SECOND DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR A.M. NO.
RTJ-06-2018
GENERAL, (Formerly Adm. Matter
Complainant, OCA-IPI
No. 05-2360-RTJ)
- versus - Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO, CARPIO,
Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial CARPIO
MORALES,
Court,
Branch 3,
Respondent. VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
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R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga,
J.:
On
30 September 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Solicitor
General Alfredo Benipayo, filed an administrative
complaint[1]
against Executive Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr. and
Judge Antonio I. De Castro (respondent), for (a) knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment; (b) grossly disregarding the law and prevailing jurisprudence; and
(c) dishonesty and abuse of authority.
The complaint stemmed from the Order
dated
Gao Yuan is a national of the People’s
Republic of
James Mahshi
filed on
On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio, Jr. of the RTC of Manila issued a 72-hour TRO[8]
enjoining the Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding and/or
directing the suspension of any such proceedings against Gao
Yuan. The case was then raffled to
Branch 3 of the Manila RTC presided by respondent.
Commissioner Fernandez, through the
OSG, filed a Return of the Writ[9] on
On
On P250,000.00. However, upon service of the order, the BI
refused to release Gao Yuan as there was no BI
clearance. Commissioner Fernandez filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[15]
of the said order on
During the hearing for clarificatory questioning on P100,000.00; (2) her movements
were to be monitored by the court; (3) the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against her should she try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao
Yuan and her husband of an undertaking that she will come to court at any given
time she is called. Respondent based the
provisional release on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC
and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child.
Commissioner Fernandez was compelled
to file a Notice of Appeal upon Gao Yuan’s release
from the BI’s custody.
On
On
Complainant OSG contends that Gao Yuan’s release on bail is illegal since such falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration and not in the
regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No. 613. Citing Commissioner
Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio,[20]
complainant contends that the RTC has no power to release the alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings.
Complainant also points out that the
grant of injunction embodied in the
Complainant insists that the Notice
of Appeal it filed is proper since respondent already ordered the release of Gao Yuan, which was the very action in the petition for habeas
corpus, notwithstanding respondent’s reasoning that the release was merely
provisional or temporary. Respondent
already decided the habeas corpus suit on the merits and his declaration
of the notice of appeal as premature is also illegal.
Lastly, complainant argues that
respondent is guilty of dishonesty for making it appear that Solicitor Danilo Leyva agreed to the extension of the TRO and did not oppose
the release of Gao Yuan when the contrary is
true.
Both Judge Eugenio,
Jr. and respondent were required to
comment.
Judge Eugenio,
Jr. submitted his Comment[21]
dated
The case against Judge Eugenio, Jr. was dismissed per Resolution[25]
dated 30 August 2006, as it was found that even though Judge Eugenio, Jr. erred in issuing the TRO, it was a mere
judgment error not meriting administrative
sanction. The same resolution also
resolved to re-docket the complaint against respondent as a regular
administrative matter and refer it to a Court of Appeals Justice for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was eventually raffled to Justice Arcangelita
Romilla-Lontok.
After a hearing on
As summarized in the Report and
Recommendation, respondent averred in his comments that: (a) the RTC had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for habeas corpus; (b) he acted in accordance with law
in issuing the Orders dated 9, 13 and 16 September 2005; and (c) the proper
remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of a court is to elevate the matter
by appeal or certiorari and not to file an administrative case against the
judge.
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent
argues that under Sec. 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, RTCs have original
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of habeas corpus which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions, and the material averments in
James Mahshi’s petition for habeas corpus sufficiently
raised the issue of legality of Gao Yuan’s
detention. The remedy of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, and the prayer for injunctive relief
enjoining the deportation of Gao Yuan is merely
incidental to the question of legality of her detention. Respondent also points out that the Summary
Deportation Order came after the filing of the habeas corpus petition,
so that the jurisdiction of the RTC was already vested upon service of summons
on respondent, and the BI cannot remove such jurisdiction by issuing a Summary
Deportation Order.
Justice Romilla-Lontok
agrees that the RTC, and in this particular case, Branch 3 with respondent
presiding, had clearly been vested with jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus, based on the allegations
in the petition that Gao Yuan had been detained even
without a judicial writ or order for her commitment.[26]
As to the issuance of the Orders
dated 9, 13 and 16 September 2005, respondent observes that these
were all in the nature
of TROs or injunctive
reliefs, so
issued after careful study and deliberation of the facts of the case and
the clear presence of the requisite elements for the grant of such reliefs. Respondent
believes that the factual milieu showed that Gao
Yuan’s right to due process of law was whimsically disregarded. He also insists that there is no rule
requiring that James Mahshi’s Supplement to the
application for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction be verified. He adds that there was sufficient showing of
grave injustice and irreparable injury to Gao Yuan if
her release was not immediately effected.
On this point, Justice Romilla-Lontok disagrees with respondent. She points out that the return of the writ
filed by the Commissioner of Immigration formally informed respondent about a
deportation case against Gao Yuan with the BI Board
of Commissioners, supported by attachments consisting of the Charge Sheet and
Summary Deportation Order. From the time
said return was filed, respondent’s actions should have been governed by
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant thereto, the orders releasing Gao Yuan upon posting of a cash bond and placing her under
the custody of the RTC are devoid of legal basis. According to Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge
Bonifacio,[27]
cited in the Report, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should
be dismissed where the BID has not yet completed its hearing and investigation
with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its
decision. When an alien is detained by
the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, RTCs
have no power to release said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings,
because there is no law authorizing it.
Respondent finally argues that the
proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of a court is to elevate the
matter by appeal or certiorari and not to file an administrative case against
the judge. He insists that his acts were
in accordance with law and jurisprudence and were justified by the circumstances
of the case. He views the case as harassment
and prays for its dismissal.
Justice Romilla-Lontok
concedes that respondent issued the assailed orders without any ill-will, but
rather was motivated by humanitarian considerations. Thus, she concludes that his error was not
due to any conscious and deliberate effort to commit an injustice. However, she emphasized the duty of members
of the judiciary to keep abreast of the laws, rulings and jurisprudence
affecting their jurisdiction. A judge
owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy and to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance of such laws and procedures. Finding that respondent fell short of the
conduct expected of a judge, she recommends the imposition of a two (2)-month
suspension with admonishment that similar conduct in the future will be dealt
with more severely.[28]
The Court agrees with Justice Romilla-Lontok’s finding that respondent’s conduct has
proven inadequate to satisfy the required standards, but deems it proper to
increase the period of suspension to three (3) months and one (1) day without
pay.
A petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.[29] What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest,
the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Sec. 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing
of the application.[30] Section 4, Rule 102 provides:
SEC. 4. When
writ not allowed or discharge authorized. —If it appears that the person to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the
Thus, once a person detained is duly
charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court.
The term “court” includes quasi-judicial bodies or governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement,[31]
like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[32]
In the case at bar, the petition for habeas
corpus was filed on
Respondent’s acts also disregarded
the rule on burden of proof after the writ has been returned as laid down in
Sec. 13 of Rule 102. If the detention is
by reason of or in pursuance of law, the return is considered prima facie evidence
of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner therein has the burden of
proof to show that the restraint is illegal.[33] The reason for this is the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.[34] The transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing on 16 September 2005 shows that the allegations in the return that Gao Yuan had a pending deportation case with the BI Board
of Commissioners, as shown by the Charge Sheet, and that a Summary Deportation
Order was already issued against her and that she used an expired Chinese passport
in her attempt to leave the Philippines, were not controverted
by James Mahshi.
It seems that respondent merely confirmed from Gao
Yuan the allegations in the petition for habeas corpus that she was not
a fugitive from justice but was merely wanted as a witness in a case and that
she was a nursing mother to a 17-month old baby.[35] Believing that Gao
Yuan’s detention was without due process of law, respondent ordered that the court
take custody of her and that she be not
returned to the BI Detention Center.[36]
The provisional or temporary release
of Gao Yuan also effectively granted the petition for
habeas corpus insofar as the discharge of the detainee is concerned,
since the main prayer in a petition for habeas corpus relates to the release or discharge
of the detainee. The general rule is
that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders
the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Such release must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints.[37] Gao Yuan’s release, while still subject to certain
conditions, did not unduly restrain her movements or deprive her of her
constitutional freedoms. The conditions
were deemed necessary by the court below to ensure her attendance in the
subsequent hearings on the case. Said
conditions did not at all restrict her freedom of movement as she was able to
elude the authorities who tried to arrest her for her failure to appear before
the trial court on
Respondent may also have been under
the impression that the case before him was one for extradition, particularly
because Gao Yuan’s arrest and detention were pursuant
to a request from the PROC to hold and deport her in connection with an
embezzlement case in
It may be argued that in Government
of
It should be noted too that Section
37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides that
“[a]ny alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding
may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration.” This
provision confers upon the Commissioner the power and discretion to grant bail
in deportation proceedings, but does not grant to aliens the right to be
released on bail. The exercise by the Commissioner of such power is
discretionary. So too, the determination of the propriety of allowing the
temporary release on bail of the alien, subject to deportation under the
Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such release falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not
administer immigration laws. The power
of the Commissioner to grant bail in deportation proceedings should be
exercised when the alien is still under investigation, and not after the order
of deportation has been issued by the BI.[41] When an alien is detained by the BI for deportation
pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the courts of
first instance, now RTCs, have no power to release
such alien on bail, even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is
no law authorizing it.[42]
Thus, we find respondent’s failure to
observe the law and procedure on petitions for habeas corpus inexcusable,
albeit done in good faith for humanitarian considerations and in the honest
belief that Gao Yuan’s detention was in violation of
due process. Accordingly, respondent is administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Ordinarily, to constitute gross
ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in
the performance of his official duties should be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, and most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.[43] In the present case, there is no finding of
bad faith or malice, but this does not excuse respondent. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[44] While judges should not be held accountable
for every erroneous judgment rendered in good faith, such good faith is no
defense where the basic issues are simple and the applicable legal principle
evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.[45]
A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of
well-settled authoritative doctrines.[46] Competence and diligence are prerequisites to
the due performance of judicial office.[47] When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity
with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts.[48] There will be great faith in the
administration of justice only if the party litigants believe that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.[49] For disregarding jurisprudential
pronouncements and basic legal principles, respondent should be held
liable.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of
the law is classified as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of
either dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Since it has not been established that the
infraction was motivated by malice or bad
faith, and in the absence of a
showing that respondent had earlier been found to have committed an
administrative offense, it is just and reasonable to impose upon him the
penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one (1) day.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge
Antonio I. De Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, City of
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
[27]Cited
as 398 Phil. 441 (2000). The Report and
Recommendation also cites Bernarte v. Court
of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323; Republic v. Cloribel,
9 SCRA 453; and Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677.
[29]Tung Chin Hui v.
Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, 2 April 2001, 356 SCRA 31, 38 citing Sombong v. CA, 252 SCRA 663, 31 January 1996
and Ordonez v. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114, 8 December
1994.
[31]See F.D. Regalado, 2 Remedial Law Compendium
159 (1995 ed.), citing Republic,
etc. v. Cloribel, et al., No. L-9700,
[32]Commissioner
Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, supra note 20 at
471 citing Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 [1995].
[38]See
Order dated
[40]
[41]Ong Hee Sang, etc., et
al. v. Commissioner of Immigration and Protugal, 114 Phil. 368, 373-374 (1962).
[43]Officers
and Members of the Integrated Bar of the