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PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, |
G.R. No. 166723
[Formerly
G.R. Nos. 147653-54] |
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- versus - ELMERATO DELA CRUZ y |
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA, TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO,
JR., and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
For review
is the Decision[1] dated
The informations
that led to dela Cruz’s conviction are as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2779-M-99
That
on or about the 10th day of April, 1999, in the municipality of xxx,
province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused brother-in-law of the victim did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with
lewd design have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, 16 years of age, against her
will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2780-M-99
That
on or about the 19th day of April, 1999, in the municipality of xxx,
province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused brother-in-law of the victim did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with
lewd design have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, 16 years of age, against her
will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[4]
When arraigned, dela Cruz entered pleas of not guilty. At the pre-trial conference, the parties
entered into the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the offended party/complainant is the sister-in-law of the accused in this case;
2. That they lived together at x x x, Bulacan for a period of two months;
3. That the accused and his wife have a neighbor by the name of Susan;
4. That the offended party was born on
5. That the
offended party was examined by Dr. Manuel Aves and that the findings of said
Doctor was that the victim was found suffering from “multiple healed
laceration” and to be in a non-virgin state.[5]
During
trial, the prosecution established that AAA and her mother XYZ were living with
AAA’s half-sister, BBB, and the latter’s husband, dela Cruz. On
On
April 19, 1999, between 5 o’clock and 6 o’clock in the morning dela Cruz again
entered AAA’s room, placed himself on top of her, held both her hands thereby
thwarting her attempts to push him away,[7] threatened
to kill her, removed her shorts and underwear, forcibly spread her legs, and
then had carnal knowledge of her.
On
The incidents
were reported to the police, and AAA was examined by Dr. Manuel Aves of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan. He issued the Biological Science Report
stating that AAA had multiple deep healed lacerations at the 3, 4, 6, 8, 10 and
XYZ
corroborated AAA’s testimony on the circumstances surrounding the report to the
police authorities and the filing of the complaints. She added that she noticed that dela Cruz had
been acting queerly and could not look her straight in the eye.
On
the other hand, dela Cruz denied having raped AAA. He admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA,
but he claims that she consented to said acts. He testified that on
Ronald dela Cruz, the nephew of accused,
also testified for the defense. He
stated that AAA was his girlfriend and that he had sex with her on March 10 and
19. She was not a virgin when they first
had sex. He learned that AAA had a
relationship with his uncle and thus broke up with her.
The
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2779-M-99 and 2780-M-99.
The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE,
all premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the accused is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Simple Rape on two counts.
Accordingly, Elmerato dela Cruz y Flores is
hereby sentenced in both Criminal Cases Nos. 2779-M-99 and 2780-M-99, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, he is hereby ordered to indemnify
AAA in the sum of P75,000.00; to pay her the
sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages; and another sum of P50,000.00
for compensatory damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Seasonably, the accused appealed.
Following People v. Mateo,[9] the
case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. Upon review, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming with modification the decision of the lower court. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed and with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty imposed should be death
in EACH of the two (2) cases of rape and the retained civil liabilities awarded
should also be for EACH case. Costs
against the accused-appellant.
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the
Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalties, the case, together with the
entire record, is hereby forthwith certified, and ordered elevated, to the
Supreme Court for review.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
Appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief and
instead relied on his appellant’s brief which raises the following issues for
our resolution:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WERE CONSENSUAL[; AND]
II.
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE[.][11]
In other words, was the element of force or intimidation,
and thereby absence of consent on the part of the victim, proven?
Appellant
contends that the absence of an outcry, a determined resistance or a firm
struggle by AAA against her unarmed half-brother-in-law is strange and
unnatural for a teenage maiden who is about to be despoiled of her virtue.
For the state, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) points out that the victim although plump, was barely
sixteen (16) years old when the incident happened. She was no match against the older appellant,
who is more muscular and stronger than her.
The victim was intimidated physically and mentally by appellant who, as
her older brother-in-law, exercises moral ascendancy over her. Appellant, likewise, has physical superiority
over said victim.
We
note that in the first incident, AAA had just awakened and found dela Cruz already on top of her. It can be expected that her faculties were
still sluggish from sleep. Furthermore,
having been caught by surprise while at the same time threatened with being
killed, it is understandable that she was able to muster only feeble attempts
of resistance against a deed that was almost fait accompli when she came to her senses.
More significantly, we are not wont to
accept, as insinuated by appellant’s counsel, that in the clear light of day
while working in an office, it is easy to reflect and reach the conclusion that
the threat made on AAA, in the absence of a weapon, would not intimidate anyone
into submission to the will of a rapist.
In People v. Oarga[12]
we held that intimidation was addressed to the mind of the victim and therefore
subjective, and its presence could not be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but
must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time
of the crime.[13] Furthermore, it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation employed to commit rape be so great or of such character
as could not be resisted because all that is required is that it be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[14] The ambient circumstances must, therefore, be
viewed from the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the rape.[15] Under the circumstances of the two cases, we find that the element of force
or intimidation was sufficiently proven so as to negate the alleged consent on
the part of AAA to the sexual intercourse that transpired on both April 10 and
19, 1999.
As we have
time and again observed, it is instinctive for a young, unmarried woman like
AAA to protect her honor and it is thus difficult to believe that she would
fabricate a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts,
reveal her shame and permit herself to be the subject of a public trial if she
had not really been ravished. Besides,
the records are devoid of any improper motive which would have moved
complainant to charge appellant with rape.
Therefore, the logical conclusion is that no such unseemly motive exists
and her testimony is worthy of credit.[16] In one case, we held that in a prosecution
for rape the complainant’s credibility becomes the single most important
issue. If her testimony meets the test
of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[17]
The trial court, after having observed
AAA’s categorical, frank and spontaneous testimony, found her to be a credible witness. We find no reason to overturn such a
finding. The findings of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and
respect since it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor as they
testified on the witness stand.[18]
However,
we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the RTC erred in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty. The
relationship of brother and sister, by affinity, between dela Cruz and AAA has
been duly proven. Since it was also duly
proven that AAA was below 18 years of age at the time the two rape incidents
took place, the imposable penalty should have been death in each case. But, in view of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9346[19]
on
Sec. 2. In
lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
This
Court also sustains the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the award of damages by
the RTC should be modified. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,[20]
the civil indemnity and moral damages to be awarded are P75,000 and P75,000, respectively, for each conviction
of rape which is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each conviction of
rape[21]
in light of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Hence, appellant should
pay AAA P150,000 as civil indemnity, P150,000 as moral damages
and P50,000 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
(1)
the
penalty of death meted out on the appellant is reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each count of rape, without
eligibility for parole as provided under Rep. Act No. 9346; and
(2)
appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P50,000 as
exemplary damages, in addition to P150,000 as civil indemnity and
another P150,000 as moral damages, for the two (2) counts of rape consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
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RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-30. Penned by Associate Justice
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 98-105. Penned by Judge Cesar M. Solis.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] Records, p. 105.
[9] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[10] Rollo, p. 29.
[11] CA rollo, p. 60.
[12] G.R. Nos. 109396-97,
[13] People v. Luzorata, G.R. No. 122478,
[14] People v. Cañada, G.R. No. 112176,
[15] People v. Ranido, G.R. Nos.
116450-51,
[16]
[17] People v. Luzorata, supra at 491-492, citing People v. Gecomo, G.R. Nos. 115035-36, February 23, 1996, 254 SCRA 82, 96.
[18] People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 168174
(Formerly G.R. Nos. 156174-76),
[19] An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Seven (R. A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R. A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the
death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
[20] People
v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236,
[21] People
v. Matrimonio, G.R. Nos. 82223-24,