FIRST DIVISION
|
HEIRS OF MIGUEL MADIO, Petitioners, -
versus - HENRY C. LEUNG, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 169161
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August
17, 2007 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Via this
petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the decision[1]
dated
The facts:
On
On July 29, 1964, Miguel Madio (Madio),
Teofilo Quiambao, Emilio Perposi and William Capiao, hereafter collectively
referred to as “protestants,” through counsel, filed a protest for the
cancellation of the Order of Award in question on the following grounds:
1. They are the claimants of
2. Leung failed to comply with specific
requirements under the award; i.e.,
he did not introduce any improvement on the lot since the award was made to him
on
3. They were never notified previously
that
4. They have already built their houses on
5. Under Republic Act No. 730 (RA 730),
they are entitled to acquire the property.
Acting on the protest, the Bureau of Lands
initiated an investigation thereof, and, upon ocular inspection of Lot 8 in
1967,[3]
found several improvements thereon which the protestants introduced, among
which was a one-storey house which Madio claimed to have constructed in 1960.
Based on the assailed decision of the
appellate court, hereunder is the chronology of events that transpired in the
Bureau of Lands in connection with the investigation of the aforementioned
protest:
The initial hearing was scheduled xxx on
On
The next hearing was set on
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
“WHEREFORE, it is ordered, as hereby it is ordered, that the protest and claim of the claimants-protestants be dropped and that they vacate the premises within sixty (60) days from the date of their receipt of copy hereof; and that the District Land Officer concerned conduct an investigation on the alleged non-compliance by the applicant with the conditions of the award, and, thereafter, submit report thereon.”
In compliance with the order dated July
13, 1967, Land Investigator Trisoguno S. Bartolo, Jr. submitted a report xxx with
the following findings: (i) Lot No. 8 is more suitable for residential purposes
and is not needed … for future public improvements; (ii) during the ocular
inspection of Lot No. 8, it was found that [Madio] constructed a house
thereon sometime in 1947, …; and (iii) [Leung] has not made improvements
on Lot No. 8 because it is being occupied by the protestants.
On January 29, 1973, [Madio]
filed a petition with the Bureau of Lands opposing the award of Lot No. 8 to [Leung]
and praying that he be allowed to apply therefor under Rep. Act No. 730 as he
has been in continuous possession thereof since 1947.
On October 3, 1974, the Director of
Lands, xxx informed [Madio] that his petition could not be given due
course because the controversy over the award of Lot No. 8 to [Leung]
had already been resolved in the order dated July 13, 1967 of the Regional
Director in Dagupan City.
In a letter dated
On
On February 21, 1980, [Madio]
filed another petition, this time with the Office of the Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”), and for
reopening of the case, alleging the he has preferential right to Lot No. 8
under Rep. Act No. 730 because of his more than ten years of possession
thereof; that the summary dismissal of his protest against the award to [Leung] was not based on
evidence but on mere technicality; that the order of award in favor of [Leung] should be canceled for
non-compliance with the conditions of the award; xxx
On
On
“IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the
SO ORDERED.”
The decision was based on these findings:
(i) there is no showing that [Madio] actually received the order dated
July 13, 1967 and, therefore, the same never became final and executory; (ii) [Madio]
was denied due process when his protest was dismissed for failure of his
co-protestants to appear for hearing before the Land Investigator; (iii) the
public bidding is invalid for non-compliance with the publication and posting
requirements under Sec. 24 of the Public Land Act; and (iv) [Madio] is
qualified to acquire Lot No. 8 under Rep. Act No. 730 xxx
[Leung] filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision but it was denied on
Aggrieved,
[Leung]
elevated the case to the Office of the President (“OP”) [in O.P. Case No.
97-J-8167]. However, his appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated
“Per the ‘Urgent Motion For Second
Extension Of Time To File Appeal Memorandum and Draft Decision,’ dated December
22, 1997, filed by [Leung], thru his counsel, Atty. Jose R. Erbo, Jr.,
the latter prayed that he ‘be granted a second extension of fifteen (15) days
from December 22, 1997, within which to file the required appeal memorandum and
draft decision for appellant in the above entitled case.’
Considering that as of
‘Section 5. The appeal may be dismissed
for failure to comply with the Order of the Office of the President issued in
connection with the appeal.’
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed
and the records of the case remanded to the office a quo for proper
disposition.”
On September 18, 1998, [Leung],
through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, contrary to
the resolution dated March 12, 1998, his counsel personally filed before the OP
the appeal memorandum, draft decision and affidavit of service on December 29,
1997 as evidenced by said counsel’s file copies of the aforementioned documents
duly stamp-marked “RECEIVED”, dated and initialed by the receiving clerk of the
OP Legal Office.
On
“In the present recourse, [Leung] insists
and alleges that an appeal memorandum and draft decision were in fact filed
together with an affidavit of service, duly marked ‘received’, on December 28,
1997. The records, however, reveal otherwise. To complicate matters, these
documents are not attached to the present motion, contrary to [Leung’s] representation.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
Let the records of the case be remanded
to the DENR for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
(Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Leung took
recourse with the CA by way of a petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62216, thereunder claiming
that the O.P. erred: a) in dismissing his appeal thereto for
failure to file an appeal memorandum and draft decision and in denying his
motion for reconsideration for failure to attach thereto copies of the appeal
memorandum and draft decision; and b) in not setting aside the
June 16, 1992 decision of the DENR OIC-Secretary, which decision invalidated the
award in his favor of Lot 8 and decreed that said lot be sold to Madio instead.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed resolutions of the Office of the President dated
Let this case be
remanded to the Office of the President which is directed to give due course to
[Leung’s] appeal from the decision and order of the Officer-in-Charge-Secretary
of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources dated June 16, 1992 and May 22, 1997, respectively, and to
conduct further proceedings thereon.
SO ORDERED.
In time, Madio
moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by the appellate court in its equally challenged resolution of
With Madio
having evidently died in the meanwhile, his heirs are now with this Court via the present recourse, claiming that
the CA gravely erred -
1.
xxx when it ruled that the Office of the President summarily
dismissed Leung’s appeal;
2.
xxx when it ruled that Leung’s arguments deserved
serious consideration;
3.
xxx when it ruled that the case should be remanded to
the OP for the latter to conduct further proceedings thereon.
We DENY.
It ought to be stressed at the outset that the
issue tendered in this recourse turns on whether or not the O.P. erred in
dismissing, for the reason set forth in its resolution of
First, We find perplexing the conflicting
claims of the OP and petitioner [Leung] on the filing of the documents
[referring to the appeal memorandum and draft decision] in question. Petitioner’s file copies of said
documents clearly bear stamp markings
indicating receipt by the OP Legal Office. (Words in brackets and emphasis
added.
.
At
bottom then, the O.P.’s dismissal action
has no factual support and thus should
be struck down, as the CA correctly did. But assuming, for the nonce, that the
necessary documents were indeed not filed, the imperatives of fair play would
have impelled the O.P. to ask for an explanation, instead of proceeding with
its outright dismissal action based on technicality, given that Leung’s case
appears to be prima facie meritorious.
In this regard, we quote with approval what the CA said:
At any rate,
assuming that the documents in question were not filed together with the motion
for reconsideration, possibly due to oversight or inadvertence, the OP would
have done well to require the submission of the omitted attachments, instead of
outrightly denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Indeed, judicial action by a party-litigant
must be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint
or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities (Paras vs. Baldonado, 354 SCRA 141). This rule rings true in administrative
proceedings where technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied (Ocampo
vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17).
On the
substantive aspect, We find prima facie
merit in petitioner’s appeal as discussed in his appeal memorandum. Instead of dismissing the appeal on
technicality, the OP should have pondered upon petitioner’s arguments, one of
which is that the order dated
xxx xxx xxx
Equally deserving
serious consideration is petitioner’s argument that Sec. 79 (which merely
requires “due notice”)- not Sec. 24 – of the Public Land Act is the applicable
rule on the publication and posting requirements of sale of lots in townsite
reservations.
Be that as it
may, we shall not resolve petitioner’s appeal, as it was summarily dismissed
without respondent being afforded the chance to give his side of the
controversy.
Finally,
dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. The rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid and technical sense for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice (Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, 376
SCRA 459).
Lest it be misunderstood,
this, as was the CA’s disposition, is not meant to resolve the substantive
merits of the respective claims of the herein parties over a public land.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed decision and resolution of the CA, dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(No
part)
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice