EN BANC
|
ERLIND A. ALCUIZAR, Complainant, - versus -
JUDGE EMMANUEL C. CARPIO,O, ATTY. CRISOSTOMO
S.J. UGALI, JR, and MRS. DIVINAGRACIA BARCELONA, Respondents, |
|
A.M.-RTJ-07-2068 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI
No. 03-1854-RTJ)
Present: PUNO, Chief
Justice, QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: August 7, 2007 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Four protagonists, all working in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16, are involved in
this administrative
case which started when Court Stenographer Erlind
A. Alcuizar filed a verified Complaint Affidavit[1] dated September 2, 2003 against Presiding
Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio, Atty. Crisostomo
S. J. Ugali Jr., Branch Clerk of Court, and Mrs. Divinagracia B. Barcelona, Clerk III. Complainant Erlind “Neneng” Alcuizar charges them with different offenses – respondent
judge for sexual harassment, while respondents Ugali
and
Against
respondent judge, complainant,
in her complaint-affidavit, alleged, in gist, the following:
1. On the occasion of her birthday on
2. Sometime in October 2002, respondent judge tried to kiss her while she was
transcribing notes in the staff room after office hours. Respondent judge, who
earlier locked the door from the inside, desisted when she threatened to shout
and to throw a stapler at him. She related the incident to her husband after
she got home.
3. A week later, respondent judge scolded
her for allegedly always being out of the office, with an embarrassing
reminder that the government pays her salary.
4. In a day in January 2003, respondent judge entered the staff room where her
co-workers were eating and, there and then, the former asked if she can go inside the CR
so he could kiss her.
5. There were instances when respondent
judge would touch her legs and give her a wink.
6. On
7. There were times when respondent judge
would place his gun on top of her table which would give her a scare.
8. The
harassment she was subjected to impelled her to confide and seek solace from
co-employees and other judges and forced her to request transfer of assignment and to go on
leave. She also did talk to and ask permission from respondent judge to
transfer.
9. On
10. She received on
Appended to
and forming part of the sworn complaint are letters complainant wrote to
several persons respecting her travails and her desire to transfer and to go on
leave.
In his Comment[2]
dated November 13, 2003 that he submitted in compliance with the Court’s
directive, respondent judge denied the charge of sexual harassment, particularly
with respect to allegations about his having kissed or about
his aborted attempt to kiss
the complainant and making what amounts to sexual advances. In
this regard, respondent judge stated that he cannot recall being with the
complainant alone in his CR. As to a near-kissing incident after office hours,
respondent judge stated that complainant had never rendered overtime service. And
even as he denied touching her legs on one occasion, respondent judge went on
to explain that the fact that complainant’s table was veritably surrounded by
those of her co-workers argues against the suggestion of an indecent behavior
going unnoticed. If, according to respondent judge’s logic, he subjected the complainant
to sexual harassment, her having attended thereafter his birthday party, the
retirement party of an office mate and
her visits to his chamber on April 3 and 11, 2003 would make no sense.
On the matter
of the P500 he gave the complainant on her birthday, respondent judge offered that
it was an office practice for the presiding judge and branch staff members to contribute
something for the celebration. He denied insinuations of surreptitious giving, the
amount adverted to having been handed out to the complainant in the presence of the process server for the
purpose of buying food. Respondent judge also downplayed his having winked at
complainant, noting that he winks at all the members of his staff, regardless
of gender, as a greeting gesture.
Closing his
12-page comment, respondent judge stated that the complaint is actually an
offshoot of four (4) incidents which bear on the performance by the complainant
of her official duties.
Among the attachments
to respondent judge’s Comment, which
would later be submitted in evidence, is Annex “1,”[3] a photograph taken during
his birthday celebration on
Against
respondent Ugali, the complaint alleged under paragraph No. 52 thereof, that he
is liable for misconduct for “scolding,”
“yelling at” and “calling [the complainant] ‘praning’” and
“for his failure to take any action
despite [her] report to him about the sexual harassment committed by [respondent judge].”
With respect
to respondent
In their
separate comments,[4]
both respondents Ugali and
When asked whether she wanted to press charges
against the respondent judge, complainant, so respondent Ugali claims, replied
in the negative, her only wish being that she be permitted to transfer.
Respondent Ugali also denied calling her “praning.”[5] He stated that what he, in
context, told the complainant was: “Ang
hirap sa iyo, hindi ka lang inconsiderate at selfish, nagiging praning ka na.” Respondent Ugali then proceeded to explain
that his outburst was in reaction to complainant’s statements: (a) that her
co-employees should not complain if she goes on leave since it is her salary
anyway that would be affected, and (b) that she was complaining that he
(Ugali), as her boss, was no longer minding her and was saying things
indirectly.[6]
On the other
hand, respondent Barcelona’s curt answer to allegations that she did not
transmit the complainant’s leave application and DTRs was: She presented the
complainant’s leave application for April 2003 to respondent Ugali for the
latter’s signature, only to be instructed to inform the complainant about the presiding
judge being the proper signing authority
since she had been absent since February 7, 2003; and that being the
case, her application should be refiled accompanied by requisite clearances;[7] that when complainant
refiled her application for leave for April 2003 even without the needed
clearances, she transmitted the same to the Supreme Court Leave Section[8] after the same had been
duly signed.
As events
would later develop, respondent
Per an en banc Resolution[9] of
By agreement
of the parties, the affidavit of each affiant, including that of each of the
protagonists, was considered his/her direct testimony, albeit clarifications on
certain points were allowed.
Following a
marathon hearing, the
Investigating Justice submitted her Report dated
Section 3. xxx Work …related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer … who, having authority, influence, or moral ascendancy
over another in a work … environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires
any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the subject of said Act.
(a)
In
a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
1.
The
sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or the employment … or
in granting said individual favorable …
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
xxx xxx xxx
2.
The
above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for the employee.
The Investigating
Justice predicated her recommendation on the strength of the following main findings
and observations:
The testimony of [complainant] Alcuizar against
the [respondent] Judge is credible. She was consistent and unambiguous in her
claim that on several incidents while in the workplace, the [respondent] judge,
who is her superior, sought her permission to kiss her which she refused and at
other times directed her to go to the comfort room so that he could kiss her.
While Alcuizar’s testimony is uncorroborated on these incidents but (sic) her
narration thereof in a direct and unhesitating manner convinces one that she is
sincere in her revelations. Her demeanor in the witness stand leaves no doubt
that she was speaking the truth. She was spontaneous and frank.
xxx xxx xxx
From Alcuizar’s answers, one can feel the directness and
spontaneity with which they were uttered. And that can only spring from the
lips of one who has gone through an offensive experience.
xxx xxx xxx
The [respondent] Judge’s soliciting a favor from Alcuizar
that he be allowed to kiss her and at other times
directing Alcuizar to go to the comfort room so he can kiss her are requests
made in a workplace for sexual favor from his underling. It made the workplace
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for his employee, Alcuizar.
Considering that in administrative proceedings only
substantial evidence is required to make a finding of guilt, such quantum has
even been exceeded in this case. The evidence proves the commission of sexual
harassment by the [respondent] Judge. (Words in brackets added)
The Report also recommended the suspension
from office of respondent judge for three (3) months for the offense.
The Court is unable to agree with the
recommendation and the premises and findings holding it together.
We start off with the matter of proof.
In administrative or disciplinary
proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on
the complainant.[11] While substantial evidence would ordinarily
suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the
proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative
proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for
the removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[12]
To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:[13]
Inasmuch
as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave
that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof
required should be more than substantial.
Going over the testimonial and
documentary evidence thus adduced during the investigation, the proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt
threshold required under the premises has not been hurdled. As it were,
circumstances obtained and/or credible evidence presented tended to cast a heavy
cloud on complainant’s credibility and, necessarily, her case. For instance, Alfredo Tayabas, a court aide, contradicting complainant’s account of washing food
containers (“pyrex”) inside the CR, testified
that “[O]n August 29, 2002, after the
[birthday] lunch, [he] and Mr. Michael Monje cleared the table …, brought the
plates and utensils used to the comfort room and washed them all inside.”[14]
And then there is the complainant’s allegation that on a day in October 2002,
while working past the regular working hours, respondent judge attempted to
kiss her. This incident could not have happened as the complainant narrated for
the simple reason that not once did she render overtime service
for the month of October 2002.
The entries in her DTR[15]
for the period which show her being out of the office by
Complainant also asserted that there were
instances when respondent judge touched her legs while she was working at her
computer[16]
and placed his gun on top of her table.[17]
This assertions are hardly credible. Complainant’s
working desk was inside the staff room, which the Investigating Justice describes
as “quite small … for the number of
personnel it houses … [where] the distance of tables from an occupant’s chair
to the next table provides only a passage for a normal sized person.”[18]
It is thus unthinkable that respondent judge would be so callous
and boorish as to perform the
highly disgraceful acts thus ascribed to him by the complainant in the staff
room during office hours in full view of branch employees. Respondent Ugali,
among other court personnel,[19]
swears to not having observed respondent judge putting his gun on top of
complainant’s table, let alone touching her legs during all the years he
(Ugali) was seated beside her.[20]
If respondent judge had, indeed, made overt sexual
overtures towards, and blatantly demanded a kiss from, the complainant within
court premises, good sense would dictate that the matter be immediately reported
to the proper authorities. Per the complainant’s own account, respondent Judge
allegedly made his indecent advances from August 2002 to January 2003. However,
she decided to make a formal complaint with this Court only in September 2003,
albeit she appeared to have sought counsel from her office mates, among other
co-workers in the judiciary. Reckoned from the alleged first incident,
complainant herself testified that it took her “more than thirteen (13) months”
to file this case.[21]
This seeming lack of urgency on the part of the complainant in taking concrete
administrative action against a wayward judge bears heavily on her case.
The Court has certainly taken stock of
the fact that even after the alleged “sexual harassment” incidents transpired, complainant
still dared to repair, in several instances, to respondent Judge’s chamber all
by her lonesome self when the natural thing to do is to
avoid occasions likely to further exacerbate an already difficult situation.
What is more, complainant, by her own admission[22]
even attended the birthday party of respondent judge in his residence and, judging
from photographs[23]
of smiling, clapping and swinging court
staff personnel, complainant definitely appeared to be having much fun. To be
sure, complainant is not exactly a picture of one recently sexually harassed by
her offending host.
With the view we thus take of the
case, complainant has failed to prove her charge against the respondent judge
with the quantum of proof required under the premises. Given this perspective,
the dismissal of the complaint as against respondent judge for insufficiency of
evidence is indicated. The Court, however, stresses that this ruling does not necessarily reflect
on the bona fides of the filing of
the complainant, let alone what complainant perceives to be the righteousness of her grievances. However,
the facts of the case and applicable jurisprudence leave no room for another
kind of disposition.
The
misconduct charge against respondent Ugali is, as recommended by the Investigating
Justice, also dismissed. To be sure, respondent Ugali has adequately addressed
and very well acquitted himself of the allegations against him. His evidence
showed that, upon being informed of complainant’s beef against respondent Judge
Carpio, he inquired what the complainant exactly wanted (she just wanted a
transfer, at that time[24]),
confessing at the same time that he cannot plausibly order respondent Judge Carpio’s dismissal from the
service.
To be sure, respondent Ugali was in an
awkward position. For here was an underling pouring out her concerns and needing
the kind of help which could undermine the delivery of public service and
offend a superior. Yet, he tried to do something about a delicate situation by
confronting the respondent judge about what had been reported to him (Ugali).
And
with respect to the complainant’s request for transfer, respondent Ugali could
not be held liable for not favorably acting thereon, given that her absences
had, as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice, already brought havoc to
the office in general and to Acuizar’s co-employees, in particular, since they
have to perform the tasks that pertain to the complainant in whole or
in part.
Vis-à-vis the scolding and yelling
incidents adverted to by the complainant, the Court, like the Investigating
Justice, finds them of little moment to merit belaboring. Criticisms and scoldings from a superior,
particularly if deserved, or being yelled at occasionally happen in any organization
and are not necessarily counter-productive. And Clerks of Courts, like any
mortal, have their own idiosyncrasies and are subject to human limitations
which everyone is heir to. Well-intentioned outbursts cannot, without more, plausibly
be the subject of an administrative complaint. Nonetheless, it may not be amiss
to state that humility, patience, self-restraint and civility are virtues
usually credited not to bullies and wimps, but to the strong in character.
With
respect to the charge against respondent
As reported by the Investigating Justice,
accomplished DTR forms, once submitted by the personnel concerned, pass the area of
two employees, i.e., Ms. Barcelona, who puts the DTRs in the folder, and Atty. Ugali who signs
them. Once signed, the DTRs are returned to Ms. Barcelona who keeps a
copy, gives one to the accomplishing employee, and sends two copies (original and duplicate) to the
Leave Division of the Court.
Clearly, when Atty. Ugali returned the
signed bunch of DTRs to respondent
As we see it, the loss could have not
been intentional or the product of willful behavior so as to support a charge
of misconduct. By complainant’s own account, before she filed this
administrative complaint, no bad blood existed between her and respondent
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court rules as
follows:
(a)
The
complaint as against respondent Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio for sexual harassment
is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence. He is, however, admonished, to avoid any act or conduct that would in
any way diminish public trust and confidence in the courts and the individuals
representing the institution.
(b)
The
complaint insofar as it charges Atty. Crisostomo S.J. Umali for misconduct is
also DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
(c)
Mrs.
Divinagracia B. Barcelona is adjudged guilty of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE and is hereby REPRIMANDED, and warned to be more diligent and careful in the
performance of her assigned duties and functions.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 2 et seq.
[2]
[3]
Marked and presented in evidence
as Exh. “3” for Judge Carpio.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 187 et seq.,
for Ugali, and pp. 220-221 for
[5]
The parties did agree that
word “praning” means paranoid.
[6]
Page 9 of Comment; rollo, p, 205.
[7] Rollo,
p. 210.
[8]
[9]
[10]
An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful
in the Employment, Education or Training Environment, and for other Purposes.
[11]
[12]
Duduaco v. Laquindanum,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601,
[13]
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575,
[14]
See Exh. “13” for Carpio.
[15]
Exh. “1,”
for Carpio.
[16]
Exh. “B,”
par. 11.
[17]
Exh.
“B,” par. 50.
[18]
Page 1 of the Report.
[19]
Ms. Barcelona, per TSN,
[20]
Exh. “7”
for respondent Carpio.
[21]
TSN,
[22]
TSN,
[23]
Exh.
“FF” and Exh. “3,” for respondent Carpio.
[24] TSN,
[25] Samson v. NLRC, G.R. No.
121035,
[26] Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma,
G.R. No. 154521,
[27] TSN,
[28] TSN,