THE PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus
- SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA, TINGA,
Appellant. CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
For
automatic review is the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006, affirming with modification the
decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28,[3] dated
27 December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of qualified rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
In
three (3) separate Informations[4] for
Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother [BBB][6] in a sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan (Laguna), the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby accuses ALVIN ABULON Y SALVANIA, of the crime of “RAPE,” committed as follows:
“That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, with grave abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the [sic] time was thirteen (13) years of age, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.”
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
After
appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution
witness, testifying to the following facts:
AAA
is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14,
15, and
AAA
was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her.
Appellant had removed her underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAA’s
waist and threatened to kill her and her siblings if she reported the incident
to anyone. She begged him to stop but he proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina,
and breast, and to have carnal knowledge of her.[8] Although
they witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAA’s siblings could do nothing but cry as appellant
likewise poked the knife on them.[9] The
following morning, AAA found a whitish substance and blood stains on her panty.[10]
On
Again,
AAA’s siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAA’s
sister, however, took a pen and wrote her a note which read: “Ate, let us
tell what father was doing to the police officer.” After appellant had
raped AAA, the latter’s sister asked their father why he had done such to AAA.
In response, appellant spanked AAA’s sister and threatened to kill all of them
should they report the incidents to the police.[13] The
sisters nonetheless related to their relatives AAA’s misfortune, but the
relatives did not take heed as they regarded appellant to be a kind man.[14]
The
third rape episode happened at around
To
corroborate AAA’s testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAA’s 6-year old
brother CCC.[17] BBB testified
that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Piñas on the dates that her
daughter was raped by appellant. On
CCC
testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked
on top of AAA, who was likewise naked.[19]
The
prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr.
Gloria Cabael (Dr. Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of
Appellant
testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his
defenses. According to appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay,
to deliver hogs and that at
Finding that the prosecution had
proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of qualified
rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment
against appellant and sentenced him accordingly, thus:
W H
E R E F O R E :
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums:
P
75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7423, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums:
P
75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7424, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.[25]
With
the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v.
Mateo,[26] the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are hereby AFFIRMED.
The civil aspect of the
case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423, the award
of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00 is reduced to [P]25,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount
of [P]30,000.00 as moral damages. We affirm in all other respects.
Pursuant to A.M.
00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated
and certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In
his Brief,[28] appellant
assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for giving
weight and credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of
AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother. He likewise impugns the
trial court’s alleged bias in propounding inappropriate leading questions to
private complainant AAA. Finally, he maintains that the Informations against
him are defective as they failed to allege the key element of force and/or
intimidation.[29]
We
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The duty to ascertain the competence and
credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court,[30]
because it has the unique position of observing the witness’s deportment on the
stand while testifying. Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of
the evaluations and conclusions of the trial court, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the former’s findings.[31]
In rape cases particularly, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this
crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify
for herself.[32] Her
testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost caution.[33]
When a rape victim’s testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency
despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot
be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain
a conviction.[34]
The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible,
made in a candid, spontaneous, and straightforward manner and never shaken even
under rigid cross-examination.[35] We
agree that AAA’s narration of her harrowing experience is worthy of credence,
thus:
Criminal Case
No. SC-7422
Trial Prosecutor:
Q
: Tell us what happened at around
A : My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [sic] came home. We told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding celebration (kasalan).
x x x x
Q : What happened next when you continued sleeping?
A : I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir.
Q : Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up?
A : I was still lying straight down, sir.
Q : How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up?
A : He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir.
Court:
Q : Was he naked?
A : Already naked, Your Honor.
Q : How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?
A : I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened?
A : No more, sir.
x x x x
Q : What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?
A : He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir.
Court:
Q : Did he say something?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : What did he say?
A : He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor.
x x x x
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : What else did he do aside from telling you “huag kang magsusumbong”?
A : He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir.
Q : They were already awakened at that time?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and sister?
A : No more, sir.
Court:
Q : While
your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if
any?
A : “Kinayog
na po niya ako.”
Q : What
do you mean by telling [sic] “kinayog na po niya ako”?
A : He
was moving, Your Honor.
Q : While
your father was moving, what else was happening at that time?
A : I
felt pain, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : From
where did you feel that pain?
A : From
my private part, sir.
x x x x
Q : Do
you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body?
A : Yes,
sir.
Q : Please
tell us if you know?
A : Something
whitish coming out from it, sir.
Court:
Q : From
where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?
A : From
my father’s private part, Your Honor.
Q : Why,
what happened to the private part of your father?
A : I
do not know, Your Honor.
Q : When
you felt pain, what was your father doing then?
A : He
repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic]
anybody.
Q : At
that time, did you see the private part of your father?
A : Yes,
Your Honor.
Q : When
you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part
of your father?
A : Yes,
Your Honor.
Q : What
was happening?
A : His
private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.
Q : Where
was it placed if any?
A : Into
my private part, Your Honor.
Q : Did
the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina?
A : Yes,
Your Honor.
Q : What
did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina?
A : It
was painful, Your Honor.
Q : At
that time was your father making any movement?
A : Yes,
Your Honor.
Q : Will
you describe the movement made by your father?
A : (Witness
demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over her
left hand)
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Did he kiss you?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : In what part of your body?
A : On my mouth, sir.
Q : Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss?
A : On my private part, sir.
Q : When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after?
A : After he inserted his penis, sir.
Q : What other part of your body did he kiss?
A : On my breast, sir.[36]
x x x x
Criminal
Case No. SC-7423
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q
: Now, you said that the second
incident happened [on]
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened?
A
:
x x x x
Q
: And what were you doing when your
father returned at around
A : We were all asleep, sir.
Q
: And how did you come to know that
he returned at around
A : My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q : And because of that, you were awakened?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And
what happened when you were awakened because your father held your hand?
A : He
covered my mouth, sir.
Q : And
after covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A : He
removed the lower portion of my clothes. “Hinubuan po niya ako.”
x x x x
Q : After
removing your lady sando, what else did he do?
A : He
laid himself on top of me, sir.
x x x x
Q : Now,
what did he do to you when he was already on top of you?
A : He
was “kinakayog niya po ako.”
Q : Aside
from “kinakayog,” what else did he do?
A : He
kissed my breast, sir.
Q : Aside
from that, what else?
A : He
likewise touched my private part, sir.
Q : When
he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that
time?
A : Yes,
sir.
Q : Where?
A : Into
my vagina, sir.
Q : How
did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina?
A : I
felt pain in my private part, sir.
Q : And
do you know why you felt pain in your private part?
A : Yes,
sir.
Q : Why?
A : His
private part …. (Thereafter witness is
crying while uttering words: “I am afraid I might be killed by my father.”)
He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted it repeatedly into mine,
sir.
Q : And
you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina?
A : Yes,
sir. [37]
x x x x
Criminal
Case No. SC-7424
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q
: Now, you said also that you were
raped on
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What time?
A
: It was
x x x x
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q Now, how did it happen, that third incident?
A I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold my dress, sir.
Q : Was your father drunk at that time?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : How did you come to know?
A : His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: “It is your end.” (Witness crying while answering the question.)
Q : Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress?
A : He carried me upstairs, sir.
Q : Was he able to carry you upstairs?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs?
A : He removed my panty and shortpants, sir.
Q : After
removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do?
A : No
more but he kissed my vagina.
Q : Which
part of your vagina did he kiss?
A : That
part of my vagina with hold [sic].
Court:
Q : What
about your upper garments at that time?
A : He
did not remove it, Your Honor.
Q : What
else did he do, aside from that?
A : Nothing
more, just that.
Q : After
kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?
A : He
again poked the knife on us, Your Honor.
Q : At
that time, was your father naked or not?
A : Still
with his clothes on, Your Honor.
x x x x
Q : For
clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed
your vagina?
A : Nothing
more, merely that act, Your Honor.
Q : You
mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore?
A : No
more, Your Honor.
x x x x
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q : Now,
what did he use in kissing your clitoris?
A : His
tongue, sir.
Q : How
did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used?
A : It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir.[38]
Verily,
it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is
attached to her father by the natural bond of love and affection, to accuse him
of rape, unless he is the one who raped and defoliated her.[39]
As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy:[40]
It is unthinkable
for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of
her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself,
along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple
offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the
very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved.
Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply
because she wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for
allegedly scolding and maltreating her.[41]
In stark contrast with AAA’s
convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB and
CCC, are appellant’s uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi.
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and
denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of the complainant.[42]
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it
can easily be fabricated.[43]
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[44]
The records disclose that not a shred
of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it
is fatal to the accused.[45]
Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission.[46]
By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the
rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant
was within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly
even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents.
Appellant’s contention that AAA’s
accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged occurrences of
rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told
her father’s niece about the incidents. However, the latter doubted her,
believing instead that appellant was not that kind of man. AAA’s subsequent
attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be futile as well
as she was only able to speak with the barangay driver, who happened to be
appellant’s brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the latter. Her
disclosure of the rapes to a certain Menoy did not yield any positive result
either. Fearing for the lives of her grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them
about the incidents.[47]
A child of thirteen years cannot be
expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the authorities.[48] Indeed,
We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the people around her
were relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them were in
vain. Thus, AAA’s silence in not reporting the incidents to her mother and
filing the appropriate case against appellant for over a month is sufficiently
explained. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable
and unexplained.[49] It is
not beyond ken that the child, living under threat from appellant and having
been turned away by trusted relatives, even accused by them of lying, would
simply opt to just suffer in silence thereafter. In People
v. Gutierrez,[50]
we held:
Complainant’s
failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the
authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is
baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some
time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist’s threat on their
lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and who was living
with her.[51]
Appellant brands the trial judge as partial
against him for propounding leading questions to AAA. According to him, were it
not for the lower court’s and the prosecution’s biased leading questions, AAA
would not have proven the elements of the crimes charged.[52]
Appellant’s argument is not
well-taken. It is the judge’s prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to
ferret out the truth.[53]
It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain
truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.[54]
After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the
respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent
demands of due process.[55]
Also, being the arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[56]
Besides, jurisprudence explains that
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with
caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the
accused. The propriety of the judge’s questions is determined by their quality
and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not.[57]
In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole, the questions
propounded by the judge a quo were
but clarificatory in nature and that, concomitantly, appellant failed to
satisfactorily establish that he was prejudiced by such queries.
The matter of the purportedly
defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals, pointing
out that a close scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words
“force and/or intimidation” are specifically alleged therein.[58]
Even if these were not so, well-established is the rule that force or
intimidation need not be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral
influence of a father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer
of resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is unrelated
to the victim.[59]
Now, we turn to the determination of
the crime for which appellant under the third charge is liable and the
corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief
for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all three
(3) charges of rape, including the rape committed on
The automatic appeal in criminal
cases opens the whole case for review,[62] as
in this case. Thus, this Court is mandated to re-examine the vital facts
established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The two courts
below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on
cross-examination to appellant’s insertion of his tongue into her vagina, viz:
Court:
Q
: On the third time you are [sic]
allegedly raped, you said it happened at
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March 16?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What he did is he kissed your vagina?
A : Yes, sir.
Q
: For how long did he kiss your
vagina?
A
: Two minutes, sir.
Q
: What did he actually do when he
kissed your vagina?
A
: He kissed my vagina, thereafter he
laughed and laughed.
Q
: You mean to tell the court when he
kissed your vagina he used his lips?
A
: His lips and tongue, sir.
Q
: What did he do?
A
: He put out his tongue thereafter
he “inano” the hole of my vagina.
Court:
Q : What
did your father do with his tongue?
A : He
placed it in the hole of my vagina.
Q : Did
you feel pain?
A : Yes,
sir.
Q : By
just kissing your vagina you felt pain?
A : Yes,
Your Honor.[63]
Notwithstanding
the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find appellant
guilty of rape as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this
conclusion, we take a route different from the ones respectively taken by the
courts below.
With
the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997,[64] the
concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime
should include sexual violence on the woman’s sex-related orifices other than
her organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free rape.[65]
The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime
against persons and the introduction of rape by “sexual assault”[66]
as differentiated from the traditional “rape through carnal knowledge” or “rape
through sexual intercourse.”
Section
2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. – The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape Is Committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Paragraph
1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while
paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault. Rape through sexual intercourse
is also denominated as “organ rape” or “penile rape.” On the other hand, rape
by sexual assault is otherwise called “instrument or object rape,”[67]
also “gender-free rape,”[68]
or the narrower “homosexual rape.”[69]
In
People v. Silvano,[70]
the Court recognized that the father’s insertion of his tongue and finger into
his daughter’s vaginal orifice would have subjected him to liability for
“instrument or object rape” had the new law been in effect already at the time
he committed the acts. Similarly, in People v. Miranda,[71] the
Court observed that appellant’s insertion of his fingers into the complainant’s
organ would have constituted rape by sexual assault had it been committed when
the new law was already in effect.
The
differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following:
(1)
In
the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender
may be a man or a woman;
(2)
In
the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the
offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3)
In
the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person; and
(4)
The
penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
In
view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode
is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the
charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal
knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it
was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However,
following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section
5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the
lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec.
5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed,
acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in
rape.[72]
In
light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the
With
respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal
Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify
AAA, for each count of qualified rape, in the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[75]
The award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is affirmed.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus costs. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum,
and to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 plus costs.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 3-34. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Arturo G. Tayag.
[5]The
real name of the victim is withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262. See People
v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
[6]The real name of the victim’s mother is withheld to protect her and the victim’s privacy, also pursuant to R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262.
[17]The real name of the victim’s brother is likewise withheld to protect him and the victim’s privacy, also pursuant to R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262.
[30]People v. Biong, 450 Phil. 432, 445 (2003), citing People v. Tadeo, G.R. Nos. 128884-85,
[33]People v. Penaso, 383 Phil. 200, 208 (2000), citing People v. Domogoy, et al., G.R. No. 116738, 22 March 1999, p. 11, citing People v. Casim, 213 SCRA 390 (1992). See also People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44, 53 (2000), citing People v. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 citing People v. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26.
[34]People v. Penaso, supra, citing People v. Caratay, G.R. Nos. 119458,
119436-37,
[40]459
Phil. 933 (2003). See also People v.
Mendoza, GR. No.152589 and G.R. No. 152758,
[42]People v. Penaso, supra note 33, at 210, citing People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, 20 October 1999, p. 18; People v. Accion, G.R. Nos. 122550-51, 11 August 1999, p. 11.
[43]People v. Penaso, supra note 33, at 210, citing People v. Hivela, G.R. No. 132061,
[50]451 Phil. 227 (2000). See also People v. Ilao, 463 Phil. 797 (2003); People v. Alfaro, 458 Phil. 942 (2003); People v. Manahan, 455 Phil. 658 (2003); People v. Romero, 435 Phil. 182 (2002); People v. Ponsica, 433 Phil. 365 (2002); People v. Dela Cruz, 432 Phil. 988 (2002).
[53]People v. Cabiles, 396 Phil. 46, 59 (2000), citing People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, 226-227 (1998).
[59]People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101,
[65]Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 950, Special Law on Rape, 6 August 1996, pp. 12-15; Deliberations of the House of Representatives, Committee on Revision of Laws and Committee on Women on House Bill No. 6265 entitled “An Act to Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Sexual Assault,” 27 August 1996, pp. 44-50.
[66]Deliberations
of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 950,
[72]People
v. Laguerta, 398 Phil. 370, 380 (2000), citing Dulla v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 123164,