FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE
OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ARMANDO
RODAS[1]
and JOSE RODAS, SR.,[2]
Accused-Appellants. |
|
G.R. No. 175881 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00289 which affirmed in toto the decision[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch XI,
convicting accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. of the crime of
Murder.
For the death of one Titing Asenda, accused-appellant
Jose Rodas, Sr., together with his sons Charlito, Armando, and Jose Jr., all
surnamed Rodas, were charged with murder in an information which reads:
That, in the evening, on or about the 9th day of August, 1996, in the municipality of Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, firearm, chako and bolo, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, beat, stab and hack one TITING ASENDA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple wounds on the vital parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of the herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:
a) Indemnity for victim’s death . . .
P50,000.00
b) Loss of earning capacity . . . .
. . . P30,000.00
P80,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength.[5]
When
arraigned on
By
agreement of the parties, pre-trial conference was terminated on
The
prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Alberto Asonda, Danilo Asenda,
Ernie Anggot, Blessie Antiquina and PO1 Pablo Yosores.
Before
the prosecution could rest its case, accused Charlito Rodas[8]
and Jose Rodas, Jr. [9]
withdrew their previous pleas of “NOT GUILTY” and entered their respective
pleas of “GUILTY” for the lesser crime of Homicide. Both were sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and were each
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,500.00
as damages.[10]
The
prosecution formally offered Exhibits “A” to “H,” inclusive, with sub-markings.[11]
From
the evidence adduced, the prosecution’s version of the killing is as follows:
On
9 August 1996, Titing Asenda,
a resident of Boyos, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, was at Milaub,
Denoyan, Zamboanga del
Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda, in the harvesting of the latter’s corn.
On
the same day, at around
After
the assailants left, Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot approached Titing Asenda who was already dead. They informed Danilo
Asenda that his brother was killed. The police arrived the following day after
being informed of the incident.
On
the part of the defense, accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr.,
and Vilma Rodas, the former’s wife, took the witness stand. The defense rested its case without marking
and offering any documentary evidence.
Defense evidence showed that only Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr. killed Titing Asenda. Appellant
Jose Rodas, Sr. denied any participation in the
killing of Titing Asenda claiming
he was not present in the benefit dance and that he was in his home with his
wife and infant granddaughter when the killing happened. He revealed that on the night of the killing,
his son, Charlito Rodas,
who was carrying a hunting knife, arrived and told him he killed somebody. He then brought his son to the municipal
building of Siayan to surrender him to the police
authorities.
Appellant Armando Rodas
likewise denied he was one of those who killed Titing
Asenda. He
claimed that at the time of the killing, he was in his house sleeping with his
children. He denied using a chako
and firing a gun. He insisted it was his
brothers, Charlito and Jose Jr., who killed Titing Asenda because they
pleaded guilty.
To bolster the testimony of the
appellants, Vilma Rodas
testified that she was at the benefit dance when the killing happened. Armando and Jose Sr., she claimed, did not
participate in the killing. She said Charlito stabbed Titing while
Jose Jr. merely punched the victim.
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused Jose Rodas, Sr. and Armando Rodas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, as amended under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 and hereby sentenced them to RECLUSION
PERPETUA each and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Titing Asenda, P12,500.00
each or a total of P25,000.00.
COST de oficio.[13]
In finding accused-appellants guilty,
the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alberto Asonda
and Ernie Anggot. It found
accused-appellants and the other two accused conspired in the killing of the
victim and that treachery attended the same.
It gave no weight to accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial
arguing that they were positively identified as the perpetrators and that they
failed to adduce evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be
present at the crime scene when the killing happened. It added that their unsubstantiated denial
will not be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
With a Notice of Appeal[14]
filed by accused-appellants, the trial court forwarded the entire records of
the case to this Court.[15] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[16] the
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.
In its decision dated
With the Court of Appeals’ affirmance
of their convictions, accused-appellants are now before this Court via a notice of appeal. With the appeal being timely filed, the
records of the case were elevated to this Court.
In our Resolution[18]
dated
Accused-Appellants assign as errors
the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ALSO PRESENT AT THE DANCE AND PARTICIPATED IN ATTACKING THE VICTIM.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THEY ARE ONLY LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
On
the first assigned error, appellants contend that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot should not be believed because they did not see the
start of the assault on Titing, and all they saw was him
injured and lying down on the floor.
They insist that Asonda and Anggot could not have seen the killing because only a Petromax lighted
the place.
After a
careful and meticulous review of the records of the case, we find no reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm
appellants’ conviction.
We find the evidence of the
prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by appellants. When it comes to credibility, the trial
court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding,
if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court
is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly
testimonial evidence.[21]
It is to be noted that the Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. In
this regard, it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court.[22] We find no compelling
reason to deviate from their findings.
The Court finds that Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot witnessed
the killing of Titing Asenda
by Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr. and Jose Rodas, Sr. When Titing was killed, Asonda and Anggot were near him.
Contrary to the claim of the defense that the place where the killing
occurred was not lighted enough for the assailants to be identified, the place was
sufficiently lighted by a Petromax as
testified to by Vilma Rodas.[23]
Appellants make a big issue about the
absence of a medical examination. Should
they be exonerated because of this? The
answer is no.
A medical examination or a medical
certificate is not indispensable in the case at bar. Its absence will not prove that appellants
did not commit the cime charged. They can still be convicted by mere
testimonial evidence, if the same is convincing. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the
two eyewitnesses, which the Court found to be credible, are sufficient to prove
the crime and its perpetrators.
Appellants’ defense of denial and
alibi must likewise fail. Mere denial,
if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a
victim.[24] Denial is intrinsically weak, being a
negative and self-serving assertion.[25]
Denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any
ill motive to testify against appellants.
Absence of improper motive makes the testimony worthy of full faith and
credence.[26] In this case, appellants, who were positively
identified, testified that Asonda and Anggot had no ill motive to testify against them.[27] Moreover, ill motive has no bearing when
accused were positively identified by credible eyewitnesses. Motive gains importance only when the
identity of the culprit is doubtful.[28]
Appellants also interposed the
defense of alibi. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses for
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is
generally rejected.[29] For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is
imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus criminis
at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.[30] Appellants failed to do so.
In the case at bar, both appellants
claimed that on the night Titing Asenda
was killed, they were one kilometer away.
Thus, it was not possible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime when the crime was committed. The
defense witnesses, however, gave conflicting testimonies. Appellant Armando said his residence was more
or less one kilometer away from the crime scene[31]
but Jose Sr. said it was only 50 meters away.[32] Jose Sr.[33]
said the house of Charlito was only 50 meters away
from the crime scene but Armando said it was one kilometer away.[34] Armando said his wife was in
The information alleged that appellants, together with Charlito and Jose Jr., conspired in killing Titing Asenda. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. It
is hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing
evidence, the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.[41] Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the
malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy.
It is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is primordial is that all
the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination
as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the victim’s death.[42] Once conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of
their degree of participation. In the
contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes the act of all, and it matters
not who among the accused inflicted the fatal blow on the victim.[43]
In this case, conspiracy was convincingly proven beyond
reasonable doubt. All the accused had
the same purpose and acted in unison when they assaulted the victim. Surrounding the victim, Charlito
stabbed Titing Asenda at
the back with a hunting knife. Armando
next clubbed the victim with a chako,
hitting him on the left side of the nape, causing him to fall to the
ground. Jose Sr. then handed a bolo to
Jose Jr. who used it in hacking the victim.
On the second assigned error, appellants argue that assuming
arguendo they are guilty, they are liable only
for the crime of homicide, not murder. They
contend that treachery was absent since they, together with Charlito
and Jose Jr., met the victim casually in the dance hall.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
killing. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim.[44] In People
v. Villonez,[45]
we ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.
In the case under review, the victim was completely unaware
that he was going to be attacked.[46] He was not forewarned of any danger to
himself as there was no altercation or disagreement between the accused and the
victim. If treachery may be appreciated even
when the victim was forewarned, more so should it be appreciated when the
victim was not, as in the case at bar. The
suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused and their use of weapons
against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense or
retaliation by the victim. The fact that
the victim was already sprawled on the ground and still Jose Jr. hacked him
with a bolo clearly constitutes treachery.
The information also alleged that evident premeditation,
nocturnity and abuse of superior strength attended the killing.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following
elements must be established: (1) the
time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly
indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[47] Like any other circumstance that qualifies a
killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and
positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[48] The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[49] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
show the presence of any of these elements.
The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be
considered against appellants. This
circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission
of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for
the purpose of impunity. The essence of
this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological
onset of, nighttime. Although the
offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the
offender’s immunity from identification or capture.[50] In the instant case, the prosecution failed
to show that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of
impunity. The crime scene was
sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to the identification of all the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the killing. There was glaring
disparity of strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed while the accused were
armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. It is evident that the accused took advantage
of their combined strength to consummate the offense. This
aggravating circumstance, though, cannot be separately appreciated because it
is absorbed in treachery. In People v. Parreno,[51]
we decreed:
As regards the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be considered is not that
there were three, four, or more assailants as against one victim, but whether
the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate
the offense. While
it is true that superiority in number does not per se mean superiority
in strength, the appellants in this case did not only
enjoy superiority in number, but were armed with a weapon, while the victim had
no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there was obvious physical
disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength on the part
of the appellants. Abuse of superior strength attended the
killing when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength in order
to consummate the offense. However, the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being necessarily absorbed in
treachery.
As a final attempt to lower their conviction to Homicide,
appellants, citing People v. Alba,[52]
argue that although treachery was alleged in the Information and proven according
to the trial court, the same was not specified as a qualifying circumstance. Such argument fails.
In People v. Aquino,[53]
we have held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as “qualifying” or “qualified by” to properly qualify an offense. We explained:
Section 8 of Rule 110
requires that the Information shall “state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.” Section 8 merely requires the Information to
specify the circumstances. Section 8
does not require the use of the words “qualifying” or “qualified by” to refer
to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words “qualifying”
or “qualified by” that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element
raising the crime to a higher category.
In the instant case, the
attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically alleged
in the Information precisely to qualify the offense of simple rape to qualified
rape. The absence of the words “qualifying”
or “qualified by” cannot prevent the rape from qualifying as a heinous crime
provided these two circumstances are specifically alleged in the Information
and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We therefore reiterate
that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege,
specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to
qualify the offense. These circumstances
need not be preceded by the words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” or
“qualified by” to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be
specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him
to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises
during the trial. When the prosecution
specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law
as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt,
the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper
cases.
x x
x x
To guide the bench and
the bar, this Resolution clarifies and resolves the issue of how to allege or
specify qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the Information. The words “aggravating/qualifying,”
“qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by” need not be
expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are
specified in the Information.[54]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,[55] murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in
the commission of the felony, appellants should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code.
We now go to the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages.[56]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.[57] We affirm the award of civil indemnity given
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Under prevailing jurisprudence,[58]
the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is
in order. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals awarded P25,000.00 as civil indemnity because the two
accused who pleaded guilty to the lower offense of homicide were ordered to pay
P25,000.00 or half of the P50,000.00 civil indemnity. Considering that half of the P50,000.00
was already paid, appellants should therefore pay only the difference.
As to
actual damages, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto because said
damages were not duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.[59] However, the award of P25,000.00 in
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[60] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[61]
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of
murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death
of the victim.[62] The award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is in order.
The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established.[63]
WHEREFORE, all the
foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00289 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas,
Sr. are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The appellants are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Titing Asenda the
amount of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Middle name is
[2] Middle name is Marinduque.
[3] Rollo, pp. 141-152; penned by Associate Justice Sixto Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., concurring.
[4] Records, pp. 85-104.
[5] Records, p. 13.
[6]
[7]
[8] Entered plea of guilty to the
lesser crime of Homicide on
[9] Entered plea of guilty to the
lesser crime of Homicide on
[10] Records, pp. 39-40 and 55-56.
[11]
[12] Sometimes spelled as “Requilme.”
[13] Records, pp. 103-104.
[14]
[15]
[16] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[17] Rollo, p. 151.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] People
v. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67,
[22] People
v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017,
[23] TSN,
[24] People v. Esperas, 461 Phil. 700, 713 (2003).
[25] People
v. Agsaoay, Jr., G.R. Nos. 132125-26,
[26] People
v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534,
[27] TSN,
[28] People v. Orpilla, 425 Phil. 419, 428 (2002); People v. Sicad, 439 Phil. 610, 626 (2002).
[29] People v. Sanchez, 426 Phil. 19, 31 (2002).
[30] People v. Flora, 389 Phil. 601, 611 (2000).
[31] TSN,
[32] TSN,
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35]
[36] TSN,
[37] TSN,
[38] TSN,
[39]
[40] TSN,
[41] People
v.
[42] People v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606 & 138607, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 218, 234.
[43] People
v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027,
[44] People
v. Botona, G.R. No. 161291,
[45] 359 Phil. 95, 112 (1998).
[46] TSN,
[47] People v. Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 836-837 (2001).
[48] People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
[49] People
v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856, 879 (2003).
[50] People
v. Cariño, G.R. No. 131117,
[51] G.R. No. 144343,
[52] 425 Phil. 666, 677-678 (2002).
[53] 435 Phil. 417 (2002).
[54]
[55] An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, other Special Laws, and for other Purposes. Took effect on
[56] People
v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051,
[57] People
v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[58] People
v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309,
[59] People v. Tubongbanua, supra note 57.
[60] People
v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368,
[61] People
v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478,
[62] People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700 (2003).
[63] People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 56.