THIRD
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- FELIX ORTOA Y OBIA, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 176266 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For
Review is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01745, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Appellant
was charged with rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.[4] The Information against him reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of
April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) his own daughter,
AAA, a minor (13 years old), against her will and consent, thus debasing and/or
demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being.[5]
Upon
arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[6] Trial on the merits ensued.
The
prosecution’s version of the incidents is anchored principally on the
testimonies of AAA; her mother, BBB; Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra), who
conducted the physical examination on the victim; and Police Officer Sonia
Gaviana (PO Gaviana), the officer-in-charge of the case.
AAA
testified that in the afternoon of
AAA
also stated that it was not the first time that appellant had sexually molested
her. She alleged that appellant started
raping her when she was about three years old by inserting his finger in her vagina. Thinking that appellant was merely playing a
game with her, AAA did not tell anyone about such incident. Eventually, however, her mother discovered
appellant’s reprehensible conduct when AAA got pregnant. When asked if she delivered a child, AAA claimed
that she had an abortion after appellant made her take medicines.
BBB
testified that she and appellant were in a common law relationship and together
they have seven children. She recalled
that on
The
following night, BBB, together with AAA and Daylo, went to the police station
where they were referred to PO Gaviana.
While she and AAA were being interviewed by said police officer, her
younger daughter, CCC, purportedly said, “Ako
rin po Ma, ginagawa din sa akin ni Papa iyong ginagawa niya kay Ate.”[8] This
statement made her feel even worse since it turned out that two of her daughters
had fallen prey to appellant’s bestial desires.
BBB also corroborated AAA’s testimony regarding the latter’s pregnancy
and the abortion induced by appellant.
Dr.
Freyra, a medico-legal officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory,
testified that on
After
the interview, Dr. Freyra said that she conducted the physical examination on
AAA which yielded the following findings:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are Hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is scanty growth of pubic
hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic,
fleshy – type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 5.7 and
PO Gaviana testified that on
Appellant vigorously denied the charge
hurled at him. According to appellant,
AAA was the eldest of his seven children with BBB. He claimed that on
The trial court refused to believe
appellant’s account of the case and rendered a decision finding him guilty as
charged, thus:
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused FELIX ORTOA y OBIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 in relation to RA 7610, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided by law. The accused is hereby ordered to pay AAA the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the Mittimus and to transmit the complete records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
The City Warden of Mandaluyong,
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology is hereby ordered to deliver forthwith
the person of FELIX ORTOA y OBIA to the National Bilibid Prisons,
The case was automatically elevated to
this Court in view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident lack of merit and the assailed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION imposing the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA upon the Appellant without possibility of parole.[14]
Appellant is once again before Us
praying for his acquittal upon the ground that the trial court gravely erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.[15]
Appellant insists that the trial court
should not have given “full faith and credence”[16]
to AAA’s testimony. He points out that
the trial court should have taken into account AAA and BBB’s motive in filing
the case against him as it is possible that they were only moved by resentment
towards him. Particularly in the case of
AAA, she admitted during her testimony that she felt bitter about her father’s
strictness towards her while BBB could have been provoked by his illicit
relationships and his irresponsibility.[17]
In addition, appellant harps on the
inordinate delay in reporting his alleged wrongdoing when he was supposed to
have even impregnated AAA in the past.
He argues that it is highly inconceivable for a mother such as BBB to
stand idly by while her own child suffered enormous distress. In such a situation, appellant argues, BBB’s
immediate reaction should have been to report the incident to the authorities
particularly in the absence of an allegation that he threatened them with harm.
After thoroughly reviewing the records
of this case and thoughtfully weighing the parties’ respective claims, we hold
that a denial of this appeal is in order.
In resolving rape cases, this Court
has been traditionally guided by three principles: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the
complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[18]
In the
crime of rape, the conviction
of an accused invariably depends upon the credibility of the victim as she is
oftentimes the sole witness to the dastardly act. Thus, the rule is that when a woman claims
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has been committed and that if her testimony meets the crucible test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[19] Ultimately and oftentimes, the resolution of
the case hinges on the credibility of the victim’s testimony – a question that
this Court usually leaves for the trial court to determine, for it is doctrinal
that factual findings of trial courts, particularly the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are given much weight and accorded the highest
respect on appeal.[20] This is only proper considering that the
trial court has the unique and singular opportunity to personally observe a
witness’ demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.[21] It is already well-settled that an appellate
court would generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court in
the absence of a clear showing that the court had failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the
outcome of the case.[22]
In the case before us, AAA recalled her
cruel experience in the following manner:
Fiscal
Tacla: Now, what happened? Is there
anything that happened on
Witness: “Pinatungan niya po ako,” he raped me.
Fiscal Tacla: What did your father do first on that day?
Witness: He closed the windows and the door.
Fiscal Tacla: What happened next?
Witness: He asked me [to] undress, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Your upper dress or what?
Witness: He told me to remove my panty and my shorts.
Fiscal Tacla: What did you do when your father told you to remove your shorts and panty?
Witness: I did not agree.
Fiscal Tacla: So anything happened?
Witness: There was, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: What was it?
Witness: He told me to spread my legs, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did you spread your legs?
Witness: No, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: So, in other words, you were made to remove your shorts and panty?
Witness: My father removed my shorts and my panty and he told me to spread my legs.
Fiscal Tacla: Where were you at that time when your father told you to spread your legs?
Witness: I was lying on the makeshift, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did you comply when you were told by your father to spread your legs?
Witness: No, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: So nothing happen[ed] when you did not spread your legs?
Witness: He was the one who spread my legs, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: When these things were happening to you, what did you do if any?
Witness: I did not like it, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did you tell that to your father?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: How did your father react when you said “ayaw mo”?
Witness: He said[,] “sandali lang ito.”
Fiscal Tacla: While your legs were forcibly spread by your father, what did you do[,] if any?
Witness: He went on top of me, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: When he was on top of you, were his pants on?
Witness: Yes, but the pants’ zipper was open.
Fiscal Tacla: What happened next when he opened the zipper?
Witness: He inserted his penis in my vagina.
Fiscal Tacla: How sure are you that he inserted his penis to your vagina?
Witness: I saw it and I felt it, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: How did you feel?
Witness: “Masakit”, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did you tell that to your father while he was performing that act?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: How did your father react, if any?
Witness: He told me that, “sandali na lang
matatapos na.”
Fiscal Tacla: What happened when your father’s penis was inserted in your vagina?
Witness: “Yumuyogyog po siya”. (push and pull movement).
Fiscal Tacla: When your father was doing this push and pull movement, how did you feel?
Witness: It’s painful, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: In particular, where was the pain?
Witness: Inside my vagina, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: What could be the reason why you felt pain?
Witness: Because my vagina was moved.
Fiscal Tacla: Is it normal for you to feel pain?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Even without your father’s penis inserted in your vagina, you still feel pain?
Witness: Sometimes.
Fiscal Tacla: What is that pain all about?
Witness: It’s painful when I am urinating, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Was that before or after the incident?
Witness: After sexual intercourse, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: How long did it take for your father to insert his penis in [your] vagina?
Witness: I do not know exactly how long (sic)?
Fiscal Tacla: Did it take the whole afternoon for your father to insert his penis?
Witness: No, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did your father finally take off his penis from your vagina?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: When was that?
Witness: After he raped me.
Fiscal Tacla: After that, what happened next?
Witness: He ordered me to put on my panty and my shorts and then he stood up and opened the door and the windows.[23]
AAA’s vivid recollection of her ordeal
that afternoon reveals her utter lack of reluctance in charging appellant with
the grave crime of rape. Her simple, straightforward,
and definitive answers to the questions propounded to her underscores the
truthfulness of her narration and the substance of her accusation. Moreover, as AAA was only thirteen years old
when the crime was perpetrated, jurisprudence
enjoins us to accord more weight to her testimony, thus:
Moreover, settled is the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight and credit. xxx. We have ruled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. The embarrassment and stigma of allowing an examination of her private parts and testifying in open court on the painfully intimate details of her ravishment effectively rule out the possibility of false accusations of rape.[24]
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of
reference to violence or intimidation employed upon AAA, we are convinced that
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it finds him guilty
as charged, should be affirmed. When a
father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation.[25] The absence of violence or offer of
resistance would not be significant because there exists the overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the father over the daughter which takes the
place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by
an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.[26]
To parry
AAA’s testimony as well as its damning implication against him, appellant
offered the defense of denial and alibi.
In this regard, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that –
(Appellant) having proferred the
defense of denial and alibi, suffice it to say that denial and alibi are the
weakest defense and are practically worthless against the positive
identification made by the prosecution witness, especially by the rape
victim. Between the positive and categorical
testimony of a rape victim on one hand and the accused’s bare denial on the
other hand, the former generally prevails.
Universally accepted is the rule that denial is a self-serving negative
evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible
witness who testified on affirmative matters.[27]
In addition, AAA’s testimony was
corroborated by Dr. Freyna whose medico-legal examination confirmed that AAA
was already in a non-virgin state physically.
When the victim’s testimony of her violation is supported by a physician’s
findings of penetration, sufficient foundation exists to conclude the existence
of carnal knowledge.[28]
We, likewise, find as preposterous
appellant’s claim that AAA’s resentment towards him motivated her to file this
case. Indeed, it is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim
that the case is a mere fabrication and that the victim was moved by familial
discord and influence, hostility, or revenge.
There is nothing novel about such defense and this Court has had the
occasion to address it in the past. In People v. Melivo,[29]
we declared that “(e)ven when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount
of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put
her own father for the most of his remaining life to jail and drag herself and
the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.”
Verily, no child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her
family to the humiliation and strain that a public trial surely entails unless
she is so moved by her desire to see to it that the person who forcibly robbed
her of her cherished innocence is penalized for his dastardly act. The imputation of ill motives to the victim
of an incestuous rape becomes even more unconvincing as the victim and the accused
are not strangers to each other. By
electing to proceed with the filing of the complaint, the victim risks not only
losing a parent, one whom, before his moral descent, she previously adored and
looked up to, but also the likelihood of losing the affection of her relatives
who may not believe her claim. Indeed,
it is not uncommon for families to be torn apart by an accusation of incestuous
rape. Given the serious nature of the crime
and its adverse consequences not only to her, it is highly improbable for a
daughter to manufacture a rape charge for the sole purpose of getting even with
her father. Thus, the alleged ill motives
have never swayed the Court against giving credence to the testimonies of
victims who remained firm and steadfast in their account of how they were
ravished by their sex offenders.[30]
Besides, it is not correct, as
appellant would have us believe, that AAA was impelled to initiate this case by
his strictness towards her. It is true
that AAA testified that she abhorred appellant’s sternness but that was not the
end of her statement before the court.
What she really detested was the fact that hiding behind appellant’s
pretentious concern for her well-being was a perverse sexual desire that
respected no one, not even his own child.[31]
We likewise reject appellant’s
contention that BBB initiated the filing of the charge against him because of
his relationship with another woman. No matter how enraged a mother could be,
it would take nothing less than psychological depravity for her to concoct a
story too damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter.[32] Courts are seldom if at all convinced that a
mother would stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to the physical, mental
and emotional hardship concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her
own hurt feelings.[33] It must also be emphasized that in this case,
when BBB first found out about appellant’s sexual transgression, she did not go
to the police right away; instead, she respected AAA’s desire to keep her
misfortune a private matter. Indeed,
nothing could be more wrenching for a mother than to watch her own daughter
suffer such irreparable injury. Yet BBB
chose to abide by her child’s entreaty. It was only when they were confronted
with the hopelessness of the situation that they finally summoned the courage
to have appellant account for his misdeeds.
Anent the claim
that the truthfulness of the accusation is affected by AAA’s failure to report the
purported previous incidents of rape, we likewise rule against appellant. There is no uniform behavior that can be
expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested.[34] Some may have found the courage early on to
reveal the abuse they experienced; there are those who have opted to initially
keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and tried to move on with their
lives. Again, to quote our holding in People v. Melivo –
A rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.[35]
In this case, the delay was
sufficiently explained by AAA. According
to her, when she was still a young child and already subjected to the revolting
behavior of appellant, the latter threatened her with physical harm should she
divulge his misdeeds to anyone else. When she became pregnant, appellant
resorted to emotional blackmail by telling her that he would be imprisoned
should she tell anyone about what he had been doing to her. And when BBB wanted appellant to move out of
their house because of his appalling conduct, appellant had the audacity to
confront BBB with the fact that he was the sole breadwinner of their
family. It is therefore clear that
appellant used every scheme he could think of to dissuade AAA and BBB from
going to the proper authorities. But
more than appellant’s actuations, AAA was discouraged by the public ridicule
that she expected to come her way. In
her words:
Nalaman na noon ng aking Mama ang ginagawa ng aking Papa sa akin at
tinanong ako kung anong gusto kong mangyari, ang sabi ko ayoko pa dahil hindi
ko pa kaya na humarap sa ibang tao. [36]
Having sustained the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, we shall now turn to the penalty to be imposed
upon appellant. Under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated
thereunder. One of these is “(w)hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.” The Information in this case alleges both the
minority of AAA and her relationship with appellant and these were duly
established during the trial. Hence, the
imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was proper.
With the effectivity, however, of
Republic Act No. 9346 entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the
In addition, appellant is not eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, which states:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses with reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As regards the award of damages, the
appellate court affirmed the court a quo’s
award of the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We
sustain the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity despite the
reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant from death to reclusion perpetua. As we explained in People v. Victor,[37] the said award does not depend upon the
imposition of the death penalty; rather, it is awarded based on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense.
On
the other hand, we deem it proper to modify the amounts awarded for moral
damages and exemplary damages to bring them at par with prevailing
jurisprudence. Thus, we increase the
amount awarded as moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,[38] while
the amount awarded as exemplary damages should be reduced from P30,000.00
to P25,000.00.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01745 dated 27 September
2006, finding appellant Felix Ortoa Obia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay
AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Fernanda Lampas
Peralta, concurring; CA rollo, pp.
121-136.
[2] Per then Presiding Judge Japar B.
Dimaampao (now a member of the Court of Appeals); id. at 63-79.
[3] Under Republic Act No. 9262, also
known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” and
its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, as well as those of her
immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials are used to
identify her in order to protect her privacy; People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA
419, 421-422.
[4] An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties For its Violation, and for other Purposes.
[5] Records, p. 1.
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] The request also included a physical examination on CCC; records, p. 385
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[14] CA rollo, p. 19.
[15] Rollo, p. 55.
[16]
[17]
[18] People
v. Marahay, 444 Phil. 143, 146 (2003).
[19] People
v. Tismo, G.R. No. 44773,
[20] People
v. Villanueva, 324 Phil. 443, 450 (1996).
[21] People
v. Almendral, G.R. No. 126025,
[22] People
v. Canoy, 459 Phil. 933, 942 (2003).
[23] TSN,
[24] People
v. Rosario, 455 Phil. 876, 886-887 (2003).
[25] People
v. Agbayani, 348 Phil. 341, 366 (1998).
[26] People
v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441,
[27] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[28] People
v. Terrible, 440 Phil. 602, 614 (2002).
[29] 323 Phil. 412, 427-428 (1996).
[30] People v. Agbayani, supra note 25 at 364-365.
[31] TSN,
[32] People
v. Padilla, G.R. No. 142899,
[33] People v. Agbayani, supra note 25 at 366-367.
[34] People v. Mendoza, 432 Phil. 666, 682 (2002).
[35] Supra note 29 at 422.
[36] Records, p. 387.
[37] 354 Phil. 195, 209 (1998), cited in People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, 31
August 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
[38] People
v. Pandapatan, G.R. No. 173050,
[39]