SECOND DIVISION
|
IN RE: SANDRA L.
MINO v. JUDGE DONATO SOTERO A. NAVARRO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH 6, |
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1645 [Formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1702-MTJ] Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR.,*
JJ.
Promulgated: August
28, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
By letter of March 7, 2005[1] addressed
to the Court Administrator which was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on March 14, 2005, Sandra Mino (complainant) charged
Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Cebu City, with gross inexcusable negligence
arising from his failure to issue a warrant of arrest, within the period
prescribed by the Rules of Court, in Criminal Case No. 124511-R, People of
the Philippines v. Allan Arcilla, for
Attempted Homicide.
It
appears that the above-said
criminal case was raffled to the sala of respondent on
After ninety seven (97) days from the raffling
of the case to his sala or on February 5, 2004, respondent issued an Order[2]
declaring that on the basis of the affidavits of the offended party and his
witness, “the accused may actually be charged only with Grave Threats, as there
is no probable cause to believe that the accused had acted with intent to kill,
not having persisted in his threat against the offended party.”
Respondent accordingly ordered the remand of the record of the case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor “so that the information may be amended to
reflect the proper crime.”[3]
To the
In the
same Ex-Parte Motion, the Prosecution argued that amending the Information was
no longer proper, the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor having already issued
a resolution “after a preliminary investigation” finding probable cause against
the accused for Attempted Homicide from which no appeal, either to the Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor or to the Department of Justice, was taken.[5]
The
Prosecution further argued that the Order is contrary to law and jurisprudence since
respondent practically conducted his own preliminary investigation of the case
which he has no authority to do as it is exclusively lodged with the Office of
the Prosecutor.[6]
Eighty seven (87) days from the filing
on
The prosecutors making the instant motion should be thoroughly familiar with the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure by now that requires judges to make a determination of probable cause before issuing warrants, in effect reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in the record of preliminary investigation filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor so that the Court may even dismiss the case outright without any motion from the accused. There is actually no basis for the Judge of this Court to recuse himself from this case.
The Court is deeply disturbed by the actuations of the three prosecutors who filed the motion for inhibition, … particularly as they would insist that the Court issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused when the Court has determined that this case falls only under the rule on summary procedure, so that the issuance of a warrant is completely unnecessary. Something is not right.
x x x x
The Court shall leave the resolution of the motion for reconsideration to whatever branch of this Court the case may be raffled to.
Remand the record of this case to the Clerk of Court so that it may be so raffled. (Underscoring supplied)
To
complainant, respondent has been trifling with the findings of the Office of
the City Prosecutor, to show a pattern of which she submitted a copy of
respondent’s October 12, 2004 Order[8] in
another criminal case, Criminal Case No. 122800-R, People of the Philippines
v. J. Walter Palacio, also for Attempted Homicide. In this criminal case, respondent downgraded
the crime to Grave Threats and ordered the remand of the case to the Office of
the City Prosecutor “for the amendment of the Information.” The said Order, complainant informs, was
issued forty five (45) days from the time the case was raffled to his sala.
In his Letter-Comment
dated
It was important for the respondent that the prosecution show clear probable cause for the crime charged because the effect of doing so would be for the respondent to issue a warrant of arrest. The liberty of the accused is at stake! As the record of preliminary investigation does not support such a finding, respondent had no choice but to dismiss the case, ask for additional evidence, or remand the record as he did so that the prosecution had the option of submitting additional evidence or amending the information. This was the best course of action among the options left to the respondent.[10] (Italics in the original)
In its Report
dated May 8, 2006,[11] the OCA
came up with
the following:
EVALUATION: Paragraph (a), Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which is applicable to first level courts when the preliminary investigation was conducted by the public prosecutor, provides, thus:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the compliant or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to [S]ection 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecution to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.[12]
From the foregoing, the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, and to forthwith issue a warrant of arrest or dismiss the case, as the evidence may warrant. In fact, a maximum period of thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information was set for the court to resolve the issue on the existence of probable cause, should the prosecution be required to submit additional evidence.
Criminal Case No.124511-R was raffled to
Branch 6, presided over by respondent judge, on
On the issue of downgrading the crime charged from attempted homicide to grave threats, respondent judge manifested ignorance of the rule mentioned above. When the preliminary investigation was conducted by the prosecutor, the judge has three options after the filing of the information and upon evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence. He/she may (a) dismiss the case, (b) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order, as the case may be, against the accused, or (c) require the prosecution to submit additional evidence to support the existence of probable cause. Nowhere in the rule was the judge authorized to determine the proper crime that the accused should be charged with. The options given to the judge are exclusive, and preclude him/her from interfering with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged.
x x x x
Respondent judge’s clarification that his
Order returning the records of the preliminary investigation to the Office of the
City Prosecutor so that the information
‘may be amended’ gave the prosecution an option to submit additional evidence
does not inspire belief. Nothing in the questioned Order suggests that the
prosecution may exercise that option. He could have expressly ordered the
prosecution to present additional evidence in support of its earlier findings,
pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, had he
so intended. In fact, this is not the first time that he ordered the
downgrading of the crime charged. In People of the
The OCA, noting that respondent’s actions in the two criminal cases “fell
short of the standards set by the New Code of Judicial Conduct, not to mention
that he [had been previously] sanctioned by this Court in two other cases,”[14]
recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months without salary and
benefits.
By Resolution of
Respondent, in his Manifestation of
2. The respondent is willing to have this case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already submitted provided the following are taken into consideration:
a. The only basis for the filing of the charges in Criminal Case No. 124511-R is the affidavit of the offended party, sadly now deceased Alvin Mino, that appears in the record of preliminary investigation;
b. Only the second and third paragraphs of the affidavit of the offended party in the record of [the] preliminary investigation is relevant to the crime charged, to wit;
2.
That on or about
3. That my wife Sandra . . . stopped and confronted Allan Arcilla by saying “Nganong man imo mang harason ang akong bana wala man ka hilabti. (Why do you harass my husband although he has not bothered you?) X x x x[16]
By imposing the above-quoted qualification to his willingness to submit
the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already submitted,
respondent betrays his gross failure to understand the main issue in the
present administrative complaint, which is whether he is aware of and complied
with Rule 112, Sec. 6(a).
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 112, a judge, upon the filing of an Information,
has the following options: (1) dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be
resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.
Contrary to respondent’s assertion, he did not have the option of
remanding the case to the prosecutor “so that the prosecution had the option of submitting additional evidence or
amending the information.”[17] (Italics in the original)
At all events, by acting on the Information only after the lapse of 97
days following its filing, and taking him 87 days or almost three months to
resolve the Prosecution’s Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Inhibition, respondent did not comply with the reglementary periods prescribed
by Section 6(a) of Rule 112.
Particularly with respect to his delay in resolving the Prosecution’s
motion, it reflects respondent’s lack of awareness that immediate resolution
thereof was essential to setting the case in motion in order not to frustrate
the parties’ right to a speedy disposition of their case and thus avoid inflaming
distrust and discontent in the judiciary as a whole.[18]
Respondent is reminded of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
which took effect on
Canon 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
x x x x
SEC.3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
x x x x
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. (Emphasis supplied)
He is
reminded too of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is applied in
suppletory character, requiring judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
In fine, since the law or procedure violated is so elementary for respondent
not to know it or act as if he does not know, he is guilty of gross ignorance.[19]
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of
the law or procedure a serious charge for which a penalty of (1) fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000, or (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding
six months, or (3) dismissal from service.[20]
Aside from committing gross ignorance of law or procedure, respondent committed
unjust delay in rendering a decision or order, classified as a less serious
charge under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which is punishable by suspension
from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
The penalty recommended by the OCA for respondent’s gross ignorance of
the law – suspension from the service for a period of six months without salary
and benefits – merits this Court’s approval.
Respondent being guilty also of unjust delay, this Court imposes on him a
fine of P10,000.
WHEREFORE,
Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 6, P10,000) Pesos.
He is WARNED that a commission of any further administrative
offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
(NO PART)
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
* No part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2]
[3] Ibid.
[4]
[5]
[6] Ibid.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Section 6 (b) of Rule 112 provides:
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
[13] Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[14] In the Resolution dated P20,000. In A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 04-1579-MTJ, Fernandez
v. Navarro, the Court in a Resolution dated
[15] Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[16]
[17]
[18] Vide Custodio v. Judge Quitain, 450 Phil. 70, 76 (2003).
[19] Vide
Ligaya Santos v. Judge Rolando G. How, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946,
[20] Section 11 (A), Rule 140.