” is also defined as a preclusion of a person from asserting a fact, by previous conduct inconsistent therewith, conduct on his own part or on the part of those under whom he claims, or by adjudication on his rights, which he cannot be allowed to call in question. It is a rule of equity as well as a conclusion of law. The purpose of estoppel is to prevent inconsistency and fraud resulting in injustice. While estoppel does not make valid the thing complained of, it closes the mouth of the complainant. It is a doctrine for the prevention of injustice and is for the protection of those who have been misled by that which on its face was fair and whose character, as represented, parties to the deception will not, in the interest of justice, be heard to deny. (31 C.J.S. 288-290).

[8]               November 29, 2005 decision in this case.

[9]               G.R. No. 168498, 24 April 2007.

[10]             MEA Builders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121484, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 155.

[11]             Id.

[12]             Alfonso v. Office of the President, supra note 6.

[13]              The action should have been filed within ten years from the date the order became final.

[14]              Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, 208 Phil. 441 (1983); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 370.

[15]              Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67451, 28 September 1987, 154 SCRA 328.

[16]             Supra note 6.

[17]             See Alfonso v. Office of the President, supra note 6.

[18]             Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution.

[19]             Guingona v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415 (1998).

[20]             Id.

[21]             Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283.

[22]              The Republic consistently prayed in its motion for reconsideration dated January 4, 2006 and memorandum dated August 25, 2006 that “the decision dated November 29, 2005 be reconsidered, and a new one be issued upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.” 

[23]             Section 48, PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

[24]              Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59731, 11 January 1990, 181 SCRA 9; Vda. De Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, 04 May 1988, 161 SCRA 36.

[25]             Director of Lands v. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184 (1951).

[26]             Id.

[27]             77 Phil. 365 (1946).

[28]             Id.