THIRD
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- EMMANUEL ROCHA alias “Nopoy” and RUEL
RAMOS alias “Aweng,” Accused-Appellants. |
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G.R. No. 173797 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,*
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On
That on or about the 28th day
of September, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with several others, whose true identities,
whereabouts and personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, all armed with high power (sic) guns, with intent
to gain and by means of violence and intimidation against person (sic), did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) represented by ALEX BABASA, JR. in the following
manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while Alex Babasa, Jr.
was placing the money contained in two (2) duffle bags inside the vault of the
armored van, with the two (2) security guards on the watch, the said accused
pursuant to their conspiracy and with intent to kill, opened fire at them
hitting S/G ROGER TARROQUIN and S/G TITO HOMERES, thereby inflicting upon them
serious and mortal wounds which were the immediate cause of their death and
thereafter, accused took, robbed and carried away the said two (2) duffle bags
containing P1.5 million pesos, Philippine Currency, and the 12 gauge
shotgun with SN 1048245 worth P11,000.00 issued to S/G Roger Tarroquin and the
cal. 38 revolver with SN 23238 worth P6,500.00 issued to S/G Tito
Henares and owned by Eaglestar Security Services, Incorporated to the damage
and prejudice of the offended parties in the amount aforementioned and to the
heirs of the said victims.[1]
On
WHEREFORE, the accused ROMEO TRUMPETA y
AGUAVIVA, EMMANUEL RIOCHA y YEBAN, RUEL RAMOS y ALCOBER and EUSTAQUIO CENITA y
OMAS-AS, are found GUILTY of the crime of Robbery With Homicide as charged, the
prosecution having proven their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In accordance with Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, paragraph 1 thereof, all of the above-named accused are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
attendant thereto. They could have been sentenced to death but for the fact
that the death penalty was suspended, then the crime was committed.[2]
In addition, all the accused are
jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Roger Tarroquin and
Tito Henares P50,000.00 each, respectively. Further, all the accused are jointly and
severally ordered to indemnify the Bank of the Philippine Islands the sum of P1,600,000. With costs against the accused.[3]
Trumpeta, Cenita and accused-appellants
appealed to this Court. On
On
On
Wherefore, the appealed Decision is
AFFIRMED with CLARIFICATION. Appellants Emmanuel Rocha @ “Nopoy” and Ruel Ramos
@ “Aweng” are found guilty as co-principals in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Each one of them is ordered to pay civil indemnity
in the amount of [Fifty Thousand Pesos] (P50,000.00) each to the heirs
of Roger Tarroquin and Tito Homeres. All
other aspects of the appealed Decision are MAINTAINED.[10]
On
On
On
On
On
We are therefore determining
herein whether or not the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants
Rocha and Ramos should be granted.
According to the
plaintiff-appellee,
8. It is well-settled that in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, appeal in criminal cases to this Honorable Court is a matter of
right. A review of the trial court’s
judgment of conviction is automatic and does not depend on the whims of the
convicted felon. It is mandatory and
leaves the reviewing court without any option.
9. In
The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a
case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial
court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of the
accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is
entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest tribunal of
the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined. Such procedure
is merciful. It gives a second chance of
life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive
provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no
evasions. (emphasis supplied)
10. No less than this Honorable Court
recognizes the value of human life that it provided an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused. In People vs. Mateo, this Honorable Court
held:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review
by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however has it proscribed an intermediate
review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the court now deems it wise and compelling to provide
in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court. Where life and
liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence
must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be undone. A prior determination by
the court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error in judgment. If
the court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition.
11. Appellant’s motion to withdraw
appeal, therefore, contravenes this Honorable Court’s power to automatically
review a decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Neither appellant nor this
Honorable Court can waive by mere motion to withdraw appeal, the Court’s power to
review the instant case.
12.
Based on the above disquisition, the review by this Honorable court of
appellants’ conviction is mandatory and the withdrawal of his appeal can not be
granted as it will contravene the applicable rules and jurisprudence.[12]
Plaintiff-appellee also
claims that accused-appellant Rocha’s motion is “actually a scheme to evade the
supreme penalty of reclusion perpetua”[13]
and that it is “obviously merely an afterthought designed to trifle not only
with our procedural law, but more importantly, our judicial system.”[14] Plaintiff-appellee continues that “if indeed,
appellant Emmanuel Rocha was acting in good faith, he should have withdrawn his
appeal at the first opportunity.
Instead, he waited for the ‘intermediate review’ of the RTC Decision to
be first resolved and after an unfavorable decision thereon that he now decides
to withdraw his appeal.”[15]
We resolve to grant the
Motions of accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos.
The confusion in the case
at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo.[16] In Mateo,
as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated that “[w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.”[17] A closer study of Mateo, however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing
statement of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the
purpose of including these cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of
the Court of Appeals: “[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide
in these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review by the Court
of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.”[18]
We had not intended to
pronounce in Mateo that cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of
this Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases because,
prior to Mateo, it was this Court
which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review, however, was
different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before
this Court via a notice of appeal,
while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic review. Thus, the erstwhile Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, provided as follows:
SEC. 3. How
appeal taken.—
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to
the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The
appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which
arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed, shall be by filing a notice of
appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No
notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by
the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the
Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
x x
x x
SEC.
10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.— In all cases
where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five
(5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter.
After the promulgation of
Mateo on
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to
the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The
appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed
but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No
notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed
the death penalty. The Court of Appeals automatically review the Judgment provided
in section 10 of this Rule.
x x
x x
SEC.
10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.— In all cases
where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty
days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or
notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript
shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.
Neither does the
Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. The constitutional
provision quoted in Mateo merely
gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has
assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on
the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x
x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.”[19]
For a clear understanding
of this provision, the full text thereof provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court
is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
In this provision, only
paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of jurisdiction over cases. However, this Constitutional provision does
not enumerate cases involving mandatory review.
Indeed, it would almost be silly to claim that this Court is mandatorily
required to review all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue. Instead, the significance of the
enumeration of this Court’s jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is that
while Section 2 of the same Article VIII of the Constitution gives to Congress
the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts, it denies to Congress the power to deprive this Court of jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5.[20]
Since the case of accused-appellants
is not subject to the mandatory review of this Court, the rule that neither the
accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants’ separate
motions to withdraw appeal may be validly granted.
The granting of a Motion
to Withdraw Appeal, however, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court. After a case has been submitted
to the court for decision, the appellant cannot, at his election, withdraw the appeal.[21] In People
v. Casido,[22] we
denied the accused-appelant’s Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal therein:
It is then clear that the conditional
pardons separately extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In the resolution of
Earlier, in our resolution of
Having observed that the pronouncements
in the aforementioned cases remained unheeded, either through deliberate
disregard or erroneous applications of the obiter
dictum in Monsanto vs. Factoran
or the ruling in People vs. Crisola,
this Court, in its resolution of
We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment”
limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits
the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial
court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor
administratively liable. Accordingly,
those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis
for the release of the accused from confinement.
x x x x
This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after
It follows then that the conditional
pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on
In the case at bar,
however, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants’ Motions to Withdraw
Appeal. There is no showing that accused-appellants
had already applied for parole at the time of the filing of their Motions to
Withdraw Appeal. On the contrary, they
stated in their motions that they merely intend to apply for the same.
Plaintiff-appellee claims
that the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal is actually a scheme to evade the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and is
meant to trifle with our judicial system.
Plaintiff-appellee, however, does not explain how the withdrawal of
appeal can be used by accused-appellants for these purposes. It seems that plaintiff-appellee is expecting
that the granting of the Motions to Withdraw Appeal would nullify the Court of
Appeals Decision, on the understanding that the Court of Appeals cannot enter judgments
on cases remanded to them pursuant to Mateo. Such conclusion, however, is applicable only
where the death penalty is imposed. Rule
124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, which was likewise amended in A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC pursuant to Mateo, provides:
Section 13. Certification
or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. – (a) Whenever the Court of Appeals
finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render
judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the
case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a
lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the
penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal should be
included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals
imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals.
Plaintiff-appellee must
have likewise observed that accused-appellants intend to apply not only for
parole, but also for executive clemency.
This is shown by the Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal of
accused-appellant Ramos, where he affirmed that he intends to follow his
co-accused who had already “applied for executive clemency to avail of parole.”
It should be kept in mind
that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if their appeal is
dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the
commutation of their reclusion perpetua
sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as
amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases,[23] we
have considered the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. As further discussed by Associate Justice
Dante Tinga in his Concurring Opinion in People
v. Tubongbanua[24]:
Parole is extended only to those
convicted of divisible penalties. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible
penalty, with no minimum or maximum period.
Under section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is after “any
prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him,” that the Board
of Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be granted
parole. There being no “minimum penalty”
imposable on those convicted to reclusion
perpetua, it follows that even prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346,
persons sentenced by final judgment to reclusion
perpetua could not have availed of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
This Court cannot review,
much less preempt, the exercise of executive clemency under the pretext of
preventing the accused from evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua or from trifling with our judicial system. Clemency is not a function of the judiciary;
it is an executive function.[25] Thus, it is the President, not the judiciary,
who should exercise caution and utmost circumspection in the exercise of
executive clemency in order to prevent a derision of the criminal justice
system. We cannot and shall not deny
accused-appellants’ Motions to Withdraw Appeal just because of their intention
of applying for executive clemency. With
the Constitution bestowing upon the Executive the power to grant clemency,[26] it
behooves the Court to pass the ball to the President and let her determine the
fate of accused-appellants.
In sum, the mandatory
review by this Court is only required for cases where the penalty imposed is
death. Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
review of the trial court decision is conducted only when the accused files a
notice of appeal. Neither the Decision
of this Court in Mateo nor the
abolition of the death penalty has changed this. As the penalty imposed by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals in the case at bar is reclusion
perpetua, the review by this Court is not mandatory and, therefore, the
accused-appellants can validly withdraw their appeal.
The granting of a Motion
to Withdraw Appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deny
accused-appellants’ Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
Plaintiff-appellee’s allegation that the Motion was for the purpose of
evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and trifling with our judicial system is unsubstantiated, as the Court of
Appeals’ imposition of reclusion perpetua,
unlike an imposition of the death penalty, may be entered by said appellate
court even without another review by this Court. Neither should we deny the Motions just
because of accused-appellants’ intention to apply for executive clemency, since
the granting of such executive clemency is within the prerogative of the
Executive Department, and not of this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respective Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants
Emmanuel Rocha and Ruel Ramos are GRANTED,
and the Court of Appeals Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On
leave
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] CA rollo, p. 51.
[2] The Information stated that the
crime was committed on
[3] CA rollo, p. 70.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[9] Penned by Associate Justice
Magdangal M. de Leon with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
Mariano C.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 8.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the
[21] People v. Belaro, 367 Phil. 90, 112-113 (1999), citing United States v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666, 677 (1918).
[22] 328 Phil. 1149, 1153-1154 (1996).
[23] People
v.
[24] G.R. No. 171271,
[25] Supra note 20.
[26] CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 19.