THIRD DIVISION
|
LICOMCEN INCORPORATED, Petitioner, - versus - FOUNDATION
SPECIALISTS, INC., Respondent. x ------------------------------------------x FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., Petitioner, - versus - LICOMCEN
INCORPORATED and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 167022
G.R. No. 169678
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is
the November 23, 2004 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 78218, as well as the
Resolutions dated February 4, 2005[2]
and September 13, 2005,[3]
denying the motions for its reconsideration.
Liberty Commercial Center, Inc.
(LICOMCEN) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating shopping
malls. In March 1997, the City Government of Legaspi leased its lot in the
Central District of Legaspi to LICOMCEN. The Lease Contract was based on the
Build-Operate-Transfer Scheme under which LICOMCEN will finance, develop and
construct the LCC City Mall (CITIMALL).
LICOMCEN engaged E.S. De Castro and Associates (ESCA) as its engineering
consultant for the project.
On
Upon
receipt of the notice to proceed, FSI commenced work and undertook to complete
it within ninety (90) days, all in accordance with the approved drawing, plans,
and specifications.
In
the course of the construction, LICOMCEN revised the design for the CITIMALL
involving changes in the bored piles and substantial reduction in number and
length of the piles. ESCA, thus,
informed FSI of the major revision on
On
On
FSI
demanded payment for its work accomplishments, material costs, and standby off
equipment, as well as other expenses amounting to P22,667,026.97,[12]
but LICOMCEN took no heed.
On
FSI
reiterated its demand for payment from LICOMCEN, but the latter failed and
refused to pay, prompting FSI to file a petition for arbitration with the CIAC,
docketed as CIAC Case No. 37-2002.
LICOMCEN denied the claim of FSI,
arguing that it lacks factual and legal basis.
It also assailed the jurisdiction of the CIAC to take cognizance of the
suit, claiming that jurisdiction over the controversy was vested in the regular
courts, and that arbitration under the GC-61 of the GCC may only be resorted to
if the dispute concerns the execution of works, not if it concerns breach of
contract.
During the preliminary conference, the
parties agreed to submit the controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal and signed
the Terms of Reference (TOR).[16]
But on
On
After due proceedings, the CIAC rendered
a Decision[19]
in favor of FSI, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Claimant FOUNDATION SPECIALIST, INC. and against Respondent LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, ordering the latter to pay to the former the following amounts:
1. P14,643,638. 51 representing
material costs at site;
2. P2,957,989.94 representing payment
for equipment and labor standby costs;
3. P5,120,000.00 representing
unrealized profit; and
4. P1,264,404.12 representing the
unpaid balance of FSI's billing.
FURTHER, the
said Respondent is ordered to solely and exclusively bear the entire cost of
arbitration proceedings in the total amount of P474,407.95 as indicated in the TOR, and to reimburse the
herein Claimant of any amount thereof which it had advanced and paid pursuant
to TOR.
All the above-awarded
amounts shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the date of the formal demand
on
SO ORDERED.[20]
LICOMCEN
elevated the CIAC Decision to the CA. It
faulted the CIAC for taking cognizance of the case, arguing that it has no
jurisdiction over the suit. It also assailed the award and the ruling that the
contract had been terminated, allegedly for lack of factual and legal
basis.
On
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the
assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that paragraph 1 of
the dispositive portion is amended and accordingly, petitioner is ordered to
pay only the amount of P5,694,939.865
representing the material costs at site; and paragraphs 2 and 3 on equipment
and labor standby costs and unrealized profit of the same dispositive portion
are deleted. The rest is AFFIRMED
in all respects. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Both LICOMCEN and FSI filed motions for
partial reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolutions
dated
LICOMCEN and FSI reacted with the
instant petitions. Considering that the
cases involve the same parties, issues and assailed decision, this Court
ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 167022 and G.R. No. 169678 in its Resolution
dated
LICOMCEN raised the following issues:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT WAS MERELY SUSPENDED AND NOT TERMINATED.
2.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIBUNAL HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE.
3.
WHETHER OR NOT FSI IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM ANY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
4.
WHETHER OR NOT LICOMCEN IS THE PARTY AT FAULT.[24]
FSI, on the
other hand, interposes the following:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING TO PETITIONER THE FULL AMOUNT OF MATERIAL COSTS AT THE SITE.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR EQUIPMENT AND LABOR STANDBY COSTS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR UNREALIZED PROFIT.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A MERE MINUTE RESOLUTION IN RESOLVING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION.[25]
First,
we resolve the issue of the CIAC’s jurisdiction.
LICOMCEN
insists that the CIAC had no jurisdiction over the suit. Citing GC-05 and GC-61 of the GCC, it posits
that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the regular courts of
The argument is misplaced.
The power and authority of a court to
hear, try, and decide a case is defined as jurisdiction. Elementary is the distinction between
jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person. The former is conferred by the Constitution
or by law, while the latter is acquired by virtue of the party's voluntary
submission to the authority of the court through the exercise of its coercive
process.[26]
Section 4 of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1008, or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, provides:
SECTION
4. Jurisdiction. — The CIAC shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or
connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in
the
The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual provisions; amount of damages and penalties; commencement time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.
Excluded
from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee
relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the
Corollarily,
Section 1, Article III of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provides that recourse to the
CIAC may be availed of whenever a contract contains a clause for the submission
of a future controversy to arbitration, thus:
SECTION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction. — An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.
Clearly
then, the CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have
agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.[27]
The
GCC signed by LICOMCEN and FSI had the following arbitral clause:
GC-61 DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION
Should any dispute of any kind arise between the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED and the Contractor or the Engineer and the Contractor in connection with, or arising out of the execution of the Works, such dispute shall first be referred to and settled by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED who shall within a period of thirty (30) days after being formally requested by either party to resolve the dispute, issue a written decision to the Engineer and Contractor.
Such decision shall be final and binding upon the parties and the Contractor shall proceed with the execution of the Works with due diligence notwithstanding any Contractor’s objection to the decision of the Engineer. If within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’s decision on the dispute, either party does not officially give notice to contest such decision through arbitration, the said decision shall remain final and binding. However, should any party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’s decision contest said decision, the dispute shall be submitted for arbitration under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, Executive Order 1008. The arbitrators appointed under said rules and regulations shall have full power to open up, revise and review any decision, opinion, direction, certificate or valuation of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED. Neither party shall be limited to the evidence or arguments put before the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED for the purpose of obtaining his said decision. No decision given by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED shall disqualify him from being called as a witness and giving evidence in the arbitration. It is understood that the obligations of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, the Engineer and the Contractor shall not be altered by reason of the arbitration being conducted during the progress of the Works.[28]
LICOMCEN
theorizes that this arbitration clause cannot vest jurisdiction in the CIAC,
because it covers only disputes arising out of or in connection with the
execution of works, whether permanent or temporary. It argues that since the claim of FSI was not
connected to or did not arise out of the execution of the
works as contemplated in GC-61, but is based
on alleged breach
of contract, under GC-05[29]
of the GCC, the dispute can only be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts. Furthermore, FSI failed to
comply with the condition precedent for arbitration. Thus, according to LICOMCEN, the CIAC erred
in assuming jurisdiction over the case.
Contrary
to what LICOMCEN wants to portray, the CIAC validly acquired jurisdiction over
the dispute. Firstly, LICOMCEN submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the CIAC when its president Antonio S. Tan signed
the TOR[30]
during the preliminary conference. The
TOR states:
V. MODE OF ARBITRATION
The
parties agree that their differences be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal who
were appointed in accordance with the provision of Article V, Section 2 of the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing
Construction Arbitration, as follows:
SALVADOR C. CEGUERA
Chairman
FELISBERTO G.L. REYES
Member
SALVADOR P. CASTRO, JR.
Member
The case shall be decided in accordance with the Contract of the parties and the Construction Industry Arbitration Law (Executive Order No. 1008) and on the basis of evidence submitted, applicable laws, and industry practices where applicable under the law.[31]
Secondly,
we agree with the CA that the suit arose from the execution of works defined in
the contract. As it aptly ratiocinated:
[T]he
dispute between [FSI] and [LICOMCEN] arose out of or in connection with the
execution of works. [LICOMCEN] has gone
quite far in interpreting “disputes arising out of or in connection with the
execution of work” as separate and distinct from “disputes arising out of or in
connection with the contract” citing the various provisions of the Construction
Agreement and Bid Documents to preclude CIAC from taking cognizance of the
case. To the mind of this Court, such
differentiation is immaterial. Article
1374 of the Civil Code on the interpretation of contracts ordains that “the
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing
to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.” Essentially, while we agree
that [FSI’s] money claims against [LICOMCEN] arose out of or in connection with
the contract, the same necessarily arose from the work it accomplished or
sought to accomplish pursuant thereto.
Thus, said monetary claims can be categorized as a dispute arising out
of or in connection with the execution of work.[32]
Thirdly,
FSI complied with the condition precedent provided in GC-61. Record shows that FSI referred the claim to
ESCA on
Just
as meaningful, the issue of jurisdiction was rendered moot by LICOMCEN's active
participation in the proceedings before the CIAC. It is true that LICOMCEN initially assailed
the jurisdiction of the CIAC. But when
the CIAC asserted its jurisdiction in its
Having resolved the issue of
jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits of the case.
LICOMCEN
faults the CIAC and the CA for ruling that the contract had been terminated,
insisting that it was merely indefinitely suspended. To bolster its position,
LICOMCEN cited GC-41 of the GCC which reads:
GC-41 LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’S RIGHT TO SUSPEND WORK OR TERMINATE THE CONTRACT
x x x x
2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED
If any time before completion of work under the Contract it shall be found by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that reasons beyond the control of the parties render it impossible or against the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to complete the work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at any time, by written notice to the Contractor, may discontinue the work and terminate the Contract in whole or in part. Upon issuance of such notice of termination, the Contractor shall discontinue the work in such manner, sequence and at such time as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct, continuing and doing after said notice only such work and only until such time or times as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this
provision does not support but enervates its theory of indefinite suspension. The cited provision may be invoked only in
cases of termination of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase “discontinue
the work and terminate the contract.” And in statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or
union.[42] Thus, by invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in
effect, admitted that the contract had already been terminated.
The termination of the contract was
made obvious and unmistakable when LICOMCEN’s new project consultant rebidded
the contract for the bored piling works for the CITIMALL.[43] The claim that the rebidding was conducted
for purposes of getting cost estimates for a possible new design[44]
taxes our credulity. It impresses us as
nothing more than a lame attempt of LICOMCEN to avoid liability under the
contract. As the CIAC had taken pains to
demonstrate:
Suspension
of work is ordinarily understood to mean a temporary work stoppage or a
cessation of work for the time being. It
may be assumed that, at least initially, LCC had a valid reason to suspend the
Works on
Perhaps because of this LCC came up with the assertion that what we have is an “indefinite suspension.” There is no such term in the Construction Agreement or the Contract Documents. In fact, it is unknown in the construction industry. Construction work may either be suspended or terminated, but never indefinitely suspended. Since it is not sanctioned by practice and not mentioned in the herein Construction Agreement and the Contract Documents, “indefinite suspension” is irregular and invalid. Due to the apparent incongruity of an “indefinite suspension,” LCC changed the term to “continued suspension” in its Memorandum. Unfortunately for it, the factual situation remains unchanged. The Works stay suspended for an indefinite period of time.[45]
Accordingly,
the CA did not err in affirming the CIAC ruling that the contract had already
been terminated.
Neither
can LICOMCEN find refuge in the principle of laches to steer clear of
liability. It is not just the lapse of time or
delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or
declined to assert it. [46]
Indeed, FSI filed its
petition for arbitration only on
The doctrine of laches is
based upon grounds of public policy which require, for the peace of society,
discouraging stale claims. It is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice. [49]
We now come to the monetary awards
granted to FSI. LICOMCEN avers that the
award lacked factual and legal basis. FSI, on the other hand, posits otherwise,
and cries foul on the modification made by the CA. It asserts that the CA erred in disregarding
the pieces of evidence that it submitted in support of the claim despite the
lack of objection and opposition from LICOMCEN.
It insists entitlement to the full amount of material costs at site, for
equipment and labor standard costs, as well as unrealized profits.
In this connection, we
must emphasize the distinction between admissibility of evidence and its
probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is not objected to does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively
proves the fact in dispute. The
admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are
to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.[50]
We
have carefully gone over the records and are satisfied that the findings of the
CA are well supported by evidence. As mentioned above, the contract between
LICOMCEN and FSI had already been terminated and, in such case, the GCC
expressly provides that:
GC-42 PAYMENT FOR TERMINATED CONTRACT
If the Contract is terminated as aforesaid, the Contractor will be paid for all items of work executed, and satisfactorily completed and accepted by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED up to the date of termination, at the rates and prices provided for in the contract and in addition:
1. The cost of partially accomplished items of additional or extra work agreed upon by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED and the Contractor.
2. The cost of materials or goods reasonably ordered for the Permanent or Temporary Works which have been delivered to the Contractor but not yet used and which delivery has been certified by the Engineer.
3. The reasonable cost of demobilization
For any payment due the Contractor under the above conditions, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, however, shall deduct any outstanding balance due from the Contractor for advances in respect to mobilization and materials, and any other sum the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED is entitled to be credited.[51]
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the liability of LICOMCEN for the cost of materials on site is only P5,694,939.85.
The said award represents the materials reasonably ordered for the project and which
were delivered to the job site. FSI cannot demand full payment of the steel
bars under Purchase Order No. 6035.[52] As shown by the records, the steel bars were
loaded at M/V Alberto only on
LICOMCEN,
however, cannot deny liability for 50% of the steel bars because, as mentioned,
it ordered their delivery to the jobsite. The steel bars had in fact
been delivered to the jobsite and inventoried by Cesar Cortez of ESCA,[56]
contrary to LICOMCEN’s claim. The
payment of these materials is, therefore, in order, pursuant to GC-41:
The Contractor shall receive compensation for reasonable expenses
incurred in good faith for the performance of the Contract and for reasonable
expenses associated with the termination of the Contract. x x x.[57]
We also uphold the denial
of FSI’s claim for equipment and labor standard costs, as no convincing
evidence was presented to prove it. The
list of rented equipment[58]
and the list of workers[59]
offered by FSI and which were admitted by CIAC, are far from being clear and
convincing proof that FSI actually incurred the expenses stated therein.
As aptly said by the CA,
FSI should have presented convincing pieces of documentary evidence, such as the
lease contract or the receipts of payment issued by the owners of the rented
equipment, to establish the claim. As to
its claimed labor expenses, the list of employees does not categorically prove
that these listed employees were actually employed at the construction site
during the suspension. Hence, even
assuming that LICOMCEN failed to submit evidence to rebut these lists, they do not ipso facto translate into duly proven
facts. FSI still had the burden of proving its cause of action, because it is
the one asserting entitlement to an affirmative relief.[60] On this score, FSI failed. The CA, therefore,
committed no reversible error in denying the claim.
FSI’s claim for
unrealized profit has to be rejected too. GC-41 specifically provided that:
x x x The Contractor shall have no claim for anticipated profits on the work thus terminated, nor any other claim, except for work actually performed at the time of complete discontinuance, including any variations authorized by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer to be done under the section dealing with variation, after the date of said order, and for any claims for variations accruing up to the date of said notice of termination.[61] (Emphasis supplied)
The provision was agreed upon by the parties freely, and
significantly, FSI did not question this.
It is not for the Court to change the stipulations in the contract when they
are not illegal. Article 1306 of the
Civil Code provides that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.[62] Besides, no convincing proof was offered to
prove the claim. In light of the
foregoing, the CA, therefore, correctly denied the claim for unrealized profit.
Similarly, we agree with the CIAC and the CA that LICOMCEN
should bear the cost of arbitration as it adamantly refused to pay FSI’s just
and valid claim, prompting the latter to institute a petition for arbitration.
In sum, we find
no reason to disturb the decision of the CA. It cannot be faulted for denying
FSI’s motion for reconsideration through a mere Minute Resolution, for as we held
in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:[63]
The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these being, x x x deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.
WHEREFORE, the herein petitions for review are DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1695-1713.
[2]
[3]
[4] Exhibit “A,” CIAC records, Folder II, pp. 419-429.
[5] Exhibits “B-14” to “B-50,” id. at 444-480.
[6] TSN,
[7] Letter dated
[8] Letter dated
[9] TSN,
[10] Letter dated
[11] Letter dated
[12] Letters dated
[13] Exhibit “14,” id. at 764-765.
[14] Exhibit “15,” id. at 766.
[15] Exhibit “I-1,” id. at 523.
[16] CIAC records, Folder I, pp. 369-375.
[17]
[18] CIAC records, Folder II, pp. 697-698.
[19] CIAC records, Folder IV, pp. 1448-1462.
[20]
[21] CA rollo, Vol. IV, p. 1713.
[22]
[23]
[24] Memorandum, rollo (G.R. No. 167022 ),Vol. II, pp. 1914-1915.
[25] Memorandum, id. at 2130.
[26] Arnado
v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543,
[27] Philrock, Inc. v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 412 Phil 236, 245 (2001).
[28] Exhibit “B-50,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 480.
[29] GC-05. JURISDICTION
Any question between the contracting parties that may arise out of or in connection with the Contract or breach thereof shall be litigated in the courts of Legaspi, except where otherwise specifically stated or except when such question is submitted for settlement thru arbitration as provides herein.
[30] CIAC records, Folder I, pp. 369-375.
[31]
[32] CA rollo, Vol. IV, p. 1702.
[33] Supra note 12.
[34] Exhibit “L,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 543.
[35] Exhibit “L-2,” id. at 545.
[36] Exhibit “M,” id. at 546.
[37] Reyes
v. Balde II, G.R. No. 168384,
[38] CIAC records, Folder II, pp. 697-698.
[39] Meat
Packing Corporation of the
[40] Philrock v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, supra note 27, at 246.
[41] Exhibit “B-40,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 470.
[42] Solanda Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 194, 206 (1998).
[43] Exhibit “I-1,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 523.
[44] TSN,
[45] CIAC records, Folder IV, p. 1455.
[46] Placewell
International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973,
[47]
[48] Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
[49] Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, supra note 46, at 769.
[50] Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172 (2003).
[51] Exhibits “B-40” to “B-41,” CIAC records, Folder II, pp. 470-471.
[52] Exhibit “Q-2,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 571.
[53] Exhibit “Q-3,” id. at 572.
[54] Exhibit “Q-4,” id. at 573.
[55] Supra note 8.
[56] Exhibit “R,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 738.
[57] Exhibits “B-14” to “B-50.”
[58] Exhibits “K-8” to “K-9,” CIAC records, Folder II, pp. 539-540.
[59] Exhibits “K-10” to “K-11,” id. at 541-542.
[60] Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, supra note 50, at 172.
[61] Exhibit “B-40,” CIAC records, Folder II, p. 470.
[62] Security
Bank & Trust Company v. RTC
[63] Ortigas
and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 324 Phil. 483, 491-492 (1996).