FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ROLANDO MANGUBAT, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 172068 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August 7, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
On appeal to this Court is the Decision[1]
dated January 23, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00186 finding appellant Rolando Mangubat @ “Lando” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape on two (2) counts and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. The decision
affirmed with modifications that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, in Criminal Case Nos. P-5788 and 5789 which
found appellant guilty of qualified rape
on two (2) counts and sentenced him to death for each count.
Appellant had previously been with
this Court in G.R. Nos. 154661-62
on account of the penalty of
death imposed by the trial court.
However, in accordance with our decision in People
v. Mateo,[2] the same were referred to the Court of Appeals
for intermediate review, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00186. Following the CA’s affirmance, albeit
with modifications, of the trial court’s decision, appellant is again with this
Court via the present recourse pursuant
to a Notice of Appeal[3] filed
by him with the CA.
Conformably with our
decision in People v. Cabalquinto[4] and
subsequent cases, the real name of the victim in this case is not disclosed
herein. Instead, fictitious initials (AAA) are used to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the
victim, as well as any information tending to establish or compromise her identity
and those of her immediate family or household members, are also not disclosed
in this decision.
The Case
On
In Ciminal
Case No. P-5788:
That sometime in the year 1997, more or less
nighttime, in barangay Palayan, municipality of Pinamalayan, province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of
force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie, and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a 10-year-old granddaughter
of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
In Criminal Case No.
P-5789:
That on or about the 13th day of
June, 1998, at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, in barangay Palayan,
municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental, Mindoro, Philippines and with the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and
unchaste design, by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a 10-year-old
granddaughter of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of said offended
party.
When arraigned in both cases,
appellant entered a common plea of “Not guilty.” Thereafter, the cases were
heard jointly.
The Evidence
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented in evidence the oral testimonies of AAA herself and that of Dra.
Adelaida Malaluan, Municipal Health Officer of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
who conducted a physical examination of the victim, plus the documents marked
in the course of the proceedings. For its part,
the defense adduced in evidence the testimonies of appellant himself and
that of BBB, grandmother of the victim and appellant’s common-law wife.
The prosecution’s version of the incidents was aptly narrated in
the CA decision under review, to wit:
Sometime
in 1997, [AAA], who was born on 7 March 1987, was raped by her step-grandfather,
appellant Rolando Mangubat, at their house at Barangay Palayan, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro while her grandmother and Rolando’s common-law wife, [BBB], was working
in Manila. [AAA] knew that Rolando was able to partially insert his penis into
her vagina because of the pain that she felt then.
Later,
on
After
the dinner, at around
[AAA]
did not report the incident to her mother for fear that Rolando might kill
them. Instead, [AAA] reported the matter to a certain “Bogs” at the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), which later brought her to Dr.
Adelaido Malaluan for a physical examination.
Thereafter,
[AAA] was brought to a police headquarter, where she detailed her traumatic
experience in the presence of the investigating officer and her grandmother [BBB],
who had already learned of the incident.
[BBB] confirmed [AAA’s] report, and explained that [AAA] bears Rolando’s
surname, instead of her father’s surname, because they caused her surname to be
registered after Rolando’s, as she was in their custody since her early
childhood. [6]
Denial is appellant’s main plea in
exculpation. Denying the charges against him, appellant averred that the cases
were filed by AAA in retaliation to his having whipped her for refusing to do
an errand on
Testifying for the defense, BBB, AAA’s grandmother and
appellant’s common-law wife, belied the accusations hurled against her common-law
husband and claimed that on
The Trial and Appellate Court’s Decisions
In a decision[7] dated
March 13, 2002, the trial court, giving more credence to the testimony of AAA
and appreciating the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, adjudged appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of qualified rape and sentenced
him to the extreme penalty of death for each count. The trial court also ordered
appellant to indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count. More specifically, the decision dispositively
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused
Rolando Mangubat alias “Lando” GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of RAPE, for TWO (2)
COUNTS, defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and hereby sentences him to TWO (2) DEATH
PENALTIES.
Additionally,
accused is ordered to indemnify [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00) for each count and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
When directly elevated to this Court
for automatic review in view of the penalty
imposed, the case, as earlier stated, was transferred to the CA for
intermediate review, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00186.
In its decision of P50,000.00
by way of moral damages, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded
by the trial court for each count. We
quote the fallo of the appellate court’s decision:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case
Nos. P-5788 and P-5789 on 13 March 2002 is AFFIRMED,
with the modifications that accused-appellant Rolando Mangubat is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape, for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
of perpetua for each count, and to pay private complaint [AAA] the amounts
of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00, as moral damages, for each
count.
SO ORDERED. [8]
The
case is again with us in view of the Notice
of Appeal interposed by appellant from the CA decision .
In
its resolution dated
In his Brief, appellant contends that
the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape on two counts and in imposing upon him the penalty of death for
each count. The People, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), submits that the trial court properly convicted appellant of qualified rape and correctly sentenced him with death in each count.
The
appeal must fail.
In the review
of rape cases where, most often than
not, the credibility of the victim is in issue, the Court consistently relies
on the assessment of the trial court.[9] It has long been held that the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses should be viewed as correct and
entitled to the highest respect because it has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness box, and the manner in which
they give their testimony.[10] For
this reason, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there
appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
that court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if
properly considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[11] None of the exceptions obtain herein.
Undoubtedly, AAA was twice sexually
violated by appellant – the first, in 1997 when she was barely ten (10) years old
and the other, on
In a clear, spontaneous and
straightforward manner, AAA narrated in tears her harrowing experience with
appellant. We quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes AAA’s
testimonies in both cases:
In Criminal Case No. P-5788:
“Q – The first to the last time that you were raped by your father in 1997, tell us where was (sic) actually that incident took place?
A – In our house also, sir.
Q – On that particular occasion when you were in Grade IV when you were raped in your house, what was done by your father?
A – The same, sir.
Q – In the year 1997, was there fatal (sic) penetration?
A – On (sic) sir, only one half.
Q – Why do you know only one half (sic) was able to penetrate to your vagina?
A – Because it was so painful, sir.
Q – What did you feel when the penetration reached one half?
A – I felt pain, sir.
Q – What did you do when your father was trying to insert his penis to your vagina?
A – I was crying then because I was apprehensive that he will do what he [had] done to me before.
Q – All in all, how many times were you raped by your father aside from 1997 and when you were in Grade IV?
A
– He was always raping me whenever my
mother was in
In
Criminal Case No. P-5789:
“Q – Are you the same [AAA] who filed this case against Rolando Mangubat?
A - Yes, sir.
Q – Why did you file the case against Rolando Mangubat, your Tatay?
A
– Because he raped me. ‘Kasi
po ginahasa po ako’[13]
Q – Who are left inside the house?
A- The two of us, sir.
Q – When you were alone with your tatay, what happened?
A – After that, tatay called me and told me to get the oil.
Q – Did you get the oil?
A – Yes, sir.
Q
– And thereafter, what was done to
the oil?
A – My father told me to rub the oil in his body.
Q – While you were rubbing the oil over the body of your tatay, what happened next?
A – After rubbing him with oil, he caused me to lay (sic) in his beddings.
Q – Did you accede to his request?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – While you were lying on his bed, what happened next?
A – He placed himself on top on (sic) me, sir.
Q – Before he placed himself on top of you, what did he tell you to do, if any?
A – He told me to remove my shirt and panty.
Q – Did you obey his command?
A – Yes sir.
Q – Why did you obey his command?
A – Because if I will not obey his order, he will hit me.
Q – Where was your mother on that particular time and date?
A
– She was in
Q
– What was she doing in
A – She was working to support us.
Q
– What kind of work was she doing in
A – Housemaid, sir.
Q – After you were made to lay on the bed and made cause (sic) to remove your panty and short and make (sic) himself on top of you, what else did he do?
A – After placing himself on top of me, he inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q – After placing his penis to your vagina, what did you observe to his penis?
A – ‘Matigas po’.
Q – When the accused inserted his hard penis towards your vagina, what did you… say to your father?
A – None, I continued crying and I was asking for my mother.
Q
– Why did you ask for assistance when
your mother was working in
A – ‘Kasi po hirap na hirap na po lagi akong gingahasa ng aking tatay’.
PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
At
this juncture, I would like to make it on record that the witness is shedding
tears after making her statement.”[14]
It is noteworthy that despite rigid cross-examinations,
AAA remained consistent and categorical in recounting the sordid details of the
two (2) incidents of rape perpetrated against her by appellant. Again, to quote
from the transcripts:
Q – But you were able to notice or feel the hard penis of your tatay Lando despite the fact that you did not see it?
A – When I felt the hard penis of my tatay Lando having inserted (sic) to my vagina, I raised my two hands asking for help to my mother (sic).
Q – You noticed that it was hard because you hold the same/
A – He told me to hold it.
Q – And you held it?
A
– Yes, madam.
Q – As a matter of fact you guided it towards his waist.
A – No more, madam.
Q
– In 1997, which according to you the
incident prior to
A – Yes, madam.
Q – You felt that the penetration was only one-half because you were at that time emoting, so you have the time to notice that the penetration was only one-half?
A – No, madam.
Q – How could you tell that the penetration was only one-half?
A- Before he inserted his penis, he was slowly inserting it.
Q – While he was inserting his penis during the time, again you were hold (sic) the other one-half which were (sic) penetrating?
A – No, madam.
Q
– After
A – Yes, madam.
Q – And that you only decided to leave that house after you [were] physically hit by your father?
A – Yes, madam.
Q – And that cause[d] you to tell to Lilian that your Tatay Lando hit you, am I correct?
A – No madam. Aling Lilian assisted me to go to Shirley
Q – When you were already talking with Shirley Pontillar, you told her that your tatay Lando hit you again?
A – Yes, madam.
Q – Because of that sumbong to Shirley Pontilar, she turned you to DSWD?
A – No, madam, Tiya Shirley brought me to the police headquarters.
Q – Your very purpose when you went to the house of Shirley [was] to make ‘sumbong’ that Rolando Magubat hit you again physically, am I correct?
A
– Yes, madam, and also when he raped
me.[15]
Most importantly, AAA’s rape on
“Q – In your medical opinion, what could have caused this complete hymenal laceration at 1 o’clock, 3 o’oclock and 10 o’clock position[s] of the clock[?]
A – It may be due to the penetration of foreign bodies in the vaginal canal.
Q – Is it possible that the same can be caused by an erected penis/
A – Yes,
ma’am.”[16]
AAA's clear and categorical narration
of the sexual assaults against her, free from material inconsistencies and
coupled with spontaneous outburst of emotions, deserves full faith and credence. The rule is that when a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and
candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examinations and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and
credit.[17] Hence, the testimony of the rape victim alone
is sufficient to convict. More so, when,
as here, such testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration.[18]
Appellant insists, however, that the
evidence is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, most
especially the rape which allegedly occurred in 1997. But, as the two courts below
found, there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently establish the
occurrence of said rape. As shown in her testimony, AAA clearly and
categorically stated that appellant was able to partially penetrate his penis
into her vagina, and she confirmed that there was indeed such penetration
because she felt pain at that time. True, there was no medical certificate
presented showing any injury or lacerations in AAA's hymen; nonetheless, such
does not negate the possibility of rape. Medical findings are at best
corroborative and therefore not indispensable in proving the commission of the
crime of rape,[19] inasmuch
as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. Besides, for rape to be consummated, full
penetration is not necessary. Penile
invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia and it suffices that there
is proof of the entrance of the male organ with the labia of the pudendum of
the female organ. Thus, penetration of
the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.[20] Likewise, AAA’s failure to specify the exact
date of her rape in 1997 is immaterial considering that the exact date of
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. For, the gravamen
of the offense of rape is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented.[21] Also,
AAA’s delay in disclosing her sexual defilement is understandable, given the
fact that such procrastination was attributable to her fear for her life and that
of her mother. In any event, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of
rape have not always been construed as an indication of a false accusation.[22] And this principle applies with greater force where, as in
this case, the victim was 10-11 years old at the time of the rape incidents,
and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm.
With respect to appellant's defenses of
denial and alibi, the same cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical statements of AAA. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving and merits no weight in law and
cannot, therefore, be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses testifying in the affirmative.[23] Verily, an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth
of a credible witness,[24]
as AAA in this case. On the other hand, alibi is often viewed with suspicion and
received with great caution not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because it is easy to fabricate. Appellant’s alibi that he was sick in bed at the
time of the rape on June 13, 1998 is much too flimsy an excuse to be believed, while
his claim that AAA accused him of rape as a revenge for his having physically
maltreated her is utterly preposterous and downright unworthy of belief. Mere resentment is not so compelling as to
have motivated a young girl to accuse a person who practically took care of her
since birth and whom she already considers as her tatay, of such a serious crime as rape. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable how a
young girl of ten,[25] like
AAA, could have concocted a story of defloration, suffer the embarrassment of
recounting in a public trial the harrowing details of her experience and
thereby open herself and her family to gossip, just because she was whipped by her
ravisher for not doing an errand for him, as appellant would want us to believe.
As this Court observed in People v.
Dimacuha:[26]
No woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are given full-faith and credit, since when a girl says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. In assessing the testimony of the child victim, the standards used for adults should not apply. Rather her testimony should be viewed as a narration of a minor who barely understands sex and sexuality.
On the whole, we are thus convinced
that when AAA testified during trial that she has been raped, she said, in
effect, all that was necessary to show that she has indeed been raped.
We now review the penalty imposed.
Carnal knowledge of a minor under 12
years of age is rape as defined under Article 266-A[27]
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
Under Article 266-B[28]
of the same law, rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, in which case the death penalty
shall be imposed.
Here, the two Informations against
the appellant alleged the special qualifying circumstances of minority of AAA and
her relationship to the appellant. Proof
of these special qualifying circumstances is necessary to justify the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
In the prosecution of criminal cases,
especially those involving the penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an
accused is charged must be established.[29] Qualifying
circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no
conviction of the crime in its qualified form.[30]
As a special qualifying circumstance
raising the penalty for rape to death, the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or
information and proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.[31]
Here, while AAA’s minority was properly alleged and proved, the
same is not true as regards the parties’ relationship.
AAA was described in the criminal
indictments as the appellant’s granddaughter.
But this cannot be so because AAA herself testified, and such testimony was
confirmed by no less than her grandmother BBB, that appellant is the common-law
husband of BBB and that AAA’s biological father is BBB’s son from a previous
relationship. As the CA correctly found:
xxx The prosecution failed to prove its allegation that Rolando is [AAA’s] grandfather. [AAA] herself admitted that Rolando is [BBB’s] common-law husband, and, therefore, not her grandfather. Hence, Rolando cannot be considered an ascendant, or a relative by affinity within the third civil degree of [AAA] xxx[32]
We
hasten to add that appellant cannot even be considered as AAA’s
step-grandfather which should have been indicative of a relationship by
affinity[33] for the
same reason that he and AAA’s grandmother only lived in a common-law
relationship. In fact, appellant cannot even be considered as AAA’s grandfather
by affinity, precisely because appellant is a mere common-law spouse of AAA’s
grandmother. As ruled by this Court in People
v. Mamac:[34]
At
the most, appellant can be described as the common-law husband of Bernadette’s grandmother. As such, appellant is not a “parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree or the common law spouse of the parent” of Bernadette. In a similar case, we ruled that courts must
not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not embraced by it to
the end that no person who is clearly not within the terms of the statute can
be brought within them. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The OSG insists, however, that
appellant’s and BBB’s admissions regarding their marriage duly established the
relationship between AAA and appellant as the latter’s granddaughter by
affinity.
Evidently, the admissions are invoked
by the People to justify the imposition of the penalty of death on appellant.
We are not persuaded. The qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot be
established by mere testimony or even by the accused’s very own admission. So it is that in People v. Pascual Balbarona,[35] the
Court ruled:
Circumstances
that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be the subject of
stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of
death on the basis of stipulations or his
own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the
penalty of death.
Here, apart from the admissions of
appellant and BBB, no further and/or independent proof was proffered by the prosecution to establish the fact of their
marriage with certainty. Lest it be
forgotten, elementary is the doctrine that upon the prosecution lies the burden
of proving all the elements of a crime including the qualifying circumstances.[36] The prosecution cannot rely on the defense to
prove its case.
Given the reality
that the prosecution
in this case
failed to prove the alleged special qualifying circumstance of relationship,
appellant can only be adjudged guilty of
simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
All
told, the Court rules and so holds that the crime committed by appellant is
only simple rape on two counts, as
defined in Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, for which he should be meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. In any event, Republic Act No.
9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Lastly, with regard to appellant’s
civil liability, we affirm the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
each count as it is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of
proof other than the fact of the commission of rape.[37] We
likewise affirm the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count considering that the same is also automatically granted in rape
cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such award.[38]
WHEREFORE, the
assailed CA decision in CA-G.R. CR.-HC
No. 00186 is AFFIRMED in all
respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Santiago Javier
Ranada and concurred in by Justices Mario L. Guarina and Roberto A. Barrios
(deceased); CA Rollo, pp. 114-122.
[2] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[3] CA Rollo, p. 130.
[4] G.R. No. 167693,
[5] CA Rollo, pp. 9-10 & 11-12.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] People v. Bernie Teodoro, G.R. No.
170473,
[10] People v. Alviz, G.R. Nos. 144551-55,
[11] People
v. Wilson Suarez, et al., G.R. Nos. 153573-76,
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] TSN,
[17] People
v. Chito P. Ucab, G.R. No. 133227, October 10, 2002, 390 SCRA 564, 572.
[18] Supra note 11.
[19] People
v. Federico Arnaiz, G.R. No. 171447,
[20] People
v. Jouriel Dimacuha, G.R. Nos. 152592-93,
[21] People
v. Avelino Latag, G.R. Nos. 140411-13,
[22] People v. Wilson Suarez, et al., supra.
[23] People
v. Alviz, supra at p. 172.
[24] People v. Federico Arnaiz, supra.
[25] AAA was ten years old when the first
rape occurred in 1997 and eleven at the time of the second rape on
[26] supra
[27] In
part, said Article reads:
Article
266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.
— Rape is committed:
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived
of reason or otherwise consciousness;
c) By means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
xxx
xxx xxx
[28] Said
Article pertinently provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties. -
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx xxx xxx
[29] People v. Ruperto Ramos, G.R. No. 142577 December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 452, 469.
[30]
[31] People
v. Pascual Balbarona, G.R. No. 146854,
[32] Rollo, p. 121.
[33] See People v. Mamac, G.R. No. 130332,
[34]
[35] Supra.
[36] People v. Ruperto Ramos, supra.
[37] People
v. Esperida, G.R. Nos. 139637-38 January 22, 2003, 395 SCRA 679, 686.
[38] People
v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147,