THIRD DIVISION
|
ALEX B.
CARLOS, ABC SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and HONEST CARE JANITORIAL SERVICES,
INC., Petitioners,
-
versus - COURT
OF APPEALS, PERFECTO P. PIZARRO, JOEL B. DOCE, GUILLERMO F. SOLOMON, FRANCISCO
U. CORPUS and RONILLO GALLEGO, Respondents. |
|
G.R.
No. 168096 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August
28, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
filed by petitioners Alex B. Carlos (Carlos), ABC Security Services, Inc. (ABC
Security), and Honest Care Janitorial Services, Inc. (Honest Care Janitorial),
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,[1]
dated 31 August 2004 and the Resolution,[2]
dated 9 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74458. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision
and Resolution affirmed the Decision dated 19 July 2002 and Resolution dated 30
August 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR-06-04079-93
finding the petitioners jointly and severally liable for illegal dismissal, and
ordering them to pay the private respondents backwages, separation pay,
overtime pay, 13th month pay, premium pay for rest days and
holidays, and service incentive leave pay.
The dispositive portion of the assailed appellate court’s Decision thus
reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant
petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly DISMISSED. Consequently, the decision dated July 19,
2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.[3]
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant
petition are as follows:
Petitioner ABC Security is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of job contracting by providing security services to its clientele.
Petitioner Honest Care Janitorial is a domestic
corporation likewise engaged in job contracting janitorial services. It appears that Honest Care Janitorial was
consolidated with ABC Security and the consolidated corporations are
represented in this action by its president, Alex B. Carlos.
Private respondents Perfecto P. Pizzaro (Pizzaro), Joel B. Doce
(Doce), Francsico U. Corpus (Corpus) and Ronillo Gallego (Gallego) were
employed by petitioner ABC Security as security guards and were assigned to Greenvalley
Country Club at the time they were allegedly separated from employment. Private respondent Pizzaro was already with
petitioner ABC Security since 1975, while private respondent Corpus was
employed in 1990. Private respondents Doce
and Gallego were both hired in 1987.[4] Private respondent Solomon was employed by
Honest Care Janitorial as janitor supervisor since 1975 and was posted to
different offices.[5]
On 22 July 1993, private respondents filed a
Joint/Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[6]
against petitioners praying for the payment of minimum wage, 13th
month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, cost of living allowance and
clothing allowance.
As shown by the Registry Return Receipt,[7]
petitioners received a copy of the complaint and the corresponding summons on
16 July 1993. On the following day, private
respondents Pizzaro, Solomon and Doce were allegedly relieved from their posts
and were not given new assignments. Subsequently,
private respondents Gallego and Corpus were also allegedly dismissed from
employment.[8]
Private respondents claimed that every time they received
their salaries, they were made to sign two sets of pay slips, one was written in
ink while the other was written in pencil.
These two pay slips showed the amount of salaries they actually received,
which was below the minimum; but since the entries written on one of the pay
slips they signed were in pencil, there
was a possibility that petitioners could alter the said entries to make it
appear that they were compliant with the labor laws.
For its part, petitioners averred that private respondents
were not dismissed but voluntarily resigned from their respective employments as
evidenced by the resignation letters bearing their signatures. Petitioners claimed that after private
respondents’ assignment to Greenvalley Country Club ended, they were reassigned
to other posts as an exercise of management prerogative, but they refused to
transfer and opted to resign. In addition, petitioners alleged that private
respondents’ resignations were prompted by the loss of bowling equipment in
their custody, which they were obliged to pay.
Petitioners further asseverated that the private respondents
were paid the minimum wage in accordance with the standards prescribed by the labor
laws and received benefits including the overtime pay, cost of living
allowance, night differential pay, premium pay and 13th month pay as
evidenced by the General Payroll of the company. Private respondents’ signatures appeared on
the said General Payroll, signifying that they were able to receive the wages
and benefits in accordance with the standard set by law.
On 31 August 1999, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioners
submitted overwhelming documentary evidence to refute the bare allegations of
the private respondents and thereby dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The dispositive part of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision[9] reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises all considered, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings by
giving more evidentiary weight to private respondents’ testimonies in light of
the factual circumstances of the case and thus declared that there was illegal
dismissal. It appears that petitioners
received a copy of private respondents’ complaint on 16 July 1993, and shortly
thereafter, private respondents were dismissed from employment. The decretal portion of the NLRC Decision[10]
reads:
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED.
The [herein
petitioners], who are hereby declared to be jointly and severally liable for
the monetary awards, are hereby ordered to pay the [herein private respondents]
the following: (1) backwages (computed on the basis of the applicable minimum
wage rate on July 17, 1990) from the said date up to the date of the
promulgation of this decision; (2) separation pay equivalent to one month’s
salary for every year of service from the date of hiring to the date of the
promulgation of this Decision; and (3) for the unexpired 3-year period,
overtime pay of four (4) hours daily, 13th month pay, premium pay
for restdays and holidays, and service incentive leave pay.
Both petitioners and private respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the above-quoted NLRC Decision. Petitioners prayed for the NLRC to vacate its
previous ruling finding them liable for illegal dismissal and for the monetary
claims of the private respondents. On the
other hand, private respondents prayed that, in addition to monetary awards, attorney’s
fees be also awarded in their favor.
In a Resolution[11]
dated 30 August 2002, the NLRC denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
the parties for lack of cogent reason or palpable error to disturb its earlier
findings.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the NLRC
abused its discretion in giving more credence to the empty allegations advanced
by private respondents as against the overwhelming documentary evidence on
record which was fully substantiated by the testimonial evidence they submitted
during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
On 31 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
affirming in toto the NLRC Decision.
The appellate court declared that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in giving more evidentiary weight to the evidence
submitted by the private respondents.
In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the defense
posed by petitioners that private respondents were not dismissed from
employment but voluntarily resigned therefrom, is not plausible in light of the
prompt filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. Indeed, resignation is inconsistent with the
filing of action for illegal dismissal.
Similarly ill-fated was petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated 9 May 2005.
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioners assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
and raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE PETITIONER
ALEX B. CARLOS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE JUDGMENT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE [PRIVATE RESPONDENTS]
WERE IMPROPERLY PAID OF THEIR SALARIES AND WAGES AS WELL AS BENEFITS UNDER THE
LAW.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT [PRIVATE RESPONDENTS] WERE
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY [PETITIONERS].
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION
ISSUED BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE NLRC SHERIFF IS IMPROPER.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS [RESPONDENTS]
SHOULD BE ADJUDGED OF BACK WAGES DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE.[12]
At the outset, we must stress that this Court is not a trier
of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties considering that, as general rule, the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court.[13] We have likewise held that factual findings of
labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even
finality, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[14]
Notably, the question of whether or not the private
respondents were illegally dismissed from employment or voluntarily resigned
therefrom, as well as the issue of whether or not they are entitled to the monetary
awards they are claiming, are factual matters that should not be delved into by
this Court.
As borne by the records, it appears that there is a
divergence in the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter on one hand, from those
of the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on the other. For the purpose of clarity and
intelligibility therefore, this Court will make a scrunity of the decisions of
the labor officials and appellate court and ascertain whose findings are supported
by evidence on record.
The Labor Arbiter found that the private respondents
voluntarily resigned from employment, since they refused to be assigned to
another work station. The new assignment
effected by petitioners was in valid exercise of their management prerogative
which should not take precedence over private respondents’ personal
interests. The NLRC and the Court of
Appeals found otherwise.
In finding that private respondents were illegally
dismissed, the Court of Appeals declared that the alleged resignations of the
private respondents were inconsistent with their filing of the complaint for
illegal dismissal. It decreed that it is
illogical for private respondents to resign and then file a complaint for
illegal dismissal thereafter.
For its part, the NLRC found that the confluence of the
factual circumstances as to the date of the receipt by the petitioners of the
copy of the complaint filed by private respondents, which was in close
succession to the time when private respondents were relieved from their posts,
leads to the reasonable conclusion that petitioners were indeed illegally
dismissed in retaliation for their filing of a complaint for money claims.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals. They are
more in accord with prudence, logic, common sense and sound judgment.
Time
and again we have ruled that in illegal dismissal cases like the present one,
the onus of proving that the employee
was not dismissed or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests on
the employer and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal.[15]
Thus,
petitioners must not only rely on the weakness of private respondents’ evidence,
but must stand on the merits of their own defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support
his allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation and unreliable documentary evidence cannot stand, as
it will offend due process.
Petitioners
failed to discharge this burden.
Petitioners’
complete reliance on the alleged resignation letters to support their claim
that private respondents voluntarily resigned is unavailing, as the filing of
the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.[16]
Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal
reasons to dissociate themselves from their employment. It must be done
with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.[17]
It is
illogical for private respondents to resign and then file a complaint for
illegal dismissal. We find it highly unlikely that private respondents
would just quit their jobs because they refused to take new assignments or attempted
to avoid any monetary liability for the purported loss of bowling equipment, after
enduring long years of working for the petitioners, notwithstanding the meager
salary they were receiving and the lack of the appropriate labor and social
benefits. It would have been equally
senseless for private respondents to file a complaint seeking payment of their
salaries and benefits, as mandated by law, then abandon subsequently and
immediately their work by resigning.
In the same breath, we agree with the NLRC that the General
Payrolls submitted by petitioners cannot be given the stature of substantial
evidence, not only because of evident inconsistencies of the entries therein with
the factual circumstances surrounding their preparation, but also because there
is a high possibility that they could have been manipulated, given that the
General Payrolls are within the complete control and custody of the
petitioners. We thus quote with approval
the findings of the NLRC:
Not only were
the [herein private respondents] one in testifying that they did not receive the
salaries stated in the payrolls submitted by the [herein petitioners] – they
were able to show that the payrolls in question were a sham because [private
respondent] Doce, whose signature appears on the payroll for January 1-15,
1990, could not have signed the same, since at that time he was assigned, not
in Greenvalley Country Club, but in Ajinomoto. Falsus in unius, falsus in omnibus.
The payrolls may not be given any weight.
As a result, full weight must be accorded to [private respondents’]
testimonies to the effect that they worked twelve hours daily, and were not
paid overtime pay, 13th month pay and premium pay for Sundays and
holidays.[18]
The
above-quoted NLRC Decision is anchored on the substantial evidence culled from
the records that swayed the reasonable mind of this Court to adopt its
conclusion. Surely, petitioners cannot
expect this Court to sustain its stance and accord full evidentiary weight to
the documentary and testimonial evidence they adduced in the absence of clear,
convincing and untarnished proof to discharge the allegations of the private
respondents. Having failed in this
regard, we are constrained to sustain the findings of the NLRC as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in light of the time-honored dictum that should doubt exist between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter.[19]
Accordingly,
this Court finds no reason to disturb the monetary awards for backwages,
separation pay, overtime pay, 13th month pay, premium pay, holiday
and service incentive leave pays ordered by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the monetary
awards, we find that the grant of backwages was likewise proper, with some
modification as to the computation of separation pay.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to other
benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.[20]
In explaining the rationale of this rule,
we thus held in De la Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission that[21]:
The provision gives meaning to the laborer’s constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure and finds solid basis on the universal principles of justice
and equity. The grant of back wages
allows the unjustly and illegally dismissed employee to recover from the
employer that which the former lost by way of wages as a result of his
dismissal from employment.
Undoubtedly, private respondents are entitled to the payment
of full backwages, that is, without deducting their earnings elsewhere during
the periods of their illegal dismissal.
However, where, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer feasible due
to strained relations between the parties, separation pay equivalent to one
month’s salary for every year of service shall be granted.[22]
The question now arises:
when is the period for computation of backwages and separation pay
supposed to end? This question was
squarely addressed in Gaco v. National
Labor Relations Commission[23] where it was held that in such circumstance,
the computation shall be up to the time of finality of this Court's decision. Apparently, the justification is that along
with the finality of this Court's decision, the issue of illegal dismissal is
finally laid to rest.[24]
The petitioners’ insistence that they cannot be held liable
for backwages during the period of the pendency of this action for they cannot
be faulted for the delay of the disposition of this case cannot take precedence
over the long-standing and well-entrenched jurisprudential rule.
Parenthetically, the award for separation pay equivalent to
one-month pay for every year of service shall be computed from the time the
private respondents were illegally separated from their employment up to the
finality of this Court’s Decision in the instant petition.
Furthermore, petitioners argue that the veil of corporate
fiction of petitioners ABC Security and Honest Care Janitorial should not be
pierced, because said corporations have personalities separate and distinct
from their stockholders and from each other.
The petitioners must concede that they raised this issue
belatedly, not having done so before the labor tribunals, but only before the
appellate court. Fundamental is the rule
that theories and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However, even if this argument were to be
addressed at this time, the Court still finds no reason to uphold it.[25]
Basic in corporation
law is the principle that a corporation has a separate personality distinct
from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. This feature flows from the legal theory that
a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its stockholders.[26]
However, the statutorily granted privilege of a corporate
veil may be used only for legitimate purposes.
On equitable considerations, the veil can be disregarded when it is
utilized as a shield to commit fraud, illegality or inequity; defeat public
convenience; confuse legitimate issues; or serve as a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person or an instrumentality, agency or adjunct of
another corporation. The legal fiction
of a separate corporate personality in those cited instances, for reasons of
public policy and in the interest of justice, will be justifiably set aside.[27]
Petitioner Carlos admitted that he is not only the
stockholder of petitioners ABC Security and Honest Care Janitorial, but the
General Manager of said corporations as well.
Being the General Manager of these corporations, it is assumed that petitioner
Carlos possessed complete control of their affairs including matters pertaining
to personnel management, which includes the rates of pay, hours of work,
selection or engagement of the employees, manner of accomplishing their work,
and their hiring and dismissal. It is
highly plausible then that petitioner Carlos had a hand not only in unilaterally
terminating the private respondents’ employment, but also in paying private
respondents’ wages below minimum and denying them the benefits accorded by the
Labor Standard Law which includes, but is not limited to, the payment of night-shift
differential, overtime pay, premium pay and 13th month pay.
We cannot allow petitioner Carlos to
hide behind the cloak of corporate fiction in order to evade liability. It bears repeating that the corporate veil
must be pierced and disregarded when it is utilized to commit fraud, illegality
or inequity.
Lastly, petitioners’ contention that
the execution of the NLRC Decision pending review of this case is detrimental
to their interest is equally unavailing.
The pertinent provisions of the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission provides:
Rule VII
Proceeding Before the Commission
x
x x x
Section
14. Finality
of Decision of the Commission and Entry of Judgment. –
a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions
or Orders of the Commission. – Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the
decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
b) Entry of Judgment. – Upon the
expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period provided in paragraph (a) of
this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be entered in a book of
entries of judgment.
The
Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider the decision,
resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) calendar days from
the date of mailing in the absence of return cards, certifications from the
post office, or other proof of service to parties.
SECTION
15. MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION. –
Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the
Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent
errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of
service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary
period, the adverse party; and provided further, that only such motion from the
same party shall be entertained.
Should
a motion for reconsideration be entertained pursuant to this section, the
resolution shall be executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
RULE XI
Execution Proceedings
x
x x x
SECTION
10. Effect
of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. – A petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall
not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is
issued by said courts. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Prescinding from the above, the
private respondents had a clear right to move for the execution of the monetary
award of the NLRC pending appeal. The
rule is in harmony with the social justice principle that poor employees who
have been deprived of their only source of livelihood should be provided the
means to support their families.
Having said that, we need not further
press that the proposition of the petitioners assailing the order granting
execution pending appeal of the NLRC Decision should fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 August
2004 and its Resolution dated 9 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74458 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of backwages which shall be computed
from the date of the private respondents’ dismissal up to the finality of this
judgment. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto
and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring. Rollo, pp. 5-10.
[2] Rollo,
p. 11.
[3] Id.
at 10.
[4] Records,
p. 3.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
at 3-9.
[7] Id.
at 18-19.
[8] Id.
at 58.
[9] Id.
at 450-457.
[10] Id.
at 502-506.
[11] Id.
at 543-547.
[12] Id.
at 87-88.
[13] The Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 275,
283.
[14] Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Llamera,
G.R. No. 152514, 12 July 2005, 463 SCRA 254, 260-261.
[15] Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation
v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 437.
[16] Kay Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 162472, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 544, 554-557.
[17] Domondon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 154376, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 559, 568-569.
[18] Records,
p. 505.
[19] Gu-Miro v. Adorable, G.R. No. 160952, 20
August 2004, 437 SCRA 162, 168.
[20] Article
279, Labor Code of the Philippines.
[21] 359
Phil. 316, 329 (1998).
[22] Atlas Farms v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 440 Phil. 620, 635-636 (2002).
[23] G.R.
No. 104690, 23 February 1994, 230 SCRA 260, 269.
[24] Surima v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 353 Phil. 461, 471 (1998).
[25] San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 631, 648 (1998).
[26] Id.
at 644.
[27] Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 368 Phil. 374, 384-385 (1999).