EN BANC
|
AUGUSTO C. CAESAR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE ROMEO M. GOMEZ,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Respondent. |
|
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2059 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2419-RTJ) Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: August
10, 2007 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NACHURA, J.:
Augusto C. Caesar (Caesar) filed the instant administrative
complaint against Judge Romeo M. Gomez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maasin,
Caesar was the private complainant in
a criminal case for estafa filed against Norman Victor M. Ordiz (Ordiz) with
the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-02-2578 and
raffled to Branch 25 presided by the respondent judge.
The criminal information against
Ordiz was filed in March 2004, but several months passed before he was
arraigned. The delay in the arraignment
was due to several motions for postponement filed by the accused, which were
all granted by the respondent judge. The
pre-trial conference was finally conducted on
Before the scheduled date of trial,
Ordiz allegedly negotiated to settle the civil aspect of the case and promised
to return Caesar’s Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) and pay
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for attorney’s fees and other expenses. Ordiz, however, did not fulfill his
promise. A rumor circulated that instead
of paying Caesar P250,000.00, Ordiz gave respondent judge P200,000.00
on the promise that the latter will dismiss the case.[2]
On
Caesar opposed Ordiz’s motion,
arguing that the motion was in reality a motion to quash which, under Section
1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, should be filed before
arraignment. The filing of the motion after the pre-trial conference is, thus,
irregular. Likewise, the grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss are not
among the grounds set forth in Section 3, Rule 117, and are but defenses which
Ordiz must prove during the trial.
Therefore, they cannot be made a basis for the quashal of the
information. Lastly, he argued that novation
does not extinguish criminal liability.[4]
On P790,000.00, the original agreement to sell was
novated and converted into an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship. The acceptance of the partial return is
sufficient proof of novation and has effectively rescinded their original
transaction, thus, preventing the incipience of criminal liability for
estafa. Respondent judge also added that
Ordiz could not be held criminally liable under Article 316(1) of the Revised
Penal Code (1) because the agreement he signed was not a contract of sale, but
only an agreement to sell. Furthermore,
the agreement provides that title to the property shall be delivered to the
vendee only upon full payment of the purchase price which Caesar failed to
do. Clearly, the non-delivery of the
property sold was due to Caesar’s fault.
As such, there is no basis for Caesar to claim that he suffered damage
under the contract or by reason of the non-delivery.
Caesar
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Inhibition,[6]
but Judge Gomez denied the same.[7] Respondent judge ruled that the arguments
raised by Caesar had been sufficiently explained in the Order sought to be
reconsidered. He also denied the motion
for inhibition holding that divergence of opinion between counsel and the
judge is not a proper ground for inhibition.
According to him, opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings,
as long as they are based on the evidence presented, do not prove bias or
prejudice.
Caesar claims that Judge Gomez
employed slanted logic to justify his premeditated corrupt objective to favor
Ordiz, disregarding, in the process, the prohibition in Rule 117 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The dismissal of
the criminal case by respondent judge prior to the presentation of the evidence
by the prosecution is a travesty of justice.[8]
In his Comment,[9]
respondent judge denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he
explained that the motions for postponements filed by the accused were all
meritorious and so he granted the same.
Respondent judge also denied the charge of bribery against him,
asserting that:
[I]t has no
basis except the thin air circulating around, as if private complainant only sniffed
the air and say, “huh pay off”. But how
could private complainant sniff the thin air in the Halls of Justice in P200,000 to a judge for an alleged payable amount of only P250,000
and for a criminal case that is easily dismissible? This only bolsters the claim of accused that
of the P790,000 returnable amount to private complainant, per previous
agreement, P640,000 has already been paid or returned.[10]
On the
charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent judge maintained that he did
not disregard the basic procedural rules.
He reasoned that:
(1) The motion to dismiss was still
given due course when at the time it was filed the accused was already
arraigned, pre-trial had already been held, the case was already set for the
reception of the prosecution’s evidence and the accused already committed to
private complainant and counsel to return the amount of P200,000 and to
reimburse the amount of P50,000 as attorney’s fees.
This
reasoning of private complainant is quite inaccurate because a motion to
dismiss is not like a motion to quash which must be filed normally before
arraignment. A motion to dismiss in
criminal cases is usually filed on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. Sometimes this is termed as
demurrer to evidence. The motion to
dismiss as understood in this connection may be filed after the pre-trial or
after the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence if it can be clearly seen
that from the evidence presented the crime was not actually committed or that they
are not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In
criminal cases, after the pre-trial, the evidence admitted and the facts
stipulated became immutably established, so that they need not be proved in the
trial. So that in [the] pre-trial there
is already presentation of evidence. And
after the pre-trial based on the evidence admitted and the facts stipulated, a
motion to dismiss may be filed if it becomes clear that the offense charge was
not really committed.
Now
in [the] instant case, during the pre-trial, the following evidence and facts
were admitted and stipulated.
1)
Contract/Agreement Exh. “A”, (Annex “G”) between accused and private
complainant that a certain portion of agricultural land including the
improvements existing thereon located at Flordeliz Machoron, Southern Leyte,
denominated as Lot No. 70 containing an area of 3,000 sq. meters will be sold
to the vendee in the amount of P1,200,000 and will be paid in three (3)
installment payments.
That
the first installment payment will be paid to the vendee upon execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale of a portion of land in the amount of P400,000;
That
the second installment payment will be paid four months after the payment of
the first installment plan;
That
the third or last installment payment will only be paid to the vendor upon
execution and turn-over of the Original Certificate of Title to the vendee.
That
the title of the said property shall remain in the name of the vendor.
A
perusal of the foregoing instrument Exhibit “A” (Annex “G”) would indeed reveal
that it is not a Deed of Sale, rather it is only an agreement to sell. And private complainant was not yet obligated
to make any partial payment to the accused because, per said agreement, the
first payment of P400,000 shall be paid only upon the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. On the other hand[,]
the accused is not yet under obligation to deliver the land because no sale has
yet been perfected, or that the last installment has not yet been paid. That being so, the accused is not yet under
obligation to own the property because the obligation to deliver the same has
not yet accrued.
2)
That of the P790,000 received by the accused from the private
complainant as partial payment of the subject lot, P640,000 has been
returned per their agreement, the first amount returned was P140,000 and
the second amount was P500,000 paid by defense counsel Atty. Nicasio
Nueve to private Prosecutor Atty. Francisco Escaño.
Because of the documentary evidence admitted and [the] facts stipulated during the pre-trial hereto attached as Annex “H”, the accused filed a motion to dismiss x x x .[11]
Caesar filed his Reply to Comment,[12]
reiterating the allegations in his complaint-affidavit.
In its Report and Recommendation, the
Office of Court Administrator (OCA) found that:
[T]he charge of bribery against the
respondent judge should be dismissed as complainant failed to present any
evidence to prove that respondent judge received from the accused the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in exchange of the dismissal of
the criminal case.
However, the complaint for gross
ignorance of the law is meritorious.
Respondent judge tried to evade administrative liability by claiming
that he dismissed the criminal case pursuant to Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court x x x.
However,
the rule on demurrer to evidence is inapplicable in the case as the prosecution
has not yet rested its case at the time the motion to dismiss was filed. The rule is very clear that a criminal
complaint may be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence only after the
prosecution has rested its case. In the
subject case, trial had not even commenced when respondent judge dismissed the
criminal complaint.
Moreover,
respondent judge dismissed the criminal complaint on its merit and not due to
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
He categorically stated in his order dismissing the complaint that “the
original agreement/contract to sell was novated and/or rescinded by agreement
of the parties, so estafa did not attach”. Nowhere in the decision was it
stated that the case was being dismissed for insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution.
That demurrer to evidence may be given due course only after the prosecution has already rested its case is a basic rule of procedure that every member of the judiciary ought to know. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands as they are expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Their failure to observe the basic laws and rules are not only inexcusable but renders them susceptible to administrative sanction. Where the law involved, as in this case, is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[13]
The Court agrees with the OCA.
Caesar charges
the respondent judge with grave misconduct, claiming that the latter received P200,000.00 as consideration
for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
For a judge
to be rendered culpable in any administrative proceeding, there should be a
clear and sufficient evidence of his misconduct.[15] In
this case, Caesar failed to substantiate his allegation of bribery.
Accordingly, we find no cause to controvert the findings of the OCA
absolving the respondent judge from the charge of grave misconduct.
In
addition, Caesar condemns the respondent judge for rashly dismissing Criminal
Case No.
This explanation deserves scant
consideration.
Admittedly, there is no material difference between the
Motion to Dismiss filed by Ordiz before the RTC and a demurrer to evidence.
Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the procedure for
demurrer to evidence:
Section
23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court.
If
the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state
its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
after the prosecution rests its case.
The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from receipt.
If
leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
In this case, the
prosecution had yet to present its evidence at the time the Motion to Dismiss
was filed. A demurrer to evidence is, therefore, inappropriate in Criminal Case
No.
The rule is that when the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[16]
By giving due course to and granting Ordiz’s Motion to Dismiss, respondent
judge exhibited gross ignorance of the law. It may very well be that respondent
judge knew the procedural rule in question. What renders him liable is that he
acted as if he did not.
Respondent judge chose to exonerate Ordiz based on his
defense that he did not commit estafa.
He ruled that Ordiz is not liable under Article 316(1) of the Revised
Penal Code because the agreement he signed is merely an agreement to sell, not
a contract of sale, and thus, he is not under obligation to own the property at
the time of the execution of the agreement.
Such reasoning is specious.
The information against Ordiz reads:
That
on or about the 24th day of February 2003, in the City of Maasin,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to defraud, by means of deceit and false
pretenses, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Augusto C. Cesar (sic), as follows, to wit: the accused under false pretenses
which he made to said Augusto C. Cesar (sic) to the effect that he was the
owner of a parcel of land, situated in Flordeliz, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
consisting of 3,000 square meters, and was willing to sell said land for 1.2
million pesos, which pretenses and representations he well knew were false and
fraudulent, and were only made to induce the said Augusto C. Cesar (sic) to
accept and conclude the sale, as in fact, the said Augusto Cesar (sic) paid,
gave and delivered a total amount of P790,000.00 as partial payment; and
after the true owner thereof was revealed, the said accused only returned the
amount of P140,000.00, and withheld the balance of P650,000.00,
and while in possession of said amount, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted said P650,000.00, to his own
personal use and benefit; and that despite repeated demands made by the herein
complainant Augusto C. Cesar (sic), to account the said amount, accused failed
and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Augusto Cesar (sic) in
the said amount of Php650,000.00.[17]
From the
information, it is clear that Ordiz was not charged under Article 316, but for
violating Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides as one of
the modes of committing estafa:
2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The
gravamen of the felony is an intent to deceive, or fraudulent intent. Intent,
being a state of the mind, may be proved by words or by the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the transaction, subject of the case,
independent of and distinct from the non-compliance with the promise or
representation of the accused.[18]
Ordiz never
denied that he did not own the property at the time of the execution of the
agreement. Deceit is demonstrated in the
false pretense by which Ordiz deluded Caesar into believing that he owned a
property in Flordeliz
Machoron,
What is more nettlesome is respondent
judge’s holding that there was novation or rescission of contract that
prevented the onset of criminal liability for estafa. Jurisprudence is replete with cases[19]
that the criminal liability for estafa already committed is not affected by the
subsequent novation of the contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the State on its own motion even if complete reparation
had been made for the damage suffered by the offended party.[20] Although totally inapplicable to the matter
of criminal liability, the claim of novation by reason of the partial return of
the money defrauded was swallowed by the respondent judge hook, line, and
sinker to absolve Ordiz from liability.
The Court recognizes that not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction.
But this is true only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon
amounts to ignorance of the law.[21]
In this case, respondent judge
displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles
governing demurrer to evidence or dismissal of criminal action for
insufficiency of evidence. Also, he showed his utter lack of knowledge and
understanding of the effect of novation and partial restitution of the amount
defrauded in estafa cases. As mentioned,
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does
not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[22]
A judge is
called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. It is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge must
be conversant with the principles of law; and Canon 18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law. The Code of Judicial Conduct also enjoins judges to
"be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.”
Indeed,
respondent judge owes it to the public and the legal profession to know the law
he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. In order to render substantial
justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are
expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent
with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence,
integrity and independence. Thus, it has been held that when the judge's
inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule,
a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.[23] When the law is sufficiently basic, as what is involved in
the present case, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.[24]
Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge punishable by either
dismissal from the service, suspension from office or a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.[25]
We believe that an imposition of P40,000.00
fine upon respondent judge is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Romeo M. Gomez is
hereby found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law, and is ordered to pay a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) upon
notice.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
[1] Affidavit-Complaint, rollo, pp. 3-5.
[2]
[3] Annex “C,” id. at 13-16.
[4] Annex “D,” id. at 20-25.
[5] Annex “E,” id. at 26-34.
[6] Annex “F,” id. at 35-39.
[7] Annex “M,” id. at 93-95.
[8] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Baldado v. Judge Bugtas, 460 Phil. 516, 526 (2003).
[16] Gamas v. Oco,
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231,
[17] Annex “A,” rollo, p. 6.
[18] Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593,
[19] People v. Ladera,
398 Phil. 588, 602 (2000); People v.
[20] People v. Moreno, supra.
[21] De Jesus v. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1921,
[22] Baldado v. Judge Bugtas, supra note 15, at 525.
[23] Judge Naui v. Judge
Mauricio, 460 Phil. 107, 116-117 (2003), citing Judge Atty. Daniel O. Osumo v. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano, 380 SCRA
110 (2002).
[24] De Jesus v. Dilag, supra note 21, at
184.
[25]