THIRD DIVISION
|
Rosalina
Galanza, Complainant, - versus - Judge Henry
J. Trocino, RTC, Branch 62,
Respondent. |
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A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2465-RTJ) Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This
is an administrative complaint[1]
filed by Rosalina Galanza (Galanza),
against Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Bago City, for gross inefficiency, serious
misconduct and failure to decide within the reglementary period Criminal Case
No. 796 entitled, “People v. Salvador
Rivera, et al.” and Criminal Case No. 810 entitled, “People v. Joel Yundue, et al.” for murder and frustrated homicide,
respectively.
Galanza
is the mother of the victims in Criminal Case No. 796 and No. 810. Criminal Case No. 796 was filed on
On
In
his Comment[9]
to Galanza’s complaint dated
Judge Trocino avers that he cannot be held liable for the
delay since the period to decide has not commenced to run considering that the TSNs
are not yet complete. Without the
pertinent TSNs, he would have no basis for deciding Criminal Cases No. 796 and
810. He also points out that his case is
identical to the case of Judge Sergio D. Mabunay (Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, Branch 24,
On
Respectfully
submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court [are] our
recommendations that Respondent Judge Henry J. Trocino, RTC, Branch 62, Bago
City, Negros Occidental be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P10,500.00) for the delay in the disposition of Criminal Case[s]
Nos. 796 and 810 which amount shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.[12]
On
Galanza and Judge Trocino failed to file their
manifestations despite notices sent to and received by them. Thus, this Court deemed[14]
as waived their rights to submit supplemental comment/pleadings herein.
Resultantly,
the case was submitted[15]
for decision based on the pleadings filed, after a review of which, this Court
finds itself agreeing in the recommendation of the OCA except for the penalty
imposed.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.[16]
The office of the judge exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the
discharge of official duties.[17]
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges
to “dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.” Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct
in order to preserve the integrity, competence, and independence of the
judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient.[18] Time and again, this Court has stressed the
need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate its efforts to minimize,
if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have
long plagued Philippine courts. Canons 6
and 7 of the Code of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in
the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their
courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt
in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed
is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Further, Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay.
In line with the above,
this Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that the mandates
on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, pertinent part of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 13-87 dated
3. Judges
shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15,
of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters
submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided
or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower
collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three
months to do so. (Emphasis supplied.)
Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 28 dated 3 July 1989 provides that the 90-day reglementary period within
which to decide a case shall commence to run upon the completion of the TSNs when
the case was previously heard by another judge and not the deciding judge. The exact provision reads:
3) x x x Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same. (Underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, Criminal Cases No.
796 and No. 810 were totally heard by previous judges of the RTC, Branch 62,
Bago City, namely, Judge Marietta H. Alino and acting Presiding Judge Edgardo
L. Castillo. Judge Trocino assumed
office only in 1999. An inventory of the
cases conducted by Judge Trocino shows that the TSNs of the hearings conducted
on 21 September 1992, 22 December 1993, 28 July 1994, 2 August 1994, 23 January
1996 and 10 November 1998 in Criminal Cases No. 796 and No. 810 have not yet
been transcribed. Consequently, based on
this Court’s Administrative Circular No. 28, the 90-day reglementary period
within which to decide said cases has not commenced to run.
Judge Trocino, however, cannot be
totally absolved of any administrative liability. While it would be difficult for him to decide
the cases, not having heard the testimonies of the witnesses, he was
nonetheless remiss in his duties as the administrator of the court to take
appropriate action to expedite the resolution of these cases. If he personally believed that he could not
decide the cases because these were heard by other judges (which, by itself, is
not an acceptable excuse), he should have communicated to the OCA his
predicament and sought appropriate relief. He did not. Worse, he even had the nerve to invoke the
case of Judge Mabunay in A.M. No. 98-3-114-RTC,[19]
wherein the latter was relieved of his duty to decide the remaining cases
assigned to him upon reaching the compulsory age.
The case of retired Judge Mabunay
does not apply to Judge Trocino. In the said case, it may be noted that more
than 10 years had lapsed after Judge Mabunay left
In contrast, Criminal Cases No. 796
and No. 810 had already been submitted for decision as of year 2000. It must be stressed that when Judge Trocino took
over the RTC, Branch 62,
It is disheartening to
note that Judge Trocino casts the blame on his staff for his own inefficiency.
Such an excuse hardly
merits serious consideration. Judge Trocino
still cannot be absolved of liability for the inefficiency of his court
personnel. A judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since proper
and efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the guardians of a
judge’s responsibilities. The efficient
administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame
from one court personnel to another. A
judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the
mistakes of his subjects.[21]
A Judges is charged with
the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court
personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at
all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
Indeed, he is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform
their tasks and that the parties are promptly notified of his orders and
decisions. It is his duty to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the
flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.[22]
As this Court has
previously held:
While
the Court will not anymore dwell on the abject state of
affairs of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao del Norte, under the leadership and
direction of Judge Tupas who has already retired, nevertheless it underscores
the need for all judges to adopt and implement effective management techniques
and procedures in their respective jurisdictions. There is no gainsaying the
snowball effect of the failure of a judge to exercise authoritative control and
supervision over his court personnel and court
processes. The whole system may simply break down. It is thus exigent that
the Office of the Court Administrator
appropriately address the administrative problems of trial courts, particularly
those uncovered in this case, viz., inefficient and improper handling, nay,
mismanagement of expedientes, docket books and other court
documents and papers; lackadaisical or perfunctory enforcement of rules [on]
financial accountabilities and related obligations of court
officers and employees; and, the need for judicial inventory prior to the
resignation or retirement of judges and court personnel. Unless
the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the
adjudicatory process are tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice
will be impeded and rendered illusory.[23]
More importantly, judges
have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for
additional time.[24] It must be
stressed, however, that their application for extension must be filed before
the expiration of the prescribed period. A close scrutiny of the records does not
disclose any attempt by Judge Trocino to request a reasonable extension of time
to dispose of Criminal Cases No. 796 and No. 810. This way, the parties involved are aware of
the progress of the cases instead of being left in the dark. More importantly, this would dispel any
suspicion that Judge Trocino was unduly holding on to the said cases for
corrupt or ill motives.
Members of the judiciary
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do so has to suffer the
consequences of his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines
the people’s faith in the judiciary.
The office of a judge
exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of justice by administering it
speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that
court is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not
even have to be emphasized but which we always advert to when some members of
the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics.[25] More importantly, failure to resolve cases submitted for
decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.[26]
A judge’s inability to
decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions.[27]
A judge should, at all times, remain in
full control of the proceedings in his sala and, more importantly, should
follow the time limit set for deciding cases.[28]
Indeed, we have consistently impressed
upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the
principle that justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the
expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial,
which, as defined, is one “[c]onducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.” The
primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of
the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It is likewise intended to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.[29]
Failure to resolve cases submitted
for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.[30]
We cannot overstress this policy on
prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit
in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering
of its standards.[31]
Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.[32]
This Court notes
that Judge Trocino left undecided two criminal cases. As we previously
stressed, the unjustified delay in the dispensation of justice in a criminal
case cuts both ways: on the part of the accused, since his liberty is at
stake, his suffering is unduly prolonged on account of the judge’s failure to
promptly render the judgment of acquittal; and on the part of the offended
party, the excruciating pain of waiting for the sentencing of the accused gives
the offended party the impression of impropriety that could diminish his trust
in the judicial system.[33]
All told, this Court finds
Judge Trocino guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision which, under
Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of
Court, is classified as a less serious charge.
Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In this case, this Court deems it necessary
to impose upon Judge Trocino stiffer sanctions than those recommended by the
OCA. If the failure of a judge to
dispose of even just one case constitutes gross inefficiency, how much more the
failure to decide two criminal cases? Such misconduct is aggravated by his lack
of candor and his callous disregard of this Court’s directive requiring him to
manifest his willingness to have this administrative case submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.[34]
The records also show that this is
not Judge Trocino’s first administrative case.
He was administratively sanctioned by this Court in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936 wherein
he was suspended for six months. There is
also another pending case against Judge Trocino in A.M. No. No. 06-2416-RTJ for
which he is charged with Bias and Partiality, Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Oppression. Considering that Judge Trocino
compulsorily retired from the service last
Given the foregoing premises, this Court finds the imposition
of the maximum amount of fine, P20,000.00,
reasonable.
WHEREFORE,
respondent Judge Henry J. Trocino is found LIABLE
for undue delay in rendering judgment in Criminal Cases No. 796 and No. 810 and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
[2]
[3]
Id at 11-12.
[4]
Id at 14-15.
[5]
Id at 17-19.
[6]
Id at 20-22.
[7]
Id at 24-26.
[8]
Id at 27-30.
[9]
[10] 354 Phil. 698 (1998).
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 540,
548-549, citing Cf. Valdez v. Ocumen,
106 Phil. 929, 933 (1960) and Alvero v.
De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 (1946).
[17]
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Cases in
RTC-Br. 138,
[18]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No.
RTJ-02-1737,
[19]
Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC, Branch 24,
[20]
As ruled in the case of Re:
Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC, Branch 24,
We
take this opportunity to remind trial judges that once they act as presiding
judges or otherwise designated as acting/assisting judges in branches other
than their own, cases substantially heard by them and submitted to them for
decision, unless they are promoted to higher positions in the judicial ladder,
may be decided by them wherever they may be if so requested by any of the
parties and endorsed by the incumbent. Presiding Judges through the Office of
the Court Administrator. (id.)
[21]
Re: Cases Left Undecided by Retired Judge Antonio E. Arbis, RTC Branch
48,
[22]
Fernandez v. Hamoy, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821,
[23]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1893,
[24]
Española v.
[25]
Ruperto v. Banquerigo, 355 Phil. 420, 425 (1998).
[26]
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
[27]
Visbal v. Buban, 443 Phil.
705, 708 (2003).
[28]
Hernandez v. De Guzman, 322 Phil. 65, 69 (1996).
[29]
Guerrero v. Deray, 442 Phil. 85, 91-92 (2002).
[31] Re:
Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada, Re: Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. 00-4-09-SC, 23
February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 133.
[32]
Celino v. Judge Abrogar, 315 Phil. 305, 312 (1995).
[33]
Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in RTC, Branches 29 and 59,
Toledo City, 354 Phil. 8, 21 (1998).
[34]
Zarate v. Balderian, 386 Phil. 1 (2000).