MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and G.R. No. 123346
MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus
- SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CARPIO-MORALES,
CORPORATION, AZCUNA,
Respondent. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI- G.R. No. 134385
CULTURE, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY
HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING
SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR
CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON
AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS
LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND
ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF
MALABON,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga,
J.:
The stability of the country’s
These two petitions[1]
involve properties covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate.[2] The vast
tract of land stretches over three (3) cities, comprising an area larger than
the sovereign states of
OCT No. 994 have
been beset by controversy and sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and
shady transfers. It may as well be renamed the “
The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has not eluded this Court. Since 1992, our findings and ruling in MWSS v. Court of Appeals[4] have stood as the Rosetta Stone in deciphering claims emanating from OCT No. 994, as was done in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,[5] and in the Court’s Decision dated 29 November 2005 (2005 Decision) in these cases.[6] Yet in the course of resolving these motions for reconsideration came the revelation that OCT No. 994 was lost in translation following MWSS. Certain immutable truths reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must emerge and gain vitality, even if we ruffle feathers in the process.
I.
A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been extensively narrated in the 2005 Decision, is in order. For clarity, we narrate separately the antecedent facts in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385.
A. G.R. No. 123346, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation,
vs.
CLT Realty Development
Corporation
On
CLT’s
claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued
in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived
from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage dated
For
their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT,
claiming that Dimson’s title, the proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and,
hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The
Manotoks asserted their ownership over
the property on
The
trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions
arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of
titles. It was established that the
entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT
No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;[12]
that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from
the Dimson title and that on the basis
of the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles,
the latter’s property indeed encroached on the property described in CLT’s
title.[13]
The
Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court.[14] Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied,[15] they filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the trial
court’s decision which decided the case on the basis of the majority
commissioners’ report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner’s
report.[16]
B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.
On
The
trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993 with these
findings: first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the
titles that formed each link in the chain of ownership that culminated in the
Manotok title, i.e., that the technical descriptions
in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged mother
title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state that deviated
from the usual practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was established
procedure to indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or transfer
certificate, the date of the original survey of the mother title together with
the succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence of
the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on Manotok’s chain of titles, the
trial court added, should mean that OCT No.
994 was not the mother title not only because the original survey dates
were different but also because the original survey date must always be earlier
than the issue date of the original title. OCT No. 994 was issued on
May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date indicated in the succeeding
titles, which is December 22, 1917.[18]
Undaunted,
Araneta interposed an
appeal to the
Court of Appeals which,
on
decision.[19] In so holding, the appellate court declared
that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169 was derived from “OCT No. 994
registered on
Araneta
then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to
the Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better right of
possession over the property than did Dimson.[21]
As
both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the validity of the
parties’ separate titles to portions of the greater Maysilo Estate, they, along
with G.R. No. 148767[22],
were consolidated per Resolutions dated
On
WHEREFORE,
the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.[24]
The Court acknowledged that the paramount question
raised in the petitions is whether the titles issued in the name of Dimson and
of CLT are valid. Noting that this
question is one purely of fact, the Court held that the same was beyond its
power to determine and so, the factual findings of the trial courts in these
cases as affirmed by the Court of Appeals must be accorded the highest degree
of respect and not disturbed at all.
Nonetheless,
the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit in the petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the validity of the trial court’s
adoption of the
commissioners’ majority report as part of the decision inasmuch as the same is
allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and that a case of
overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of experts in the
field of geodetic engineering who, on account of their experience and
expertise, are in a better position to determine which of the contending titles
is valid. For this reason, the Court emphasized, the
trial court may
well rely on
their findings and conclusions. Second, the Court pointed
out that the titles of respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No.
994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on
The
Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
On
From the above petitions, the following principal
issues are gathered:
I.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending
parties are valid:
A. Petitioner’s titles:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012,
9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956,
63268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc.,
and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of
Manotok Estate Corporation;
2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta
Institute of Agriculture; and
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto.
Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
All these titles were derived from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 in the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same
city.
B. Respondents’ Title:
1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development
Corporation;
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and
3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development
Corporation/
All
these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on
II.
Can
this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan Water Works and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 103558, November 17, 1992) and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96259,
September 3, 1996) sustaining the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April
19, 1917 and nullify the same OCT No. 994 registered later, or on May 3, 1917?
III.
How
will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the Senate Fact-Finding
Committee, not presented in evidence before the trial courts concluding that
the valid title is OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, affect the
disposition of these cases?
Will
it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to determine which of
the Certificates of Title are valid? If so, which trial court?[25]
A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The
Republic, through the Solicitor General,[26]
strenuously argued that contrary to the supposition reflected in the Advisory,
there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994.
x x x In this particular case, it appears
that on December 3, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto
Romualdez presiding, acting on Land Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering the GLRO to
issue a decree. Pursuant to this order,
the GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and
issued the same on
On
the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that
he had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated
In
response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and the counsel for CLT
submitted their separate “Compliance” to this Court, with their respective
copies of OCT No. 994 attached thereto. Both copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by
the Solicitor General and CLT indicate on their face that the decree of
registration issued on 19 April 1917 was received for transcription at the
office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on 3 May 1917.
Indeed, there is no evident variance between the copies of OCT No. 994
submitted by the OSG and CLT, and CLT admits just as much in its Memorandum
dated
The
claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994 was duly
confirmed though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente of the 2005 Decision has recognized this fact, as indicated
in her present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary as it
is to the crucial predicate underlying the issues presented in the Court’s
Advisory, has changed the essence and complexion of the controversy. The key to grant or deny the motions for
reconsideration is the answer to the question:
which is the true date of OCT No. 994,
II.
We
turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the quoted portion of the
certified true copy thereof submitted by the Republic of the
Therefore,
it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of said xxx
‘Witness:
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the 3rd day of
December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.
‘Issued
at
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of
Justice
Received for transcription at the office of
the Register of Deeds for the
As
evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued on
This
argument marks a radical departure from CLT’s earlier theory that there were
two OCTs No. 994, one dated
The process involved is what this Court called “the method of giving a paper title.”[36] It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the
decree of registration the clerk shall
send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court, to the register of
deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and the
register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be- called the
'registration book,' in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be
devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in
this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be
signed by him and sealed
with the
seal of the court. All certificates
of title shall be numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The
register of deeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original
certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words 'Owner's duplicate
certificate,' and deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney duly
authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate certificate and
the original certificate the original shall prevail. The certified copy of the
decree of registration shall be filed and numbered by the register of deeds
with a reference noted on it to the place of record of the original certificate
of title: Provided, however, That when an application includes land lying in
more than one province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court shall
cause the part lying in each province or in the city of Manila to be described
separately by metes and bounds in the decree of registration, and the clerk
shall send to the register of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila,
as the case may be, a copy of the decree containing a description of the land
within that province or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same
and issue an owner's duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters
pertaining to registration under this Act the portion in each province or city
shall be treated as a separate parcel of land.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration
book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of
Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and place of entry of decree and the
number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the
transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same
land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled 'Transfer from number' (the
number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also
the words 'Originally registered' (date, volume, and page of
registration.")
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds.[37] Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.[38]
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being the original certificate of title.[39] Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration are unanimous on the matter. The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, widely acknowledged as the leading authority on the subject during his time, wrote, thus:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry
of the decree of registration, the Registrar of Land Titles transcribes the
same in the registry book called the “Registration Book” and issues an owner’s
duplicate certificate of title to the applicant upon payment by him of the
necessary registration fees. The entry
made by the Registrar of Land Titles in his registry book is actually the
original copy of the original certificate of title and shall be signed by
him and sealed with the seal of the Court and of his office. Pursuant to Rep.
Act No. 113, the Registrar of Land Titles may now use only the seal of his
office, dispensing with the court seal.[40]
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the same conviction:
A
decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the Commissioner
of Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the name of the Judge to the
fact that the land described therein is registered in the name of the applicant
or oppositor or claimant as the case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in
toto in the registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the page
on which the transcription is made become the “original certificate of title,”
more commonly called the
xxx
The land becomes a registered land only
upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration book by the
register of deeds, the date and time of such transcription being set forth
in the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate of
title.
xxx
The issuance of the original and owner’s
duplicate certificates are basic for the valid existence of the title. Issuance
of additional copies are permissive and their non-existence does not affect the
status of title. A certificate of title
is deemed as regularly issued with the issuance of the original copy and
owner’s duplicate.[41]
So was Professor Francisco Ventura:
Immediately
upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Commissioner of
Land Registration sends a certified copy thereof, under seal of the said
office, to the Register of Deeds of the province where the land lies, and the
register of Deeds transcribes the decree in a book, called the Registration
Book,” in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order should be devoted
exclusively to each title. The entry
made by the Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the original certificate
of title and is signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office.[42]
The same view came from Professor Narciso Peña, also a former Assistant Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and Acting Register of Deeds of Manila, as he wrote, thus:
Thus,
Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the certificate first registered in
pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall
be entitled in the registration book “Original Certificate of Title, entered
pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of decree
and the number of the case). This certificate shall take effect upon the
date of the transcription of the decree.
Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form,
but shall be entitled. “Transfer from
number (the number of the next previous
certificate relating to the same land),” and also the words “Originally
registered (date, volume, and page of
registration).[43]
The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these two
dates is ultimately inconsequential. It cannot be so for otherwise, the recent
decision of the Court in Alfonso v.
Office of the President[44]
would simply be wrong. In Alfonso,
the Court precisely penalized Alfonso, the former register of deeds of
III.
Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there is
an OCT No. 994 registered or dated
We noted in the beginning of this Decision
that the issue in all these three (3) cases involves the validity of the
parties' overlapping titles. The titles
of the respondents in these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry
of Deeds of
We cannot delve anymore into the
correctness of the Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision,
confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from which the
titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become
final and executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is
meant to correct
what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest court of the land.[45]
This new conclusion
likewise differs from what the Court had to say regarding OCT No. 994 “dated
It
must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No.
36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on
Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals[48] decision, which essentially reaffirmed foregoing factual pronouncements made in MWSS.
Notwithstanding the
emerging error in fact that informed the MWSS
and Gonzaga decisions, the dissent
now claims that said decisions confirmed “the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on
(1) “Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel
land situated in Balintawak, Kalookan City with an area of 213,012 square
meters, more or less, and covered by TCT No. C-15167 which was registered on
(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917;[50]
(3) “It must be observed that the title of petitioner
MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994
registered on
(4) “Lastly, a certificate is not
conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been
registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. 5
Since the land in question has already
been registered under OCT No. 994 dated
In one (1) out of the four (4) times
that reference was made to the mother title of Dimson in MWSS, it was “OCT No. 994 issued on
Since the dissent and even CLT now
acknowledge that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was registered by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal on
Gonzaga
primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a finding that the case involved “facts that are exactly
the same as those that we have passed and ruled upon in the [MWSS case].” The title which was affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT No. C-26806 in the name of
Lilia Sevilla, was “a transfer from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
which was registered on
It was the title originally
registered on
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005 Decision that the 3
May 1917 OCT No. 994 must be distinguished from “OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917
involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases” because the former title
was “based on the Cadastral Survey of Kalookan City under Cadastral Case No.
34, also covering the Maysilo Estate.” It is elemental to note that assuming
said 3 May OCT was somehow flawed because it was based on Cadastral Case No.
34, it does not mean that the so-called
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to
reiterate MWSS and Gonzaga when they effectuated the OCT
No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the same time that the
same OCT never existed, the genuine OCT
No. 994 being that which was registered on 3 May 1917. We need not go as far as
to revive the MWSS or Gonzaga decisions, but certainly we can
decline to infuse further validity to their erroneous basic premise that there
was an OCT No. 994 registered on
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and and their properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[55]
We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court in dealing with municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning with Pelaez v. Auditor General,[56] the Court declared as a general principle that the President had no power to create municipalities through executive orders. However, instead of nullifying the creation of all municipalities created in the same manner, the Court only annulled those municipalities whose creation was specifically attacked in the petition filed by then-Vice President
Pelaez.[57] With respect to the other municipalities which were not
annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few decades, annul only the municipalities which were specifically challenged in petitions raised before the Court.[58] However, after the adoption of the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory recognition to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled, the Court started to affirm the legal existence of such municipalities.[59]
As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the “doctrines” pronounced in MWSS and Gonzaga can extend only to the parties and properties involved in said cases, even if it can be argued that the rights involving other parties and properties are afflicted with inconsistency as regards the legal rulings therein, similar to the municipalities created which though created by void executive orders were not however annulled. Yet with the emergence of a new fact–the enactment of the Local Government Code vis-à-vis Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 exists vis-à-vis MWSS and Gonzaga–subsequent rulings would be informed primarily by the new developments, rather than by the previous precedents that were not able to take into account the true or new factual premises.
IV.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this
Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by
the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT
No. 994 dated
This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005 Decision and the dissenting view, which dwells in the main on the alleged flaws in the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and the Heirs of Dimson. Since the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons are valid and with force and effect. To that end, we need only examine the titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons.
In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally
filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in the name of the Manotoks,
alleging that it was the registered owner of
IT IS FURTHER
CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day
of April, in the year, nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as
Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No.
_____in the name of ___________.
This
certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R-17994/T-89,
which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is
concerned.
Entered
at City of
In
the year nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine
at
CLT further alleged that
it derived TCT No. T-177013 on
IT IS FURTHER
CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day
of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page NA, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in
L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No. ________.
This certificate is a
transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
R-15166/T-75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the
above-described land is concerned.
Entered
at the City of
in
the year nineteen hundred and seventy-
eight
at
Dimson’s original
complaint for recovery of possession against Araneta was founded on the claim
that he was the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at Malabon,
comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-15169
of the Registry of Deeds of
IT IS FURTHER
CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day
of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page___ , Original
Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant
to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No.
4429, Record No. __
This Certificate is a
transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. [illegible] which is cancelled
by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered
at
in
the year nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at
It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s,
Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—that the properties they purport to cover were
“originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred and
seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal.” Note, as earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally
registered on
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of
these three titles can be accorded recognition simply because the original
title commonly referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would
constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed
only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on
Given this
essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision which
sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of possession
filed by CLT and the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on an
inexistent mother title. How can such actions prosper at all even to the extent
of dispossessing the present possessors with title?
The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called
therefore, the burden of proof did
not lie on them. The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by
a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land
sought to be reconveyed is his.[63] In
an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.[64]
V.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference
between the present acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin.[65] Such jurisdiction is “limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.”[66] It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz[67] that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the determination of “which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings.”[68]
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar[69] concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco and his children, at Sideco’s own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo
Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that “[t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his desire with respect thereto, and the court’s order precisely followed the petition of the registered owner.”[70]
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in place of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:
“Inasmuch as the land is identified in the
plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving
the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does
not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in the
previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said
decree. It does not adjudicate the title anew.
It simply deals
with the certificate
of title. This is for the
convenience of the landowner because it is easier for
him to identify his property inasmuch as all the lands brought under the
cadastral survey are designated by cadastral numbers.”[71]
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the
registration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the name of
another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his
favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial
rights.[72]
Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction
over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at
all even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered owner,
as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent
contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there was a
cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such
titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles
issued, and they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of
the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated
VI.
From
these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As
it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by
the Register of Deeds on
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.
With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to take with respect to the pending motions for reconsideration? Considering that CLT and the Dimsons clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court. However, such solution may not satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.
More pertinently, after
the instant petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic of the
Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the petition, albeit under differing qualifications. The Manotoks submit that there should be a remand to the court of origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial court.[76] On the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4) options for the Court to consider: (1) the dismissal of the original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a ruling granting Araneta’s appeal and dismissing Dimson’s complaint, but at the same time remanding the case to a new division of the Court of Appeals for factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion for reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the proceedings to the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, particularly the Senate and DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and the consequent resolution by the appellate court of the instant petitions.
The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for reconsideration, then Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a remand may be required to determine the status of the original title.[77] Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/ registered on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the said genuine OCT No. 994. On the one hand, the appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this Court, since it is not a trier of fact[78] as well as not capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to engage in that undertaking.
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari,[79] the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office.[80] The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact.[81] Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually
resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of
Appeals. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals,[82] this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine “the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are ‘open spaces’ and/or ‘areas reserved for certain purposes,’ determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to.”[83] The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a “Commissioner’s Report” shortly thereafter.[84] Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.[85] The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence.[86] The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.[87] In Republic, the commissioner’s report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.
VII.
The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the
respective investigations and reports by the Department of Justice and the
Philippine Senate, components of the two other co-equal branches of the
government. Both the DOJ Report dated
It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were
rendered on
Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. The Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account
the reports on the regrettable premise that they could somehow “override” the judicial decisions earlier arrived at.[90] The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. The Manotoks and Araneta advert to certain factual allegations relating to their titles and backstories to advance their respective positions. Still, if it indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of the title of respondents the titles of petitioners are cut from the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway with any and all appropriate remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the properties in question.
VIII.
The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these cases are spelled out in Part VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions serve to guide the Court of Appeals in hearing these cases on remand.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear these cases on remand. The Special Division shall be composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i.
Which of the contending parties are able to trace back
their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966
Order of Judge Muñoz-
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Sgd.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
No part due to relationship to one of the counsels
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
Sgd. |
(No Part) |
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
See my Dissenting Opinion |
(No Part – On Leave) |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
Sgd. |
See concurring and dissenting opinion: |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
|
Sgd. |
Sgd. |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO J. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
Sgd. |
I join the dissent of J. A. Gutierrez |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
No part. As SolGen appeared in the oral arguments |
I join the dissent of J. A.S. Gutierrez |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES Associate
Justice |
Sgd.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
Sgd.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1]The present motions for reconsideration seek reversal of the Decision dated 29 November 2005 (see 476 SCRA 305) promulgated in the consolidated cases of Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty (G.R. No. 123346), Araneta Institute v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (G.R. No. 13485) and Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association v. CLT Realty (G.R. No. 148767). However, the losing party in G.R. No. 148767 failed to file any motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
[3]The
total land areas of
[23]Supra note 1. Decision penned by Associate Justice Angelita Sandoval Gutierrez, and concurred by then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, Associate Justices Renato Corona and Conchita Carpio Morales.
[26]Then Antonio E. Nachura, now an Associate Justice of this Court. Justice Nachura took no part in the present cases.
[28]
[43]Peña, Peña and Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (1988 ed.) at 141. Emphasis supplied.
[48]Supra note 5.
[55]Galicia v. Manliquez, G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 95; citing National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 469, 478 (2005). See also, e.g., Mabayo Farms v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 112, 118 (2002).
[57]As was
later observed in Camid v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 161414, 448 SCRA 711,
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the
President was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities
through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized “that the President
has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations,
and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . . . .”
However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33)
municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to
[58]See e.g., Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva, 125 Phil. 1004 (1967);
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 137 Phil. 358 (1969) and
Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya, G.R. No. L-41322,
[59]See Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, 6 December 1994, 239 SCRA 11; Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 922 (1995); Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, 333 Phil. 1 (1996).
[63]See Civil Code, Art. 364,. See also Silvestre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
L-32694 & L-33119,
[64]Pisalbon v. Balmoja, 122 Phil. 289, 292 (1965); citing Civil Code, Art. 364. See also Misamis Lumber v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 881, 883 (1933); Sanchez Mellado v. Municipality of Tacloban, 9 Phil. 92, 93-94 (1907). “In an action to recover possession of real estate, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that he has a better right to the possession than the defendant; and the universal rule in actions of ejectment, where plaintiff seeks to recover possession and establish title to the land in controversy; is that he must rely on the strength of his own and not on the weakness of defendant's title.” Nolan v. Jalandoni, 23 Phil. 292, 298 (1912).
[71]
[72]Peña, supra note 42 at 491.
[78]See
[79]See Revised Rules of Court, Rule 56, Sec. 2. “The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, and 52.
[85]Reference to a commissioner may also be directed in cases when the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long account on either side; or when the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. See Revised Rules of Court, Rule 32, Sec. 2.
[89]In the Manotok petition, the Court of Appeals had first ruled against Manotok in September of 1995, and subsequently affirmed its decision on motion for reconsideration in January of 1996.
[90]“Finally, we cannot consider the alleged newly-discovered evidence consisting of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports invoked by petitioners herein. Certainly, such committee reports cannot override the Decisions of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents’ titles in these cases. The said Decisions were rendered after the opposing parties have been accorded due process. It bears stressing that the courts have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly brought before them. The DOJ and Senate, or any other agencies of the Government for that matter, have clearly distinguishable roles from that of the Judiciary. Just as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the overlapping of findings of facts among the different branches and agencies of the Government.” Supra note 1 at 338.