PEOPLE OF
THE
Appellee,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
ARTURO BARLAAN y
ABION,
Appellant. Promulgated:
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On
That on or about the 10th
day of February 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stab with a bladed weapon one MARVIN SUETOS, thereby inflicting
upon the latter multiple stab wounds, and as a result thereof, the said Marvin
Suetos died.
That the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in that the attack against the victim with
a bladed weapon was sudden and the victim was unarmed and was not able to
defend himself.
The killing was likewise attended by
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength in that the accused
were three and armed with bladed weapons while the victim was alone.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Barlaan was arrested
while Esquillon and Domingo remain at large.[2]
During the arraignment,
Barlaan pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The facts as found by
the trial court are as follows:
It
appears that in the evening of February 10, 2001, Jose Dasalla and Marvin
Suetos were walking downtown Baguio when they came upon the group of accused
Arturo Barlaan, Alex Esquillon and George Domingo who invited them for a round
of drinks. At around P200.00. Initially, the group asked Marvin Suetos to
pay the bill but the latter refused and was offering only to contribute a
certain amount. After some exchanges,
the group pointed to Esquillon to pay the bill for which reason the latter got
mad and brought out his fan knife. At
this juncture, Dasalla and Suetos scampered out of the establishment for their
safety and proceeded towards the direction of the nearby Orchidarium. Forthwith, the three accused chased
them. When Dasalla and Suetos were running
infront of the gate of the Orchidarium, Suetos stumbled and fell on the
pavement face down. While Suetos was
lying down on the pavement face down, the three accused caught up with him. Esquillon stabbed him at the back several
times in rapid succession while Barlaan was preventing him from getting up and
escaping by holding his legs. Domingo
also lifted the body of Suetos and stabbed him in front. All these were witnessed by Dasalla from a
distance of 4 to 5 meters away. Dasalla
attempted to help Suetos but Esquillon attacked him with the fan knife. However, Dasalla swiftly moved backwards and
so only his cheek got caught by the blade of Esquillon’s weapon. Dasalla ran but was chased by the three
accused. While chasing him, Esquillon
again attempted to stab him but only his shirt got caught by the knife. Dasalla was chased up to
At
the
An
autopsy was conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan who made the following findings:
“FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound no. 1, located at the left
axillary, anterior, measuring 5 cm in width, with superior pole sharp and the
inferior pole blunt. It was directed
slightly upward, anteriorly to the midline, penetrating to the skin and part of
the left pectoralis major muscle. Depth
was 7 cm.
2. Stab wound no. 2 located at the right
inguinal area, diagonally with superior pole sharp and inferior pole blunt,
measuring 7.5 cm in width. It was
directed slightly downward to the midline, cutting through the skin lacerating
the femoral artery and femoral vein, then to the pelvic cavity. The depth was 10 cm. Massive hematoma and hemorrhage noted on the
pelvic cavity.
3. Group stab wounds at the back numbering
in three, with superior poles sharp and posterior poles blunt. Width measures 1.7 cm average, and depth
average was 5 cm. All stabwounds were
muscle deep.
4. Abrasions: Right knee, measuring 4 cm
by 4 cm dimension. Left knee measuring 2
cm. by 3 cm. dimension.
5. Linear superficial cuts, right lower
arm, anterior, 3 lines, parallel, diagonally with average length of 9 to 10 cm.
x x x
DEATH: HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE. MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS OF THE BODY.
x x x.”
A
certificate of Death was issued.
On
On
the civil aspect, Florian Suetos, wife of the deceased, spent P22,500.00
for the services of the Baguio Memorial Chapel, P20,000.00 for food
during the wake, P17,306.00 and P3,500.00 for the interment fees
and P4,500.00 for her husband’s hospitalization expenses or a total of P67,806.00. Her husband Marvin Suetos died at the age of
29 and, during his lifetime, was managing the business of his parents and was
earning an income of P10,000.00 a month.
For
his part, Arturo Barlaan denied the charges against him. He testified that when Alex Esquillon was
stabbing the deceased, he tried to prevent him by shouting “Alex, don’t! He is our companion” but, instead, Alex
Esquillon turned to him and attempted to stab him so he ran away. Esquillon chased him but did not catch up
with him. He proceeded directly home
after the incident. At the time
Esquillon was stabbing the deceased, he did not see George Domingo around. Few hours thereafter, George Domingo, who is
his neighbor, went to his house and informed him that Suetos died.[3]
The trial court found
the version of the prosecution more credible.
It held that Barlaan conspired with Esquillon and Domingo in killing
Suetos; that the testimony of Dasalla was corroborated by the autopsy report of
Dr. Tinoyan; that treachery attended the killing; and that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery.
The dispositive portion
of the decision of the
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused Arturo Barlaan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of R.A. 7659 and hereby sentences him to
Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marvin Suetos the
sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P67,806.00 as
actual damages, P2,040,000.00 as unearned income and P50,000.00
as moral damages for the pain and anguish suffered by his heirs by reason of
his death, all indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The
accused Arturo Barlaan being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited
4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
In
respect to his co-accused Alex Esquillon and George Domingo who remained at
large, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them so that upon their
arrest, they shall be entitled to a separate trial. And pending their arrest, the case as to them
is archived to be revived upon their arrest.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. In particular, the appellate court found that
the assailants conspired with each other as can be inferred from their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime. Their actions showed a common purpose and
design. Thus, when Dasalla and the
victim fled, they were chased by Esquillon, Domingo and Barlaan. When the malefactors caught up with the
victim, they ganged up on him. Thereafter,
Esquillon and Domingo took turns in stabbing him, while Barlaan held the
victim’s legs to prevent him from escaping.
The Court of Appeals,
however, found that treachery was not present because a heated argument and a
chase preceded the actual stabbing.
Thus, the victim and Dasalla were aware that the accused would harm them
when they fled from the restaurant. Moreover,
the appellate court noted that the stabbing was spontaneous and there was no
evidence showing that the assailants have planned and deliberately or
consciously adopted their mode of attack upon the victim.
On the other hand, it
appreciated the presence of abuse of superior strength because the aggressors
took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. The victim was lying prone on
the ground and his feet were being held by Barlaan when the two other
assailants, Esquillon and Domingo, simultaneously delivered the fatal stab
wounds.
The Court of Appeals
likewise sustained the awards of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and
moral damages and P2,040,000.00 as lost earnings, but reduced the amount
of actual damages awarded by the trial court to only P43,306.50 as the
same was the amount duly supported by official receipts.
The dispositive portion
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the decision dated P43,306.50 in actual
damages; P50,000.00 as indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
and, the sum of P2,040,000.00 representing lost earnings.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
Barlaan alleges that the
existence of conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the
trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of murder. He claims that the testimony of prosecution
witness Dasalla that he (Barlaan) was holding the legs of the victim who was in
a prone position should not have been given credence for being
preposterous. He argues that since
Esquillon was on top of the victim, then there is no necessity for him (Barlaan)
to hold the legs of the victim to prevent his escape. He alleges that Dasalla could have
misinterpreted the reason for his presence in the crime scene. At any rate, mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not establish conspiracy.
The appeal lacks merit.
The issue raised in this
appeal, i.e., whether or not the
accused participated in the commission of the crime by holding the legs of the
victim, is factual in nature. Settled is
the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are
accorded great weight and respect and are deemed final, moreso in this case where
the appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this
rule, such as when the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted
facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the
outcome of the case.[7] However, none is present in the instant case. At any rate, we reviewed the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals and found the same to be duly supported by
the records. Besides, as between
categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the
other, this Court has strongly ruled that the former must prevail. Indeed, positive identification of the
appellants when categorical and consistent and without any ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial.[8]
There is no merit in
Barlaan’s contention that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
construing his presence in the crime scene as proof that he acted in conspiracy
with Esquillon and Domingo. The defense
misread the findings of the lower courts vis-à-vis the issue of conspiracy.
Conspiracy exists among
perpetrators of a crime when there is unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of the crime. To establish
conspiracy, direct evidence of a previous plan or agreement to commit assault
is not required, as it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all
the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack. Indeed, conspiracy may be inferred when by their
acts, two or more persons proceed towards the accomplishment of the same
felonious objective, with each doing his act, so that their acts though
seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing a closeness of former
association and concurrence of sentiment.[9]
Records show that the
findings that Barlaan conspired with Esquillon and Domingo in killing the
victim was not based solely on the fact that he was seen at the crime
scene. On the contrary, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals considered Barlaan’s actions before, during and
after the commission of the crime in arriving at the conclusion that there was
conspiracy among the malefactors.
As correctly noted by the
trial court:
3. There
is evidence that Arturo Barlaan and his co-accused conspired and confederated
in killing the deceased making the act of one the act of all.
For collective responsibility among
the accused to be established, it is not required that there be a previous
agreement to commit the crime. It is
enough that at the time of the assault, all the accused acted in concert and
performed specific acts manifesting a common desire or purpose to attack and
kill the victim therefore making the act of one as the act of all.
Here,
when Suetos and Dasalla scampered out of the Ledsay Eatery after sensing
danger, Barlaan, Esquillon and Domingo immediately ran after them. And when the three caught up with Suetos
after he fell to the pavement face down, Esquillon and Domingo stabbed him while
Barlaan made sure he does not escape by holding his feet. The act of Barlaan in restraining their
victim while being stabbed by his confederates show that he was in unity with
them in their purpose to kill Suetos.
The intent to kill is manifest from the number, location and nature of
the stab wounds inflicted. There is no
showing at all that Barlaan attempted or endeavored to stop his confederates
from inflicting further harm on their victim.
Besides, when Dasalla attempted to aid Suetos, he was attacked by
Esquillon with a knife prompting him to ran away but Esquillon, Domingo and
Barlaan chased him. All these show unity
of purpose and design of the accused and that they were acting in concert.[10]
Similarly, the Court of
Appeals found that:
Concededly, there is no direct
evidence that any of the stab wounds sustained by the victim was inflicted by
accused-appellant. He is, however, still
criminally liable because he and his co-accused, Esquillon and Domingo,
conspired to kill the victim.
x x x x
In the present case, when the victim
and Dasalla fled to escape the rage of accused Esquillon, accused-appellant
along with accused Esquillon and Domingo, chased them. When the victim stumbled and fell on the
pavement, Esquillon and Domingo took turns in stabbing him while
accused-appellant held the victim’s feet to prevent him from getting up. When Dasalla came to the victim’s rescue,
Esquillon tried to stab him. Dasalla ran
and the trio, including accused-appellant, likewise chased him. Given these circumstances, it cannot be said
that accused-appellant did not conspire with his co-accused in the common
purpose to kill the victim.
Where
the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence
of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators are liable as principals. Thus, while accused-appellant was not the one
who actually stabbed and killed the victim, he is still criminally liable since
the existence of conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.[11]
We agree with the Court
of Appeals that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of
the crime without risk to himself from any defense which the victim might make. It must be clearly shown that the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen to accomplish the
crime without risk to the aggressor.[12] Thus, the Court ruled that:
The
impulsive stabbing followed a brief argument x x x. While the attack may have been sudden, the
circumstances show that the casual, brief, and tension-filled encounter did not
afford the accused-appellant an opportunity to plan and deliberately adopt the
method of assault as to accomplish the crime without risk to himself. He simply used whatever weapon he had on
hand. To our mind, therefore, treachery
cannot be appreciated.[13]
In the instant case, the
attack was spontaneous and there is no evidence showing that the malefactors
consciously adopted the method of the attack.
Also, an altercation preceded the stabbing. Thus, when Dasalla and the victim fled from
the restaurant, they were already aware that the accused would harm them.
The Court of Appeals
correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The accused positioned
themselves in such a way as to ensure that the victim cannot escape. Thus, Barlaan held the legs of the victim
while his body was being pinned down by Esquillon. Domingo, on the other hand, positioned himself
in front of the victim. With
synchronicity, the trio attacked the victim who was unarmed. Their concerted actions showed that they
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their combined superiority
in strength.[14]
The Court of Appeals also
correctly awarded the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with recent
jurisprudence. Civil indemnity is
mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.[15] Moral damages on the other hand are awarded
in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries,[16]
including death. The award of P43,306.50
as actual damages is proper considering it is the amount supported by official
receipts.
Under Art. 2206 of the
Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. To be entitled to such
an award, documentary evidence is necessary.
By way of exception, testimonial evidence would suffice: (1) if the victim
was self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws
and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work,
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) if the victim was employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[17]
In this case, the
victim’s widow testified that her husband manages the small business of his
parents of supplying P10,000.00.[18] Thus, the award of P2,040,000.00
representing lost earnings is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Arturo
Barlaan guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P43,306.50 as
actual damages and P2,040.000.00 as lost earnings, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2]
[3]
[4] Penned
by Judge Ruben C. Ayson.
[5] Records, pp. 108-109.
[6] CA rollo, p. 121. Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and
Sesinando E. Villon.
[7] People
v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027,
[8]
[9]
[10] Records, pp. 103-104.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 109-110.
[12] People
v. Bejo, G.R. No. 138454,
[13]
[14]
[15] Sabang v. People, G.R.
No. 168818,
[16] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2219.
[17] People
v. Tagana, supra note 7 at 647.
[18] CA rollo, p. 120.