THIRD
DIVISION
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CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA,
Petitioner, - versus
- TOMAS FANGONIL, PURA FANGONIL TINO, MARINA FANGONIL, MARIANO
FANGONIL, MILAGROS FANGONIL-LAYUG and VICTORIA FANGONIL ESTOQUE,[1] Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 169356 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this instant Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
(a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61990, and (b) the Resolution of the same Court dated 15 July 2005 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner urges this Court to modify
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated
A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq.
m) has been included and situated in Barrio Lloren, Tubao, La Union, declared
under Tax Dec. Number 2889. Bounded on
the North, by the property of Manuel Ordońa; on the East, by the property of
Severino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero, and Heirs of V. Selga; on the South, by the
properties of Manuel Ordońa and Francisco Padilla; and on the West, by a river;
containing an area of more than two hectares; x x x.[2]
and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union,
designated as:
A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent
improvements, situated in Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union with an area of
10,777 sq. m. (1 Ha. 1,777 sq. m.) more or less, visible by signs of pilapiles
around its perimeter, assessed at P400.00, declared for tax purposes in
my name under Tax Declaration Number 6373, and bounded-on the North, by Donato
Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs of Flaviano Fangonil, and others; on the
South, by Eulalio Fangonil; and on the West, by the heirs of Remgio Boado; x x
x.[3]
be adjudged solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In addition, petitioner requests that another
parcel of land located in Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, be divided in accordance
with the manner she proposes.
The following are the
antecedent facts:
Petitioner and respondents[4]
are children of the late Fabian Fangonil and Maria Lloren Fangonil[5] of
Tubao, La Union. The Fangonil spouses
had 7 children: Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and Carmen.
Fabian died on
Parcel 1 – a 1,800
square meter residential land located at Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, which is
facing the
Parcel 2 – a 922
square meter residential lot located at Barangay Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union;
Parcel 3 – a 54,759
square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 4 – an 84,737
square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 5 – a 5,821
square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Francia Sur, Tubao, La
Union;
Parcel 6 – a 17,958
square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 7 – 9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at San Nicolas East, Agoo, La Union.
The
only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial settlement
executed by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement of the estate. The parties do not dispute that the succeeding
transactions involving parcels 6 and 7 took place. Fabian Fangonil, with the
consent of Maria Lloren Fangonil, obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over a
15,364 square meter middle portion of the sixth parcel of land for P1,450.00, executed under a Deed of Mortgage[6] in
favor of Francisca Saguitan on P1,450.00 on P2,600.00. The total amount
received by the Fangonil spouses for the properties was P5,500.00.
The
parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by the Fangonil spouses.
Prior to foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel covered by a Deed of
Mortgage was released from the mortgage on P1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan. The portion of the sixth parcel covered by the
Deed of Pacto de Retro P1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel subject
of the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro
was repurchased by petitioner on P2,600.00
to Quirino Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of P6,100.00 for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7.
On
On
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings,
considering there was no disagreement as to the manner of sharing Parcels 2, 3,
4, and 5 of the estate. In addition, on P7,453.00[10]
as payment to petitioner and her brother Tomas Fangonil as the only outstanding
debtors of the estate as specified in the
3. That the currency rate of the
Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar on P3.90 to U.S. $1.00;
4. That the currency rate of the Philippine
Peso to the U.S. Dollar as of this date P42.00 to U.S. $1.00;
5. So that the amount of indebtedness of P6,100.00
on November 13, 1959 has now the equivalent of P65,790.00 as of 31
August 1998;
5.1 The
equivalent amount of P65,790.00 shall be proportionately paid by all the
heirs with each and every heir having a share in said indebtedness in the
amount of P9,398.57;[11]
On P138,100.00 as the present
equivalent of the amount of P6,100.00 previously paid by petitioner to
redeem parcels 6 and 7. In its Decision[12]
dated P138,100.00, the money equivalent of the P6,100.00 paid
by her at the time of redemption of parcels 6 and 7. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing
premises, this court hereby adjudicates and partitions the inherited properties,
including the controversial parcels 6 and 7, in accordance with the following:
FIRST PARCEL
x x x x
This is divided into two (2) segments, the Eastern Portion
and Western Portion.
The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs, namely
Tomas Fangonil, Sinforoso Fangonil represented by Victoria Estoque and Marina
Fangonil. The Western Portion shall belong to two (2) heirs, the Southwestern
part belongs to Pura F. Tino and the Northwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil
Herrera x x x.
SECOND PARCEL
x x x x
This
parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and Milagros Fangonil Layug.
THIRD PARCEL
x x x x
A drawing
of lots was conducted on
x x x x
FOURTH PARCEL
x x x x
The same
thing happened. There was a drawing of lots. The result was the following:
x
x x x
FIFTH PARCEL
x x x x
On
SIXTH PARCEL
x x x x
On
x x x x
SEVENTH PARCEL
x x x x
The draw
was made on the same day,
It should
be noted that after the draws on
The six
heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shall reimburse the amount of P138,100.00,
each one contributing the amount of P19,728.57, to Carmen F. Herrera.
Since the other six heirs did not insist on the accounting of the produce with
respect to parcels 6 and 7, Carmen F. Herrera does not have to render an
accounting. As a matter of fact, this
Court, in its Order dated
Petitioner appealed the
above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging the unfair and prejudicial
manner of partition of parcel 1 and claiming exclusive ownership over parcels 6
and 7. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal in its Decision promulgated
WHEREFORE,
the
Under said decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court,
pronouncing that petitioner
failed to adduce any evidence that would support her claim that the
distribution was not equal and prejudicial to her interest. It concurred with the trial court in
concluding that, at the most, she is only entitled to the reimbursement of the
amount she spent for redemption of the questioned lots in an amount equivalent
to what her money commanded then, stating that petitioner is simply holding the
said property in trust for the other co-heirs. At the same time, it upheld the trial court’s
finding on the equivalent of the money which petitioner paid to redeem and
repurchase parcels 6 and 7, but the dispositive portion merely indicated the
amount of P130,100.00.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MANNER IN WHICH PARCEL 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONED BASED ON THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ POSITION WHICH IS CLEARLY UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSE SHARE WILL THEN BE FOUND AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE SAID LOT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PARCELS 6 AND 7 SHALL BE OWNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY THE PETITIONER BEING THE ONLY ONE WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAID PARCELS IN THE 1950’S EVEN WHILE THE PARENTS OF THE PARTIES WERE STILL ALIVE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG PRESCRIBED AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG BEEN BARRED BY LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER [TO] EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MONEY EQUIVALENT OF THE MONEY OF THE OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT WHICH SHE USED TO REPURCHASE AND REDEEM PARCELS 6 AND 7 IN THE 1950’S WOULD ONLY BE P138,100.00 IN TODAY’S MONEY, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE SAID PARCELS COULD BE REDEEMED BY THE ESTATE OF FABIAN AND MARIA LLOREN.[15]
Petitioner’s
arguments are fallacious.
With
respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a
combination of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. This is based on the
observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents
while at the same time raising issues of fact alone. Respondents posit that these are indicative of
an “intention to categorize the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of
the Rules of Court” and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded the
Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly
invoked Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[16] the
appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions,
final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.[17] The correct procedure is not to implead the
Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in
several instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in
the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of
Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.[18] The Court of Appeals is herein omitted from
the title of the case, as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality,
in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity.[19]
We
now discuss respondents’ contention that only factual issues have been brought
to this Court.
Under
Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that
only questions of law may be set forth.[20] Questions of fact may not be raised unless the
case falls under any of the following exceptions[21]:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
In
this particular instance, we are clearly faced with issues of fact. A question of fact is involved when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the
query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation.[22] We find that the only questions to be resolved
are the following: (a) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in
affirming the partition of parcel 1 in accordance with the findings of the
trial court; and (b) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in not
finding that exclusive ownership of the properties in question has been vested
in petitioner.
In
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this Court is not a trier
of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case.[23] Factual matters are beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court.[24] In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence
on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. As held in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[25]
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive[26] on the parties and carry even more weight when
the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[27] Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness,
the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a
dismissal.
Setting
aside the procedural defects, the appeal must fail based on the merits. Upon perusal of the records of the case, it is
evident to this Court that no cogent reason exists to disturb the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner
contends that the manner of partition of parcel 1 by the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, is unfair and prejudicial to her interest. However, she was not able to adduce substantial
evidence aliunde to support her
allegations. Respondents stress that the
Fangonil spouses appropriated portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura, Tomas,
Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing out specific areas pertaining to each. Carmen, Tomas, and Marina built their houses
on parcel 1. Prior to the order of
partition, an ocular inspection of parcel 1 was conducted by the RTC to
determine which manner of partition it would approve. During said ocular inspection,
however, the RTC saw existing structures upon which the homes of Carmen, Tomas,
Anent
the rights of the parties pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, petitioner insists
that her act of paying for the repurchase and release from mortgage of parcels
6 and 7 was on the understanding with her parents that she would thereafter be
the owner thereof. She asserts that her
exercise of acts of ownership over parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her
parents and siblings, reveals she is the exclusive owner of these lots. She cites several circumstances in support of
her contention that respondents never considered parcels 6 and 7 part of the
estate of their parents and are not co-owners thereof. First, petitioner presented real estate tax
receipts indicating that she had been the one paying for the realty taxes of
the property. Secondly, petitioner asserts
she has been the only one hiring tenants for and benefiting from the produce of
parcels 6 and 7. Lastly, the non-attempt
of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within 10 years from the death of
the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if indeed such was the agreement,
demonstrates that they never considered the said parcels part of the estate of
their parents.
After
a thorough examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a painstaking
review of the case records, this Court cannot give credence to petitioner’s
stance. The scales of justice
overwhelmingly tilt in favor of respondents and against petitioner’s assertion
that exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 has vested in her. The fact that it was petitioner’s money that
was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner
thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such. This is more
so if other evidence was adduced to show such is not the case. Neither will petitioner’s
exercise of acts of ownership over the properties bring us to that conclusion. It is evident that petitioner was allowed to maintain
possession and enjoy the fruits of the property
only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners.[28] Moreover, although we recognize that real
estate tax receipts indicating payment of realty tax and possession of the
parcels are indicia of ownership,
such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances
and evidence showing otherwise.[29] As a matter of fact, although the receipts indicate that the real estate tax payments for
parcels 6 and 7 for the years following their repurchase and release were made
by petitioner, the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties
is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil.
Petitioner
and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement dated P8,700.00. This amount represents what was paid for by
her for the repurchase and release from the mortgage lien of parcels 6 and 7 in
the 1950s. Pertinent records of the case
reveal that the amount actually advanced for the repurchase was P6,100.00. The aforementioned extrajudicial settlement, which
was later on submitted to the RTC for consideration in the judicial partition,
taken together with petitioner’s comment[30]
in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the
transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan. Under this extrajudicial settlement,
respondents and petitioner included parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of
their deceased parents. It is
particularly stated therein that petitioner and her brother Tomas are the only
creditors of the estate. Although
petitioner’s comment allegedly maintained her claims on parcels 6 and 7, she
categorically admitted therein that the amount totaling P8,700.00 referred to in the extrajudicial
settlement represents the personal money she used for the redemption of parcels
6 and 7.
Thus,
petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and
7. An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that no such
admission was made.[31] We find that petitioner’s affidavit retracting
her acquiescence to the stipulation on parcels 6 and 7 in the extrajudicial
settlement deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier
statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable mistake, retractions
thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence.[32]
As
to the issue of prescription, petitioner’s possession of parcels 6 and 7 did
not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to adverse, open,
continuous, and exclusive possession. In
order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners,
the following elements[33]
must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse
possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents
stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner. Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his
receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of
buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land
taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by
clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other
co-owners.[34] In this case, we find that petitioner effected
no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner’s only act of repudiation of the
co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in
1994. Alternatively, possession by a
co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the
other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them.[35] A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each
owner being a trustee for each other.[36] Mere actual possession by one will not give
rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is,
after all, entitled to possession of the property.[37] Thus,
as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership.[38] An action to demand partition among co-owners
is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property.[39]
On
the matter of laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle of
laches, it being a principle grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[40] Several circumstances must be present. First,
there should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complainant seeks a remedy. Second,
there is delay in asserting the complainant’s right, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit. Third,
defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his claim. Fourth,
the defendant will suffer injury or prejudice in the event relief is accorded
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. Petitioner failed to prove the presence of all
four established requisites of laches. Moreover,
there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances, with the
question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[41] Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to
defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.[42]
Regarding
the issue on the computation of the money to be paid to petitioner as
reimbursement for the amount she advanced to repurchase and release parcels 6
and 7 from the mortgage debt, the Court of Appeals adopted the amount as
computed by the RTC based on the present peso money equivalent.[43] There is a discrepancy between the amount of
indebtedness as quoted by the Court of Appeals from the RTC decision and the
amount cited by the Court of Appeals in the latter part of its decision. However,
the amount stated in the paragraph before the dispositive portion was P130,100.00, without any other indication that it
intended to modify the amount determined by the RTC while the body of the Court
of Appeals decision quoting the RTC decision indicated the amount of
indebtedness as P138,100.00.
There was obviously a typographical error, with the body of the decision
stating that the Court of Appeals was affirming the RTC’s manner of computation
totaling P138,100.00. Moreover, in
the body and dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC’s
decision in toto. Even then, the
amount found by the RTC on the basis of the formula it used in the Order dated
Still
applying the present peso-dollar exchange rate, a slight modification in the
computation is hereby ordered. The present
peso equivalent of the P6,100.00 indebtedness incurred on
The currency
exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar in the 1950s,
which is P2.00:$1.00;
Currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment.
Therefore,
the present peso money equivalent of the P6,100.00 should be derived
from the succeeding formula:
[(Current exchange
rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of
finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)]
multiplied by P6,100.00
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30
January 2004 and (b) its Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 February 2004 are hereby affirmed,
with MODIFICATION as to the amount
to be reimbursed to petitioner. The
present peso equivalent of the P6,100.00 indebtedness is hereby ordered
reimbursed to petitioner which amount shall be computed based on current
peso-dollar exchange rates at the time of finality of judgment, applying the
formula below:
[(Current exchange
rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of
finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)]
multiplied by P6,100.00
The
equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and
every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] The
Court of Appeals was removed from the original title of the case in compliance
with the requirements under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Hereinafter referred to as parcel 6. Rollo, p. 213.
[3] Hereinafter
referred to as parcel 7.
[4] Respondent
Victoria Estoque is the daughter of a brother of the other respondents, the
late
Regional Trial Court Executive Judge Sinforoso
Fangonil.
[5] Hereinafter
referred to as the Fangonil spouses.
[6] Under
this Deed of Mortgage dated
“That I reserve to myself, my heirs, and assigns the
right and to redeem the above mentioned middle portion for the same amount of
One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty (P1,450.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
without interest thereon except enjoying the fruits and products of said
portion of land raised therefrom by the mortgagee until said property is
redeemed, and failure of mortgagor to redeem said property shall remain in full
force and effect and be inforceable (sic) in accordance with law.” Rollo, p. 213.
[7] Under
the pertinent provisions of the Deed of Pacto
de Retro
“That we have agreed with the purchaser that I shall
have the right to repurchase the land above described for the same amount of
One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty (P1,450.00) PESOS, Philippine currency
in any time during the month of May of each year within the period of TEN (10)
years effective from this date of execution of this instrument and that failure
on my part to exercise my right as above stipulated will render this instrument
the character of absolute and irrevocable sale without the necessity of
executing my further deed to consolidate the ownership of the same unto the
vendee.”
[8] Deed
of
“That I hereby
reserve the right to repurchase the said property within the period of
TEN (10) years from and after the execution of this instrument by paying back
to the vendee, his heirs or assigns, the same price of Two Thousand Six Hundred (P2,600.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency; and on my, or my heirs’ or assigns’ failure to exercise the right of
redemption within the period stipulated, this instrument shall automatically
become an absolute deed of sale and absolute title to the property shall become
irrevocably vested in the vendee, his heirs and assigns.”
[9] Paragraph
9 reads:
That,
in all these years, such forbearance of my brothers and sisters on my acts of
ownership and possession of the properties is in abiding with an oral agreement
of partition with our parents who, having caused these properties to be the
subject of sale with pacto de retro or mortgage (salda in the locality),
enjoined their children that whoever redeems or repurchases any or all of these
properties shall take possession of and own the property so redeemed or
repurchased.
Paragraph 12 reads:
That x x x (b) because my signature on the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and Partial Partition have been procured against my better
judgment; and (c) considering that the said properties cannot be the subject of
agreement(s) other than the oral agreement which my brothers and sisters abided
to in all these years, I hereby repudiate my agreement on the portion of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Partial Partition which states on page 5
thereof: “The properties described above as Sixth and Seventh Parcels shall be
partitioned and settled in a separate agreement for the reason that they have
not yet agreed on the manner of the disposal of the same. Records, p. 12.
[10] Records,
pp. 95-96. Computed as:
A. Estate Debt to Petitioner P 8,700.00
Add:
Estate Debt to Tomas P 1,500.00
Total
Estate Debt P10,200.00
Divide
among seven heirs /7
P1,457.00
per heir
B. Estate Debt to Petitioner P8,700.00
Less:
Share in Estate Debt P1,457.00
Amount to be
reimbursed Petitioner P7,243.00
[11] Records,
p. 342.
[12] Penned by Judge Clifton U. Ganay.
[13] Records,
pp. 361-368.
[14] Penned
by Former Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Lucas
P. Bersamin and Godardo A. Jacinto, concurring; rollo, p. 39.
[15] Rollo, pp. 17-19.
[16] 376
Phil. 362, 372-373 (1999), as cited in Macasasa
v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 368, 376.
[17] Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
150241,
[18] Selegna Management and Development
Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 165662,
[19] Anent
the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the correct
procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed
decision. However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the petition for
review on certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal
but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition. Besides, formal
defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous
petitions for review on certiorari that
erroneously impleaded [the Court of Appeals.] In those cases, the Court
merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve
the case on their merits.
The
Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in
this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss
the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to
dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter approach
may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.
Simon v.
Canlas, G.R. No. 148273,
[20] Section
1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
[21] It
should be stressed that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review before this Court. However, this Rule is not
absolute, it admits of the
exceptions, as provided in the text.
Pamplona Plantation Company,
Inc. v. Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, 3
February 2005, 450 SCRA 421, 427-428; Maglucot-aw
v. Maglucot, 385 Phil. 720, 729-730 (2000); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, 11
February 2005, 451 SCRA 63, 68-69; Halili
v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906, 912 (1998); Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168-1169 (1997); Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
105540, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 494, 498-499; Lacanilao
v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 1074, 1079-1080 (1996).
[22] Manzano v. Court of Appeal, 344 Phil.
240, 252-253 (1997).
[23] The Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 274,
283, citing Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86; New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149281, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 227; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Gan, G.R.
No. 150464, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 239, 242-243; Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432 SCRA 329, 336.
[24] Barcenas
v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321,
[25] 274
Phil. 624 (1997).
[26] Agasen v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil.
391, 398-399 (2000); Ancog v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112260, 30 June 1997, 274 SCRA 676, 681, citing Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
82220, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 162, 171; Heirs
of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, 21 October 1993, 227
SCRA 330, 336.
[27] Usero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
152115,
[28]
[29] Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 70825, 11 March 1991, 195 SCRA 38, 44; Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-50420,
[30] Petitioner,
in her comment as intervenor in the aforementioned judicial partition case,
admitted the following:
“That she likewise ADMITS the allegations in paragraph
4 of the petition but hereby adds that it was her personal money which was used
to pay the mortgage indebtedness of the late Fabian Fangonil to Francisca
Saguitan in a document covered by Deed of Mortgage (sixth parcel)
executed on April 20, 1949; that she was the only one among the heirs who paid
the repurchase price in the Deed of Pacto de Retro (sixth parcel) executed by
the late Maria Lloren Vda. de Fangonil in favor of Constantino
Oribello dated December 15, 1953; that it was only the herein
intervenor who paid the repurchase price in the Deed of Sale under Pacto de
Retro executed by Fabian Fangonil in favor of Quirino
Estacio dated December 12, 1949 involving the Seventh Parcel. Rollo, p.
54.
[31] Taken
from the provision on judicial admissions, Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules
of Court.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 389 Phil.
153, 164 (2000).
[37] Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat v. Tamayo,
358 Phil. 797, 803-804 (1998).
[38] Robles v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil.
635, 649 (2000);
[39] Article
494, Civil Code of the
[40] Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil.
18, 27 (1999); Catholic Bishop of Balanga
v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206, 218-219 (1996).
[41] Agra v. Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil. 829, 842-843 (1999), citing Jimenez v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 46364,
[42] Jimenez v. Fernandez, id., cited in Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil.
107, 120-121 (2001).
[43] The
RTC applied the present peso money equivalent based on the proposal of
respondents in their Manifestation/Motion dated
[44] Relevant
provisions of the aforementioned order read:
“The Philippine Peso should have a rate of exchange
with the P42.00:$1.00, then the amount of P6,100.00
in the 1950s has its equivalence at present in the amount of P138,100.00.”
Records, p. 347.