Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. ODEL S. JANDA and A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2054
ATTY. JERRY O. REMONTE (formerly A.M. OCA IPI
Complainants, No. 07-2575-RTJ)
-
versus -
JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Polomolok,
ATTY. QUEENIE
MARIE L. Present:
FULGAR, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
SHERIFFS MARILYN P. ALANO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
and RAMON A. CASTILLO, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, NACHURA,
and
Trial Court, Office of the Clerk
of Court,
respectively,
Respondents. August 23, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Although a judge has in his favor the
presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of his official
functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law
obviates this presumption and renders him susceptible to administrative
sanctions.[1]
This
is an administrative complaint[2]
against Judge Eddie R. Rojas (Judge Rojas), Pairing Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 37, General Santos City, Atty. Queenie Marie L. Fulgar
(Atty. Fulgar), Branch Clerk of Court of the same RTC Branch, and Marilyn P.
Alano (Alano) and Ramon A. Castillo (Castillo), Sheriffs IV detailed at the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of General Santos City. The complaint was filed by Atty. Odel S.
Janda and Atty. Jerry O. Remonte (complainants), as officers and
representatives of Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank).
On
June 15, 2006, Judge Rojas rendered a Decision[3] in
Civil Case No. 6474 entitled “George Philip Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz v.
Engr. Edgardo Torcende, Planters Development Bank, Benjamin N. Tria, Arturo R.
Delos Reyes, Mao Tividad, and Emmanuel Tesalonia,” involving a complaint
for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages. The fallo of the said Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, defendants are hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally PAY plaintiffs as follows:
i) Actual
Damages:
a) Plaintiff
George Philip Palileo the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Five Thousand Nine
[Hundred] Seventy-Two Pesos and Ninety-Two Centavos (P2,605,972.92) with
12% compounded interest per annum reckoned from the filing of this case until
full settlement thereof.
b) Plaintiff
Jose R. Dela Cruz the amount of One Million Five Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand
Five Hundred Eight [Pesos] and Eighty Centavos (P1,529,508.80) with 12%
compounded interest per annum reckoned from the filing of this case until full
settlement thereof;
ii) Moral
Damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iii) Exemplary
Damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iv) Attorney's Fees in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand [Pesos] (P500,000.00) each and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The
defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial (Omnibus
Motion). Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
Both parties filed their respective responsive pleadings to the said
motions.
On
On
The herein complainants
charge Judge Rojas of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an
unjust order, because in his August 30, 2006 Order, he declared that the June
15, 2006 Decision was already final and
executory when he knew that it was not yet so and that it contravened Neypes
v. Court of Appeals[7]
which provides for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a denial
of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. They claim that Judge Rojas showed manifest
bias in directing the contiguous execution of the Decision against Planters
Bank, especially when
he
converted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal into a regular motion for
execution in the P100,000.00 to P500,000.00;
(b) moral damages of P300,000.00 to P500,000.00; and (c)
exemplary damages of P300,000.00 to P500,000.00.
Complainants
impute to Atty. Fulgar uncanny speed in issuing a Writ of Execution on
With respect to
Sheriffs Alano and Castillo, who were purportedly in cahoots with Judge Rojas
and Atty. Fulgar, complainants charge them with oppression, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in the hasty and
arrogant enforcement of the Writ of Execution against Planters Bank on
Complainants allege that at
As the amount of the judgment obligation was allegedly not
specified in the Writ of Execution, defendants claim that Sheriffs Alano and
Castillo arrogated unto themselves the judicial power to determine the
same. Likewise, on
Planters
Bank, thru counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[10]
and a Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution,[11]
furnishing the sheriffs copies thereof. However, while the court had yet to rule on
the said motions, Sheriffs Alano and Castillo still demanded delivery of the
garnished amount by way of an Order of Delivery of Money[12]
dated
In sum,
complainants posit that the indecent haste in the execution of the June 15,
2006 Decision through an erroneous Writ of Execution shows that respondent
court officers were bent on exacting from Planters Bank alone the total amount
of the judgment obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
In his
Comment[13]
dated
IN
LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial is
hereby DENIED, and the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal (which is treated as
a motion for execution of a final and executory judgment) is also GRANTED as
explained above. Accordingly, let A WRIT
OF EXECUTION be issued against herein defendants to enforce the FINAL and
EXECUTORY Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[15]
He explained
that the motion, being a "mere scrap of paper," did not toll the
reglementary period to appeal.
Accordingly, he considered the
Judge Rojas
dismisses the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust order as based only on
suspicion and speculation. He argues
that adequate proof is required to show that the order is truly unjust and not
merely erroneous. He submits that judges
cannot be held liable for acts done in the exercise of judicial functions and
in good faith.
Clerk of
Court Atty. Fulgar avers in her Comment[16]
dated December 8, 2006, that she issued the questioned Writ of Execution on
August 31, 2006 to comply with the August 30, 2006 Order, and that the writ was
modified on October 9, 2006 by Judge Panambulan M. Mimbisa, newly appointed
regular judge of the same court, in his Order dated October 6, 2006. She denies issuing the writ with
"uncanny speed" considering that there was legal basis therefor. She says she was specifically ordered to
issue the same and she found no reason to delay compliance. She proffers that she keeps a Book of Entry
of Judgments since she assumed her office in 1998 and submitted copies of its
pages.
In their
Joint-Comment[17]
dated
The
OCA Findings and Recommendations
With respect
to Judge Rojas, the OCA, in its Report[18]
dated April 19, 2007, agreed with him that the issue as to the correctness of
the August 30, 2006 Order in resolving the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and New Trial and the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal should be properly
threshed out in a judicial action, rather than in an administrative complaint
for gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust order, in the
absence of proof of bad faith or malice
on his part.
The OCA,
however, observed the extraordinary zeal of Judge Rojas to execute judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs despite lack of a proper motion therefor and to declare
the defendants' right to appeal as barred even before it could be
exercised. It noted that Judge Rojas
ordered the immediate execution of the June 15, 2006 Decision against Planters
Bank alone by virtue of a writ of execution which was amended only one month
after it was implemented, and without the requisite prior demand from the bank
or any of its co-defendants.
The OCA
ascribed as highly improper and subject to administrative sanction the act of
Judge Rojas in strictly applying the Rules of Court with respect to the Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, and swiftly denying the same on a
technical ground while leniently treating the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal as a regular motion for execution after declaring the June 15, 2006
Decision final and executory even before the defendants knew that their right
to appeal was lost.
Thus, despite
his protestations of good faith, the OCA found Judge Rojas guilty of grave
abuse of authority and recommended that he be reprimanded with a stern warning
not to repeat the same or similar act under pain of a more severe penalty.
As regards
Atty. Fulgar, the OCA found the charges against her without merit considering
that her participation was confined to the preparation of the assailed writ of
execution, and in doing so, she was merely following the directive of the
court. Further, the error found in the
writ she originally prepared was insignificant and it was then formally
corrected. Atty. Fulgar was also found
not to have been moved by bad faith, malice or other ill motive. Lastly, the charge of not keeping a Book of
Entry of Judgments has been sufficiently belied when she submitted copies of
its pages in her Comment.
As to the
charges against Sheriffs Alano and Castillo, the OCA found that the
complainants failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty in favor of respondent Sheriffs. Like Atty. Fulgar, the OCA said that they
were only carrying out their ministerial roles and had no discretion in either
proceeding or delaying the accomplishment of their tasks. While they seemed too eager to effect
satisfaction of judgment, they were also found to have been moved by caution
against being exposed to accusations of delay.
The OCA, likewise, considered that they consulted their superior, the
Acting Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff,
before proceeding with the execution.
Moreover, the OCA found that the allegation of arrogance against
Sheriffs Castillo and Alano was unsubstantiated, taking into account the time
they took in negotiating with the officers of Planters Bank, which showed a
sense of patience and civility on their part.
In view of
these findings, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the charges against Atty.
Fulgar and Sheriffs Alano and Castillo.
The Court's Ruling
We partially
agree with the disquisitions and recommendations of the OCA.
Anent Judge
Rojas, we agree with the OCA that while the correctness of the August 30, 2006
Order resolving the Omnibus Motion of Planters Bank and the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6474 should be
threshed out using judicial remedies, Judge Rojas' unilateral conversion of the
latter motion into a regular motion for execution, taking into consideration
the unequal treatment in the application of the requirements of the Rules of
Court, warrants administrative sanction.
Rule 39,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court regarding execution of judgment or final order,
specifically provides:
Section
1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as
a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If
the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The
appellate court, may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ
of execution. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
On the
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal, the pertinent provision
is Rule 39, Section 2(a) which states:
Sec.
2. Discretionary execution. –
(a)
Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. – On motion
of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the
trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the
time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period
to appeal.
After
the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal
may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary
execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order
after due hearing.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
A plain reading of the afore-cited provisions of the Rules
of Court readily reveals that the execution of a judgment or final order that
has attained finality and another pending appeal require different motions from
the prevailing party. Put differently, a
judgment or final order that has become final and executory mandatorily
requires a specific motion to execute the same.
Thus, Judge Rojas erred when, finding the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal mooted by his pronouncement that the June 15, 2006 Decision had attained
finality, effectively "granted" it as a motion for execution which
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6474 should have filed separately, and only
after they received notice of the denial of the Omnibus Motion of Planters
Bank. Verily, the error committed by
Judge Rojas pertains to basic procedural rules that he, as a member of the
Bench, is expected to be conversant with.
Notwithstanding his claims of good faith, Judge Rojas'
unequal treatment of the two motions of the contending parties in Civil Case
No. 6474 is truly manifest. As aptly
pointed out by the OCA, it is one thing to strictly apply the procedural requirement
on the notice of hearing of a motion, and it is another to become overly
lenient with respect to the requirement of a proper motion for execution of a
decision that purportedly became final and executory.
When the
inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule,
a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.[19] If the law is so elementary, not to know it
or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law,
without even the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
the judge as it can be clearly inferred from the error committed.[20]
We also note
that this is not the first time Judge Rojas has been administratively charged
before this Court. In Re: Inhibition of Judge
Eddie
R.
Rojas, RTC Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato in Crim. Case No. 09-5668,[21]
he was fined P10,000.00 for his failure to inhibit himself from the said
criminal case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor. Recently, in the consolidated cases of Coronado
v. Rojas and Capisin, et al. v. Rojas,[22]
Judge Rojas was suspended without salaries for three (3) months for gross
ignorance of the law for disregarding the rule on indispensable parties and due
process. In both cases, Judge Rojas was
given a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense would
merit a more severe penalty.
In light of
the circumstances, we hold that Judge Rojas deserves an administrative penalty
of one (1) year suspension without salaries.
With respect to Clerk of Court Atty. Fulgar and Sheriffs
Alano and Castillo, we agree with the OCA that the charges against them should
be dismissed for lack of merit, considering that they were merely performing
their respective ministerial duties when they performed the acts complained of. As such, they did not have the discretion not
to proceed with the preparation of the writ of execution and the consequent
execution of the
WHEREFORE, Judge Eddie R. Rojas, Pairing Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[1] Vda.
de Danao v. Ginete, 443 Phil. 657,
663 (2003); Caguioa v. Lavina, 398 Phil. 845, 853-854 (2000).
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-12.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] G.R. No. 141524,
[8] SEC. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. – If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory.
[9] Rollo, p. 83
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (emphasis supplied)
[15] Rollo, p. 21.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Español v. Mupas, A.M. No.
03-1462-MTJ,
[20] Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar
of the
[21] 358 Phil. 790, 796 (1998).
[22] A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047 and A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2048,